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 This dissertation looks at contemporary forms of social protest in Argentina.  The 
ethnographic focus is on two groups.  One of these is Memoria Activa, which developed 
following the 1994 bombing of an important local institution, the Argentine Jewish 
Mutual Aid Society (AMIA).  Their demands center on the need for a serious 
investigation and justice in the attack, which remains unresolved.  The other group I 
discuss is the Cooperativa BAUEN.  Part of a broader phenomenon know as the 
recuperated businesses movement, this workers’ cooperative was formed by a set of 
former employees from a central Buenos Aires hotel after its closure in 2001.  The 
cooperative, which took control of the installation and reopened its operations under their 
own direction, remains engaged in a prolonged struggle with opposing economic and 
political forces over the legitimacy and effects of their actions.   
 In looking at these groups, I consider the ways that notions of impunity and 
corruption permeate and structure their demands.  I illustrate how these notions have 
developed out of a particular cultural and historical context, and have come to serve as a 
source of conceptual unity among and across a number of groups working for social 
change.  I also consider the practical and strategic constraints they face in engaging with 
national and international legal and political systems.  In doing so, I show how differing 
assessments of appropriate forms of engagement with established institutions and centers 
of power tend to serve as a source of division for groups with highly similar aims.  
Ultimately, this dissertation demonstrates how these groups, through asserting and 
working to achieve their demands, at once conform to and challenge codified forms of 
institutional practice.  They engage with a labyrinthine system of public administration in 
what is fundamentally a mutually transformative process of continual generation that 




Introduction, or Into the Political Labyrinth 
      
 
En América Latina hubo un tiempo en que la política significó lucha de clases.  Luego se convirtió en 
lucha de frases.  Hoy, en lucha de disfraces... La acción política en gran medida es el poder. 
 
(In Latin America, there was a time when politics signified a contest between classes.  Later this changed 
into a contest of words.  Now, it is a contest of disguises...  Political action is in great measure an issue of 
power.) 
 
.--Dr. Elias Neuman, cited in Melamed 2000:83 
 
 This dissertation looks at contemporary forms of social protest in Argentina.1  In 
constructing this study, I chose to focus in particular in two groups engaged in making 
demands upon the state in ways that propose redefinitions of the notion of citizenship.  
These redefinitions challenge the ways in which the idea of citizenship was promoted by 
dominant sectors of the media and the Menem administrations during the era of 
neoliberal politics in the 1990s, which worked to reduce the role of the citizen to being 
primarily based on individual insertion in the market.  One of the groups I consider is the 
grassroots movement Memoria Activa, which developed out of the Buenos Aires Jewish 
community following the 1994 bombing of the Argentine Jewish Mutual Aid Society 
(AMIA) building, an important local community institution.  This group, along with a 
number of other organized groups of family members of victims from this attack, has 
spent the years that have followed demanding a serious investigation and justice 
regarding the bombing, which remains shrouded in a cloud of uncertain accusations and 
evidence of state-sponsored cover-ups.  In doing so, they insist on the role of Argentine 
Jews as full citizens within the nation, embodying the right to difference in contrast to 
both historical pressures for cultural assimilation and in reaction to a recent spate of 
limited inclusionary politics of the kind referred to by Charles Hale as “neoliberal 
                                                 
1 All photos and translations throughout this work are by the author, unless otherwise noted. 
multiculturalism.”  They also draw on the rhetoric and practices of other Argentine 
human rights organizations in asserting justice as a fundamental right of citizenship.
 The other group I consider is the Cooperativa BAUEN, a workers’ cooperative 
formed by former employees following the closure of the Bauen hotel.  This 4-star 
installation located in the heart of Buenos Aires was originally built using state credit 
under the last military dictatorship in preparation for Argentina’s hosting of the 1978 
World Soccer Cup.  When faced with the closing of the hotel following the economic 
crisis of 2001, and in a context of widespread unemployment, a group of former 
employees organized the cooperative and reopened the hotel.  I take into account both the 
actions and demands of the BAUEN Cooperative specifically, and their role within the 
broader recuperated businesses movement and its organized manifestations in Argentina 
and across Latin America.  In this regard, I am interested in how they bring to the fore the 
idea of work as a central right of citizenship and propose cooperativism and collective 
benefit as a counterlogic to the ethics of individualism as promoted by neoliberal 
capitalism. 
 My research with these two groups thus set out to understand how they 
conceptualized and perceived ideas and practices of citizenship, in contrast to definitions 
promoted by the state during a particular historical period.  In doing so, I found that the 
demands and actions by these groups tended to operate on two distinct registers 
simultaneously.  One of these articulated a set of ethical claims about these rights of 
citizenship, in a strong oppositional rhetoric that openly condemned state practices.  In 
this ethical register, demands made upon the state were couched in an antagonistic 
language of moral right and social necessity.  The street was the main arena for the 
presentation and assertion of these demands.  Furthermore, these claims were filtered 
through a set of key terms that had particular relevance and resonance in contemporary 
Argentina.  The most important of these are the ideas of impunity (and its related 
perceived antonym of justice) and of corruption.  Each of these terms is understood and 
deployed in particular ways, and this both influences and limits the possibilities for 
definition and action by the groups in working to achieve their goals.   
 However, this ethical register does not reflect the whole picture of these groups’ 
political action.  Rather, their demands are also made at the level of practical challenges 
to the status quo, working both within and at times against institutional bodies in order to 
achieve their objectives.  In this register, members of these groups both learned to move 
through and ally themselves to the world of political practice and at times sought to 
expose and denounce the operations of this world.  I term this sphere the practical 
register, using the dual connotations of the word practical to encompass both the nature 
of this register as a realm of action and that of a negotiated acceptance of the limits of the 
possible.  In this dissertation, I argue that accounting for this register as well as that of 
ethical challenges is essential in understanding these organizations and their role in 
shaping the landscape of state policies and social debate in contemporary Argentina.  
Much scholarship on organizations demanding social and/or political change, whether 
conceived of in terms of social movements, civil society organizations, or groups 
engaged in collective action, tends to characterize these as oppositional.  This treatment 
misses the miss the multiple and contradictory ways in which these groups often move 
through, reinforce, and challenge existing practices in the focused attempt to achieve their 
goals.   
 In making this conceptual distinction between the ethical and practical spheres, I 
do not mean to indicate that what I am calling the ethical sphere is devoid of action, nor 
that the practical sphere operates in ways antithetical to ethical considerations.  Rather, I 
seek to distinguish between actions that are designed to communicate a kind of rhetorical 
opposition to policies or discourses put forth by the government and/or other power-
wielding sectors of society, on the one hand, and the realm of practical engagement, 
where groups working for change in society utilize established channels of action in 
interacting with institutions or structures in working towards their goals, on the other.  I 
highlight how in their interactions on this realm of practical engagement, they often 
choose or are required to conform to habitual modes of operation.  In this way, they find 
themselves making calculated decisions on how to proceed within pre-existing structures 
whose organizing principles or actual modes of operation do not necessarily conform to 
those held or proposed by the groups themselves.  This is in many ways akin to the kind 
of strategic amorality of dealing with immediate situations argued for by Machiavelli in 
his revealing commentary on political machinations among the powers battling for 
control of the 16th century Italian landscape [see Machiavelli 1952 [1513], esp. chapter 
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15, p.22].  While elements of this kind of a hyperpracticality that can subsume ethical 
considerations are apparent in some ways, I also show here how these groups enter into 
calculated practical operations but also inflect them with their own sense of reason.   
 This study is significant in that it shows how these groups operate on both the 
ethical register, relying on and contributing to a set of key idioms that hold widespread 
currency in contemporary public discourse in Argentina, and the practical register, 
working both within and against established codes of political practice.  My analysis of 
these cases illustrates how it is not enough to look at either the practical actions of groups 
involved in working for social change, or their discursive challenges, but that we must 
look at both in order to understand what is happening and the ways in which change 
occurs.  Furthermore, as this dissertation demonstrates, an understanding of these two 
registers and the relationship between them provides us with a framework for 
understanding why those involved in social protest in Argentina as subject to what others 
have called “tend[ency] to dissolve into extreme factionalism.”2  Using the examples 
from my research, I argue that the tendency towards division and against unified action 
among highly similar groups in Argentina revolves in large measure around the extent to 
which the contradictions between the ethical and practical registers are perceived and 
interpreted by participants.  My research with Memoria Activa, the BAUEN Cooperative, 
and their related groups reveals how it is precisely differing assessments of how to 
manage and engage in action on the practical register that leads to the divisions between 
groups with highly similar aims. 
 
Theoretical Considerations 
 In the first part of this Introduction, I trace the outlines of some of the major 
themes that run throughout the dissertation.  These include an unraveling of how certain 
key terms, like impunity and corruption, are understood and used in the context of 
Argentine protest organizations.  I also consider ideas of politics and the entanglement of 
these to the understandings and actions of these groups in working to achieve their goals.  
                                                 
2 For example, Hinton 2007: 192, also Bonner 2007.  The divisions among Argentine organizations with 
similar interests and goals is widespread and widely noted.  Affected groups include human rights 
organizations like the Mothers of Plaza de Mayo, piqueteros and other associations of the unemployed, the 
family members of Cromañón victims, feminist and women’s organizations, and organizations from the 
gay, lesbian, and transgendered community.    
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I begin with a consideration of the idea of citizenship as an important lens for considering 
the actions of these groups.  I explore the concept as a theoretical category in general, and 
its particular manifestations within Latin America and especially within Argentina. 
     
Citizenship  
 In recent years, the idea of citizenship has become increasingly set off as an 
analytical category to be considered.  Of particular interest have been its limitations and 
exclusions, and the struggles undertaken on numerous fronts around the world in 
attempting to challenge the borderlands of its definitions [Holston 1999; Solinger 1999; 
Warren 1998; Yashar 2005].  In this section, I describe in detail the notion of citizenship 
as used and understood within this dissertation, making explicit the foundations on which 
my theoretical considerations build.  First, I take as a starting point the idea that 
citizenship, conceived of as the set of rights and responsibilities understood as pertaining 
to members of a national community, is subject to multiple manifestations both within a 
single national community and across different countries.3   Subsequently I consider how, 
as a malleable rather than objective category, notions of ‘citizenship’ are inherently the 
stuff onto and through which political (and often cultural, racial, and other) ideologies are 
inscribed and enforced [Ong 1996; Corrigan and Sayer 1985].  Finally, I consider in 
detail the ideas of citizenship promoted and enshrined in Argentine law and politics 
during the era of neoliberal reform.   
 
 The Multiple Manifestations of Citizenship 
 The Enlightenment ideal of citizenship conceived of an independent and free 
individual able to participate in the political life of the nation.  The spread of the liberal 
democratic model of the nation-state to widely varying contexts around the world has 
been accompanied by multiple expressions of this ideal of citizenship, both in its intended 
application and actual forms.  This wealth of manifestations have led to anthropologists 
becoming increasingly interested in the ways different cultures construct and interpret 
ideas of citizenship [Caldeira 1996, 2000; Feldman 2007; Gohn 1995; Goldstein 2003; 
                                                 
3 Caldeira and Holston define citizenship as “prerogatives and encumbrances of membership in the modern 
political community” [1999:693]. 
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Hart 1999].  Work from around the world has provided evidence that ideas of citizenship 
must be understood as they are conceived and practiced locally, often in hybrid ways that 
combine responses to social and cultural conditions with adherence to abstract political 
ideals.  For example, Akhil Gupta has shown how a discourse of corruption in India 
functions to both allow people to symbolically construct the state and to define 
themselves as citizens, not only in the sense of belonging to a marked territorial domain, 
but also as possessing a particular set of rights and obligations, in a way that puts limits 
on and resists the Enlightenment-based concept of citizenship as enshrined in the Indian 
Constitution [Gupta 1995].    
 Much of the recent literature on citizenship that accounts for its multiple 
manifestations in a variety of national contexts builds off T.H. Marshall’s seminal work 
on the topic in the 1950s.  Marshall defined the notion of citizenship as comprised of 
three main components:  political, civil, and social rights.  He considered the political 
element to include the right to participate in the exercise of political power.  The civil 
element is composed of the rights necessary for individual freedom, including the right to 
justice.  The social element covers a wide spectrum, but is fundamentally based on the 
right to economic welfare and security and social support, such as education, ‘necessary 
for sharing in the full social heritage of the society’ [Marshall 1950].  Working out of a 
Latin American context, Teresa Caldeira and James Holsten add cultural rights to 
Marshall’s typology, and develop the idea of ‘disjunctive democracies’, in which the 
different rights of citizenship do not all develop at the same rate nor always appear as 
equally distributed across all citizens [1999].  Such ‘uncivil political democracies’, as 
they name them, suffer from delegitimation and lack of faith in their ability or right to 
serve as representatives of the populace.  As developed throughout this work, such a lack 
of legitimation and disenchantment with the system of representative democracy as 
practiced has been a key factor in defining the terms of debate and spheres of action in 
Argentina in the past three decades. 
 Moving beyond Marshall’s typology, Charles Tilly argues that citizenship must 
be understood not only as composed of rights and obligations, but also as a set of 
particular collective memories about what these rights and obligations can and should be 
[1994].  Referring specifically to the right to justice, he proposes three main ideas:  1) 
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that definitions of justice are culturally and historically specific; 2) that people have a 
choice between the mnemonic and moral frames adopted in pursuing justice; and 3) that 
an observer cannot account for the shared interest of people (a prerequisite for collective 
action) without looking at available mnemonic and moral frames.  The relationship of 
memory to practices of citizenship, and the theme of justice as a central component of 
these, is developed in Chapters 3 and 4.   
  
 Citizenship as Ideological Practice 
 Beyond the recognition of the need to consider citizenship not solely as a 
universal category but also in its local expressions, this dissertation also builds off of the 
insights of scholars who have noted how this category becomes a key site for the exertion 
of power.  For example, Aihwa Ong highlights the role of the state in constructing and 
controlling ideas of citizenship and citizens.  Drawing on Corrigan and Sayer’s seminal 
work on the state as cultural formation, she argues for the way states undertake projects 
of moral regulation designed to condition and universalize citizens [Corrigan and Sayer 
1985: 4-5; Ong 1996: 738].  As such, citizens are created and homogenized in quotidian 
practice by the state through their ascription into definitive roles, such as students, 
workers, consumers, and patients.   
 These general observations on the nature of state control over citizenship become 
even more acute in contexts of authoritarian rule, when the very notion of ‘citizenship’ is 
drastically undermined (though often, as in the case of Argentina, still appealed to by the 
ruling powers).  The legacy of authoritarianism in Argentina has left an obdurate 
impression that citizenship is a condition ultimately controlled by the state, both in its 
unilateral ability to bestow (and impose) the benefits and obligations that accompany this 
status.  The most recent military dictatorship (1976-1983) retained the daily technologies 
of control practiced by democratic as well as authoritarian bureaucratic agencies to 
enforce the sensation that the state remains the ultimate arbiter of citizenship status and 
benefits, from architectural and spatial organization to the arbitrary and instrumental 
inefficiency of bureaucratic institutions designed to process the numerous forms of 
obligatory civilian registration.  Beyond this, the military dictatorship also expressly used 
the status of citizenship as a political weapon.  When journalist Jacobo Timerman 
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published in exile the influential Preso sin nombre, celda sin número (Prisoner Without a 
Name, Cell Without a Number ) about his detention under the military regime, he was 
summarily stripped of his Argentine citizenship. 
 The impression that it is the state that maintains control over citizenship and 
defines its rights and responsibilities is one that is often carefully cultivated by those in 
power.  Nonetheless, directing too much focus onto the state as the ultimate controller of 
citizenship misses the way this concept is itself the site of a continuous process of 
contentious construction between multiple forces representing varying sets of interests.  
As Aihwa Ong also notes, “...citizenship [is] dialectically determined by the state and its 
subjects” [Ong 1996:738].  My research takes an in-depth look at the way ideas of 
citizenship are being recrafted in contemporary Argentina, through the practices of 
groups like Memoria Activa and the BAUEN Cooperative.   
 Recently, a number of scholars have applied this interest in citizenship to an 
analysis of the ways in which the concept has been understood and created in Argentina 
throughout its history.  Hilda Sábato provides cogent insight into the nature of political 
practice and theories of citizenship as conceived and practiced in Buenos Aires in the late 
nineteenth century [1992, 2004].  This was a critical era in the formation of civic life and 
citizen-state relationships in Argentina, in a period of prolonged struggle between 
classical liberalist thinkers and conservative forces.  Sábato argues against focusing 
solely or even primarily on electoral practices as a means for understanding how citizens 
were defined and influenced national life in this period.  She contends that models of 
political practice that assume a linear development in the progressive accumulation of 
political rights to a wider body of individuals and groups, when applied to the Argentine 
case, “...fail to account for the complex links established between civil society on the one 
hand and political power and the state on the other, particularly during [this] formative 
period of the modern political system in Argentina” [1992:140].  Instead, she directs 
attention to a number of different areas, including community associations, the press, and 
public spaces in understanding how citizenship was practiced in this period. 
 This insight is also observed by Inés Dussel, in her perceptive and persuasive 
work on the making of citizens through the regulation of the body in early 20th century 
Argentina.  She argues that viewing citizenship in terms of voting or the expressing of 
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opinion in political matters is a particular historical articulation of the concept (and one 
that I would add is itself infused with an hegemonic exclusionary ideology).  Rather, she 
asserts, “...it encompasses a variety of practices in which one relates to others as a public 
self; communitarian actions, collective groupings, even consumption” [2005:109-110].  
Focusing specifically on the use of white smocks in public schools beginning in the early 
20th century, Dussel shows how policies such as dress codes functioned to implement 
Enlightenment principles of egalitarianism while taking care to discipline and define the 
emerging citizenry.  With the passage of the Saenz-Peña law in 1912, which extended 
suffrage rights to all white males, new masses of people, many of them recent 
immigrants, were coming to understand and view themselves as citizens of the Argentine 
nation.  Concern over the habits and political participation of these new masses engulfed 
not only the conservative opposition but also those who supported egalitarian principles.  
“The principle of equality,” Dussel argues, “had to navigate turbulent waters, and a safe 
port could only be reached if self-discipline and enlightenment were generalized and the 
enlightened citizens participated in public government” [2005: 109].  As Donna Guy has 
also shown, the body became a central focus for attempts to mold this new citizenry [Guy 
1991, 1992].  The use of basic white smocks was designed to at once provide a release 
from the markers of difference and to educate citizens as modern “enlightened 
consumers”, able to pick democratic, healthy, and affordable dressings, monitoring 
bodies in ways that readied them to act as producers in the emerging form of capitalism.    
 The emergence of Peronism in the 1940s redefined the relationship of the 
populace to the state and incorporated masses of Argentines into the political machine in 
ways unseen previously.  New articulations of the role of the state and what the citizen 
could and should hold as their own rights and responsibilities as participants in the 
national community emerged, and political parties gained relevance in the daily lives of 
an increasingly large sector of the population.  An important body of scholarship has 
explored the legacy of these changes and the persistence of certain patterns of clientalism 
and patronage through established political channels [ex., Auyero 2001; Levitsky 2004; 
Levitsky and Murillo 2005].  However, in recent years much attention has been focused 
on the breaks away from these “traditional” forms of doing politics.  Recent scholarship 
highlights what are often referred to as “new practices of resistance” (“nuevas prácticas 
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de resistencia”), or new forms of political participation that arose surrounding the 
economic and political crisis that peaked in December 2001 [Dinerstein 2004; Mato 
2004; Svampa 2005a, 2005b].  While this body of work provides important information 
on the nature of contemporary forms of political practice and ideas of citizenship in 
Argentina, I contend that the tendency to view these developments as “new practices of 
resistance” overemphasizes the break with the past and fails to give sufficient attention to 
the ways in which the groups involved conform to and work within the structures of 
politics as practiced within Argentina.  Furthermore, in this dissertation I consider the 
ways in which assertions as to the rights of citizenship respond specifically to the 
historical moment that led to their emergence, in ways that both draw upon and diverge 
from previously established practices and ideas of citizenship.  In particular, I show how 
these assertions arose as a direct challenge to the specific ideas of citizenship promoted 
during the era of neoliberal reform in Argentina.  I turn now to a consideration of these 
idea and their effects. 
  
 Neoliberal Citizenship 
 “Neoliberalism” is a shorthand term used to denote a particular set of economic 
and political policy proposals that had widespread adherence among economic elites and 
the major Washington-based international economic regulatory agencies, such as the IMF 
and the World Bank, from roughly the late 1970s through the late 1990s.  These 
proposals include what has come to be known as the “Washington Consensus,” and 
advocate a decreased role for states in controlling or regulating economic activity.  They 
encourage free trade, privatization, reduced government spending, and deregulation of 
capital flows.4  Such policies, when applied to Argentina under the Menem 
administration, included vast cuts to the size of state institutions, widespread 
privatizations of state-controlled resources, and severe reductions in social services like 
education, health care, and transportation networks.  It is important to note that many of 
these policies have roots prior to the 1990s; indeed, many trace the beginnings of these 
patterns back to the dictatorship or even further.  However, it was during the 1990s that 
neoliberalist policies became openly and whole-heartedly embraced and promoted by the 
                                                 
4 On neoliberalism, see Harvey 2005, Saad-Filho and Johnson 2005; Touraine 2001.     
 10
national government as the way to stabilize the nation’s economy and lead the country 
out of the hyperinflationary spirals that had plagued the previous Alfonsín administration. 
 However, neoliberalism was more than just an economic and political program, 
but carried with it an inherent ideological predisposition towards the construction of a 
certain notion of citizenship, to control and divert public participation in political life 
[Assies, et.al. 2000; Hale 2002].  This included a number of different elements.  
Neoliberalism as implemented advanced a new kind relationship between the state and 
civil society.  This minimalist conception of the state and democracy and the reduction of 
the political domain and its appropriate participants removed citizens from meaningful 
participation in political life.  Rather, participation in the public sphere was (somewhat 
paradoxically) based on individual integration into the market, where citizens could voice 
their opinions and exercise their freedoms through the power of consumer choice.  
Furthermore, citizens were now expected to be self-responsible for social obligations, 
including the provision of basic and necessary services previously provided by the 
government [Alvarez, et.al. 1992].   
 Neoliberalism was developed in the Global North and had a distinct flavor even in 
its different expressions therein, whether through US Reaganomics or Thatcher’s Great 
Britain.  Its manifestations in the Global South, where it was introduced through a 
coordination of international agencies and local elites, was inflected in even more locally 
specific ways in the different places in which it was applied.  Maristella Svampa 
delineates three figures of citizenship that she argues were developed during the 1990s in 
Argentina, in relation to its own version of neoliberalism [2005:280-285].  The first of 
these she denominates “patrimonial citizenship.”  This model has as its basis the idea of 
citizen as owner and controller of their property and resources, with individual autonomy 
as an overriding principle.  The commercialization of social services, such as education, 
health, and security, has led those financially able to provide for themselves to embrace 
the “improvements” to such services brought about by the increased reliance on options 
within the private sector.  This model, which Svampa argues has seen widespread 
expansion throughout the upper middle and ascendant classes in recent years, has its 
ultimate example in the rapidly growing number of gated communities ( known as 
“countries” in Argentina), which often function as complete independent neighborhoods, 
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including stores, health services, and schools within its barriers.5 
 The second model identified by Svampa is that of the citizen consumer.  The idea 
of the citizen consumer is based on the inclusion of the individual in terms of their 
consumption and use of the goods and services provided by the market.  The centrality 
given to this model during the 1990s was so great that the rights of the consumer as social 
actor and the obligations of the State towards these were included as Article 42 in the 
1994 reform of the Constitution.  The figure of the citizen consumer was based on a 
notion of individual advancement and an acceptance of the logic of the market that was 
promoted by the state as the new unifying values that could guide the nation towards 
stability and prosperity. 
 The third model of citizenship that Svampa sees as operative in Argentina during 
the era of neoliberalism is that of community assistance/participation.  This model was 
applied to the increasing number of those otherwise largely excluded from the other two 
models, and consisted of a kind of low-intensity, restricted citizenship, to be operative 
under the watchful eye of the state and through the constant control of international 
lending and development agencies [284].  This model advocated the development of 
community support networks to cover the survival needs of those left out of the formal 
economic system.  In this way, “...those paradigmatic expressions of Latin American 
social cooperation (like survival networks and the informal economy) that had for 
decades been seen as obstacles to modernization...were reinterpreted in terms of ‘social 
capital,’” a term that she says serves as “an ideological nucleus of the neoliberal model” 
[284]. 
 These, then, were the models of citizenship offered, promoted, and enshrined by 
the state during the 1990s and into the 21st century.  In the chapters that follow, I show 
how the terms and consequences of these models are being challenged and reworked by 
those who refuse to accept the limitations these models present.  First, having traced the 
outlines of the ideas of citizenship and their relationship to social, political, and economic 
climate in Argentina during the period of my research, I turn now to a consideration of 
some of the major concepts that structure both the language used by the groups I worked 
with and, as a consequence of this, the focal points of my analysis. 
                                                 




 The word ‘politics’ is perhaps so broad as to preclude maintaining usefulness as 
an analytic term.  Nonetheless, I think it is possible to provide a working definition of the 
word that can allow it to serve as a general referent for a feature of human social 
relationships that holds a great deal of relevance for understanding the issues I explore.  
In generic terms, politics here refers to the way people move through and manage 
interpersonal relationships of power.  As such, my use of the word ‘politics’ encompasses 
but extends beyond the sphere of electoral practices and institutional operations.  That 
some or all of the actors in these relationships can rely upon the resources of organized or 
institutionalized bodies constitutes a factor in the kinds of power that each of the actors 
holds and has at their disposal.  My proposed definition of politics provides a way to 
usefully discuss the features I wish to highlight analytically.  Beyond this, the definition 
also approximates and is based upon some of the senses in which the term was used by 
those who formed part of the groups I studied.6   
 In conceptualizing the way politics works within and between the groups that I 
study in this text and their relationship with a myriad of individual state actors and 
institutions, I find it useful to consider the works of a number of theorists who have 
considered the issue specifically within the Argentine context.  Mercedes S. Hinton 
provides a valuable framework for considering the effects of state-level political practice 
in contemporary Argentina in her book, The State on the Streets:  Police and Politics in 
Argentina and Brazil.  As the title suggest, she focuses specifically on the police, as state 
institutions that necessarily operate not independently but embedded within the 
relationships of power between national and local governmental organizations.   
 Her analysis, in being designed to contribute insight into the issue of state reform, 
considers these relationships specifically in terms of obstacles to effective and transparent 
functioning of the police institutions.  This focus on offering programmatic strategies 
                                                 
6 Argentine sociologist Maristella Svampa takes politics as “...the sphere of deliberation and participation, 
the space of dispute and conflict, concerning the different existing models of society” [see Svampa 
2005a:273-274].  Though her definition well serves her analysis of how different positions came to be 
expressed and channeled during the last 20 years of electoral politics, I find it overly limiting for my 
purposes.  My experience is that the word ‘politics’ (la política) as used in Argentina encompasses not only 
debates over “existing models of society” but also the calculated consideration of personal or other interest 
and the relevant relationships of power in determining courses of action.  
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unfortunately prevents her from effectively exploring the nature of these relationships of 
power themselves.  However, she does provide a useful description of some of the factors 
that influence the ways in which decision-making occurs and the conditions for the 
implementation of intended or attempted reforms.  She sets out the idea of the “Argentine 
political game,” which she uses to refer to the intersections of personal and institutional 
interests within codified political behaviors.  These behaviors, she argues, are shaped by 
“...an enduring ethos shaped by historical, cultural, and institutional factors that continues 
to permeate every aspect of national life [2006:75].”    
 In further describing the “Argentine political game,” she lists a number of factors 
that she sees as key in the functioning and propagation of politics as practiced in 
contemporary Argentina.  These, she argues, are key in understanding why political 
attempts at reform continue to falter.  In her words, “Shaped by cultural toleration for 
corruption in public office, low accountability, impunity, and destructive competition, the 
political game in Argentina...is consumed by an overriding interest in self-preservation 
and predicated on an insular form of governance that primarily befits particularistic 
interests” [2006: 192].  I find her description of the Argentine political game compelling, 
particularly for the way it is able to trace in detail the kinds of multiple intersections of 
subject positions and accepted or expected methods of maneuvering that affect the 
implementation of policy directives.  Furthermore, it emphasizes the codified ways in 
which these relationships of power tend to function, and the ways in which interactions 
with(in) these state institutions are channeled through these patterns.  However, part of 
the work of this dissertation has to do with unraveling precisely how concepts like 
impunity and corruption are deployed within Argentina, and how this interrelates with the 
ways they are applied and interpreted by international observers or organizations, 
something that Hinton takes for granted.   
 While Hinton focuses on the nature of political practice within and between state 
institutions, Javier Auyero’s work on political participation in the city and province of 
Buenos Aires is primarily concerned with how the operations of politics outside of 
governmental institutions.  An important distinction that can be gleaned from Auyero’s 
treatment concerns the differences between actual interactions between actors and the 
bureaucratic production of documents that may (or may not) accompany it, on the one 
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hand, and the perception and interpretations of the idea of politics as held by those who 
engage in its practice, on the other.  In his book Routine Politics and Violence in 
Argentina:  The Grey Zone of State Power, Auyero writes: 
 Countless times during the course of our fieldwork, we heard the expression, “It’s all politics.  
What can we do?  It’s all about politics.”  When discussing the distribution of welfare in the 
neighborhood or the kind of food provided by communal soup kitchens, when chatting about 
police actions during the lootings or about the rising incidence of crime in their neighborhoods, 
even when talking about their future (individual and collective) prospects, residents in Moreno 
and La Matanza expressed their views in the language of politics.  They were not, however, 
referring to a joint transformative capacity nor to a collective struggle for resources.  They were 
certainly not referring to specific public policies nor to debates in Congress.  “Politics” (as in the 
expression “It’s all about politics”) connotes something profoundly disempowering for them 
(What can we do?”).  When speaking about politics, they refer to something coming from above, 
something beyond their control – sometimes they hint at a sort of conspiracy, but most of the time 
they use a language of politics to talk about how impotent and vulnerable they feel.  Their moral 
universe is infused by politics, and this is the source of the (mostly bad) deeds that they do not 
fully comprehend and about which they are powerless [2007:148]. 
 
 Auyero’s work is important in providing a deeper understanding of how the idea 
of “politics” is felt and perceived by those who inevitably live under the conditions of its 
consequences.  However, in focusing mainly on the disempowering effects of unequal 
political relationships, this treatment risks diverting attention away from the ways in 
which the codified conditions of these relationships influence and direct the courses of 
action undertaken by these individuals and groups when they chose or are forced into 
interaction with government authorities.  This idea of politics as a level of interaction that 
is both an unalterable reality and a source of practical effects in their daily lives is based 
on and exists alongside the actual practice of politics in everyday life, a feature that 
Auyero’s research in fact powerfully highlights.       
 In thinking about the way politics, understood in the broad sense proposed above, 
works within contemporary Argentina and particularly in how this affects the actions and 
possibilities for groups interested in influencing state policies in order to achieve a set of 
goals, I draw on the imagery proposed by one of my field informants as he reflected on 
his own experiences in navigating the Argentine political game, that of a labyrinth 
(laberinto).  And in this, I had a choice.  Others had proposed to me the image of 
Argentine politics as a “swamp” (pantano).  And while this is undoubtedly an accurate 
expression of the frustration they felt when facing state institutions, I found it did not 
reflect the hope, however, dim, that was necessarily a part of their continued collective 
action.  For total despair is incompatible with the amazing resilience and endless 
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creativity shown by the organizations I worked with.  Instead, I have chosen to adopt the 
image of the political labyrinth for the conceptual possibilities it contains.  First, a 
labyrinth, however impenetrable, forever holds the chance of being successfully 
traversed.  Secondly, a labyrinth demands choice, and a constant rethinking of strategy.  
In this, it reflects the ways in which the organizations I worked with continuously 
consider and adjust the situation they are in, viewed from the particular and unique point 
at which they find themselves.  Finally, while joined into a unified whole, the different 
parts of a labyrinth hold no necessary connection to one another in terms of form, 
structure, or content, which I argue is an important point to keep in mind whenever one 
attempts to talk about the “state”, composed as it is of a myriad of often conflicting 
institutions.  
 But it is not simply the idea of political practice as equivalent to negotiating the 
halls of a labyrinth that I hope to provide in this work.  Rather, I propose that the work of 
the groups I discuss is engaged precisely in demystifying the labyrinth as they traverse it.  
For these actors, the deeper in they get the more they have struggled to climb up onto one 
of the walls and see the whole so delicately obstructed from view.  Thus, in the very act 
of facing the labyrinth, they have also sought to deface it, by revealing and denouncing 
its nature [cf. Taussig 1999].  This occurs both within the terrain of engagement with the 
political, in which the workings of the system are exposed even as these groups move 
within them, and in the more daily carrying out of the groups’ actions.  As we will see, 
for Memoria Activa this is centered around what is held as an active practice of memory.  
In the case of the BAUEN, it is on the operation of the cooperative itself.  As a 
figurehead of another recuperated business closely allied with the BAUEN has remarked, 
“Beyond the specific functioning of each [recuperated business] experience, what has 
provoked [the managing business and political elite] is that it has been possible to 
demonstrate that workers can concretely manage factories and businesses.  Years ago to 
have even said this seemed like a utopia.  But it has been demonstrated that the reverse is 
true; the king has been left naked.”7   
 My discussion of politics has been primarily concerned with setting the stage for 
                                                 
7 Raúl Godoy, of FaSinPat.  Cited in “El strip-tease de los reyes: ¿Cuenta regresiva para Zanón?,” published 
by lavaca at www.lavaca.org, 20 November 2007. 
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understanding how these groups operate on the practical register in interacting with the 
state.  I turn now to a discussion of two of the key terms that are used by these groups in 
making their demands on the ethical register. 
 
Corruption  
corrupto, ta – adj. 1) Que se deja o ha dejado sobornar, pervertir, o viciar; 2) Dañado, perverso, torcido.  
 
corrupción – s.f. 1) Acción o efecto de corromper; 2) Alteración o vicio en un libro o escrito; 3) Vicio o 
abuso introducido en las cosas no materiales.  Corrupción de costumbres, voces; Der. 4) En las 
organizaciones, especialmente las públicas, práctica consistente en la utilización de las funciones y medios 
de aquellos en provecho, económico o de otra índole, de sus gestores.  
 
-- Real Academia Española, 22ª edición   
 
 
corrupt (selected definitions) – adj.  1) guilty of dishonest practices, as bribery; lacking integrity; crooked; 
2) debased in character; depraved; perverted; wicked; evil; 3) made inferior by errors or alterations, as a 
text; 4) infected; tainted; 5) decayed; putrid...v.--7) to lower morally.   
 
corruption (selected) – n.  1) the act of corrupting or state of being corrupt...3) perversion of integrity; 7) a 
debased form of a word; 8) putrefactive decay; rottenness; 9) any corrupting influence or agency 
 
--Random House Dictionary of the English Language, 2nd edition8 
 
  One key idiom that these groups use in defining the nature of the problems they 
face and which structures the way in which they frame their demands concerns the idea 
of corruption (corrupción).  In talking about corruption, I build off the interventions of 
recent anthropologists in disputing the treatment of this concept as an objective 
phenomenon, as often assumed or proposed in academic or prescriptive literature [see, for 
example, Eigen 2002; Goldsmith 1999].  This position is epitomized by the global 
monitoring and advisory agency Transparency International.  This organization was 
founded by lawyer and World Bank development worker Peter Eigen in 1993, and has 
been fundamental in promoting the vision of corruption as the key obstacle to achieving 
                                                 
8 Both the English and Spanish versions share a common etymology with the Latin words corruptus, 
corruptĭo, to break in pieces.   
 From the 1550s to 1870, when the law was abolished, ‘corruption of blood’ was the term in 
English law used to designate the impurity before the law that resulted from a person being sentenced to 
death or outlaw status.  This involved the loss of all civil rights, including the ability to inherit, retain, or 
bequeath lands or interests in lands.  The fact that this measure was often and notoriously abused, to allow 
for the ‘legal’ appropriation of property, though tangential to this text, adds yet another level to the 
perpetual entanglement of corruption and politics, with accusations of corruption deployed as a political 
weapon. 
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economic and political stability in “developing” countries by eroding civic trust, 
decreasing governmental legitimacy, and inflating the cost of business transactions [Muir 
2008].9 However, the idea that corruption is a readily definable and understandable social 
phenomenon concerned primarily with embezzlement, bribery, or nepotism extends well 
beyond the sphere of development agencies.  Indeed, the perception of “corruption” as an 
universal category of a distinct set of social actions is frequently adopted both in popular 
usage and across a broad set of scholarly disciplines, including political science, 
international relations, economics, and sociology. 
 However, recent ethnographic work from around the world suggests that what is 
perceived as corruption needs to be itself an object of study, and that such perceptions 
rely heavily on cultural influences [Hasty 2005; de Sardan 1999].  This operates in at 
least two ways.  On one level, what is perceived as ‘corruption’ depends on culturally 
recognized registers of appropriate behaviors.  What may be considered ‘corrupt’ 
dealings by an outside observer could be locally interpreted as the appropriate behavior 
for the actors involved.  However, in contradistinction to the divisions often posited in 
these treatments, Sarah Muir argues that, “The Argentine case disallows a too-hasty 
distinction between bureaucratic and cultural ethics, demanding instead an analysis that 
can grasp corruption as a folk category of moral critique” [2008].  Along these lines, my 
research demonstrates the way ‘corruption’ becomes a catch phase to designate morally 
condemnable behavior and social ills.   
 On another level, the way in which international development agencies and their 
promoters use the word corruption, or, more exactly, the kinds of actions defined as 
corrupt by these agencies and the way the word ‘corruption’ becomes a signal for the 
inability of local institutions to properly behave according to international standards of 
modern bureaucratic statehood, becomes locally applied and interpreted by different 
groups in different ways.  As noted above, Ahkil Gupta has argued that, in India, “the 
discourse of corruption turns out to be a key arena through which the state, citizens, and 
other organizations and aggregations come to be imagined.”  Arguing against those who 
would treat corruption as “a dysfunctional aspect of state organizations,” Gupta sees 
                                                 
9 Arthur Goldsmith claims that the idea behind Transparency International is “to spotlight corruption the 
way Amnesty International has publicized human rights violations” [1999:865]. 
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corruption as “a mechanism through which “the state” is discursively constituted” [Gupta 
1995:376]. 
 Despite a number of important differences, in Argentina “corruption” has 
similarly come to serve as a lens through which the proper role and ethical basis for 
governance comes to be asserted.  Used nearly ubiquitously to describe the era of 
neoliberalist politics, the idea of corruption as permeating Argentine society has gained a 
powerful interpretive force as a shorthand way of describing the local “source” of the 
nation’s difficulties.  As anthropologists Haller and Shore have noted in their recent 
edited volume on the subject, “Corruption typically functions as an idiom through which 
people try to make sense of the political world they inhabit.  In this respect, discourses of 
corruption...are not only powerful tools for constructing social facts, they also provide a 
lens for exploring disputes, contested meanings and the structure of social relations” 
[2005:21].  Not only are the politicians who held power during the 1990s widely seen as 
having engaged in multifarious “corrupt” practices, but the actions of community leaders, 
state workers, union bureaucrats, judges, businesspeople (empresarios) and many others 
are all considered to have been complicit in this ‘era of corruption.’    
 This sense of corruption defies a simple interpretation.  I have included the 
definitions of the term in both languages at the beginning of this section not only for the 
facility of the reader but also precisely because of the way the word has circulated within 
Argentina.  In this sense, though the word itself of course bears relationship to its 
etymological history and usage in Spanish, the way the word has come to be used and 
understood in Argentina relies as much upon an interaction with understandings of the 
word within the context of international lending organizations and government pressures 
emanating from the Global North.  The circulation of the term ‘corruption’ in Argentina 
during and in describing this era undoubtedly owes much to the international discourses 
on corruption discussed above that were becoming increasingly influential in this time 
period.  The idea that corruption was a serious problem that must be remedied was 
replacing the “functional theory of corruption” that had previously held sway among the 
intellectuals whose theories formed the basis for the policy decisions coming out of 
Washington and its economic institutions, and which had argued that corruption in 
developing countries held macro-level economic and political benefits [for discussion, 
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see Merton 1968].  This ‘narrative of corruption,’ to use a phrase coined by Gupta, has in 
fact become a primary basis of the neoliberal agenda:  
 Striped to its basics, the neoliberal thesis holds that since corruption is primarily a pathology of the 
public sector, the solution lies in reducing public spending and rolling back the frontiers of the 
state.  Shrinking the public sector, so the argument goes, reduced the scope for public officials to 
engage in malfeasance.  It also subjects public officials to the regulatory disciplines of the market, 
to cost-consciousness, and to entrepreneurial business ethic [Haller and Shore 2005:18]. 
 
The formation of an Ethics Committee by the second Menem administration showed their 
sensitivity to the new restrictions being placed by international lending agencies on 
developing countries “where fraudulent activities have significant macroeconomic 
implications.”10  Other events, like the 1996 signing of the Inter-American Convention 
Against Corruption, certainly placed this particular notion of corruption in the public eye.   
 The protest groups I study here operate within the context of widespread 
circulation of this notion of corruption as deployed in by international lending institutions 
and widely disseminated through the mainstream media.  While they certainly do accept 
they idea that corruption is a major element in contemporary Argentine society, the way 
the word was used within the Argentine protest organizations and among the alternative 
media seems to hold to a different definition of the term.  A number of scholars have 
noted how the discourse of corruption that emanates from the Global North rests on an 
inherent public/private dichotomy, clearly delineated in the definition of corruption by 
the World Bank as “the abuse of public office for private gain” [Haller and Shore 2005:2-
5].  However, in Argentina, I argue, the emphasis is placed not on a public/private 
dichotomy, but on a difference between individual and collective benefit.  In this context, 
a ‘corrupt’ act is quite specifically one that places personal interests above the public 
good.  Noteworthy perhaps is the fact that, despite listing some 14 different definitions 
for the term, neither English nor Spanish dictionaries mention corruption as having to do 
with putting individual interest above collective good.  This limited and specific usage is 
what allows its application across such a broad sector of society, indicting all those who 
hold positions of power and are expected to act for collective benefit.  In the case of 
public officials, whether of the state or in the private sectors, it is those who have been 
entrusted with the care of the collective who are seen as defrauding this trust.  In Chapter 
                                                 
10 This was the criteria applied, for example, by the IMF.  
 20
4, I discuss in detail the both state and Jewish community officials are seen as ‘corrupt’ 
for their failure to protect the interests of those they are supposed to represent, reasserting 
the rights of citizens and members to protection under their leaders.  Concerning the 
business sectors, those accused of corruption are seen as having failed in their moral 
obligation to work for the benefit of the business they run.  In Chapter 6, I take up 
specifically the way in which the logic of capitalism and the primacy given to an ethics of 
(individual) fiscal gain is contrasted by the workers’ assertions of the owners’ ethical 
obligation to act for the benefit of the business as a productive unit, one that includes the 
workers.  
 Throughout this work, I show how the notion of corruption functions as a 
fundamental part of the confrontational language and assertions of legitimacy on which 
the groups I discuss base their ethical challenges to the state.  However, even while 
accepting the transnational  interpretation that ‘corruption’ is a major cause of social 
malady in contemporary Argentine society, they adopt this interpretation without 
ascribing to its definitions.  In this dissertation, I show how they use this assertion to 




impunidad – s. 1) falta de castigo 
from the Latin impunĭtas, -ātis -- freedom from punishment; safety 
 
--Real Academia Española, 22ª edición.11 
 
 The other key idiom through which the groups I discuss structure their demands 
and understandings is that of impunity.  I propose that impunity holds a similar 
interpretive value as corruption throughout broad sectors of Argentine society, and serves 
as the basis for much public discourse.  This terminology first gained widespread usage 
in the context on the struggles to bring legal action against perpetrators of the brutal 
repression that occurred under the last military dictatorship (1976-1983), but has since 
broadened to include a lack of legal prosecution for post-dictatorship police brutality, 
repression of public protest, politically motivated murders like that of investigative 
                                                 
11The Random House Dictionary of the English Language, 2nd edition defines impunity as 1) exemption 
from punishment; 2) immunity from detrimental effects, as of an action.   
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reporter José Luis Cabezas, and the widespread violation of contract and labor laws 
across the business sector.    Chapter 3 shows how this idea of impunity gained force in 
reference to the unpunished designers and perpetrators of state violence during the Dirty 
War.  I show how groups like Memoria Activa and the other organized groups of family 
members of AMIA victims see themselves as forming part of a larger struggle against 
impunity for those involved in planning or implementing acts of violence.  However, I 
also show how this notion of impunity has taken on a broader significance in Argentine 
society, and is widely used as an interpretive trope for understanding the cause of social 
ills, the self-interested behavior of government officials, and the inefficiency of both state 
and non-state public institutions.  In this way, it becomes tied to the idea of corruption, 
and has become so widespread as for some to assert the equation of power with impunity 
[Cernadas de Bulnes 2005: 131n30].   
 The idea of impunity as used in contemporary Argentina is related to 
understandings of corruption in at least two ways.  The first of these concerns the idea 
that members of the business elite and state actors can commit corrupt acts and get away 
with it.  In this sense, corruption is seen to be fed by the shield of impunity, with those in 
power feeling confident that their actions will remain unpunished and free of negative 
legal consequences.  Furthermore, the idea of impunity is linked to that of corruption in 
that it is widely believed that acts defined as criminal, such as the AMIA bombing or 
violations of labor and business laws for the Bauen, remain unpunished as a consequence 
to the webs of relationships and interests that defines the workings of politics.  That is, 
the corrupt relationships that operate as the basis of politics inhibit the resolution of these 
(illegal) acts, thus creating a self-perpetuating climate of impunity.12  As shown in later 
chapters, the AMIA investigation spent years directed towards Buenos Aries police 
officers as major accomplices in the execution of the attack, only to have it later revealed 
that this accusation was based primarily on the political interests that lay in the 
discrediting of this institution and of its recognized leader Eduardo Duhalde, a major 
                                                 
12 This linkage of corruption with impunity is not exclusive to Argentina, and can be commonly heard 
throughout other Latin American nations as well.  To cite just one recent example, Brazilian writer Frei 
Betto recently asserted, “If corruption exists this is due to a single cause:  impunity.”  [“Tarjetas: dinero 
“de nadie””, published 10 March 2008 on http://alainet.org].  In this dissertation I am particularly 
concerned with how the meanings and interpretations given to these terms emerge in a mutually 
constructive dialogue with recent and historical events and perceived patterns. 
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political figure embroiled in a battle for control of the Peronist party.  In the case of the 
Bauen, we will see how workers’ rights were systematically violated during the 1990s, 
and how attempts to halt the tide of these violations are subject to a delicate balance of 
interests and forces between traditional union structures, business interests, and newly 
organized workers’ groups.       
 Apart from this interrelation of impunity and corruption, I want to delve further 
for a moment into other aspects of this idea of impunity.  As noted at the beginning of 
this section, the word “impunity” is essentially based in the idea of exemption from 
punishment.  However, in Argentina the word has come to denote fundamentally the lack 
of legal justice.  In this way, it is tied in a quintessential way to the notions of democracy 
and the rule of law, institutionalized in an effective and independent branch of 
government.  It is the perceived lack of this feature of national life that is being 
principally lamented in the condemnation of what is seen as the endemic problem of 
impunity.  This contrasts, for example, to the use of the term in contemporary Spain, 
where ‘impunidad’ is used to refer to the failure by the State to dismantle the legal 
structures and sentences of the War Councils and special tribunals put in place during the 
reign of Franco, i.e., to a lack of rectification of juridical forms and decisions perceived 
as illegitimate.13 
 This bond to a notion of legal justice has conditioned both the ethical demands 
asserted by the groups I discuss in this dissertation and their choices and possibilities for 
action within the legal sphere.  While demands for an effective, transparent, and 
politically neutral judiciary is at the core of these groups rhetorical demands, in practice 
they have had to learn to navigate the judicial system in its current manifestation, even 
while maintaining pressure on the Executive Branch to provide solutions that could 
circumvent it.  This is made difficult by a number of factors.  This sensation of justice as 
something that remains always out of reach is enhanced by the way it is commonly talked 
about in Argentina.  The general term “la Justicia” is used in news media and common 
speech to refer to the entire Justice System, in many cases with no further specifications.  
                                                 
13 Ricard Vinyes of the Universitat de Barcelona, speaking during the opening ceremonies for the Coloquio 
Internacional centrado en Políticas Públicas de Memoria (October 17-20, 2007) has argued that the Law 
for Historical Memory recently passed in Spain constitutes “a social metaphor that expresses moral 
disagreement and an ethical insurrection against this model of impunity.”   
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To give just one example, when a major television news channel covered the opening of a 
new subway line in Buenos Aires in 2007, they noted that, "la Justicia define si da lugar 
a una denuncia por falta de seguridad" (the justice [system] is in the process of defining 
whether or not to accept an accusation for lack of security.”)  [From Noticias TN, 
emphasis mine].  I argue that such usage further alienates most Argentines from the 
workings of the institutions of justice that are available to them and/or to which they are 
subject, by failing to provide basic information on which particular facet of this huge and 
labyrinthine branch of government is involved.  
 Perceptions of the justice system in Argentina became increasingly negative 
during the era of neoliberal reform.14  While the Supreme Court provided perhaps the 
most extreme example of executive intervention and control, the system as a whole was 
and remains widely considered as being inefficient, nepotistic, and subservient to 
political interests.15  While certain reforms undertaken by the administration of Néstor 
Kirchner were designed to improve this image and the functioning of the system, others, 
such as the widely criticized reform of the Magisterial Council (Consejo de la 
Magistratura), continued to locate this institution as among the most problematic in 
public perception, and the ability of the Judicial Branch to function independently of 
political pressures remains limited.16  A survey from July of 2004 still located the Justice 
System as the institution with the worst image, with only 18% of respondents granting it 
a positive rating, while 78% said they viewed it negatively.  This same survey saw only 
23% of those surveyed holding a positive image of the Supreme Court.17  Reflecting on 
the recent naming of a new Justice Minister, the well-known judicial correspondent for a 
                                                 
14 See, for example, Informe Latinobarometro 1995-2005: 10 años de opinión pública 
(www.latinobarometro.org). 
15 Cf, for example, to the situation in Chile, where judicial independence and unwillingness to be seen as 
operating “politically” held even during the long years of dictatorship.  See Hilblink 2007 for a recent 
treatment of the Chilean judicial system and its history of “independence.”  
16 The Executive Branch retains considerable control over numerous administrative aspects of the Justice 
System.  Among these, the most cited include its influence over the naming of judges, requisites for their 
appointment, and fiscal control over not only the amount of money the system receives but also the way in 
which it can be distributed.  For an insightful recent article on the challenges of judicial independence in 
Argentina, see Chávez 2007. 
17 This survey was conducted by Analogías, directed by Analía del Franco.  Reported in Página 12,” 
Encuesta sobre imagen de sectores del pais,” 11 July 2004.  However, and arguably reflecting a degree of 
renewed confidence following the Kirchner administration’s directed reforms, the numbers cited here for 
the 2004 survey were in fact better than those of the previous year, when the Supreme Court had garnered 
only a 9.5% approval rating, and the judicial system as a whole had received only 4%.  
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major newspaper wrote: 
 
The Justice System tends to hold an embattled position in the political agenda.  It is most often the 
territory of slow and tedious transformations, when there are transformations.  Or else drastic 
measures are undertaken, like the refounding of the Supreme Court or the polemical reductions in 
the Magisterial Council.  In the last few decades, [the Federal Ministry of Justice] has always 
ended up stuck onto some other ministry, like Education or the Ministry of the Interior, or 
associated with some other specialty, like Security.  Is this for [the Justice System’s] (earned) 
fame of being an impenetrable caste?  Or for the threat of its ever latent power?  Because it has 
become an unmanageable labyrinth?  Or to be able to control it?18 
 
 The realities of the structure and operations of the legal system has led to these 
groups simultaneously working within the system in serving as plaintiffs (in the AMIA 
case) or filing judicial petitions (for the BAUEN), pressuring for its reform, and 
demanding that the Executive Branch circumvent the justice system through issuing 
decrees favorable to the groups’ interests or pushing through new laws to restructure the 
system according to their needs.  Their attempts to change the system, often by any 
means necessary, is seen as essential in improving the quality of Argentine democracy 
and society, in accordance with the ideas of the reformulated ideas of the rights of 
citizenship that they espouse.   
 
The Limits of the Political:  Case Background and the Emergence of the 
Ethnographic Moment 
 The walls of the labyrinth are constructed from many elements, and while each 
group may encounter a particular set of these, all are ultimately influenced by the 
structure of the whole.  Throughout this dissertation, I consider different aspects of these 
constraints and their historical development within the particular political and socio-
cultural context of Argentina.  In this section, I briefly trace some broad outlines of the 
conditions within which these groups operate.   
 Each of these sets of groups emerged within a context in which the notions of 
impunity and corruption held significant interpretive force.  These use of these notions 
and the sets of practices which they are used to describe create a particular climate which 
is shared by the organized groups of family members of victims of the AMIA bombing 
and the recuperated businesses movement.  Their adoption of these notions as ways of 
                                                 
18 Hauser, Irina.  “Los desafíos del nuevo ministro de Justicia,” Página 12, 18 November 2007. 
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defining the problems they face and the nature of the political institutions with which 
they engage reflects their placement them within a shared social context.  Here in this 
Introduction and throughout the dissertation I show how these notions are affected by the 
organizations that adopt them as interpretive and assertive frames.  
 Furthermore, it is the City of Buenos Aires, with its particular economic and 
political history, that forms the background and the arena for the actions and assertions of 
both of these groups.  The geographic proximity of the Hotel Bauen, for example, to the 
Plaza Lavalle means in practice that the actors involved in both Memoria Activa and the 
Cooperative bodily traverse the same streets on a regular basis, as I did in working with 
each of them [see Picture 1.1-1.2].  This is not to say that each individual experiences or 
imagines these shared spaces in the same way.  Yet it was the same landscape that 
contained and delimited the physical concretization of their spheres of action.  
 The possibilities for their action and the responses they received also emerged 
within a shared set of historical circumstances.19  Early in the 20th century, Argentina 
enjoyed a degree of economic stability it has never since been able to replicate.  The 
economy was largely focused on the exportation of grain and cattle produced on large 
latifundias controlled by the local oligarchy and worked by an influx of mostly European 
immigrants.  As refrigeration and canning technologies improved, the profits brought by 
the cattle industry increased even more.  Industry began to develop, largely due to foreign 
investment, and Argentina began to cultivate a privileged relationship to Great Britain in 
both infrastructure development and trade.  This state of affairs remained for the most 
part intact through the Radical Governments of 1916-1930, when the world economy was 
drastically altered by the effects of the Depression and the military’s irruption into 
Argentina’s government changed state economic policies. 
 The so-called Conservative Restoration of the 1930s saw a closure of the 
economy, in reaction to the increase in protectionism in European and North American 
markets.  Import substitution industrialization grew, as did state intervention in the 
economy.  The conservative government’s harsher policies towards union and labor 
activism increased popular unrest, and arguably set the stage for the emergence of the 
                                                 
19 For a useful overview of Argentine political and economic history in the 20th century, see Romero 2002.  
My discussion in this section, though far too brief to adequately encompass the complexity of the issues 
mentioned, is much indebted to Romero’s insightful treatment. 
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Peronist movement in the 1940s. 
 The first Peronist administration enjoyed the high prices of meat and grains that 
followed the destabilization that World War II brought on European food production and 
populations.  However, by 1949, prices were returning to normal and an increasingly 
industrialized Argentine economy had become dependent on imports for fuel, machinery, 
and intermediate goods.   The crisis in foreign trade was aggravated by drought, and the 
early 1950s marked a change in state policy.  The government began to actively 
encourage foreign investment, in a fundamental departure from Perón’s earlier emphasis 
on economic independence.  However, the attempts to redirect the economy did not lead 
to stability, and another military coup in 1955 sent Perón into exile. 
 Fluctuations in the world economy continued to cause dramatic effects in the 
Argentine economy throughout the politically volatile years that followed.  The next two 
decades saw a great increase in foreign investment and an even greater increase in the 
influence foreign capital was able to exercise.   This influence took the form of 
transformation of services (and in the marketing practices that accompanied them) and in 
pressure towards the government for the maintenance of state intervention in the 
economy.  This pressure was designed to guarantee the continuation of the special 
treatment that had served to stimulate the initial investment.  In a move that would prove 
to be a continuing source of detriment for many years, the state ultimately failed to 
effectively limit the conditions or duration of this special treatment.   
 The rise to prominence of dependency theory during this era provided a tool for 
describing the constraints that policy makers in countries like Argentina faced.  Yet even 
as recognition of the continuing domination of society by problems of development and 
imperialism increased across many sectors, the governments that held power during the 
turbulent years that followed Perón’s removal from office implemented decisions that 
only increased Argentina’s dependence on foreign capital and its stagnation under the 
weight of a growing foreign debt.  The possibilities for a state directed policy that could 
address these problems were further reduced by the climate of competition and shifting 
alliances between ruling economic interests that dominated the era.  As Luis Alberto 
Romero has written: 
 It was a game without logical or predictable rules; no sector could impose rules on the rest.  
Although the state’s actions were of paramount influence, the state did not design policies 
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autonomously but was at the mercy of those who could capture the state for the moment and use it 
to take as much advantage as possible [2002:157]. 
 
 Many held hope that Perón’s return to power would serve as a route to the 
liberation of the nation from its dependence on the foreign and local elites that dominated 
the nation’s economy and absorbed the lion’s share of its wealth.  The violent years of 
political unrest that had led up to his return had also left many seeking a figurehead 
capable of controlling and striking a balance between the numerous opposing forces that 
threatened to drive the nation into destruction.  The passion play of competing interests 
included factions within the military, unions, non-unionized workers recently engaged in 
new forms of social protest, industrialists, landowners, and, of course, foreign interests.  
Perhaps inevitably given the circumstances, the return of the leader in 1973 failed to 
bring about fundamental changes in the structure of the economy.   
 The military junta that seized power in 1976 immediately concerned itself with 
economic reform as a necessary part of political stabilization.  The architect of the 
dictatorship’s economic program was the US-trained José Alfredo Martinez de Hoz, who 
served as Economics Minister under Videla.  His assessment was that state intervention 
in the economy and the establishment of the welfare state had been principal cause of 
Argentina’s problems since the 1930s.  The market was proposed as “the instrument 
capable of equally disciplining all the social actors, rewarding efficiency, and 
discouraging unhealthy interest-group behavior” [Romero 2002: 221].  The reforms he 
implemented functioned to concentrate economic power into an even smaller number of 
hands.  By the end of the dictatorship in 1983, changing international conditions and a 
severe banking crisis had sparked massive capital flight and the foreign debt had risen to 
an unmanageable $45 billion USD. 
 Pressure from foreign creditors and international lending institutions limited the 
options for newly elected Radical president Rául Alfonsín.  Locally, the major economic 
powers located in the GEN (Grupos Económicos Nacionales), the military, and the 
unions all exerted pressure on the new government in attempts to secure concessions to 
their interests.  Despite launching a new currency plan known as the Austral, Alfonsín’s 
years as president were characterized by a rampant permanent inflation that drastically 
limited the state’s ability to govern. 
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 These were the conditions that set the stage for the era of neoliberalism ushered in 
by Menem in the 1990s that forms the backdrop for the formation of the groups I discuss 
in this dissertation.  The AMIA bombing occurred as the first wave of neoliberal 
economic reforms was beginning to wane.  The recuperated businesses movement was 
born and gained strength as the neoliberal model and the severely unsustainable 
economic programs that characterized its implementation in Argentina began to wear 
themselves out.  Throughout this dissertation, I show how the groups organized around 
these events are responding to the specific conditions created by this economic and 
political history. 
 Beyond these national economic considerations, the groups also shared a local 
context subject to constant change.  The ceaseless flow of events, each of which played a 
role to a greater or lesser degree in setting the political stage for the City of Buenos Aires, 
forces these and all other groups to constantly reconsider and adapt to new circumstances.  
The case of the Cromañón nightclub fire, explored in Chapter 7, serves as a 
demonstration of how events not directly related to a group’s demands can drastically 
affect the conditions of their situation. 
 Each group also circulated within a shared international context that both limited 
and conditioned their possibilities for action, though they drew their points of connection 
in different direction.  On the one hand, this moment was characterized by an increasing 
acceptance within Argentina of the idea of the nation as having been or having become 
“latinamericanized.”  This idea, which began to gain force following the 2001 economic 
and political crisis, increasingly replaced the lingering idea of Argentina as somehow 
different from the rest of Latin America in allegedly maintaining ethnic and economic 
affinities more in line with the community of “First World” nations than with its 
geographic neighbors.  Embracing the idea of Argentina as an integral part of distinctly 
Latin American historical and economic trajectory, the BAUEN Cooperative actively 
worked to establish and accept allegiances with worker-led businesses throughout the 
continent.  During my research, representatives of the BAUEN Cooperative attended an 
international event on recuperated and worker-managed businesses in Caracas, sponsored 
by the Venezuelan government, capitalizing on desire of the Chávez administration to be 
seen as promoting these kinds of initiatives.   
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 The organized groups of family members from the AMIA bombing were also 
affected by changes in the international alliance of interests, particularly after the events 
of September 11, 2001.  The AMIA and Embassy bombings were quickly recodified by 
the Kirchner administration and the institutions of the collectivity, and to a lesser extent 
by the organized groups of family members, in the language of the war against terror.  
The ability to place their case within a historical trajectory of terrorism lent increased 
visibility to their claims, even as it became fuel for the allies of the Bush administration 
in their invectives against Iran in ways that ultimately structured the only “advances” that 
have yet to be made in the case, explored further in Chapter 4. 
 All of these conditions ultimately affected the ways in which these groups and the 
institutions they appeal to were willing and able to enact changes.  This dissertation 
demonstrates the connection between the actions and demands of groups engaged in 
working for social change and the fluctuating historical, cultural, political, and economic 
conditions that structure the moment of their operation.  By considering both of these sets 
of groups in conjunction, I am able to provide a much fuller and more rounded picture of 
this context and the conditions that structure the nature of contemporary Argentine 
politics and society than I could by focusing solely on one or the other.   
   
Research Methods and Organization of the Text 
Reflections on Research Methods 
 This dissertation is based on ethnographic field research that I conducted in a 
number of research sessions Buenos Aires, Argentina between 2000 and 2006.  However, 
my initial contact with Argentina on an personal level came in 1992, when I spent six 
months in a small town by the name of Reconquista, nestled on the banks of the Paraná 
River and surrounded by the pampas santafesinos (grasslands of the Province of Santa 
Fe) in the country’s geographic center.  In addition to providing me with trial-by-fire 
experience learning to manage the local language and cultural habits, this formative time 
also provided me with a lasting emotional connection to a place I find myself linked in a 
cycle of continuous return.  I returned to Argentina in 2000, and then 2001, for two brief 
eight-week fieldwork sessions in which I explored the public performance of memory 
and practices of monumentalization, including the way monuments functioned and 
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affected the experience of public spaces [cf. James 2000, esp. Ch 1].  This research led 
me into contact with the group Memoria Activa, and during my 2001 field session, I 
attended a number of their public events and organizational meetings, and conducted 
interviews with members of the directive board.   
 These initial research sessions in Buenos Aires laid the foundation for my 
extended period of field investigation, which I conducted between October 2004 and 
March 2006.  I also maintained an active research agenda in between these sessions and 
afterwards, through continued personal communication via letters, email, and phone 
conversations with individuals, and through careful attention to local developments 
through newspaper and other media sources.  My work with Memoria Activa and the 
other groups of family members of AMIA victims included participation at public and 
private events, semi-structured and open interviews with participants, hundreds of 
informal conversations with individuals and groups of individuals in coffee houses, 
restaurants, plazas, theaters, and private houses, and a careful (and, in my field 
informants’ eyes, perhaps leaning towards obsessive) collection of published and printed 
documentation of the group’s activities and the many facets of the AMIA case.   
 In addition to my work with Memoria Activa and the other groups, I was also 
interested in working with organizations engaged in making demands upon the state 
concerning economic rights, to complement my research on the issue of justice as a right 
of citizenship.  A participant in Memoria Activa provided me with an introduction to 
leading members of the BAUEN Cooperative, not long after their reopening of large 
portions of the hotel.  After conducting a number of initial formal interviews, I began to 
participate in activity of the hotel as an English teacher.  My research with the 
cooperative included in-depth participant observation in the most literal sense of the term, 
encompassing, among other things, attendance and participation in cooperative 
organizational meetings, observation of daily life within the hotel, being present at 
numerous protest marches, and working with their internal press committee on the 
translation and distribution of their press releases.  I also conducted semi-structured and 
open interviews with individuals and small groups of cooperative members and state 
officials, and archival research on the hotel.  In addition, I reviewed the extensive legal 
documentation surrounding different aspects and legal entanglements of the hotel’s 
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construction, ownership, and operation, as well as following the various court cases that 
arose concerning the cooperative’s possession and habilitation of the establishment, and 
their interactions with state officials concerning these cases.    
 While undertaking this fieldwork, my daily life in Buenos Aires was often so 
contradictory as to be disorienting.  Coming as I did to my anthropological research not 
only as a scholar but also as a mother and member of a family, my circle of contacts 
extended well beyond those with whom I conducted research.  In an ill-informed decision 
we later regretted, my partner and I placed our two sons in a specialized private school 
whose educational orientation focused on the arts.  Our ignorance as to the real cost of 
living in Buenos Aries (not aided by the porteño tendency to exaggerate their expenses) 
led us to the initial belief that the school was directed mainly at middle-class Argentines.  
The reality proved different, with the vast majority of students coming from the upper 
classes.  This decision thoroughly penetrated our living experience, putting us in daily 
social contact with members of the porteño elite.  Thus, for example, on a Monday, I 
would find myself at 8am dropping my sons off at school and engaging in small talk with 
the parents of their classmates fresh out of their gated communities, at 9am heading to the 
Plaza Lavalle for a memorial-protest by the middle class members of Memoria Activa, 
and by 11am in the Hotel Bauen, joining local piquetero groups in helping to block off 
Corrientes Ave. to traffic in protest of the latest judicial finding against the BAUEN 
Cooperative.  I would complain to my partner that I never knew how to dress when I got 
up.  No matter what clothes I chose, I would be drastically out of place at some point in 
the day.   
 Nonetheless, this diversity in experience allowed me to maintain constant 
awareness of the very real divisions and diversity within Argentine society.  While not a 
deliberate part of my research design, the extended contact with such diverse sectors of 
society deeply informed my understanding of the multiple perspectives that exist and 
directly affect public debate and political practice in contemporary Buenos Aires.   
 
Overview of Chapters 
 In this opening chapter, I have intended to provide an overview and a 
foreshadowing of the major conceptual themes taken up throughout the text.  I presented 
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an examination of ideas of impunity, corruption, and citizenship both as conceived in 
theoretical considerations spanning several disciplines, and as understood in Argentina 
through a comparison of these ideas with both scholarly and direct accounts of their use 
and deployment in other geographical and historical contexts.  I also offered a selective 
review of literature on the practices and workings of politics in Argentina and particularly 
in Buenos Aires, considered in relation to a larger Latin American context.  In doing so, 
this first chapter introduces the major themes as they are developed throughout the work 
as a whole.  For the remainder of this introduction, I put forth a brief description of each 
of the remaining chapters and their relation to the development of the central argument. 
 The body of the dissertation is divided into two parts.  The first of these focuses 
on the organized groups of family members of AMIA victims and different aspects of 
their modes of articulation with national and international politics.  In this section I also 
consider the relationship of these groups to one another, to the operations of the federal 
justice system, and their connection to international codes of justice.  Chapter 2 takes up 
the way the practices of resistance used by these groups respond to political and cultural 
visions concerning the positions of Jews within the imaginary of the nation.  After 
providing an overview of the attacks on the AMIA Building and the Israeli Embassy and 
the ensuing legal investigations, I argue that Memoria Activa in particular is 
simultaneously discursively advancing a pluralistic vision of the nation that contradicts 
the cultural politics of homogenization and ideal of assimilation prevalent throughout 
much of Argentine history.  I show how in doing so, they are also combating a common 
image of Jews as marginal citizens and a less prevalent but existing latent (and sometimes 
active) anti-Semitism in Argentine society.  However, I argue that while this vision draws 
on and in some ways conforms the “neoliberal multiculturalism” advanced by the state in 
the 1990s, the actions of Memoria Activa should not be seen as a simple acceptance of 
these terms.  Rather, this chapter demonstrates how they in fact contain a critique of the 
promotion of these notions within the political sphere, highlighting the disjunctions 
between discourse and action in national politics.  The assessment of the government and 
the leadership of the Jewish collectivity as corrupt and plagued by impunity leads to a 
rejection of the terms of this neoliberal multiculturalism. 
 Chapter 3 turns specifically to a discussion of these notions of impunity and 
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corruption within the context of human rights movements in Argentina.  In doing so, I 
focus on the way the notion of impunity is considered and utilized within these groups, 
and I also show how this use of impunity is intricately interconnected to ideas and 
practices of memory.  I show how the notion of impunity acts as a frame and a lens 
around and through which historical and current events are understood, and is held in a 
dialogic opposition to the neoliberal era politics of forgetting.  In the second half of the 
chapter, I draw specifically on my research with Memoria Activa and the splinter group 
Citizens of the Plaza, showing how they draw upon the use of memory by earlier 
counterimpunity organizations in working to establish an ethics of remembrance that 
includes a notion of the remembering as an active practice and a central component of 
citizenship.  In doing so, I demonstrate how this ethics of remembrance and the 
understandings of the rights and responsibilities of citizenship that accompanies it appeal 
to both moral and religious precepts.  Furthermore, I show how this practice of memory 
is specifically and deliberately configured as an occupation of public space. 
 While Chapter 3 focuses most directly on non-institutional channels utilized by 
Memoria Activa and others in pursuing their objectives, Chapter 4 turns to a 
consideration of some of the ways in which Memoria Activa have interacted with local 
and international judicial bodies  I consider in particular the stance of Memoria Activa in 
asserting their demands in front of an international regulatory body, and consider the 
assumptions this appeal to a universal discourse of human rights rests upon, and the 
cultural disjunctions its usage engenders.  This chapter also explores the ideas of 
knowledge and justice as understood and deployed by each of the three main organized 
groups of family members of victims.  While Chapters 2 and 3 focused directly on the 
ethical grounds on which family members of AMIA victims have asserted their demands, 
Chapter 4 turns to a consideration of the practical register, and the ways in which 
Memoria Activa and the other groups relate to various state institutions and actors.  This 
analysis sheds light on the divisions between the groups of family members, and argues 
that these divisions rest in large measure upon the different senses of justice and 
interpretations and constructions of citizenship and the varying conceptions of the state 
and democracy that underlie them.   
 The second part of the dissertation focuses on the BAUEN cooperative and the 
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recuperated businesses movement.  My research found that, much as in the case of 
Memoria Activa, ideas of impunity and corruption form the foundation of the workers’ 
claims to the legitimacy of their actions in taking over control of their source of labor.  In 
exploring these aspects, I look at the BAUEN and the recuperated businesses movement 
through two lenses.  In Chapter 5 I consider the ethical and practical considerations that 
arise in relation to the notion of cooperation as espoused by these groups.  I argue that the 
recuperated businesses movement that arose in Argentina in the late 1990s presents a 
challenge to the neoliberal attempt to define citizenship according to individual insertion 
in the market, by working to recreate the notion of the worker as a political actor, based 
around a logic of cooperativism.  The ethnographic data that I observed in my research in 
the Hotel Bauen reveals how this site came to hold a central and symbolic location for the 
idea of cooperativism and its practice within this movement.  After reviewing the 
historical development of cooperativism in Argentina, I discuss three aspects of the logic 
of cooperativism as expressed by the BAUEN Cooperative, arguing that its current 
manifestation is substantially distanced from earlier and other contemporaneous 
expressions.  In tracing these three key aspects of cooperativism, I make an analytical 
distinction between formal and affective cooperativism, or compañerismo.  By formal 
cooperativism, I refer to the association of workers into legal or otherwise formalized 
cooperatives, as a means of organization of management and production within the 
workplace.  By affective cooperativism or compañerismo, I refer to the way in which the 
notion of cooperation has been adopted as a cornerstone of the cultural challenge to 
neoliberalist ideas of work and the citizen, specifically the individualization and 
valorization of “freedom” and “independence” that accompanied programs of neoliberal 
reform.  The third aspect of cooperativism that I consider involves the relationship of the 
cooperative to the broader community.  In tracing these three elements, I look at evidence 
from the process of recuperation and the ensuing battle for the right to operate the hotel.  
I conclude that for those most directly involved, the struggle to hang onto to the 
recuperated business has gone beyond the protection of one’s source of labor.  Rather, I 
show that it has become an issue of defining the fundamental rights and responsibilities 
of citizenship, in a critique that relies heavily on a discourse of corruption and impunity 
within the business political sectors.   
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 Chapter 6 continues the exploration of the BAUEN cooperative, but focuses on 
another aspect of the recuperated businesses movement.  I demonstrate the how the 
reactions and defenses that they have designed represent a challenge to the neoliberal 
idea of citizenship on yet another front from that discussed in the previous chapter, 
namely through fore fronting the idea of the right to work and that of collective wellbeing 
over the property rights.  In doing so, I discuss the ethical and practical considerations of 
the politics of engagement undertaken by these groups in their struggle to gain and 
maintain the legal right to operate.  The chapter is centered around a discussion of some 
of their formal interactions with different state institutions, and the multiple ways in 
which they both confirm to and challenge these institutions themselves in navigating the 
political landscape.  I consider how their challenge on ethical grounds is simultaneously 
an argument for legitimacy, a legitimacy based on its contrast to the imputed impunity 
and corruption of their opposition.  In the end, I show how the divisions that have arisen 
between the different factions of the recuperated businesses movement, like those of the 
Jewish collectivity, are based not on differences in their assertions in the ethical register, 
even to the extent that these do differ, but on perceived differences in the proper forms of 
formal engagement with governmental and other institutions.   
 The dissertation ends with a brief conclusion integrating the major themes and 
pointing towards the direction in which this research suggests current developments in 
Argentina may be heading.  In doing so, it brings in the example of the December 2004 
nightclub fire in Buenos Aires that killed 194 young people, as a key moment that drew 
upon and put forth these notions of impunity and corruption in ways especially 




























A Place in the Nation:  The Politics of Cultural Citizenship and the 
Argentine Jewish Collectivity 
 
Introduction  
 To try to explain what happened in the 1992 and 1994 bombings in Buenos Aires 
is an exercise in futility.  By this I mean not only the simple admission that senseless 
violence makes no sense.  When over 100 people die and hundreds more are wounded in 
deliberate flashes of blind destruction, responding to some distant logic the victims had 
nothing to do with, any attempt at “explanation” in the sense of revealing meaning is 
necessarily doomed at the outset.  But there is an even more perverse element at play 
here, undermining my capacity to relate what happened.  For both of these attacks, the 
basic “facts” remain uncertain and disputed.  Official reports, where they exist, have been 
inconsistent, and a myriad of provocative statements made by high-ranking politicians, 
security force officials, and individuals close to the investigations have either been later 
retracted or remain unsubstantiated.  To describe either attack, then, requires deliberate 
selection from among contradictory pieces of information.   
 Why is this the case?  How could we ever know what happened in such moments 
of anonymous, orchestrated violence?  What would we need in order to feel we have a 
certain “knowledge”?  Who is responsible for providing that “knowledge”?  Part of the 
work of this chapter and the two that follow is concerned with unraveling how each of the 
three organized groups of victims’ family members, Memoria Activa (Active Memory), 
Familiares y amigos de las víctimas del atentado a la AMIA (Relatives and Friends of the 
Victims of the AMIA attack), and APEMIA (Agrupación para el esclarecimiento del 
masacre impune de la AMIA, or the Association for the Shedding Light on the 
Unpunished AMIA Massacre), and the informal group Ciudadanos de la Plaza (Citizens
 of the Plaza), deal with these questions, and how their answers inform and structure their 
demands for what needs to be done.    
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 My attempt here to relate a brief and partial history of the events and the 
subsequent investigations carries within it the inconsistencies left behind by conflicting 
interpretations of evidence and their selective disseminations.  But this is intrinsic rather 
than contrary to an understanding of the nature of these attacks and their aftermath.  
What has developed is a haze of (mis)information that only grows denser the further back 
in history the attacks fall.  This is not accidental, and speaks to the way in which the 
attacks and their understanding derive from and respond to their use in different and 
ambiguous ways by an uncountable number of personal and political interests.  To the 
extent possible, then, the information I have chosen to present here is that which is agreed 
upon by most journalistic, investigative, and judicial sources.  Additional information is 
presented in the context within which it is claimed. 
 
The Embassy Bombing 
Shortly before 3 pm on March 17, 1992, the Israeli Embassy on the corner of Suipacha 
and Arroyo Streets in central Buenos Aires exploded, leaving perhaps 29 people dead 
(the number of fatal victims is still debated) and more than 200 injured.  The attack was 
investigated by teams from at least six countries, principally the local intelligence service 
(Secretaría de Inteligencia del Estado, or SIDE), Israeli intelligence (MOSSAD), and the 
US Department of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Control.  These agencies report that 
the blast was produced when a truck loaded with explosives pulled up in front of the 
Embassy building and detonated.  However, this international assortment of intelligence 
teams presented different conclusions on the type of explosives used and whether they 
were manufactured within Argentina or brought in from the exterior, along with other 
aspects.  A communiqué issued by an organization calling itself Islamic Jihad claimed 
responsibility for the attack shortly after it happened, saying it was in retribution for 
Israel's assassination of Hezbollah leader Sheikh Abbas al-Musaw on February 16, 1992.  
However, this claim was quickly retracted, and Hezbollah denies any involvement.1  
Pressure fell on the Argentine government to actively participate in uncovering the details 
of the planning and execution of the bombing.  This was especially urgent given the 
                                                 
1 See, for example, http://www.lebanon.com/news/local/2003/3/20.htm; “Hezbolá niega” in Página 12, 27 
August 2006.  
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mounting suspicion that Argentine nationals and officials may have been complicit in the 
attack.  Reasons for this suspicion included the rumor that three of the four federal police 
officers assigned to be on guard at the Embassy were missing from their posts at the time 
of the explosion.  One of the three claims to have been accompanying the Ambassador 
Yitzhak Shefi, but the Ambassador has refuted this.  The other two officers are reported 
to have walked off the scene five minutes before the explosion.2   
Due to jurisdictional considerations, with the Israeli Embassy being officially Israeli 
territory, justices from the Argentine Supreme Court (rather than the federal circuit) 
headed the national judicial inquiry into the bombing.  This inquiry, which failed to lead 
to any prosecutions or arrests, also failed to arrive at conclusions as to the origin or type 
of explosive used, the provenance of the truck-bomb, or whether the truck had been 
detonated by a suicide bomber or remotely.  Nor did it shed any light on possible local 
knowledge of or involvement in the execution of the attack.  After seven years without 
results, in 1999 the Court abruptly pronounced the unsubstantiated claim that Imad 
Mughniyah and Islamic Jihad had been responsible for the bombing.  Mughniyah, an 
elusive Lebanese national, is cited on the FBI’s most wanted terrorists list as the head of 
the security apparatus for Hezbollah and was “indicted [by the United States] for his role 
in planning and participating in the June 14, 1985, hijacking of a commercial airliner”, 
TWA Flight 847.3  He is also alleged to have participated in numerous bombings and 
kidnappings throughout the 1980s and 1990s.4  The assignation of responsibility to such 
a well-known foreign suspect led many to dismiss the court’s findings as too convenient
and perhaps as a way to avoid the need to take responsibility for further action.  As one 
observer remarked, “The Supremes might as well blame the devil, for all we Argentines 
can do.”  
, 
                                                
5 
 The Argentine Supreme Court already had a reputation as an institution 
particularly subject to political manipulation.  The body has held limited independence 
from the executive branch since at least the 1940s.  Throughout the twentieth century, 
 
2  See Feitlowitz 1998:271 [footnote 35]. 
3 http://www.fbi.gov/wanted/terrorists/termugniyah.htm. 
4 Mughniyah  appeared on George Bush’s list of 22-most wanted terrorists in October 10, 2001.  He was 
murdered on February 12, 2008. 
5 Cited in Kiernan 2000.  The Supreme Court, after its renovation under President Kirchner, later ruled that 
the case be revisited.  In 2005 a new prosecutor was assigned to the investigation.  As of this writing, 
practical advances remain elusive. 
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Argentine politics consisted of unstable periods of democratic rule punctuated by a series 
of military coups.  In this context, it became common practice for military leaders to 
appoint Supreme Court justices who would legitimize their seizure of power.  The return 
to democracy would then bring a renewed opportunity to remove and appoint justices to 
the Court, often resulting in near complete renovations.6    
Negative public assessments of the Supreme Court only increased in the 1990s, as public 
confidence in the legal system, and particularly the Supreme Court, reached a low point.  
When Carlos Menem assumed power at the end of 1989, he enlarged the Supreme Court 
from 5 to 9 justices, allowing him to stack the Court with his political allies and thus form 
what quickly became known as the “automatic majority.”7   Accordingly, public polls 
from throughout the 1990s consistently rated the Supreme Court and the judiciary in 
general as among the least respected Argentine governmental and social institutions.8  
For example, a poll taken by a leading domestic polling firm in November 1991 found 
70% of the public expressing little or no confidence in the judiciary.9  By March 1997, 
the same polling firm found that 93% of lawyers and law students considered the 
Supreme Court to be completely or largely dependent on the Executive branch.   
It was this Court of the infamous automatic majority that was called upon to investigate 
the attack on the Israeli Embassy.  This has deeply undermined the sense that a full 
investigation following every probable lead was ever carried out, especially as it is now 
largely suspected that this attack and the AMIA bombing were at least in part the result of 
failed political machinations by Menem and his government.  For example, many still 
voice doubts concerning the “Syrian connections,” a body of evidence that seems to 
                                                 
6 Gargarella provides a useful chronological summary of this complicated history.   President Juan D. Perón 
removed three out of five judges from the Court in 1946-7; the military government that overthrew him 
replaced the whole Court in 1955; President Arturo Frondizi (1958- 1962) attempted to enlarge the Court 
from five to seven members, but a military coup took power before he could do so; the brief democratic 
government of Arturo Illia (1963-1966) also tried to enlarge the Court, but the military regime that came to 
power in 1966 simply removed all of its previous members.  Those justices that it appointed to the bench 
resigned with the restoration of democratic rule in 1973. The military junta that took power in 1976 
appointed a whole new court that year, and all its members resigned in 1983 when democratically elected 
President Raúl Alfonsin took office, who, eventually, appointed all the Supreme Court Judges.  Carlos 
Menem enlarged the Court from 5 to 9 members in 1990. See Gargarella 2004:196.  My thanks go to 
Leticia Barrera and her work on the Argentine Supreme Court for drawing my attention to this source.  
7 In addition to the four new members, 2 Supreme Court justices resigned, one in protest over the new plan, 
allowing Menem to hand pick 6 out of 9 justices. 
8 See Miller:371, 433 [footnote 19] 
9 Polling done by Graciela Romer y Asociados, cited in Barrera 2005:11 [footnote 35]. 
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indicate the involvement of some of Menem’s close relatives and allies in the cover up 
following the attacks, as well as their suspected implementation by Syrian nationals.  
Some argue that evidence which seemed to point in this direction was deliberately left 
aside and not investigated.  Others allege that the bombings were the result of unfulfilled 
pre-election promises that Menem had made in exchange for financial support for his 
campaign, or due to the involvement of Argentina in the 1991 war against Iraq.10 
During the event held in 2005 in commemoration of the Embassy Bombing, frustration 
with the lack of government efforts into a full investigation of the bombing was evident.  
I approached the site, held outside the Plaza Seca that replaced what had once been the 
facade of building, accompanied by Juan, a member of the group Memoria Activa.  This 
man, now in his early 70s, never ceased to reiterate during our conversations his 
contentment that all of his children had successfully established lives for themselves and 
their families outside of Argentina.  For this retired engineer, the endemic “problem” 
with Argentina was its lack of effective institutions, and the government’s unwillingness 
and inability to sufficiently resolve the Embassy bombing was just one more effect of the 
lack of strong and trustworthy political and legal systems.   
It was a hot late summer day, with a relentless sun beating down on the thousands who 
had assembled.  Security was tight, both approaching the site and once inside the police 
cordons.  This was undoubtedly in part due to the general security measures taken at any 
“Jewish” event (the monthly commemorations held in front of the AMIA had 
sharpshooters placed at intervals in neighboring windows), and in part due to the 
presence of high level government and international officials, including then-Senator and 
first lady Cristina Fernández de Kirchner and Israeli Ambassador Rafael Eldad.  I left 
Juan with the directive board of Memoria Activa, and went to greet some from other 
groups that I knew.  I tried to stay close to acquaintances and contacts, both as socially 
appropriate behavior and to hear their reactions to the speeches, but eventually found 
myself traveling from one spot to another, as much in search of respite from the relentless 
heat as to get a better sense of who was in the crowd and why.  A number of local Jewish 
youth groups were present, wearing identifying T-shirts and carrying signs that accused 
the Kirchner government of continuing the impunity installed under Menem and carried 
                                                 
10 See, for example, Gurevich 2005. 
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on by successive administrations.  Though those assembled overall listened quietly and 
respectfully to the line of official speakers, it was clear that few held faith that their 
renewed promises to uncover the “truth” and bring justice in the case.   
 
The AMIA Attack 
 The sense that official Argentine investigations were under pressure to deliver 
suspects to society, even without an accompanying body of credible evidence, was to 
overhang the investigation of the second attack as well.  Two years later, on July 18, 
1994, another building exploded in Buenos Aires.  This time the building belonged to the 
AMIA, or the Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina (Argentine Jewish Mutual Aid 
Association), and held the central offices of both the AMIA and DAIA (Delegación de 
Asociaciones Israelitas Argentinas, or Delegation of Argentine Jewish Associations), 
constituting the core of Jewish organizations and services in Buenos Aires.  85 people 
were killed and over 300 injured in the blast, which destroyed the entire front portion of 
the building and knocked out glass windows throughout several city blocks.  Striking 
early on a Monday morning, the attack claimed a wide range of victims engaged in their 
routine weekday activities.   
The legal investigation fell to the young Federal judge Juan José Galeano, whose turn in 
the rotation it happened to be at the moment of the attack.  Galeano had no experience 
with cases of this kind or magnitude.  He had only recently acquired his post, some claim 
due to an aunt’s political connections, others emphasizing his close ties at the SIDE, 
whose head, Hugo Anzorreguy, was known to pull the strings of the Federal judicial 
circuit during the Menemist decade.  Galeano’s investigation was plagued by 
inconsistencies and accusations of poor conduct nearly since its inception.  To follow 
each bit of information that has been produced would be a vast and consuming 
undertaking, and numerous books, reports, articles, and pamphlets have been written 
which take up elements of the investigation and the various persons involved in 
producing or covering up information.11  
                                                 
11 These include Caballero 2005; Goobar 1996; Lanata 1994; Levinas 1998; Poritzker and Salgado 2005; 
Salinas 1997.  See also the websites of Memoria Activa (www.memoriaactiva.com) AMIA 
(www.amia.org.ar) and the DAIA (www.daia.org.ar) for documents listing the differing allegations of 
irregularities that these organizations have made over the years.  The DAIA website also includes video and 
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This official investigation into the AMIA bombing provides an illuminating site for 
exploring the slippery realm of political intrigue and the real workings of politics 
throughout the three main branches of government over a decade of Argentine history.  
Below, I note only a few aspects of the investigation which, while not representative, 
should give the reader a sense of how it proceeded, some of the problems both those 
conducting it and those following it faced, and the difficulties and frustrations it posed 
and poses for those most profoundly affected by the attack.   
 
 Counting the Dead  
 For years, the number of dead was said to be 86.  However, in 2000, one of those 
listed as killed in the AMIA was discovered to be alive, even though compensation had 
been paid on his behalf.  According to reports from the Argentine judiciary, the remains 
of this individual were recovered from the rubble.  The passage reads “Patricio Irala.  
Paraguayan.  According to the statement made by his life partner he had begun to work in 
the AMIA as a driver that same day.  Only remains were found” (emphasis added).12  
This particular error may have been due to sloppiness rather than intentionally, and 
Galeano himself was partially responsible for uncovering the fraud perpetrated by the 
woman who received the compensation.  As such, members of the family organizations 
often hold it up as speaking to the carelessness with which the investigation, including 
the technical examinations, were carried out and the desire to affirm definitive “facts” 
about what had happened, even lacking actual supporting evidence.13   Diana Malamud, 
whose husband Andrés was killed in the attack, expressed the pain and frustration that 
this kind of disregard for something as highly significant to family members as bodily 
remains caused:  “So, did they find remains or not, whose were they, who ran the tests 
[on the remains] that should have been run, maybe the prosecutors made a mistake, or 
maybe they were trying to cover [something] up, or maybe just nobody cared.  All of this 
                                                                                                                                                 
press archives of media coverage of the attacks and the trial.  In English, the American Jewish Committee 
put out a series of yearly reports on the investigation and trial ,written by Sergio Kiernan and available at 
www.ajc.org.   
12 Patricio Irala.  Paraguayo, según denunciara su concubina había empezado a trabajar como chofer de la 
AMIA ese mismo día.  Solo fueron encontrados restos.  From the presentation of Fiscales Mullen and 
Barbaccia, number 64579.  Mullen and Barbaccia were later removed from the trial for their alleged 
complicity in the illegal procedures used by the investigating judge, Juan José Galeano.   
13 See Clarín, 20 April 2001, “Fraude con la tragedia de la AMIA”. 
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is just one more sign of the atrocities committed during this investigation that those of us 
in Memoria Activa have been denouncing.”14   
  
 The 400,000 pesos 
Perhaps the most widely known irregularity in the investigation are the 400,000 
dollars/pesos15 that Judge Galeano agreed or was ordered to have paid to the principal 
accused in the first and only case to be brought to trial over either of the attacks.  This 
trial began on September 24, 2001, and involved some 15 defendants accused of having 
handled or participated in the preparation of the vehicle that would later be used in the 
AMIA attack.  The longest in Argentine history, the trial finally concluded nearly three 
years later with a resounding verdict that absolved the defendants of all charges related to 
the AMIA bombing.  A cornerstone of the verdict was an accusation of Judge Galeano 
for having been responsible for many irregularities and illegal actions in conducting the 
investigation, most importantly (if not most seriously – other charges involved 
kidnapping and torturing of witnesses) the payment of these 400,000 pesos in exchange 
for (false) testimony.  The three presiding judges, in their extensive final sentence, 
signaled that the investigation had been oriented towards “constructing an incriminatory 
hypothesis, with the intention of responding to society’s demands, while satisfying the 
shady interests of unscrupulous governing officials.”16  This verdict also called for the 
investigation of a number of top-ranking government officials, including the head of the 
SIDE, for their suspected role in orchestrating the cover-up.  
The hypothesis that had been advanced by the prosecution in the trial, based on 
Galeano’s investigation, had revolved around the provenance of the van, a Renault 
Trafic, that this trial verified was used as a car bomb in the attack on the AMIA.17  This 
                                                 
14 Entonces, se encontraron o no restos, a quienes pertenecían, quién hizo las pruebas que debieron hacerse 
o tal vez los fiscales se equivocaron, o tal vez se intentó encubrir o tal vez a nadie le importó. Todo esto es 
un indicador más de las atrocidades cometidas en esta instrucción que desde Memoria Activa venimos 
denunciando. 
15 1U$D = 1 Argentine peso throughout the 1990s. 
16 The original reads:  “[Galeano] orientó su actuación en “construir” una hipótesis incriminatoria, 
pretendiendo atender, de eso modo, las lógicas  demandas de la sociedad, a la vez que satisfacer oscuros 
intereses de gobernantes inescrupulosos”  From the press release of the TOF 3, causa n° 487/00, 496/00,  
501/01, 502/03, origen Jdo. Fed. n° 9, sec. n°17, registro n° 1/04, 2 September 2004.  See the complete 
verdict of the judges of the Federal Justice at http://sursur.com/files/veredicto%20AMIA.pdf.  
17 As with the Embassy bombing, the claim that the explosion was the result of a car bomb remains 
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van was traced back to Carlos Telleldín, who was well known by the local police for his 
illegal activities preparing and selling totaled and stolen cars.  Arrested soon after the 
bombing, Telleldín admitted to having bought the Trafic from a local dealer after it was 
declared a loss by an insurance company, following an accident.  Telleldín rebuilt the car, 
placing it inside a different frame whose serial number had been altered, and then placed 
an ad in the paper in order to sell the reconstructed vehicle.  The attack happened on July 
18, 1994.  As of July 10, Telleldín accepts that the Trafic that would soon become a 
mobile explosive device was still in his possession.   
But what happened after that is where things begin to get complicated.  For over a year 
after his arrest Telleldín apparently said little about who took the Trafic from there.  
According to a video tape made by Galeano and later stolen from his office and leaked to 
the press, in 1996 Galeano met with Telleldín and offered to pay him if he would testify 
that he had turned the Trafic over to a group of officers from the Buenos Aires Provincial 
Police Force.  One theory holds that, as the second anniversary of the attack was 
approaching, Galeano was under pressure to produce results.  This group of officers, 
under Commissioner Juan José Ribelli, had extorted money and goods from Telleldín 
before, thus allowing him to maintain his lucrative illegal operations while themselves 
maintaining their status as the highest yielding corruption ring in Buenos Aires.18  In 
paving the way for this particular accusation, Galeano seems to have become trapped 
within the intrigues of the political forces that governed at the time.  The Buenos Aires 
Provincial Police Force was under the control of then-Provincial Governor Eduardo 
Duhalde, President Carlos Menem’s chief political opponent within the Peronist party.  
Implicating the bonaerense, as the police force is known, in the AMIA attack was in the 
political interests of Menem and his Interior Minister Carlos Ruckauf, and would serve to 
deflect any investigation away from the previously mentioned “Syrian connection,” the 
                                                                                                                                                 
disputed, and conflicting reports of evidence and its interpretation serve to confound rather than clarify the 
event.  Recently, the theory of the car bomb was verified by the TOF3, and confirmed by the Court of 
Appeals that upheld the sentence.  For Memoria Activa, this evidence was decisive, and their faith in the 
careful application of legal principles allowed them to feel secure on this point, at least.  But critics remain, 
citing contradictory evidence and laboratory reports that indicate otherwise.  This provides an example of 
the way ‘facts’ and ‘knowledge’ are produced, “verified,” and accepted by different actors, a point explored 
further in Chapter 4. 
18 The mafia-like operations and structure of the Provincial Police force is considered common knowledge 
in Argentina.  Recent treatments include Caballero 2005; Hinton 2007.  The 2002 film by Pablo Trapero,  
El Bonaerense, provides a compelling cinematographic account,   
 47
line of investigation surrounding the attack that uncovered uncomfortable information 
and implicated Menemist allies in a number of scandals.   
It seems that Telleldín obliged, as his female companion was paid his $400,000 asking 
price in two installments.  The money came from the SIDE, and though Galeano later 
insisted that the payment fell under the rubric of the reward for information that that was 
being offered by the government, the judicial commission that eventually removed 
Galeano from his post concluded that the payment had been done illegally and outside of 
the channels that the reward payments needed to follow.  In addition, the leaked 
videotape seemed to show Galeano instructing Telleldín on what to say, not offering 
payment for information the accused provided.  Based on his testimony, Ribelli and 
several other officers stood trial along with Telleldín.  On average, they each spent eight 
years in prison awaiting resolution of the case.  In the end, the trial judges decided that, 
though the defendants were undoubtedly guilty of many crimes, there was no proof that 
could link them with the AMIA attack, and that the manner in which the case had been 
conducted necessitated their absolution.  Furthermore, they found that Galeano had, 
“engaged in behavior contrary to the law, behavior in which he had the collaboration, by 
action or by omission, of several organs in the three branches of government that gave 
him political support and cover for his irregular and unlawful acts.”19 
 
Victims of Politics 
 I selected these two examples by way of illustration, though they fall far short of 
encompassing the dozens of serious “irregularities” noted by family members of victims 
and judicial tribunals.  However, they do provide a look at the way clandestine 
relationships and competing political and personal interests conditioned the handling of 
the AMIA investigation from its inception through its only judicial prosecution to date.20   
Furthermore, they illustrate the way ‘corruption,’ here taken as a fore fronting of personal 
                                                 
19 From the verdict of the TOF 3, causa n° 487/00, 496/00,  501/01, 502/03, origen Jdo. Fed. n° 9, sec. 
n°17, registro n° 1/04. 
20 Retired police commissioner Carlos Casteñeda was eventually sentenced to serve four years in prison for 
his role in the destruction of some 60 audio recordings of wire-tapped phone lines made as part of the 
AMIA investigation.  This conviction, upheld by the Court of Appeals in October 2007, marked the first 
criminal conviction in any AMIA-related case.  Nonetheless, even this landmark case was concerned only 
with cover up that accompanied Galeano’s investigation and not with the attack itself.  Casteñeda was 
neither tried nor is suspected to have had any role in the planning or execution of the bombing, only with 
having failed to preserve evidence that fell under his jurisdiction.      
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political interests over the effective execution of tasks on behalf of society as a whole, 
came to be considered as a principal factor in the lack of acceptable resolution in the 
case.    
 The family members of the AMIA victims have played a key role in constructing 
and publicizing the debates over the government’s conduct in the AMIA investigation.  
Later in this chapter, I explore the positions taken in particular by the group Memoria 
Activa.  Comprised around one section of the family members of victims killed in the 
AMIA, Memoria Activa formed immediately after the bombing to demand that the 
perpetrators be brought to justice.  As soon became clear, they would dedicate much of 
their energies to disentangling the misinformation and obstruction surrounding the 
investigation.  The mounting evidence that Galeano’s investigation responded more to 
political interests than concrete evidence led to an increased sense of deception and 
inefficiency of the government investigation into the AMIA bombing for many of the 
family members of victims.  For more than a decade, Memoria Activa held weekly public 
protests demanding a full and impartial investigation into the AMIA and Israeli Embassy 
bombings.  The organization, which also acted as a plaintiff in the criminal trial, was 
instrumental in drawing and maintaining attention to the irregularities in the official 
investigation, and ultimately pushing forward the removal of Judge Galeano from the 
case and his eventual disrobing.  Tracing the way in which family members of victims 
related to the process of the investigation provides a window on the way ideas of 
corruption, institutional inefficiency, and impunity figure as central notions in their 
assessment and considerations of the organization and workings of state political 
institutions.  This in turn becomes constitutive of their decisions for action in continuing 
to advance their calls for justice.  The way that these perceptions intersect in a mutually 
formative relationship with particular discourses of impunity and corruption across 
Argentina during the 1990s and early 2000s is a central theme developed throughout the 
dissertation.   Unraveling how each of these notions are defined, understood, and used by 
different individual and group actors within the Argentine Jewish community and beyond 
reveals a careful balance of interests and relationships between community actors and the 
political system.   
 The nature of the attack, directed against an Argentine Jewish institution, places 
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this debate within the field of the relationships between Argentine Jews, Jewish 
institutions, and various institutions of local, national, and international governance.  The 
history of these relationships, particularly within the national realm, has been complex 
and varied over the long decades of its history.  Nonetheless, certain patterns have often 
been identified as formative of the histor(ies) of Argentine Jews both in terms of internal 
organization and in relation to the broader society.  Here, I provide some background on 
these patterns before turning to a discussion of how they are discussed, utilized, and 
reformulated by different actors in contemporary Argentina, particularly around the 
defining moments of the two bombings. 
  
Jews in the Nation: Integration and Marginalization  
 The history of the Jewish collectivity in Argentina has been inextricably bound to 
the political and ideological currents that have affected the formation and historical 
development of the nation since its inception.21  Much of the early political and social 
history of the Argentine nation as a constructed entity was consumed with a bitter 
struggle between what Nicolas Shumway has referred to as competing “guiding fictions” 
[Shumway 1991].  Proponents of these two ideological currents fought over the direction 
and nature of the Argentine nation under formation.  Broadly speaking, this struggle 
divided proponents of “liberalism” from a set of oppositional viewpoints that could be 
grouped under the rubric of “nationalist.”22  The immigration of Jews to Argentina, the 
history of the Argentine Jewish collectivity, and the possibilities and limitations to Jewish 
life developed within a context profoundly conditioned by these two divergent traditions.   
The idea of a national imaginary as fundamental to the formation and development of the 
modern nation-state was proposed by Benedict Anderson in his seminal work, Imagined 
Communities.  In it he traces how the modern nation came to be understood as an 
                                                 
21 I have adopted the common practice within Argentina of using the word “collectivity” (colectividad) in 
regard to Argentine Jews.  This term is generally used to denote the diverse organized Jewish religious, 
social, and political organizations and their members, while at once recognizing the differences in attitudes 
and perceptions that exist among these.  I have chosen to use the word “community” to refer to the broader 
set of all self-identifying Argentines of Jewish descent, whether or not these have any participation in 
organized Jewish life.   In Argentina, what I am calling ‘community’ is often referred to as the ‘calle judía’, 
or the Jewish street. 
22 As Shumway also notes, the terms “liberalism” and “nationalism” are used to label ideological currents 
that held influence within Argentina during the 19th century, as described here, and need to be understood 
within that context.  They are not to be considered as necessarily the same as “liberalist” or “nationalist” 
traditions operative in other places or at other times.   
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“imagined political community...both inherently limited and sovereign” through the use 
of new mechanized technologies by institutions of power, including printing, counting (of 
populations), and mapping [1991: 6].  A number of scholars have critiqued Anderson’s 
treatment of the formation of the nation as too centered on the literary (i.e., elite, male) 
class, and for ignoring the way in which these ideas existed within a field of power 
relations that extended beyond these privileged enclaves [see Guha 1985; Skurski 1996].  
While not disputing these important critiques nor contending that this national imaginary 
was necessarily compelling for all groups across Argentine society, here I want to draw 
on Anderson’s insights in focusing on the way in which specific formulations of a 
national imaginary in Argentina have operated in conjunction with competing political 
philosophies in influencing public policy in practice.  
After the fall of Juan Manuel de Rosas in 1852 and the abandonment of an official stance 
that embraced religious and national exclusivity, immigration began to be encouraged as 
a means of modernizing the nation.  The rise to political power of the liberalists led to the 
implementation of economic incentives specifically for European immigration.  Domingo 
Sarmiento’s characterization of Argentina as the battleground for the forces of 
civilization against the powers of barbarism influenced many of the political elites of his 
time, and led the way for the vision that the nation would be built through the influx of 
(preferably Northern) Europeans, who would come to outnumber and override the “racial 
backwardness” of the gaucho and Native American populations.  Disparaging of the 
country’s Spanish heritage, which they saw as full of “stultifying piety,” Catholic 
superstitions, and bereft of industrial capacity23, thinkers within this strain believed that 
an influx of Northern European immigrants would prove the key to the successful 
development of the nation as an agricultural and industrial power.   
To this end, the government instituted several constitutional clauses that opened the door 
for the immigration of non-Catholics to Argentina, including Jews.  The relatively high 
degree of separation of church and state made Argentina a more attractive option to 
would-be Jewish immigrants than many other Latin American destinations.24  
Nonetheless, few Jews came to Argentina before 1889.  By this time, state education had 
                                                 
23 Alberdi 1852: 236, cited in Shumway 1991:138. 
24 See Avni 1991, 2005 for a detailed history of Jewish immigration of Argentina. 
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been created for all residents, and laws had been passed allowing marriage, birth, death, 
registries outside of Catholic ritual traditions.25   These laws formed part of a broad set of 
policies that were the codification of the liberalist ideology of equality.  While this 
“equality” was limited by numerous cultural preconceptions, including the racial 
typologies mentioned above, it did open the way for broader popular participation in 
national life.   
While Sephardim immigrants were the first to come in any numbers to Argentina, overall 
the majority of Jewish immigrants to Argentina were Ashkenazim.  These came in two 
waves, the first being between 1889 and 1914.  During this period over 100,000 Jews 
came to Argentina.  Some found their way to Argentina through the help of the Jewish 
Colonization Association (JCA), created by the philanthropist Baron Mauricio von Hirsh 
with the aim of bringing Jews to found and work on agricultural colonies in the fertile 
pampas.  These immigrants became the “gauchos judíos,” or the Jewish cowboys whose 
lives are commemorated in Alberto Gerunchoff’s collected stories, first published in 
1910.26  The JCA sponsored this rural immigration under an ideology of assimilation, 
combining “the rural romanticism of Thomas Jefferson which extolled the virtues of 
farming, with view that Jewish engagement in manual labor and material production (as 
opposed to trading and money lending) would bring about a decline in Anti-Semitism” 
[Humphrey 1998: 176-177].  Humphrey notes how, as part of this ideology, the JCA 
undertook scrutinizing of prospective immigrants and denying embarkation to those who 
would not shave their beard or earlocks [177].  Many of these colonists later came to 
settle in the major cities, joining those immigrants who had stayed in Buenos Aires.27   In 
1894, 85 of these Jewish porteños founded the Jevrá Kedushá Ashkenazí burial 
association, which would later become the AMIA.28     
                                                 
25 Law 1420, which made the provision of universal, compulsory, free, and secular education the 
responsibility of the provincial governments, was passed in 1884.  The laws allowing secular registration of 
birth, death, and marriage acts was passed in 1888.   Religious education would be reinstituted in 1943 
under the dictatorship of Pedro Pablo Ramirez, and upheld by Perón later that year.  Perón eventually 
revoked this decision, though not until 1955.  
26 See Aizenberg 2000; 2002 for analysis and a powerful retranslation of Gerunchoff’s work. 
27 For information on early Jewish immigration to Argentina, the JCA, and the Jewish agricultural 
communities, see Elkin 1998; Feierstein 1999.  For a useful review of literature on Jewish Latin America, 
see Elkin and Sater 1990. 
28 The tragic irony that 85 people signed this founding charter in 1894 has been noted by a number of 
observers.  It was 100 years later, almost exactly to the day, that 85 people would die in the AMIA 
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Jews were not alone in this wave of massive immigration.  Overall, Argentina saw an 
influx of 2.5 million immigrants in the period from 1888-1913.29  Over half came from 
the Italian Peninsula, another 20% from Spain, and the rest from France, Germany, Great 
Britain, and other Latin American nations.30  Many of these immigrants would also 
organize to form societies and associations along national, regional, or ethnic lines, 
sponsoring events and often publishing their own newspapers in their native languages 
and dialects.31  All of the new immigrants were, however, affected by the ideas and 
policies operative within the national climate.  As noted above, the liberalist tradition that 
then held sway in Argentina included an ideal of assimilation as a means to equality.  
This assimilation, while working to provide equal rights to the new members of the 
nation, carried the attendant implication of homogenization and minimization of 
difference.32  To this end, there were approved lists of names under which children born 
in Argentina could be named, to facilitate their easy pronunciation and understanding.  
Beginning in the first decades of the 20th century, children were required to wear 
standardized guardapolvos or smocks at school, to minimize the appearance of 
difference.  Inés Dussel argues that this move spoke, “...of a particular construction of the 
nation, a construction that equated homogeneity with democracy, and equality of people 
with equal, identical appearances” [Dussel 2005: 101-102, and see Introduction to this 
dissertation].33   Proponents of assimilation endorsed a new national identity based on a 
melting pot model of culture (crisol de razas) similar to that once promoted in the United 
States.  However, as in the US, ultimately only certain immigrant cultures were 
                                                                                                                                                 
bombing. 
29 Statistics from Dirección General de Estadística, República Argentina.  Cited in Feierstein 1999: 399. 
30 Newer immigrations to Argentina from the later 1980s onward have been mainly comprised of 
populations from the surrounding Latin American nations, and Asians, mostly from Korea or China.  See, 
for example, Courtis 2000. 
31 See Sábato 2004, esp. Ch. 2. 
32 Cogent and concise discussions of ideas of cultural homogeneity and difference in 20th and 21st century 
Argentina can be found in Grimson 2006, and in an interview with sociologist Lucas Rubinich [Halperín 
2008].  That these two texts appear in popular rather than academic media outlets demonstrates the interest 
in these ideas throughout Argentine society and the degree of visibility and public attention given to this 
kind of academic research.    
33 Mariano Ben Plotkin provides an enlightening discussion of the use of the educational system “to instill 
patriotic feelings in the children of immigrants”, throughout the first half of the twentieth century 
[2003:85].  This included the creation of national rituals and the standardization of the teaching of national 
history under Dr. José María Ramos Mejía, president of the Consejo Nacional de Educación from 1908-
1913.  Plotkin goes on to focus on the use of the educational system in the process of “political 
socialization”, particularly during the first presidency of Perón.  
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recognized as formative of this new cultural mix, with “undesirable” groups often seen as 
foreign and inassimilable by certain influential sectors of society.    
In addition, assimilationist measures could not fully discourage the assumption and 
stereotyping of difference of and among the nation’s inhabitants.  In their early history in 
the city of Buenos Aires, the image of the immigrant Jewish community came 
increasingly to be linked with organized prostitution.  Legalized prostitution in Argentina 
captured the imagination of European society already predisposed to see the shores of 
Latin America as a debauched and treacherous place.  The involvement of a small 
number of Jewish immigrants in a highly publicized white slavery ring made the 
association of Jews with prostitution a convenient way for those concerned about the 
city’s image to displace its undesirable traits onto a marginalized minority.34   
 By 1919, the “liberal consensus” had begun to crack.35  A reactive nationalist sentiment 
had developed against the growing tides of immigrants and the policies of Radical 
president Hipólito Yrigoyen (1916-1922 and 1928-1930) that benefited the urban 
working and middle classes.36  In particular, conservative elites feared the spread of 
communist and anarchist ideologies, and led media campaigns focusing on the influence 
of Jewish (Russian), Bolshevik, and Catalonian immigrant activists on national 
destabilization.  Violent labor disputes within Argentina resulted in the identification of 
Jews in general with certain sectors of the workers’ movement.  This culminated with the 
Semana Trágica or Tragic Week of January 1919.  The Semana Trágica came when 
President Yrigoyen backed away from his earlier support of labor’s demands, and sent 
police and military forces to break an ironworkers’ strike.  This sparked a wave of anti-
immigrant and anti-Semitic sentiment, and murderous bands incited by the ultra-
                                                 
34 See Guy 1991, 1992; Moya 2004 for a history of these events.  While the Jews involved in prostitution 
comprised only a small percentage of Jewish immigrants, some scholars argue that they did represent a 
dominant percentage of pimps in the city.  José Moya estimates that, according to a 1893-1894 police file, 
between 74% and 92% of pimps operating in Buenos Aires were Jewish [Moya 2004: 21].  However, Moya 
does not account for the way that these police files may have disproportionately focused on Jewish 
offenders.  Judith Elkin alleges that, “...the majority of slavers were of other nationalities” [Elkin 1998: 97].   
Donna Guy also brings up the mixed role that the Zwi Migdal (an association in which these slave traders 
had a prominent role) played in society, which included, for example, the promotion of Yiddish theater and 
the construction of synagogues [1991]. 
35 I have adopted the term “liberal consensus” from Mariano Ben Plotkin. 
36 Yrigoyen would serve part of a second term, from 1928-1930, but by this time he had largely abandoned 
the working classes and struggled to maintain support even among the urban middle class, his traditional 
base.  He was disposed by a military coup on September 6, 1930. 
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nationalist Liga Patriótica Argentina (Argentine Patriotic League) rampaged through 
Jewish and Russian shops and neighborhoods, leaving some 850-1,000 people dead and 
thousands wounded.37   Judith Elkin has argued that this event, though rare in the history 
of Argentine Jews, left the community with an ever-present sense that the actions of 
individual Jews can have detrimental effects upon the entire community [1998: 99-100].  
As we will see below, this has affected the structure and attitudes of the major Jewish 
organizations.   
 The tide of immigration was halted by the outbreak of the First World War, but 
picked up again in the inter-war period, when another estimated 100,000 Jews made 
Argentina their home.  Many of this era chose Argentina as their destination due to the 
constricting immigration patterns being imposed by the U.S., the explosion of small 
nations and consequent restrictive policies imposed on Jews in many parts of Europe 
following its post-war geographical adjustments, and the rise of fascist ideologies.   
 Nonetheless, immigration of Jews to Argentina became severely restricted 
following the 1930 military coup bringing a premature end to Yrigoyen’s second term as 
president, the first in a long series of such coups in Argentina history.  The tide in favor 
of ideologies of cosmopolitanism and modernization that justified liberal immigration 
policies had definitively shifted, and nationalist ideologies that stressed traditional criollo 
social and cultural values and cultural homogeneity gained the power of state 
enforcement.  This led to a blocking of nearly all legal immigration for a number of 
groups, including Jews, who were still pigeonholed as anarchist agitators and viewed as 
socially and racially inferior.  As Nancy Stepan writes in her important work on eugenics 
in Latin America: 
 
Already in the 1920s, as new cultural mores, democratic demands, and labor unrest challenged the 
traditional political system, the elites had hardened their attitudes toward immigration.  They 
expressed cultural nostalgia for their “Hispanic” past and resisted various classes of immigrants as 
putative carriers of strange cultural mores and unfamiliar diseases...The 1930s were marked by 
weak political parties, fraudulent elections, antiforeign sentiment, and hostility to “alien” peoples 
and cultural practices.  Old and new nationalisms came together in a shared dislike of liberalism, 
                                                 
37 See Mirelman 1975; Feierstein 1999:197-203 on the Semana Trágica; Moya 2004 for a discussion of the 
association of Jews with anarchism in the early 20th century.  Moya makes the argument that this 
association, which led to the martyrization of one Jewish activist imprisoned for the assassination of a 
police chief infamous for his repression of popular mobilizations, contributed to the low levels of anti-
Semitism among the working class during this era. 
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democracy, and foreign capital.  The church, whose influence in education and in the traditional 
sphere of marriage had been limited by the secular legislation introduced in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, began to stage a comeback...  [Stepan 1991: 59-60]. 
 
 The 1920s has also been noted as a time when Argentine Jews were undertaking a 
change in emphasis in advancing their cultural legitimacy, in an attempt to accommodate 
this move towards a Hispanic nationalist political sentiment.  While in earlier decades 
Los gauchos judíos had served as the book through which “Argentine Jews acquired their 
citizenship papers,” based on a rural ethic of cultivation, urban Jews were at this time 
beginning to draw lines to a historical connection between Jews and Hispanic-Iberian 
culture, in arguing for their inherent similarity to the broader Argentine culture 
[Humphrey 1998].   
 This climate of officially sanctioned hostility during the 1930s also provoked the 
formation of the umbrella organization, the DAIA, founded with the express purpose of 
countering Anti-Semitism.  The DAIA, which defines itself as “the representative entity 
of the Jewish community,” expresses its overriding mission as a “permanent commitment 
to Jewish dignity.”  Traditionally, the organization’s leadership has understood this to 
mean presenting itself as the political voice of the community, and the adoption of a 
strategy of mediation and non-confrontation with the political powers of the moment.  
Throughout its history, the DAIA has sought to maintain good relations with the ruling 
governments, even when this went against the sentiment or needs of many in the Jewish 
community.  This desire to protect the community and its interests, even at the expense of 
action on the part or on behalf of individuals, has structured the nature and character of 
the organization since its inception, and has been a divisive source of criticism.  Jeffrey 
Marder [1995, 1996] has studied how the DAIA achieved and maintained a positive 
relationship with Perón during his 1946-1955 presidency, even in spite of his conflicting 
responses to a wave of Anti-Semitic policies and activities from 1943-1947.  Marder 
argues that “although the DAIA may have thereby protected the community, its failure to 
represent majority Jewish opinion underscored a weakness in the organization’s 
structure” [1995: 125].  Later, the DAIA would be sharply criticized for its largely 
passive reaction during the 1976-1983 repression by the military dictatorship, when 
Argentine Jews would be disproportionately represented among the victims of state 
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terrorism.38    
 This relationship between Perón and the Argentine Jewish collectivity is 
contentious and complex.  A skilled politician, Perón managed to maintain a positive 
affiliation with sectors of the Jewish community even beyond the DAIA, largely through 
its organized representation and the formation of a pro-Peronist competing organization, 
the Organización Israelita Argentina.  Nonetheless, after the fall of Perón in 1955 the 
Argentine Jewish community would once again find itself definitively on the defensive.  
On May 30, 1960 Israeli agents kidnapped Adolf Eichmann off a Buenos Aires street.  
Eichmann had been among a number of Nazi leaders who had been admitted to Argentina 
by Perón after the war.  The popular equation of Argentine Jews with the State of Israel 
led to some people congratulating Jews on the street for the successful Israeli operation.  
However it also sparked a wave of anti-Jewish sentiment, based in part on the indignation 
felt by those who believed that Israel had violated Argentine sovereignty [Elkin 1998: 
234].   
 This era included the formation and violent actions of several ultra right-wing 
organizations, most notoriously the Movimiento Nacionalista Tacuara and its splinter 
group, the Guardia Restauradora Nacionalista (GRN), which espoused nationalist, 
Catholic, anti-Semitic, anti-communist, and anti-democratic ideals.  Admirers of Hilter 
and Mussolini, the latter organization required its members to be of European descent 
with five generations of residence in Argentina.  The stated principal objectives of 
Tacuara were the restoration of religious education in schools, re-abolished by Perón in 
1955, and fighting leftists and Jews, equated in their minds and rhetoric.  In a climate of 
increasing political bloodshed, these two groups carried out several infamous acts of 
Anti-Semitic violence, including the 1962 abduction and brutal torture of a teenage girl.39 
By this time, the model of assimilation as the basis of modern Argentine society was 
being challenged.  I have shown how Argentine Jews held a precarious relationship to the 
idea of a crisol de razas (melting pot) that held that original cultural difference would be 
erased through adaptation to life on Argentine soil.  By the 1960s, a model of “cultural 
pluralism” began to emerge, based on an assumption of the enduring nature of cultural 
                                                 
38 Elkin 1998: 98-100. 
39 See Gutman 2003; “Tacuara salió a la calle,” Página 12, 15 May 2005 
(http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/elpais/1-51068-2005-05-15.html); Rein 2001. 
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identity.  This notion was and tends to remain in Argentina a conflictual combination of 
acceptance of difference with a certain degree of racial typologizing.  While a degree of 
acceptance of some indigenous groups as a valuable and inherent part of the Argentine 
nation has begun to emerge, these are still generally considered as relevant only in the 
outlying geographical regions.  Other racial groups, from Asians to Afro-Argentines, 
remain stigmatized as fundamentally external to the national body.  However, the idea of 
cultural pluralism in any form, which I will return to below, remained subdued 
throughout the tumultuous political events of the next two decades. 
 Argentina in the 1960s and early 70s was fraught with political violence and 
social unrest.  The return of Perón in 1972 only exacerbated the fighting, which 
encompassed factions within his movement and their political and ideological opponents.  
The coup of 1976 once again left a military dictatorship in control of the country, and the 
security forces quickly and mercilessly pursued their opponents in a guerra sucia or Dirty 
War that left an estimated 30,000 victims.  Survivors of the clandestine detention camps 
report on special abuses committed against Jews during their illegal and unacknowledged 
incarceration.  And while Jews at the time constituted between one and two percent of the 
population of Argentina, they are estimated to comprise nearly ten percent of the victims 
of the repression.40  Officially, the ruling military juntas were careful to avoid the 
adoption of anti-Semitic policies or the appearance of State-endorsed anti-Semitic 
activities.  Such action would have brought international condemnation, especially from 
the Carter administration of the United States, and have endangered the lucrative 
weapons trade with Israel from whom the dictatorship imported a considerable number of 
the arms used in the repression.  Within the detention centers, however, anti-Semitic 
language and images were symbolically manipulated to terrorize the prisoners.  Reports 
detail tapes of Hitler’s speeches being blared throughout some of the detention centers, 
and of the military personnel who worked in the centers wearing swastikas and hanging 
portraits of Hitler on the walls.41  
                                                 
40 Statistics for both of these issues are considerably unreliable, yet it is clear that Jews were represented in 
disproportionate numbers among the disappeared.  While some of this over-representation may be the result 
of a demographic tendency for Jews, especially young Jews, to be involved or associated with leftist 
organizations, the symbolically charged treatment of Jews in the detention centers demonstrates the Anti-
Semitism predominant among the military class.  See Timerman 1981. 
41 Feitlowitz 1998:106.  The majority of the sources that discuss the political repression during the Dirty 
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 Thoroughly discredited by its disastrous handling of the economy and its 
deliberate spread of misinformation throughout its failed attempt to reclaim by force 
Argentine sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands, the military dictatorship finally ceded 
to elections in 1983.  Under the new government of Raúl Alfonsín, the notion of human 
rights as a subject of state policy would begin to take hold.  The idea of cultural pluralism 
first began to emerge as part of the official discourse in this era, couched within this 
language of human rights.  However, the return to nominal democracy would be 
dominated by an uneasy balance of power between the Alfonsín administration, the 
military, and the unions, with the major economic powers located in the GEN (Grupos 
Económicos Nacionales) seeking to increase its wealth and influence through supporting 
legislation and policies that protected and benefited their interests.  While the Alfonsín 
administration was able to take steps towards democratic consolidation and political 
inclusion, including for Argentine Jews, the possibilities for action would be severely 
limited by pressure from the military to counteract the legal prosecutions against its 
members for the Dirty War repression and the tensions between these competing 
economic and social interests [see Tedesco 1999; Melamud 2000].  Ultimately, 
Alfonsín’s presidency would be overshadowed by the economic instability he inherited.  
Spiraling inflation reaching to over 1000% led to the transfer of power to president-elect 
Carlos Menem in late 1989, six months ahead of schedule.   
 
Argentina on the cusp of the bombings 
 While alarming moments of Anti-Semitic actions still occasionally dot the news 
headlines [see picture 2.2], the long record of Jewish presence within and contributions to 
Argentine society were by the 1990s generally recognized by the majority of non-Jewish 
Argentines.  Two days after the Embassy bombing, 90,000 Argentines, Jews and non-
Jews, poured into Avenida 9 de Julio to repudiate the attack on the Embassy.42  After the 
AMIA explosion, another demonstration, this time of over 150,000 people, gathered in 
front of the Congress Building in denunciation of the violence, with banners that read 
“Hoy somos todos judíos” [“We are all Jews today”] hanging across streets.  A survey 
                                                                                                                                                 
War and many survivors’ testimonies mention the especially harsh treatment of Jewish prisoners.   
42 The figure 90,000 is given in Noticias, 22 March 1992, p74.  Other sources estimate the number to be 
between 80,000 and 150,000. 
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conducted at the request of the Instituto Nacional contra la Discriminación, la Xenofobia 
y el Racismo (Inadi), or National Institute against Discrimination, Xenophobia, and 
Racism, in December 2006 found that, while those surveyed reported being aware of 
discriminatory attitudes towards Jews, only 17.6% identified Jews as a principal category 
subject to discrimination, far behind the 52.3% who believed that Bolivian immigrants 
would be most likely to face such attitudes and practices.  Overall, in the perception of 
the interviewed, discriminatory attitudes were most often directed based on 
socioeconomic class rather than any other consideration.43   
    Yet anti-Semitism has continued to be entrenched in powerful institutions in 
Argentine society, especially the military and the police.  There have been very few 
Jewish officers in the Argentine military, even in comparison to other predominantly 
Catholic countries such as Chile, and the presence of anti-Semitic attitudes entrenched in 
the cultural milieu of the security forces remains well-documented.44   For example, in 
1990 one notorious military colonel and carapintada leader publicly remarked, “I know 
neither any green horses nor any decent Jews.”45 While the police force is notoriously 
lacking in its ability to increase the sense of public security among the populace,46 this is 
compounded for Argentine Jews, particularly those with lesser economic resources.   
 More pervasive than this entrenched Anti-Semitism, however, is a general 
tendency among many non-Jewish Argentines to perceive Argentine Jews as marginal 
population, at once a part of yet separate from the “true” Argentines.  This view has 
remained formalized in certain significant legal formulations, such as the law that, until 
the constitutional revision of 1994, stipulated that the president and vice-president of the 
                                                 
43 The survey was conducted by Ricardo Rouvier & Asociados,  between 18 and 30 December 2006.   The 
fact the vast majority of respondents felt that discrimination in Argentina was based on economic rather 
than racial or religious grounds should not be taken as evidence of a lack of these kinds of discrimination 
against marginalized groups.  However, it is strongly indicative of the way discrimination is considered and 
discussed in Argentina. 
44 The DAIA’s Center for Social Studies (Centro de Estudios Sociales) compiles yearly reports on Anti-
Semitism in Argentina, available on their website at www.daia.org.ar.  They also include a list of all 
reported instances of Anti-Semitism in Argentina, including press coverage.  In addition, see Luvovich 
2003; Senkman 1989, 1995.  
45 Cited in Feierstein 1999: 363.  The carapintadas were a rebellious faction of the armed forces that staged 
a number of uprisings during the democratic regimes of Raúl Alfonsín and Carlos Menem.  The pressure 
they exerted, and the fear of destabilization they inspired, helped stall the legal prosecutions of military 
members accused of committing human rights abuses during the Dirty War and limited military reform. 
46 See Hinton 2006, Kalmanowiecki 2000 for analysis of the Argentine police forces.  Hinton in particular 
argues that the inability to reform the police forces according to the principles of democratic policing has 
had negative implications on public security in recent years. 
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nation be communicants of the Catholic Church.47  The idea of Jews as marginal results 
in part from the still prevalent idea of the Argentine nation as culturally homogeneous 
and has ramifications for all Argentine minority communities, including the expanding 
Korean, Bolivian, and Paraguayan immigrant communities.48  Federico Pablo Feldstein 
and Carolina Acosta-Alzuru, in a comprehensive textual analysis of the mainstream 
newspaper coverage of the bombing of the AMIA building, demonstrate how the press 
reflected this view, by employing discursive strategies that effectively distanced 
Argentine Jews from non-Jews [2003].  With public attention being so forcibly directed 
towards the Jewish collectivity following the AMIA explosion, the mass media coverage 
of events often depicted Argentine Jews as foreigners or Israelis.49  Feldstein and Acosta-
Alzuru also found that the press consistently presented the attacks as being against Jews, 
who were said to ultimately bear the blame for their problems, rather than as against 
“Argentines,” thus implicitly defined as not Jewish.  Some of the bleakest moments in 
this coverage included the news articles and television reporters who lamented the deaths 
in the bombings of both “judíos e inocentes” (‘Jews and innocent people’).50  This 
phrasing carries the implication that Jews killed in the attack were intrinsically connected 
to the precipitating causes of such violence and thereby not “innocent.”  In the words of 
Ricardo Feierstein, “How is it still possible – when the Argentine Jewish institutional 
presence has just celebrated its 100th year – [for there to be] a confusion between “us and 
the others,” “Jews and Israelis,” “foreigners and non-foreigners,” citizens of the same 
country?”  [Feierstein 1999: 428].51 
                                                 
47 Menem, who converted to Catholicism while pursuing his career in politics, pushed the revocation of this 
article of the Constitution upon coming into office.  This Constitution still stipulates in Article 2 that the 
State upholds the Roman Catholic Faith.   
48 See Courtis 2000 for a discussion of the semantics of discrimination in relation to the Argentine Korean 
community.  Also interesting in this regard is the work by Jeffrey Lesser on the Brazilian Jewish 
community, including his provocatively titled 2004 article, “How the Jews became Japanese and other 
Stories of Nation and Ethnicity,” in which he explores the ways in which categories of sameness and 
difference get deployed in relation to considerations of ethnicity within the context of Latin American 
racial classifications [Lesser 2004, 1995].    
49 This interpretation is subtlety aided by the confusion arising from the way the term ‘israelita’ is 
commonly used to mean Jew in Spanish, dating back to well before the establishment of the modern nation-
state of Israel.  In contrast, the term ‘israelí’ is the Spanish word for an inhabitant of the modern state of 
Israel. 
50 Many others have also noted this aspect of the media coverage, which was present in not one but across 
several news agencies, including Elkin 1998: 265, and Alejandro Doria in his contribution to the film 18-J . 
51 ¿Es todavía admisible – cuando acaban de cumplirse cien años de presencia institucional judeoargentina 
– la confusión entre “nosotros y los otros”, “judíos e israelíes”, “extranjeros y no extranjeros” ciudadanos 
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 These attitudes are supported at least in part by the continued force of political 
ideologies that uphold the ideal of social unity through social (and cultural) equalization, 
in particular some manifestations of Peronism and traditional leftist parties.  I 
encountered this enduring emphasis on cultural homogeneity many times during my 
fieldwork.  One example is the reaction I would get when I would explain to non-Jewish 
Argentines what I was doing in Buenos Aires.  As soon as I mentioned the Jewish 
community I would be interrupted by my listener, anxious to provide their own opinion.  
A typical example of this kind of comment (and the lack of variation in the responses is 
noteworthy) was, “I’ll tell you what the problem with Argentine Jews is.  They never 
wanted to become part of society.  They always wanted to keep their differences.  They 
didn’t want to be like us.”  (Yo te digo el problema con los judíos en la Argentina.  Es 
que nunca querían formar parte de la sociedad.  Siempre querían mantener sus 
diferencias.  No querían ser como nosotros.)  This type of response is also interesting in 
the weight it gives to integration into the group (assuming this desire for difference as a 
“problem”).  I come back in later chapters to the way ideas of the social and group 
formation operate in Argentine society, in contrast to the valorization of individualism 
often embedded in both legal and moral transnational discourses.  Here, however, I want 
to draw attention to the way cultural pluralism remains a difficult notion within Argentina 
society, a feature noted by other groups arguing for the right to difference (for example, 
in the challenges faced by indigenous populations or the Argentine GLBT movements). 
 
Claiming cultural citizenship 
 As Rogers Brubaker has argued, “Debates about citizenship, in the age of the 
nation-state, are debates about nationhood – about what it means, and what it ought to 
mean, to belong to a nation state’ [1998: 132].  In the next section of this chapter, I 
explore the ways in which the actions of Memoria Activa work to call into question the 
location of Argentine Jews as marginal citizens.  Using evidence collected from my 
attendance at events held by the group, interviews with participants, and published and 
unpublished documents produced over the course of the group’s 13 year history, I show 
how, through their actions and communicative forms, they respond to the cultural 
                                                                                                                                                 
del mismo país? 
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marginalization of Argentine Jews by establishing their struggle for justice as pertaining 
to the nation as a whole, while simultaneously drawing on and employing the strength of 
highly symbolic religious elements in a public affirmation of the right to difference.   
Sonia Alvarez, Eva Dagnino, and Arturo Escobar’s have argued that social movements 
can serve as sites of expression for alternative conceptions of society and the social order, 
working to reconfigure the cultural field through the expression of their demands.  As 
they contend, “social movements...have struggled to resignify the very meanings of 
received notions of citizenship, political representation and participation, and...  
democracy itself...[Doing so] entail[s] the enactment of “cultural politics” [Alvarez, et. al. 
1998: 2].   
 I argue that the actions of Memoria Activa work towards a reconfiguration of the 
national imaginary, by advocating their right to a kind of “cultural citizenship.”  This 
concept has been defined by Renato Rosaldo in his work on Latinos in the United States 
as, “the right to be different (in terms of race, ethnicity, or native language) with respect 
to the norms of the dominant national community, without compromising one's right to 
belong, in the sense of participating in the nation-state's democratic processes [1994: 57].  
However, I hope to show how these claims to cultural citizenship do not occur in 
isolation, or originate solely from within the community.  Rather, I follow Aihwa Ong’s 
observations on cultural citizenship as being at once “a dual process of self-making and 
being made within webs of power” [1996:738].  Specifically, I show how Memoria 
Activa’s claims to cultural citizenship develop within a context of “neoliberal 
multiculturalism,” whereby powerful political and economic actors embrace a certain 
politics of cultural difference in specific ways that work to limit and contain its effects 
[Hale 2002].    
 
Placing Jews in the Nation 
 The 1992 and 1994 bombings, coming nearly a decade after the return to 
democracy, were pivotal moments in the history of Jews in Argentina.  In spite of 
criticisms of the leaders of the AMIA and DAIA organizations, they remained the 
principal organizational pillars of the collectivity.52  The AMIA has continued to provide 
                                                 
52 These criticisms and the contentious history of the internal workings of the Jewish collectivity are taken 
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a host of social services to the Argentine Jewish community in the over a hundred years 
since its foundation.  Alongside many offices and social programs, including the 
coordination of the city’s Jewish cemeteries and schools, the AMIA building also housed 
the largest Judaica library in South America.  More than half of its collection was 
destroyed in the 1994 attack, including many books salvaged from Europe and the fires 
of the Nazis.  Also lost were countless irreplaceable documents attesting to the over 150-
year history of Jewish immigration and life in Argentina.53  The loss was expressed by 
the library’s novegenarian founder Samuel Rollansky: “Our history is burned without 
even a war.  We are witnessing an act of Inquisition.”54  This phrase points the way the 
AMIA bombing was felt by members of the Argentine Jewish community.  The 
destruction of the AMIA/DAIA building was a devastating moment, a direct assault on 
Argentine Jewish civilian and religious life.  
 A full analysis of the weekly protest/memorials or actos held by Memoria Activa, 
as an articulation of this sentiment, is taken up in Chapter 4.  Here, I focus on those 
aspects of Memoria Activa’s weekly actos that relate most directly to their assertion of 
the position of Argentine Jews as full members of the nation, while publicly valorizing a 
sense of Jewish identity and traditions.   These demands and assertions are expressed 
through the discursive forms and symbolic actions employed by the group.  Through 
emblematic demonstrations of support with other groups, such as the presence of 
members of the Mothers of Plaza de Mayo and the frequency with which members of 
(certain) other movements speak at their actos, they link their struggle to those of other 
human rights groups, thereby placing their search for justice within the context of other 
national struggles conceived under the rubric of struggles against impunity.  By locating 
their demands for justice in the Israeli Embassy and AMIA bombings as part of a larger 
set of counterimpunity movements, they are arguing for these attacks to be seen not as a 
problem for Jews or the Argentine Jewish collectivity, but as attacks against Argentine 
society as a whole.  For example, Fernando Fischman and Javier Pelacoff have noted that 
the dual self-appellation of the group as a “movimiento social” and as a “movimiento 
                                                                                                                                                 
up further in Chapter 4. 
53 These included a collection of recently released files on Nazi refugees in Argentina. 
54 Brooke, James. "One More Victim in Argentina: Vast Judaica Library." New York Times, August 2 
1994:A3.  
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popular” works to define it both as part of a larger set of organizations that fall under the 
rubric of social movement and to assert the group’s legitimacy as coming from the 
“pueblo”, an authentic voice of the people demanding their rights [Fischman and Pelacoff 
2003].  The call to recognize the bombings and impunity as a society-wide problem is 
also emblematically evoked in a banner that was often erected in front of the plaza during 
Memoria Activa’s weekly protests, which read “Todos somos Memoria Activa”, (‘We are 
all Memoria Activa’).  This simple phrase both identifies the movement and calls upon 
all Argentines to recognize themselves in the movement’s struggle and its implication 
and relevance for their lives.   
 Yet the move to define the bombings and the struggle for justice as problems for 
all of society does not indicate a denial or an effacement on the part of Memoria Activa 
of the movement’s nature as arising from out of a Jewish community.  Rather, the 
movement also highlights its identity and location as based within a Jewish tradition, 
however diverse and multivocal the definitions of and identifications with this 
community may have been, in ways that simultaneously work to creatively reinterpret or 
reactivate that tradition.  The consistent presence of children from Jewish schools brought 
out on these Monday mornings to attend the protest-memorials shows the interest of the 
group in transmitting the enacted traditions that these rituals represent.   
 Perhaps the most visible and cherished marker of this Jewish identification comes 
with the playing of the shofar at the opening of Memoria Activa’s weekly actos, during a 
moment of silence in honor of the victims.55  This moment was used by the events’ 
organizers as a performance of Jewishness, and participants frequently mentioned it to 
me as a source of pride and a central feature of the events.  The shofar is commonly used 
in religious ceremonies for the high holidays of Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur, but it 
also carries a biblical history of use as an instrument of summoning or a call to battle.  
The blowing of the shofar is said to have helped enable Joshua to capture Jericho.  
Memoria Activa and its participants draw on and invoke this history of the shofar in 
adopting it as a symbol of their Jewish identity.  The moment of silence is introduced 
with the coordinator of the acto saying, “Escuchamos el shofar, con su llamado milenario 
                                                 
55 A shofar is a musical instrument made from a ram’s horn. 
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que nos acompaña y nos convoca, para que derrumbe los muros de la impunidad.”56  
The shofar and its ‘eternal call’ are thus summoned to ‘accompany’’ Memoria Activ
struggle, to call out against the dangers of forgetting, and to remind the community at 
large of its responsibility to work for justice.  The age, tradition, and the symbolic power 
of the shofar are highlighted, with appeals for all to listen to its ‘ancient cry,” which 
would help to “bring down the walls of impunity,” as it is said to have brought down the 
walls at Jericho.
a’s 
                                                
57  This idea of impunity noted here as a central feature of Argentine 
political life forms the subject of the next chapter.  
   Another important marker and source of pride was the biblical phrase that 
Memoria Activa uses as its central slogan.  This was recited at end of the call that was 
repeated every week in closing the actos, with the coordinator of the acto inviting those 
assembled to join in the call for justice.  While these exhibited minor variations, the 
formula remained constant.  One typical morning the call was as follows: 
  
We have heard the call of the shofar.  We end as always with our voices: 
For the 30,000 disappeared, victims of state terrorism in our country, we demand -- 
[crowd] JUSTICE 
For the children, stolen from their homes during the last dictatorship, who are still today searching 
for their true identity, we demand --  
 JUSTICE 
For the dead in the bombing of the Israeli Embassy, we demand – 
  JUSTICE 
For our relatives and friends, victims of the atrocious attack on the AMIA building in our country, 
we demand— 
 JUSTICE. 
justice, justice, you will seek  tze·dek tze·dek, tir·dof.  58 [Deuteronomy 16:20] 
 
 
56 “We hear the shofar, with its millenario call that accompanies us and calls us together, so that it can bring 
down the walls of impunity.”   
57 It is interesting to note that Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, in her presidential inauguration speech on 
December 10, 2007, adopts precisely this language.  In this speech, she referred to the administration of her 
husband and existing president Néstor Kirchner’s actions in the field of human rights by saying, “Hemos 
derrimbado los muros de la impunidad.” 
58 Hemos escuchado al shofar.  Terminamos como siempre con nuestras voces: 
por nuestros 30,000 desaparecidos, víctimas del terrorismo del estado en nuestro pais, exigimos  
JUSTICIA 
por los niños, robados de sus hogares, durante la última dictadura, que aún hoy siguen buscando su 
verdadera identidad, exigimos  JUSTICIA 
por los muertos en el atentado a la Embajada de Israel exigimos  JUSTICIA 
por nuestros familiares y amigos, victimas del atroz atentado a la sede de la AMIA en nuestro país, 
exigimos  JUSTICIA 
justicia, justicia, perseguirás 
ִּתְרּדֹף, ֶצֶדק ֶצֶדק  [typically expressed in Spanish (castellano) and Hebrew]  
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This passage from Deuteronomy is also inscribed on the monument erected to the dead in 
the Plaza Lavalle, where Memoria Activa holds their actos, and frequently appears on 
documents published by the group.  In using this Biblical passage, Memoria Activa is 
affirming that the struggle for justice is a moral injunctive as well as a social 
responsibility.  This appeal to theological justification allows Memoria Activa to 
maintain a visible assertion of a religious identity, even while discursively inserting 
themselves and their struggle within a broader national context of counterimpunity 
movements.  The reiterated use of the phrase ‘our country’ (nuestro país) also serves to 
emphasize their assertion that the attack and the political machinations that orchestrated 
its cover up are problems that affect Argentina as a whole.   
 Rather than seeing the attacks as perpetrated against Jews, with Argentine soil 
being a displaced battleground for a foreign conflict, through actions like these Memoria 
Activa locates the Jewish community as an integral part of the nation, while 
simultaneously asserting their right to Jewish specificity and difference, as part of that 
nation [cf. Aizenburg 2000].  This reveals a complex layering of multiple subject 
positions and identities, combining Jewish, Argentine, and, for some, Israeli 
identifications at the same time.59  The strategic deployment of multiple identities in 
redefining the nation-state supports the argument by John and Jean Comaroff that 
citizenship, or what it means to be a citizen within a nation-state, is being reconfigured.  
They argue that “the fractal nature of contemporary political personhood, the fact that it 
is overlaid and undercut by a politics of difference and identity, does not necessarily 
involve the negation of national belonging,...merely its...ambiguous coexistence with 
other modes of being-in-the-world” [Comaroff and Comaroff 2004].  While calling for 
recognition of Argentine Jews as full and integral members of the Argentine nation, the 
                                                 
59 When journalist Jacobo Timerman, author of the 1981 Preso sin nombre, celda sin número, one of the 
first survivor’s accounts to detail the horrors of the Dirty War concentration camps,  was stripped of his 
Argentine identity by the ruling military junta, he assumed Israeli citizenship as “his other dormant national 
identity” [cited in Humphery 1998:183].  It is also noteworthy that pictures from the days after the AMIA 
explosion show an Israeli flag hanging out of a battered window.  These imagined and practiced 
connections to Israel have become more prevalent in recent years, with increased emigration and attendant 
familial ties to Israel by Argentine Jews after the AMIA attack and around the economic crisis. They have 
also made Jewish members of the government subject to attacks by their political opponents, who often 
accuse these members of having conflicting loyalties particularly concerning international relations, 
regardless of whether or not the particular government official in question has ever expressed any such 
feelings. 
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movement is proposing a redefinition of the very nature of the national imaginary as 
essentially plural, multi-ethnic, and multicultural.  While the assertions of Memoria 
Activa focus exclusively on this notion as it applies to (Ashkenazi) Jews, their 
redefinitions open the door to more inclusive notions for groups marginalized based on 
economic and racial ascriptions.  Though Memoria Activa does not explicitly take this 
step, the significance of their assertions has not been lost on some of these other groups, 
as can be seen in the way certain indigenous organizations would frequent their weekly 
events in spite of a lack of official affiliation with the directive board or direct contacts 
among the members. 
  
Neoliberal multiculturalism?  
 Memoria Activa’s appeal to the multicultural nature of the nation does not occur 
in isolation, but must be considered within the social and political context of the 1990s.  
Memoria Activa made these assertions at a time when the idea of cultural plurality was 
increasingly gaining the force of a kind of political correctness.  In Argentina, this notion 
of cultural plurality was influenced by and expressed through three related sets of ideas:  
the political application of what Charles R. Hale has termed “neoliberal 
multiculturalism;” a concept of human rights based on both international and local 
definitions, and a vision of democracy and the process of “democratic consolidation” 
based on the protection of these rights.60  As noted above, this was not the first time the 
idea of cultural pluralism, as predicating the enduring nature of cultural identity in 
contradistinction to the idea of assimilation to the host society, became the focus of 
public discussion in Argentina.  For instance, a project undertaken in the 1960s by Gino 
Germani and José Luis Romero at the Universidad de Buenos Aires focused precisely on 
the cultural variation within Argentine society.61  A number of ethnic and religious 
groups and organized minority communities had also drawn attention to forms of cultural 
variation within society.62  The 1990s, however, was the first time that cultural pluralism 
                                                 
60 A full analysis of the ideas of human rights and democracy operative in the Argentine political climate 
during the 1980s, 1990s, and into the 21st century is taken up in the next two chapters.   
61 However, as others have noted, this project was ultimately concerned with unraveling the political 
behavior of a post-migration society, rather than the facets and articulations of ethic/cultural identity within 
a political culture of asserted homogeneity.  See Devoto 1992; Sábato 1998. 
62 See, for example, Klitch 1995, 1998. 
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became the object of official support through both political rhetoric and the 
implementation of certain state-directed policies.  Chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation 
develop in more depth the way groups like Memoria Activa contributed to and drew from 
ideas of a specific kind of democracy and a discourse of human rights.  Here, I want to 
focus particularly on the first of these influences, namely the way the application of 
neoliberal principles in Argentina included a set of purposely-constructed assumptions 
about cultural pluralism.  Furthermore, I show how Memoria Activa’s use of these 
principles did not preclude their critique its use and application (or lack thereof) by 
members of the government, but rather developed in dialogue with the official 
definitions.    
 I want to start with a set of contrasting examples of how political leaders have 
attempted to demonstrate the State’s commitment to a politics of cultural diversity, and 
the reactions that these gestures received.  At the end of the 1980s, many in the Jewish 
collectivity and the broader Jewish community had expressed reservations over the 
increasing certainty that Menem, a Peronist of Syrian descent, would be elected 
president.  A skilled politician who relied heavily on his personal charisma, Menem 
worked hard to gain the support of a very reluctant Jewish constituency.63  Shortly after 
becoming president, Menem attended in person an event organized in repudiation of 
recent anti-Semitic attacks in France, held in the historical synagogue on the Calle 
Libertad.  As Menem approached the door to the synagogue, a member of his entourage 
tried to brush aside the offered kippa (yarmulke).  Menem, however, took it into his own 
                                                 
63 A full discussion of both Menem and Alfonsín’s relationships to the Argentine Jewish collectivity lies, 
unfortunately, beyond the scope of this chapter [see Melamud 2000 for a critical analysis of this era].  
While Alfonsín’s politics of cultural pluralism was judged to be more sincere, and he inspired more trust 
among the Jewish collectivity in belonging to the Radical rather than Peronist party, his handling of 
international politics estranged many, especially the more conservative elements of the community, in that 
he worked to position Argentina alongside an emerging coalition of countries from what we now call the 
Global South.  Thus, he expressed support for the PLO and the post-colonial Arabic states in opposition to 
the US and Israel.  Menem gained initial support from the reluctant Jewish collectivity through his politics 
of alignment with the United States, including the breaking of Argentina’s membership in the Movement of 
Non-Aligned States when he deployed Argentine ships to the Persian Gulf during the first Gulf War [op. 
cit.: 43].  He also became the first Argentine president to officially visit the State of Israel, a promise made 
but not fulfilled by Alfonsín.   In addition, he did drive certain important measures, such as lifting questions 
as to an aspirant’s religion from codes for military officers.  However, the his government’s (mis)handling 
of the AMIA investigation would soon overshadow these earlier efforts.  In the next chapter, I will discuss 
in more detail how the involvement of certain high-profile members of the Jewish community in the 
Menemist government led to divisions within the collectivity that have concrete repercussions in the 
actions of the family members of AMIA victims.   
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hands and placed it on his head.  The event itself, which also included the presence of a 
high official from the Argentine Catholic Church, the president of the Islamic Center of 
Buenos Aires, and numerous local and national political figures, was meant to serve as a 
demonstration of the multicultural and multi-religious composition of Argentine society, 
and to demonstrate the harmonious relationships between the different sectors.  The 
occasion was heralded by the DAIA as the first time a national president attended such an 
event outside of countries with an active climate of anti-Semitism.  In itself this was an 
example political spin and its deployment  –  here the same organization responsible for 
logging and denouncing acts of anti-Semitism on Argentine soil (the DAIA) is classifying 
Argentina as a country without anti-Semitism.  However, I suspect that this strange 
pronouncement was offered as a show of gratitude and in recognition of Menem’s 
decision to attend.  Contradictory as it seems, the claim was widely and uncritically 
repeated across mass media and community publications, and the incident served to 
garner Menem considerable support from a once reluctant community.   
  This moment from the early 1990s can be contrasted with a similar one that took 
place over a decade later.  At that time, I attended an event held by the AMIA/DAIA in 
the Plaza Seca held inside the reconstructed AMIA building.  This event was the first of 
its kind held by the AMIA/DAIA in honor of the memories of the Jewish victims of the 
Dirty War.  As discussed above, the official Jewish collectivity leadership had been the 
object of much criticism for its perceived lack of intervention on behalf of the Jewish 
disappeared, both during the repression and in the search for justice that followed the 
return to democracy.  Voices within the community had continued and continue to 
pressure for a moment of public self-reflection on the part of the AMIA/DAIA that 
accepts this perceived failing.  While many are still unsatisfied with the leadership in this 
regard, events such as this 2004 memorial have marked a significant shift in the public 
posture adopted by these organizations.   
 This event was attended by President Kirchner, who also donned a kippa.  In his 
case, though, the gesture resulted in an uncomfortable moment of awkwardness as he 
struggled to get it positioned properly in front of an expectant and tittering crowd, 
eventually being assisted by several senior members of the collectivity leadership.  He 
then proceeded to light a menorah candle, and, after giving a brief speech, uncovered the 
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new high-relief sculpture designed for the occasion by Sara Brodsky, plastic artist and 
mother of Fernando Brodsky, disappeared in 1976.  While Kirchner’s words were widely 
praised, this kind of symbolic gesture nonetheless failed to earn him the kind of uncritical 
support it had for Menem more than a decade before.  Members of Memoria Activa that I 
interviewed took the attitude that while his presence at such events was important, they 
were more interested in seeing what concrete measures he would take in advancing the 
investigation.  Accordingly, his wife (and future president) Cristina Kirchner received a 
far more positive and uncritical evaluation from members of Memoria Activa, for her 
active role in the Bicameral Congressional Commission that undertook an evaluation of 
the AMIA investigation.  By 2004, actions counted for far more than words, and 
members of a deceived and distrustful community were far less likely to give politicians 
the benefit of the doubt based on their symbolic gestures.  
 I want to explore a bit further why the members of Memoria Activa and many 
others had become so suspicious of official policies or symbolic actions in support of an 
ideal of cultural plurality.  While the Jewish community was overall responsive to 
Menem’s attempts to solidify a politics of multiculturalism in the early days of his first 
presidency, by the second half of the 1900s significant sectors of the community held that 
such gestures amounted to little more than empty political rhetoric designed to seduce 
Jewish support.  By this time, the narrative of corruption as discussed in the Introduction 
had been firmly installed in Argentina.  The problems with the official investigation into 
the AMIA bombing had come to be seen by Memoria Activa as yet another instance of 
this kind of corruption within government institutions, which were taken to operate under 
a culture of impunity that allowed and encouraged the individuals within these 
institutions to act based on personal interest rather than towards the collective benefit.  
This assessment of endemic impunity and corruption, taken up further in the next chapter, 
had led to a increasing general deception with the government in general, including the 
official politics of cultural plurality. 
 This politics of cultural plurality cannot be separated from the broader economic 
and political climate within which it gained expression.  During this era, Argentina was 
the model for neoliberalism as the answer to Latin America’s economic difficulties, with 
President Carlos Menem and Economics Minister Domingo Cavallo firmly engaged in 
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the implementation of policies suggested by transnational agencies and foreign 
proponents of the neoliberal doctrine.  However, as noted in the Introduction, 
neoliberalism is not only about economic policies or state reform, but is also entails a 
cultural project.  Willem Assies has argued that policies of “social adjustment” become 
“...an increasingly important item on the agenda and [go] together with a transformation 
of the role of civil society and a new discourse on citizenship.”  [Assies et. al. 2000: 
10].64  Indeed, in many cases proponents of neoliberal economic reforms also embraced a 
broader reaching set of neoliberal social policies, including a kind of “multicultural 
citizenship” whereby a recognition of cultural difference becomes a central (and often 
empty) feature of official discourse.  Hale has coined the term “neoliberal 
multiculturalism” as the name for the phenomenon “whereby proponents of the neoliberal 
doctrine pro-actively endorse a substantive, if limited, version of...cultural rights, as a 
means to resolve their own problems and advance their own political agendas” 
[2002:485].65  This embrace of a “politics of recognition” [Taylor 1992] by the 
proponents of neoliberalism and its application in Latin America came about in large 
measure due to pressures from indigenous and other minority groups, who were 
becoming increasingly vocal in pushing for an expansion of their rights.  The package of 
“cultural rights” often included political reforms to include indigenous and other 
marginal citizens, at least nominally, in the processes of government, education reform, 
increased acceptance and promotion of indigenous languages, and antidiscrimination 
policies. 
Though the Argentine state was, in distinction to other Latin American nations like 
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, or Peru, not contending with a large and organized 
indigenous population demanding change, and though minority groups like Argentine 
Jews had historically held and exercised full rights as political citizens, the Menemist era 
nonetheless saw Argentina adopting a version of neoliberal multiculturalism.  As 
                                                 
64 Cited in Hale 2002. 
65 Hale defines neoliberalism as standing for “...a cluster of policies driven by the logic of transnational 
capitalism: unfettered world markets for goods and capital; pared down state responsibilities for social 
welfare of its citizens; opposition to conflictive and inefficient collective entitlements, epitomised by labour 
rights; resolution of social problems through the application of quasi-market principles revolving around 
the primacy of the individual, such as assessment based on individual merit, emphasis on individual 
responsibility and the exercise of individual choice” [2002:486].  For a further discussion of the concept 
and its application and manifestation in Argentina, see the Introduction.   
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mentioned above, in Argentina this acceptance of cultural plurality was in particular 
based on international and local discourses of human rights and democracy.  In 
Argentina, multiculturalism and the right to difference were presented as human rights, 
and the respect of these rights the duty of a country that was structured and operated 
according to democratic principles.  A limited embrace of multiculturalism thus afforded 
a low risk way for the Menem administration and its allies to be seen as promoting 
human rights while denying demands for justice for the state sanctioned perpetrators of 
Dirty War violence.   
 This emerging discourse of the right to difference, soon adopted across large 
sectors of the Argentine political spectrum, is sanctified, for example, in the Preamble to 
the 1996 Constitution of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires, following a polemical 
restructuring of the political terrain.  The preamble defines as one of the objectives of the 
city government as “...the promotion of human development in a democracy based on 
liberty, equality, solidarity, justice, and human rights, recognizing identity in 
plurality...”66 Significant as the formal recognition of the right to difference is, and 
without minimizing important advances like the 1988 passage of anti hate crime 
legislation, the adoption of a kind of neoliberal multiculturalism can be nonetheless 
dangerous for those interested in the promotion of their own or others’ cultural rights.  
Hale points out that: 
 
...these initiatives also come with clearly articulated limits... powerful political and economic 
actors use neoliberal multiculturalism to affirm cultural difference, while retaining the prerogative 
to discern between cultural rights consistent with the ideal of liberal, democratic pluralism, and 
cultural rights inimical to that ideal.  In so doing, they advance a universalist ethic which 
constitutes a defense of the neoliberal capitalist order itself [2002:489, 490].  
  
 Hale is referring specifically to certain kinds of cultural rights that are often 
perceived as a threat to basic premises of capitalist society, such as collective rights.  In 
the case of Memoria Activa, the version of state-endorsed cultural plurality is seen as 
                                                 
66 The full text of the Preamble reads: Los representantes del Pueblo de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, 
reunidos en Convención Constituyente por imperio de la Constitución Nacional, integrando la Nación en 
fraterna unión federal con las Provincias, con el objeto de afirmar su autonomía, organizar sus instituciones 
y promover el desarrollo humano en una democracia fundada en la libertad, la igualdad, la solidaridad, la 
justicia y los derechos humanos, reconociendo la identidad en la pluralidad, con el propósito de garantizar 
la dignidad e impulsar la prosperidad de sus habitantes y de las mujeres y hombres que quieran gozar de su 
hospitalidad, invocando la protección de Dios y la guía de nuestra conciencia, sancionamos y promulgamos 
la presente Constitución como estatuto organizativo de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires [1996]. 
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problematic less for the nature of its content and more for its perceived use as a 
diversionary tactic designed to allow the state to rhetorically present itself as promoting 
human rights even while, through action and omission, these rights are systematically 
violated.  More than anything, members of Memoria Activa would point to the 
inconsistency between government words and actions.  The preamble to the city 
constitution, cited above for its evocation of cultural difference as a protected feature of 
democratic life, was constantly held up by members of Memoria Activa and other 
dissident sectors of the Jewish community as both a highly significant step and ironic in 
its hypocrisy.  One of my key contacts in Memoria Activa frequently remarked on the 
importance of this preamble, and the magazine Convergencia, a progressive Jewish 
publication heavily concerned with human rights, often published this except in 
advertisement style full-page layouts on the back cover of its issues.  However, the inner 
pages of Convergencia and the impassioned invectives intoned by my informant made 
constant reference to the lack of applicability of these espoused ideas.   
 Furthermore, this gulf between rhetoric and practice is seen as a consequence of 
the generalized problems of corruption and impunity that are considered to pervade 
political and economic practice during the 1990s.  Thus, by the end of the 1990s, state-
directed neoliberal multiculturalism is taken as amounting to little more than top-down 
concessionary measures designed to placate dissenters even as public officials and 
powerful economic actors encourage a climate of decision-making based more on 
personal interest than collective good.  In this way, the policies and symbolic gestures 
made by elected officials under the Menemist regime came to be read as little more than 
bald-faced attempts to counter criticism of the implementation of Argentina’s particular 
style of neoliberalism. 67  Memoria Activa’s insistence that the AMIA bombing and its 
lack of legal resolution are Argentine, rather than Jewish, problems arise within this 
context of a ‘crisis of institutionality’ that they see as endemic throughout much of 
society.  In this way, and perhaps ironically, the vision of cultural plurality advanced by 
Memoria Activa is best understood as emerging in dialogue with state-directed neoliberal 
                                                 
67 Diego Melamud reflects a sentiment expressed by many when he asserts that the 1990s also witnessed a 
“menemization” of the Jewish collectivity, with the leaders of community institutions also paying lip 
service to the good of the community while undertaking fraudulent privatizations, making drastic cuts in 
the number employees and social services provided, and acting out of personal interests in deliberately 




 This chapter has explored the ways in which the 1992 and 1994 bomb attacks on 
Jewish targets in Buenos Aires became a contentious point of criticism against numerous 
institutions of the Argentine State, and led to the organization of sectors of the Jewish 
community into groups engaged in public criticism of the government’s policies and 
actions both concerning the attacks and with regards to an emergent politics of cultural 
pluralism.  In the next chapter, I turn to a closer consideration of the way the demands 
made by these groups intersect with a discourse of impunity as adopted by other 
organizations mobilized to pressure the government to provide legal justice to those 
involved in state repression during the Dirty War.  In doing so, I focus on configurations 
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“So that they don’t die twice”:  Disappearance, Impunity, Memory, and 
Protest in Argentina’s Human Rights Organizations 
 
 
La memoria no se construye en los museos sino en las calles, luchando para cambiar la historia. 
(Memory is not constructed in museums, but in the streets, in the struggle to change history.) 




One of the functions of the intellectual is to clarify in a critical manner the politico-social context and to 
denounce in a responsible way any hypocrisy that legitimates injustice or repression.  Walter Benjamin... 
honored this mission [by] wanting, as he said, to rub against the grain of history to challenge the thinking, 
the attitudes, and the actions that are accommodated and adapted to, unfortunately, much more rapidly than 
what we imagine...  [This is] fashion, [which he reminds us] is the sister of death and a parody of the same 
cadaver.  Fashion changes quickly, so quickly that it produces deaths and is converted into the new...  
When [memory] is just a current topic it becomes evocation and all manner of evocation is forgotten in a 
heartbeat.  Evocation is ephemeral, but memory becomes a permanent element when there exist policies 
that accompany it as a motive for the future.  Memory, so that it is not a diversion or a method of 
manipulation, should always be a mechanism for forward projection, something to do.  Memory is not 
memory unless it is a future construction.   




 This chapter takes a closer look at the idea of impunity as a central element in the 
demands made by Memoria Activa and other organized groups of family members of 
AMIA victims on the ethical register.  I look specifically at how the notion is used and 
                                                 
1 Una de las funciones del intelectual es la de clarificar de manera crítica el contexto político-social y la de 
denunciar de modo responsable cualquier hipocresía que legitime la injusticia y la represión. Walter 
Benjamin.... hizo honor a esa misión...[con] .....querer, como decía él, pasarle el contrapelo a la historia 
para desafiar al pensamiento, a la actitud y a la acción que se acomoda y se adapta, lamentablemente, 
mucho más rápido de lo que imaginamos. ...[Esto es] la moda [que] es colega de la muerte y parodia del 
mismo cadáver. La moda cambia rápido, tan rápido que provoca la muerte y se convierte en otra nueva....  
Cuando [la memoria] es sólo tópico de la actualidad deviene en evocación y todo modo de evocar se 
olvida con un estornudo. La evocación es efímera, pero la memoria resulta un elemento permanente 
cuando existen políticas que la acompañan como motivo futuro. La memoria para que no sea ni un 
divertimento lúdico ni un modo de manipulación siempre debe ser un mecanismo de proyección hacia 
delante, algo por hacer. La memoria no es memoria si no es construcción futura. “De Walter Benjamin a la 
DAIA,” published in Página 12, 20 November 2007. 
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understood by human rights organizations in Argentina, which are primarily responsible 
for the term’s installation in public discourse in the years following the return to 
democracy.  Here, I refer to the human rights groups as counterimpunity organizations in 
recognition of this central feature of their rhetoric.  Though often referred to by the first 
of these variants (organizaciones de derechos humanos), it is also common in Argentina 
to hear these groups referred to by the second (organizaciones contra la impunidad), and 
thus my choice of terms comes not only out of a desire for analytic emphasis but also in 
concordance with local interpretations of these groups, their central tenets, and ultimate 
goals.  However, part of my purpose here is precisely to unpack the meaning given to the 
notion of impunity in Argentina, and the way it is deployed by different and opposing 
sectors of society in the continuous construction of a national historical memory defining 
recent events.  I show how the notion of impunity acts as a frame and a lens around and 
through which historical and current events are discussed, understood, and debated, and 
is held in a dialogic opposition to the neoliberal era politics of forgetting.  
 In the second half of the chapter, I draw specifically on my research with 
Memoria Activa and the splinter group Citizens of the Plaza, showing how they draw 
upon the use of memory by earlier counterimpunity organizations in working to establish 
an ethics of remembrance that includes a notion of the remembering as an active practice 
and a central component of citizenship.  In doing so, I demonstrate how this ethics of 
remembrance and the understandings of the rights and responsibilities of citizenship that 
accompanies it appeal to both moral and religious precepts.  Furthermore, I show how 
this practice of memory is specifically and deliberately configured as an occupation of 
public space (as an example of action on the ethical register), locating the challenge to 
government practice as an appeal symbolically though not in practice entirely placed 
outside of and apart from the government institutions it seeks to change.  The next 
chapter focuses, then, on the ways these challenges are also pursued on the practical 
register within the halls of government, following more openly the established 
institutional channels. 
   
Part 1:  Impunity and Disappearance 
 Before discussing in more detail how Memoria Activa both draws on and departs 
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from the long tradition of public protest in Argentina and the protests of other 
counterimpunity movements, I set the stage for an analysis of their actions by outlining 
some aspects of the historical context that laid the background for the social and political 
climate in which the group formed and has operated.  In exploring the idea of impunity as 
used in Argentina, I find a connection to the idea of disappearance.  The word 
‘disappearance’ holds in Argentina an inescapable reference to a method of repression 
utilized by the last military dictatorship.  In proposing that impunity holds an ineludible 
relationship to impunity, I am contending that the idea of impunity as used in Argentina 
depends and draws on the earlier frame of disappearance as producing a particular kind of 
wound or damage to the social fabric.  The figure of the disappeared person or, more 
precisely, the concept of the act of disappearance and the notion of impunity have been 
stitched together into a unified way of understanding and interpreting the recent past.  In 
elaborating this point, I find it useful to think of disappearance as forming a kind of 
counterpoint to the idea of impunity.  The idea of a counterpoint as I use it here is in the 
sense of the necessary underside or counterpart, something apart and different from the 
first but at once inextricably intertwined within a contained whole.2  In using this idea, I 
show how this entangling of the traumatic past (disappearance) with the problems of the 
present (impunity) has had a direct influence on the ways in which current events are 
interpreted and encoded within a language of trauma and of justice that has gained 
widespread popular and political support in recent years.  This application beyond the 
sphere of the Dirty War reveals the overarching significance and emotional and moral 
resonance that the idea of impunity has taken on as an interpretive frame, and thus it is 
essential to have this history in mind in analyzing the use of memory in contemporary 
counterimpunity movements and their resonance throughout the broader society. 
 The historical overview I give here in Part 1 is concerned primarily with events 
that occurred before and often long before my fieldwork in Buenos Aires.  The analysis I 
provide relies on a selective review of journalistic and academic treatments of events 
from the 1960s through the 1990s.  My interpretation of the events from these decades 
                                                 
2 The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 2000, holds as definitions for counterpoint: 
1) The technique of combining two or more melodic lines in such a way that they establish a harmonic 
relationship while retaining their linear individuality; 2) A contrasting but parallel element, item, or theme.  
My argument here adopts both of these senses. 
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has been formed by the primary and secondary literature on these decades and, to a much 
lesser degree, on my experiences living in Argentina for a brief portion of the early 
1990s.  However, it has also unquestionably been influenced by the stories and 
interpretations that I encountered talking to people and reading contemporary treatments 
during the times I lived in or visited Argentina in the years following the social and 
political changes that have occurred in this first decade of the 21st century.  In order to 
both acknowledge this particular perspective and convey more clearly some of the ways 
in which these events are talked about and remembered at this time by those who lived 
through them, I have provided sketches of some of my field experiences and the stories I 
was told by these participants.   
 
State Terrorism 
 Accounting for successive national governments in Argentina during the 
twentieth century shows a pattern of interrupted democracy, with frequent seizures of 
power by the military.  These often occurred in response to chaotic moments of social, 
political and economic crisis, and were publicly proclaimed as attempts to redirect the 
course of the nation.  Populist leader and military general Juan Domingo Perón was 
deposed from power in one such military coup 1955.  His return to the presidency in 
1973 came after a number of punctuated military regimes were forced to yield to public 
demands for the re-legalization of Peronism as a political party.  Tensions between 
radical labor unions, student activists, and militant revolutionary groups, on the one hand, 
and the regime of General Juan C. Onganía (1966-1970) and right-wing death squads on 
the other, had led to spiraling political violence and increasing state repression.3  Perón’s 
return to the presidency, while heralded by both the right and left of his party, served only 
to increase the divisions between the Peronist factions, and radicalized the militant left.  
Perón’s death in 1974, with the assumption to power of his now-widowed third wife 
María Estela Martínez de Perón (Isabel), allowed the right-wing factions led by José 
López Rega to implement even harsher measures against the militant left and society in 
general.   
 On March 24, 1976, a military coup put an end to the chaotic presidency of 
                                                 
3 See Robben 2005 for a detailed treatment of this era. 
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Isabelita de Perón.  Within days, Congress was dissolved, and all high level courts, 
including the Supreme Court, were adjourned.  Major political party activities were shut 
down, with communist and socialist parties banned entirely.  The military intervened in 
the major unions and the right to strike was suspended.  The state of siege, in effect 
regularly since the late 1960s, was maintained, and the military leaders threaten to 
prescribe severe penalties, including the death penalty, to any who attacked members of 
the security forces, military installations, or public services. 
 The dictatorship rapidly began implementing what it called the Process of 
National Reorganization (El Proceso de reorganización nacional, or simply El Proceso), 
calculated to redesign Argentine society and cure it of the social ills that it argued were 
brought about by the revolutionary Marxist groups and left-wing Peronist ideology.  This 
was to be achieved by the complete destruction of the opposition.  Many researchers of 
this era have noted that the repression was carried out through a strategy of 
counterrevolutionary warfare heavily influenced at first by French military techniques 
and later through counter-insurgency training by American forces.  For example, Marie-
Monique Robin argues in her powerful documentary Escuadrones de la muerte: La 
escuela francesa (Death Squads:  The French School) that Argentine security forces 
received extensive training from the French permanent military mission in Argentina, 
maintained until 1981.  This mission, she shows, was comprised of ex-combatants from 
the war in Algeria and taught Argentine officers their methods of urban counter-
revolutionary warfare, particularly the notion of fighting the insurgency through 
intelligence gathering, not territorial control.4   As she explains: 
 
 The methods of the so-named Battle of Algiers were exported to the Buenos Aires War School 
(Escuela de Guerra de Buenos Aires), importing the conception of the internal enemy.  That was 
the basis of the French doctrine, based on their experience in the fight against an enemy in an 
urban environment: an enemy from the inside.  Before the arrival of the French, for the Argentine 
military the enemy came from abroad, Chile or Paraguay, but with this new conception the enemy 
could be a neighbor, a teacher, a Peronist, or a leftist militant that put Western values in danger.  
And to defeat this hidden enemy, intermingled with the population, who doesn’t wear a uniform, 
it was necessary to pull information from the French school or doctrine.  Intelligence is 
fundamental:  when they say intelligence they mean interrogation, and then torture (to get 
information), and then, to get rid of the tortured, they make them disappear.5  
                                                 
4 See also Robben 2005: 180-184; Perelli 1994. 
5  From an interview with the director, published in Página 12, 13 October 2004.   
Los métodos de la denominada batalla de Argel fueron exportados a la Escuela de Guerra de Buenos 
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 Others have traced the connections between the tactics used by the Argentine 
military and the training and ideas some of its key members received as part of US 
military counterinsurgency courses in 1961 and 1962, whose participants included future 
junta leaders like Jorge Rafael Videla and Roberto Viola.  However, already by the late 
1960s, Argentine military officials were beginning to develop their own particularly local 
counterrevolutionary doctrine, based firmly within a vision of divine hierarchy and moral 
right [ex., Feitlowitz 1998; Graziano 1992].  While continuing to borrow French military 
tactics as applicable to urban warfare, analysis of the guiding principles of the Proceso 
emphasize how the Argentine military saw themselves as different from both the French 
and the Americans in being concerned with an internal enemy within their own national 
territory.  Thus, it is argued, the military viewed the struggle as primarily a cultural war 
over the future and direction of the Argentine nation, one that necessitated at the same 
time the merciless cleansing of the national body and the reestablishment of cultural and 
historical order amongst the populace at large.  The coup that brought the military to 
power in 1976 was, as General Videla insisted, “A fight that we neither sought nor 
desired, a fight that was forced upon us, but which we accepted because nothing more 
and nothing less than the national being was at stake.”6   Looking back, many scholars 
and observers have seen this as reflective of the sharp cultural and ideological divisions 
in society, with the military fearing the guerilla groups for their perceived threat to the 
Christian values and Western cultural heritage, their view of divine hierarchy and natural 
order contrasting sharply with the guerillas’ view of an ideal society expressing the 
fundamental equality of all people.  As Robben notes, “Theirs was not just a contest 
                                                                                                                                                 
Aires, importando la concepción del enemigo interno, que era la base de la doctrina francesa, por su 
experiencia en la lucha contra un enemigo en un medio urbano: un enemigo interior. Hasta la llegada de 
los franceses, para los militares argentinos el enemigo provenía del exterior, Chile o Paraguay, pero con 
esta nueva concepción el enemigo podía ser un vecino, un maestro, un peronista o un militante de 
izquierda que ponía en peligro los valores occidentales. Y para derrotar a ese enemigo escondido, 
entremezclado en la población, que no tiene uniforme, se necesitaba recabar información en la doctrina o 
escuela francesa. La inteligencia es fundamental: quien dice inteligencia dice interrogatorio, y entonces 
tortura (para sacar información) y luego, para deshacerse de los torturados, los hace desaparecer. 
This documentary film is now being cited by former military officials who have recently come to trial, in 
particular in relation to the disappearance of two French nuns in Argentina in 1977.  The defendants argue 
that it was French agents who carried out these disappearances, and cite Robin’s film as evidence.  As of 
writing, Ms. Robin had been called to testify in the case but had yet to do so, and the cases against these 
officials were still pending. See Página 12, 25 January 2007, “Astiz llevó sus chicanas a los tribunales”, 
and 2 February 2007, “’Impartí órdenes que fueron cumplidas.’”  
6 La Nación, 14 December 1976, cited in Robben 1994: 171. 
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about power but a contest about the space of culture, about the cultural confines and 
social conditions within which the Argentine people were supposed to lead their lives.”  
[1995: 172]. 
 These scholars have further argued that the idea of the nation as a beleaguered 
body in need of saving was used to justify the military’s seizure of power and program of 
social cleansing.  In conducting this cultural war, the dictatorship and its supporters are 
shown to have used the media to propagate a prolific and authoritative discourse that 
divided the world into black and white, us and them, the moral right and the 
“subversives.”7  In doing so, they are seen as having sought to establish this subclass as 
less than human, and not Argentine, effecting their expulsion from the national self.  
Evidence of this is found in their attempts to implement this division, appealing to 
Argentine “citizens” to help in the battle against subversion.8  Such appeals were 
accompanied by the discursive stripping of citizenship to any who would oppose the 
regime.  “The repression is directed against a minority we do not consider Argentine...a 
terrorist is not only someone who plants bombs, but a person whose ideas are contrary to 
our Western, Christian civilization.”9  The designation of “subversives” as “internal 
externals” is seen as evidence of how the dictatorship worked to justify its repression 
against the “cancer” that threatened society.     
 This dichotomy of society into two uniform wholes, within the subsequent 
demonization of the created Other, is in no way particular to the Argentine case, nor was 
it devoid of historical resonance in Argentina.  The category of the “subversive” was as 
much a transformation of Sarmiento’s “barbarians” or the characterization of anarchists 
at the turn of the century as it was influenced by a real fear by the conservatives of the 
effects of the Cuban revolution or radical trade unionism.  Though it was the case that 
powerful economic and political sectors of society feared the possibility of a 
revolutionary change, they borrowed and adapted well-known discursive tropes that, for 
their familiarity, resonated and made sense in intuitive ways.    
                                                 
7 The dictatorship responded to critics by claiming to be “derechos y humanos,” playing on the multiple 
senses of the word “derecho” in Spanish.  Here, rather than referring to “rights”, they are asserting 
themselves as “just,” in the sense of fair or righteous. 
8 For example, Feitlowitz quotes how in Videla’s first speech to the nation as junta leader, he appeals to the 
public, “Citizens, assume your obligations as Reserve Soldiers.  Your information is always useful.  Bring 
it to us.”  Published in all the major newspapers, 27 March 1976, and Feitlowitz 1998:23. 
9 Spoken at a press conference18 Dec 1977, quoted in Feitlowitz 1998:24. 
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 However, the armed revolutionary groups were in large measure in disarray by 
1976, having suffered greatly at the hands of the ultra-right-wing death squads and the 
faltering of their base of public support following the return of Perón.  Thus, the 
sweeping destruction imposed by the dictatorship was in practice more an attempt to rid 
society of a way of thinking rather than a defensive move against an active threat.  Nearly 
anyone concerned with social justice was seen as a potential target, from high school 
students asking for state subsidies for student transportation to soup kitchen volunteers 
and priests and nuns seen as influenced by liberation theology.  For as much as the 
dictatorship tried to portray itself as the savior of the nation, and for as much as many 
sectors of society tried to believe that those taken “must have done something (wrong),” 
the arbitrariness of the repression became increasingly clear as time went on.   
 In her book A Lexicon of Terror:  Argentina and the Legacies of Torture, 
Marguerite Feitlowitz describes how the kinds of terror imposed by the dictatorship 
permeated and appropriated even everyday language in ways that left deep scars in 
society even after the return to democracy.  She studies the way the Argentine language 
was warped by the actions of the dictatorship, asking people, “What words can you no 
longer tolerate?  What words do you no longer say?”10   She shows how the deformation 
of language delved deep into Argentine social life, taking over and resignifiying cultural 
aspects an almost playful appropriation that was to decisively lock horrific scenes of 
torture into the negotiation of quotidian life.  For example, the “submarino”, a common 
form of hot chocolate, became the name for one of the methods of torture imported from 
the French in Algeria; the parilla, or grill, a ubiquitous feature in Argentine asados or 
cookouts, was the metal bed prisoners were strapped to during torture sessions with 
electric prods.  The resignification of the cultural norm and basic elements of a shared 
national cultural worked to further expel the victims from the national body.    
 Perhaps the most pervasive example of this distortion of the everyday was 
precisely the transformation of the word “disappear” into a transitive verb.  Someone 
could now be “disappeared” by someone else.  Counterimpunity organizations estimate 
that some 30,000 people were disappeared by the armed security forces, the majority in 
                                                 
10 Feitlowitz 1998: xi. 
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the years immediately preceding and following the 1976 coup.11   Evidence from 
survivors and extant documentation demonstrate how these individuals were abducted 
and taken away to clandestine detention centers, held often for years without recourse to 
legal procedures or any official acknowledgement of their detention.  In the next chapter, 
I discuss Argentina’s role in placing the prohibition on forced disappearances within an 
international discourse of human rights, and how this worked within the political 
sensibilities at the time.  Here, I explore the history and nature of this notion of 
disappearance within Argentina, and I show how the use of this method of repression and 
the effects it engendered have held significant value within the debates over memory that 
gained such prominence in Argentina in the years that followed, and which form an 
important and influential part of the social context within which Memoria Activa was 
formed and has operated.   
 
Public Secrets   
 In thinking about the practice of disappearance in Argentina, I find it useful to 
keep in mind the idea of the ‘public secret’ elaborated by anthropologist Michael Taussig 
in his book Defacement as that which everyone knows but no one can say, and perhaps 
not even think.  The public secret, Taussig says, is, among other things, “that which is 
generally known, but cannot be articulated,” the core of social knowledge that consists 
fundamentally in “knowing what not to know” [1999:5,2].  It seems to me that 
disappearance was created as a kind of public secret that allowed the dictatorship to at 
once conduct widespread repression while simultaneously denying their involvement in 
what were even then extrajudicial acts of violence, as part of a rhetoric aimed at 
establishing their standing as a legitimate governing body.  At the same time, and perhaps 
more importantly, the inability to articulate this reality can be seen to have spawned 
social effects, constructing a kind of ‘climate of fear’ that others have argued permeated 
Argentine society during this era.   
                                                 
11 The CONADEP report cites 8,960 documented cases of disappearance, but acknowledges that this 
number is far below the actual figure.  The number 30,000 is based upon a rough multiplication of the 
available evidence on disappearances across the nation.  Though the number is only an estimate, it has been 
widely adopted within Argentina, and holds significant symbolic value.  In this case, the estimated number 
holds far more resonance than the more “official” number established through careful research by an 
investigative body.   
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 I see the public secret working in a number of ways.  Though the practice of 
forced disappearance has historical resonance with the Nazi concept of Nacht und Nebel, 
in which prisoners would “vanish in the night and fog,”12 it was not systematically 
practiced in Argentina before the 1970s.  Political violence was nothing new in 
Argentina, and indeed, the spirals of political violence and social traumatization in the 
1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s set the stage for the dictatorship’s Proceso [Robben 2005].  
Yet the act of disappearance converted the known threats from history into an uncertain 
and unknown danger threatening in the present.   
 By officially denying their involvement in the disappearances, the military could 
publicly proclaim a position of moral right, and thus avoid jeopardizing its legitimacy 
within Argentina and abroad.13  Their worries over international retributions were 
particularly acute ahead of the 1978 World Soccer Cup.  This event, hosted by Argentina 
and culminating in the country’s first world championship title, made the country and the 
military government the spotlight of international attention.  A number of observers have 
noted the ways in which the dictatorship used major publicity campaigns in seeking to 
legitimize their status as the ruling political body to an attentive global audience.14  In 
doing so, they frequently reversed the blame of the disappearances back onto the victims, 
claiming that the missing were either killed in open combat against the (officially) armed 
forces or had chosen to run off and were living happily in a self-imposed exile.  
Furthermore, by couching this Cold War era repression in terms of counterterrorism 
measures, waged against communist insurgents, they enjoyed hidden tacit and active 
support for their efforts, particularly from the United States.15    
 However, the flip side of an public secret is that the denied must also be known.  
In this way, the dictatorship’s strategy can be seen as equally dependant on the instilling 
within the populace a sense of uncertainty and fear about the possible consequences of 
                                                 
12 This concept was clearly expressed in Hitler’s decree of 7 December 1941. 
13 As noted in Chapter 2, they were particularly keen to avoid any visible acts or declarations of anti-
Semitism, so as not to negatively impact the arms trade with Israel.  Israel provided at least 13% of the 
weapons imported by Argentina in the period between 1976-1981. 
14 See Gilbert and Vitagliano 1998; Llonto 2005; Mason 1995 for analysis of the 1978 World Soccer Cup. 
15 Recently declassified CIA documents have provided concrete evidence of the long-suspected tacit and 
active support that the dictatorship received from the US government, in particular then Secretary of State 
Henry Kissinger.  These documents also demonstrate US support for the Plan Condor that linked repressive 
dictatorships throughout the Southern Cone.   However, the Carter administration did also place pressure on 
the dictatorship to improve its human rights records.      
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dissent.  The military was explicit in talking about its “war against subversives,” widely 
referencing or staging armed confrontations and utilizing measures that allowed a certain 
degree of visibility, such as having many abductions conducted in broad daylight on busy 
streets.  In an oft-quoted statement from May 1976, Gen. Ibérico Saint Jean, then 
governor of the Province of Buenos Aires, said.  “First we will kill all the subversives, 
then we will kill their collaborators, then...their sympathizers, then...those who remain 
indifferent, and finally, we will kill the timid.”16 
 The deliberate spreading of uncertainty concerning the disappeareds’ fate, even 
beside the explicit denial of their existence, acted as another form of psychological 
torture for the loved ones of the missing.17  The fact that some disappeared were 
occasionally allowed to make phone calls to relatives, and the rumors persisting through 
the end of dictatorship that the disappeared were still alive and being kept in forced labor 
camps in the interior, are often cited by the family members as only feeding further the 
uncertainty they suffered.  Many relate having retained hope of the disappeareds’ return 
even up to the restoration of democracy.      
 It was this combination of widespread knowledge with public denial of 
responsibility and the construction of systematic roadblocks that thwarted the search for 
information about the disappeared that made the public secret of disappearance and 
torture a daily reality in dictatorship era Argentina.  Others have noted the effects this 
kind of repression had on society.18  Juan Corradi has used the term “climate of fear” to 
describe the sense of dread and uncertainty that many relate permeated Argentine society 
during this era [1987; 1992].  As one man whom I spoke with remembers the era, “You 
                                                 
16 Carina Perelli claims that this statement is from 1977 [Perelli 1994: 43]; however, though widely 
disseminated and repeated in months to come, the statement first appears in May 1976, only shortly after 
the coup.  Robben points out that by 1977, Saint Jean denied having said this, accusing the Montoneros of 
fabricating the quote (Somos 1977 38: 19, cited in Robben 2005:394).  However, Robben is astute in 
observing that whether or not the original and highly quoted statement is authentic, it clearly reflected 
military thinking of the time, and is echoed in other public statements by high military officials from 1976-
1977 [See Robben 2005: 394 for further references].  The version in Spanish reads: Primero matamos a los 
subversivos; después a los colaboradores, a los simpatizantes, a los indiferentes, y finalmente a quienes no 
reaccionan.  
17 Some of the phone calls and temporary releases of the disappeared are also likely the result of the human 
dynamics of repressive machinery; the captors held their own particular relationships and set of interests 
with regards to their captives.  A recent portrayal of this theme comes in the 1999 film by Marco Bechis, 
Garage Olimpo.   
18 Nora Sveaass provides a compelling description of the way these tactics operate as the “organized 
destruction of meaning” [1994a]. 
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could not gather even three people on a street corner, stop to chat, anything.  The street 
was not safe.”19  Carina Perelli argues that this culture of fear “was conducive to an 
extreme individualization and privatization of human beings” [1992:43]. This formed 
part of an atomization of society during this era that has been discussed by observers such 
as Beatriz Sarlo and Elizabeth Jelin.  The erosion of confidence in the public sphere 
argued to have brought on by the lack of support from public and private institutions, 
dictatorship policies designed to weaken trade unions and universities, and the 
prohibition on the use of public spaces had concrete political and social implications both 
at the time and in the perceptions and understandings of democracy that have followed.  
Some of these implications are developed in later portions of this dissertation.  Here, I 
offer one example of the way this era was remembered to me by one woman, now in her 
seventies, who lived through it.   
 
9 de Julio, 1977  
 Even now you can see the fear in Carina’s face as she tells her tale.  Clearly, it is a 
story she has told many times, but that maintains its impact for her all the same.  This 
time we were sitting in El Banchero on Corrientes, a local bar just a block away from the 
Plaza Lavalle, and a frequent spot for social gatherings after Memoria Activa’s weekly 
actos.  Though the women of the group tended to complain about the service (the coffee 
was, in their estimation, inevitably served “ice cold”), the owner of the bar was often 
credited for his actions one day several years ago, when he forcibly ejected a former 
Dirty War repressor from the locale.  Nonetheless, Carina lowers her voice and moves 
her head in close to mine as she begins to tell me story.  She sets the stage by telling me 
that it was 9 de julio, July 9, day of independence in Argentina, a holiday in celebration 
of the nation and national pride.  At that time she worked selling encyclopedias, and, 
even though it was a holiday, she needed to go deliver some volumes to a client.  The 
encyclopedias were heavy and bulky, and Carina needed to take two buses to get where 
she was going.  So she rushed to change purses, to change to one she could carry over her 
shoulder and free up her hands for the heavy books.  She said goodbye to her daughters, 
promising to be back soon.  Having the day off from school, they were angry with her for 
                                                 
19 Interview, June 8, 2000, Reconquista, Santa Fe. 
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going off to work instead of spending time with them.  The elder, having come from the 
performance all Argentine children prepare in honor of this day,  removed her little lapel 
pin flag (still an ubiquitous feature of all Argentine national celebrations), and pinned it 
onto her mother, saying somewhat sarcastically that she should wear the flag since she 
was so dedicated to working for her country.  It was only after she’d gotten on the bus 
that Carina realized that in changing purses, she had left behind her wallet with all of her 
ID documents.  This was a serious matter in dictatorship Argentina, when those without 
documents could easily be accused of having abandoned them due to their “subversive” 
activities.  The bus was stopped by security forces, its passengers forced to disembark 
and ordered to line up in two lines, one for those with ID, and one for those without.  
Knowing that “in those days, going out without ID was the worst thing you could do,” the 
people around her told her that under no circumstances should she get into the line for 
those without documents.  When they came to her, and asked for her ID, she desperately 
tried to explain everything, the encyclopedias, the purse, her rush to return home quickly.  
They took her over to the man in charge, to whom she repeated her appeal for 
understanding.  He looked at her carefully, thinking, observing, and finally, after what 
seemed to her an interminable silence, he said, alright, this time, ma’am, I’ll let you go, 
but only because, even though you had to go out to work today, you did not forget that 
this is the day of the fatherland, and you took the care to wear your lapel pin flag.    
 She looks around a bit sheepishly, knowing that her story does not compare with 
the tragic tales some of those around her could tell, the ex-desaparecidos and family 
members of victims.  Nonetheless, she clearly feels that what she has to say is important.  
It is, after all, what she lived through, her experience, her part in the national story.  
Carina was fine, nothing happened to her.  Nothing, except for the very real terror that 
has marked her to this day.  A terror that spawns its own lasting effects. 
 Carina was a regular participant in Memoria Activa’s Monday demonstrations, 
the monthly memorials held at the AMIA, and later in the gatherings sustained by 
Citizens of the Plaza.  The importance of memory, and her felt need to keep the memory 
of traumatic past events alive, is reflected in her dedication to attending these acts of 
remembrance.  It also undoubtedly influenced her desire and inclination to relate this 
story to me.  For her and many other participants in these demonstrations, the history of 
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the Dirty War and the lasting effects it had engendered were an inescapable part of 
contemporary reality.  This history and their struggle for justice and memory in the 
AMIA and Embassy bombings were inseparable. 
 
Disappearing Memory 
 The use of disappearance as a method of repression has been noted as having 
effects that go even beyond this resignification of sociality and public spaces.  The 
treatment of dead bodies in particular is cited as affecting culturally relevant ideas and 
practices of remembrance [Robben 2000].  After assassination, many of the disappeared 
were buried in unmarked graves.  Some of these were later dug up and dissolved with 
acid, ahead of a 1978 fact-finding commission of the OAS sent to investigate the 
allegations of military brutality.  Other disappeared were drugged and thrown, still alive, 
out of airplanes into the sea.20   This treatment of the bodies shows how, “state 
terror...was as much inflicted on the dead as on the living” [Robben 2000: 93].   
 As Robben and others have noted, disappearance and the subsequent vanishing of 
the corpse functioned to 1) prevent revenge on the direct perpetrators from the deceased’s 
friends and family; 2) prevent the mobilization of international opinion; and 3) avoid 
future judicial and historical condemnation through the erasure of evidence.  However, 
there were deeper cultural reasons and effects behind this extension of terror into the 
afterworld, including this desire to invalidate the social and political struggles of the 
victims [Robben 2000: 108-109].  The erasure of the dead body accompanied the denial 
of the disappeareds’ continued existence as a person, and converted a recognized social 
entity into a void.  This figure of the ‘missing’ thus has come to represent a hole in the 
fabric of society.  With no records and no trace of their passing available to the relatives, 
the disappeared were denied their social existence, effectively ceasing to exist outside of 
their loved ones’ memories.  The act of disappearance created the social death of persons 
without the concomitant physical death, denying this culturally valued piece to the 
                                                 
20 The confirmation of this public secret by former Navy Capitan Adolfo Scilingo to journalist and Horacio 
Verbitsky in 1995 sent shock waves throughout Argentine society, and gave further impulse to the demands 
for justice for all perpetrators of the repression.  See Verbitsky 1995.  In a public spectacle that included 
Scilingo’s insistence on his own victimization, a dubious hunger strike, and performed courtroom faintings, 
the former Navy Capitan who had admitted to personally throwing some 30 drugged but still living 
individuals out of an airplane into the Río de la Plata, was tried in a Spanish court in 2005 and sentenced to 
640 years in prison. 
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processes of grieving and remembering.  By entering into houses or snatching victims out 
of public spaces, the security forces left families in a liminal state.  The parental ability to 
protect their children was violated,21 as it was with the appropriation of the victims’ 
children, and no certainty of death or destiny was left behind.  In this way, the 
disappeared were to be gone forever, permanently desocialized and removed from the 
Argentine social fabric.  This worked as an attempt to prevent their reincorporation into 
society as deceased persons, whose deaths could be mourned and commemorated, and 
whose struggles could be vindicated.      
 It is this desocialization and the appropriation of the right to commemoration that 
is so forcefully reputed in the actions of the counterimpunity organizations.  From the 
anonymous silhouettes plastered across city walls and the bars of detention centers, to the 
blocks long strips of photos carried during the Resistance Marches (Marchas de la 
Resistencia), the presence of the missing is a powerful and recurrent trope taken up by 
these organizations in rebuttal of the denial of their memory.   
 The discursive power that forced disappearance has gained within the human 
rights sectors of Argentine society as a symbol of trauma can be evidenced in the 
hierarchization of victims and their relatives and friends.  One active and constant 
participants in Memoria Activa’s actos lamented to me that the leaders of the group had 
refused to let her serve as one of the weekly speakers.  This, she insisted, was because 
they did not recognize her as holding the same importance as the Madres of Plaza de 
Mayo.  Though her support for their struggle was unwavering, she herself chose not to 
don the iconic pañuelo blanco or white headscarf that identified the Mothers.  Her 
explanation for her difference from the group rested on the fact that “A mí también me 
mataron un hijo.  Pero a mí me entrgaron el cuerpo.”  (“They also killed one of my sons.  
But they returned his body to me.”)  Her having had the ability to bury her son when he 
died led to a minimization of her suffering on a cultural scale of trauma that, in response 
to the dictatorship’s denials and justifications, gave primacy to the anguish of 
                                                 
21 Victims’ property was also appropriated, though haphazardly.  At times it was taken for the personal use 
of the task force members, with or without the explicit or implicit consent of their superiors, other times as 
a directed plan from above, serving to fill the coffers of the military or its higher-ranking officers.  Michelle 
Bonner provides an interesting analytical framework for interpreting how the human rights’ organizations 
appropriated this notion of protecting the family in order to lend their demands a cultural resonance and 
legitimacy [2007]. 
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disappearance, born of the deeply felt need for official acknowledgement of their 
suffering. 
 Up to this point, the work of this chapter has been concerned with showing the 
way the notion of disappearance has operated within Argentine society, and the way it 
has been taken up within human rights circles, public discourse, and scholarly works 
concerning the dictatorship era.  Having traced the force that the figure of disappearance 
has within Argentine society, I can now turn to a direct consideration of the notion of 
impunity as deployed in formulations on the nature, role, and practice of memory within 
Argentina at the turn of the 21st century.  Understanding disappearance is essential in this 
exercise, as the social wrongs that are held to be imputed by impunity exist in 
counterpoint to the social damage that is understood to have been wrought by the act of 
disappearance.  First, however, I trace some theoretical considerations on understanding 
these notions and constructions of the past. 
 
Through the Eyes of the Observers  
 Attempts to describe the semantic workings of Argentine society have often noted 
the important role given to discourses about previous eras and events in the construction 
of understandings of the present.  Daniel James argued in the 1980s that a certain fatalism 
among Argentines both led to and was derived from an exaggerated tendency to interpret 
the present in terms of tropes from the past, based around irruptive moments or figures 
that are endowed with the power to represent broader social trends [James 1988:3].  This 
treatment differs from Antonius Robben’s more recent interpretation, in which he has 
understood contemporary Argentine society in terms of a notion of social trauma based 
on the political violence of the 1960s and 1970s (with roots in the 1950s).  He argues 
that, in this context, “Remembrance is a desperate attempt master and translate 
intolerable as well as unknowable traumatic experiences into narrative by articulating 
their meaning through repetition and reinterpretation” [2005: 357].    
 While both James and Robben’s formulations hold powerful interpretive value, I 
argue that it is essential to emphasize the way certain discourses about the past are drawn 
upon in a mutually constructive tension between individually motivated groups of actors 
acting towards the procurement of their own understood interests.  Therefore, it is not just 
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that Argentines interpret the present through the use of tropes from and about the past, 
but that these tropes both 1) are adjusted to fit particular situations in order to give 
legitimative force to the demands being made; and 2) become part of a contentious 
process of interpretation between complementary and competing groups, based upon the 
understanding of personal and group interests as seen from a multiplicity of subject 
positions.  Likewise, though Robben usefully employs the idea of social trauma to 
understanding the ways in which the past is currently discussed within Argentina, this 
idea problematically places the analytical emphasis on the passive position of the victim, 
in this case Argentine society as a whole.  Instead, I argue that the use of the idea of 
social trauma as the analytic tool for understanding contemporary Argentine society 
misses the important ways in which this idea of social trauma is itself a historically 
constituted trope frequently and actively deployed within Argentina.  Rather than viewing 
Argentine society as itself a subject undergoing the necessary and difficult healing 
process after a period of trauma, I find it analytically more useful to emphasize the way 
in which different actors and groups within Argentine society adopt the discourse of 
trauma, in the particular way in which it has been constructed within Argentina, in 
making their demands.  By doing so, we open up the possibility of exploring how and 
why different groups, utilizing the same discursive tropes, come to substantially different 
interpretations of the past and asserting widely varying demands for constructing the 
future.  In the remainder of this section, I show the ways in which the idea of “impunity” 
has become an orienting principle for understanding current social problems, and how 
this idea of impunity grew out of and was dependent upon the discourse of the trauma of 
disappearance as a personal and social reality as described above.  The remainder of this 
chapter continues this exploration of the ways in which memory has become a subject of 
contention and a political tool in post-dictatorship Argentina. 
  
Constructing Memory 
 After seven years in power, the military government was forced to call for general 
elections in 1983.  This came amidst increasing pressure from human rights groups 
demanding accountability for the ruthless repressive tactics used by the military and 
general public unrest under declining economic conditions.  The breaking point came, 
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however, with the military’s disastrous defeat in the War for the Malvinas.  Needing to 
bolster its public support, the military once again deployed a rhetoric of nationalism and 
tried to retake possession of the Malvinas Islands in 1982, which had been occupied by 
the British since 1833.  Banking on the hope for little resistance, then de facto president 
Leopoldo Galtieri deployed Argentine warships manned largely by young conscripts 
fulfilling their year of obligatory military service.  The move was extremely popular at 
first, and garnered the military some of the support it sought.  But the British responded 
with unexpected harshness and, in spite of the military’s repeated assertions that the war 
was going well, it soon became clear that Argentina was in for a disastrous defeat.  The 
war, which ended in July of 1982, cost almost 700 Argentine lives.  The military 
government, even further discredited, finally handed over power to the newly elected 
civilian president, UCR leader Raúl Alfonsín, on December 10, 1983.22 
 Just as the military government had been concerned with elaborating its own view 
of the Argentine nation, it was immediately concerned with establishing its own version 
of how its time in power would be remembered.  These attempts included the widespread 
destruction of records documenting information about the detainment and captivity of the 
disappeared.  This destruction of evidence, like the destruction of bodies, both protected 
the armed forces against future prosecutions and intensified the degree of 
“disappearance”, making future knowledge of the fate of the missing even more 
inaccessible.  Right before leaving power, the military also issued of a set of statements 
vindicating their actions.  The dictatorship’s attention to constructing a social discourse 
that legitimated its actions was as at least in part due to real anxieties over the threat of 
legal prosecution or other retributive measures for those involved in the repression.  It 
was also related to the continued interest of the armed forces in maintaining their position 
as a political force.  23  This desire on the part of the military to continue to assert its role 
                                                 
22 Alfonsín’s electoral campaign was surprisingly successful.  Even Radical leaders had expected a Peronist 
victory in the election.  Alfonsín’s campaign sought to present above all a message of peace and the 
importance of democracy, and several scholars have argued that this focus on democracy and the lingering 
effects of Peronist revolutionary politics led to his success [see, for example Cucchetti 2007; Muraro 2005]. 
23 Two sites through and around which this vision was asserted are the military rebellions by the 
Carapintadas in 1987 and 1990, including the documents produced by the so-named ‘Operación Dignidad’.  
While the military rebellions had the practical effect of eliminating criminal prosecution for all members of 
the armed forces at that time, they also had symbolic importance as moments that expressed the military’s 
desire for vindication as an institution.  See Grecco and González 1988 for more on these rebellions.  As 
Alison Brysk has also noted, the importance given to the way this era would be remembered is evidenced in 
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in society constrained and in some ways determined the manner in which the dictatorship 
era and its legacy were dealt with politically over the subsequent two decades.24 
 In discussing the debates over how to understand this divisive and painful era, my 
analysis takes as a starting point the idea that memory is not an objective univocal 
rendering of past events.  Rather, I take memory to be subject to canalization through 
social discourses that give shape and form to the kinds and ways of remembering 
[Halbswach 1992, Lambek and Antze 1996].  The use of disappearance as the preferred 
method of repression, with the concomitant denial of the validity of the victims’ 
humanity or political visions and the denial of their loved ones’ suffering, set the stage 
for a prolonged struggle over the memory of the era.  As we will see, the inability and 
unwillingness of subsequent political leadership to meaningfully incorporate the position 
of the human rights’ organizations into the discussion over memory served to prolong 
and intensify the salience of these debates within Argentine society.   
 Upon coming to power, Alfonsín took the landmark steps of calling for the 
creation of an independent commission to investigate human rights abuses, and ordering 
the trial of the military junta leaders.  CONADEP (Comisión nacional sobre la 
desaparición de personas, or National Commission on Disappeared Peoples), gathered 
evidence on the disappearance of almost 9000 persons and the existence of 365 
                                                                                                                                                 
the way these military mutineers insisted on the recognition of the political violence as part of a war 
between the military and a dangerous opposition [1994].  However, it is important not to downplay the real 
divisions within the military.  Some had opposed the repressive violence from the start (many of whom 
either left or were forced out of the armed forces [see Mittlebach 1986]), others were themselves 
disappeared [Izaguirre 1998].  Other factions, particularly those placed in command after the return to 
democracy, advocated a more reconciliatory stance towards the democratic government.  However, 
particularly with this latter group, the argument can be made that the discourse of history was shared, even 
if they settled for a different course of action.  Whether cases like the 1995 public apology for abuses 
pronounced by then head of the Army Martín Balza (later ambassador to Colombia under the Kirchner 
administration) are due to genuine repentance or political opportunism is difficult to discern, but they were 
in any case rare until after the end of the 1990s.  As always, class divisions amongst officers and enlisted 
men lead to substantial divergences in perspective.   
24 The desire on the part of certain sectors of the military to avoid the kind of delegitimation of their actions 
enforced through legal condemnation should not be underestimated.  In December 2007, former navy 
officer Héctor Febres poisoned himself or was poisoned four days before he could be sentenced for human 
rights violations during the Dirty War (See “Febres se mordió la lengua” Página 12, 14 December 2007).  
This act, while perhaps less momentous in its effects than other attempts to affect the outcome of these 
trials, such as the disappearance of key witness Julio López in another case in 2006, is nonetheless highly 
significant in revealing the importance which these trials hold symbolically for certain sectors of the 
military.  Febres’ death could serve little practical effect for other former or active members of the military; 
however, avoiding his condemnation did act as a deliberate and meaningful play in the struggle over 
historical memory.   
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clandestine detention centers.25  The commission’s report, Nunca Más (Never Again), 
was a national bestseller immediately upon its release in 1984, and the information was 
used in the subsequent trials of the military leaders.  The trials led to numerous 
convictions of high-ranking officials.  Pressures from the military, however, including the 
1987 and 1990 military rebellions, led to the passage of the laws of Full Stop (Punto 
Final) (1986) and Due Obedience (Obedencia Debida) (1987), which ended prosecutions 
of further military personnel for crimes committed during the repression.  These laws, 
usually referred to as “immunity laws” in the English-language media, are now almost 
invariably called “impunity laws” (leyes de impunidad) in Argentina.  Those that had 
been convicted were later pardoned by Carlos Saúl Menem (1989-1999) through a 
presidential decree. 
 This was the beginning of a political stance towards the memory of the 
dictatorship era that was to prevail throughout the 1980s and 1990s.  In order to calm 
military opposition, both the Alfonsín and Menem administrations adopted a “politics of 
forgetting,” designed to silence all discussion of what had happened and thereby “heal” 
the deep divisions that still rent Argentine society.  This politics of forgetting was 
brought into effect on many fronts, including such tangible acts of erasure like the 
destruction of former clandestine detention centers or their conversion into renovated 
shopping malls.  However, both Alfonsín and Menem were aware that they could not 
vindicate the military’s actions.  Rather, they needed to invoke a discourse of democracy 
[cf. Paley 2001] in order to maintain their own legitimacy, at once condemning the 
military’s actions and attending to its demand for recognition of its vision.  The attempt 
to do this led to the creation and propagation of the “Theory of the Two Demons,” a 
version of history that interpreted the violence as the struggle between two groups of 
misguided fanatics, the military and the armed leftist opposition.  While condemning the 
military’s “excesses,” this version of history left space for the military’s claim that its use 
of force was justified.  Taking this stance was an attempt by Argentina’s fragile 
democratic regimes to quell opposition from both sides, through a policy of enforced 
forgetting.     
                                                 
25 For further discussion of the CONADEP report and the legacy of the military trials in Argentina, see 
Hayner 1995, Nino 1996.  
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 As Jonathan Boyarin argues, memory and forgetting are not opposites, but rather 
intricately connected to one another [1992].  He denies the positivist assertion that 
memory implies presence and forgetting absence.  For absence, he says, lies outside of all 
possible history; it does not exist.  Forgetting, on the other hand, is both social and 
historical, a necessity of domination.  It is constructed, as memory is.  Certainly, he 
argues, Benjamin’s angel of history stares back at forgetting, and not at absence [Boyarin 
1992:2].  The attempts by nearly two decades of civilian government in Argentina to 
instill a forced forgetting did not lead to a quelling of discussion about what happened 
during the dictatorship or how it should be remembered.  Rather, the efforts of the 
government to maintain a measure of stability by foreclosing public debate instead 
strengthened the desire of large sectors of Argentine society to pressure for the 
incorporation of their need for information and closure as to the events of what was 
becoming an increasingly distant past.  It also encouraged some to adopt a radical 
revalorization of the political ideals of those the military sought to defeat, and, as will be 
discussed in more detail below, created the disappeared as a source of inspiration for and 
a base of powerful symbolic imagery for appropriation by the political left.  But first, the 
politics of forgetting gave a particular structure and language to the historical memories 
as they took shape in the continuous process of construction.  Specifically, the politics of 
forgetting led to the idea of impunity being adopted a central and orienting figure within 
public discourse and ways of understanding and interpreting not only both past events but 
also more recent and contemporary circumstances.  I turn now to an analysis of this 
figure of impunity as deployed within and around the context of the dictatorship era.    
 
Impunity and countermemories 
 In the Introduction to this dissertation I traced out some of the meanings and 
implications of impunity, generally conceived.  In later chapters, I consider more closely 
the importance of this notion to arguments of moral legitimacy in the context of workers’ 
rights and the practice of politics within Buenos Aires.  The idea of impunity has served 
as a conceptual figure around which more recent events are interpreted and understood.  
Here, I focus specifically on this notion of impunity as adopted and considered within the 
context of the human rights organizations in Argentina on issues surrounding the last 
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military dictatorship.  This is essential as it was these organizations that first placed this 
notion of impunity at the center of public discourse and at the heart of the debate over 
historical memory.  Later in this chapter, I show how this notion is taken up and used by 
the organizations of family members of victims in the AMIA attack.   
 The human rights’ groups within Argentina argue that, during the 1980s and 
1990s, the politics of forgetting included an institutionalization of impunity, enacted 
formally through a number of laws passed by Congress and in practice in the lack of what 
they would consider effective or appropriate justice for those involved in the violent 
repression of the Dirty War.  Though Alfonsín’s call for the prosecution of superior 
officers from the dictatorship was carried out in 1985, these trials were limited to the 
highest ranks of the military and did not include those responsible for the carrying out of 
the repression.  The condemned were also, as noted above, pardoned by Menem soon 
after he took office.  These and other measures meant that legal prosecution for those 
who ordered and implemented the repression were severely limited, and those who were 
tried suffered little or punishment.26    
 As it became clear that the return to democratic forms of governance would not 
result in extensive judicial prosecution or in legal punishment for the majority of those 
involved in carrying out the repression, nor in the kind of careful reckoning and 
production and validation of knowledge through its presentation as legal evidence [see 
Chapter 4], the human rights organizations that had formed previously began to 
increasingly use the idea of impunity as a way of describing the social and political ills 
against which they were struggling.  The search for justice through the channels of the 
judicial system is, in part, an attempt to have the knowledge about what happened 
discovered, unearthed, revealed, and presented to those involved and to society in 
general.  In looking to reveal information and receiving judicial approbation of what was 
done, the relatives of the victims seek to establish a kind of officially recognized 
legitimate truth that affirms the unacceptability of what they and the disappeared have 
suffered.  This kind of moral truth is seen as essential for the closure of the events and a 
                                                 
26 For a detailed discussion of the mechanics of the legal prosecutions of Dirty War repressors, see Maris 
Ageitos 2002.  The title of her book is worth noting:  Historia de la impunidad:  De los actos de Videla a 
los indultos de Memem (A History of Impunity:  From Videla’s Decrees to Menem’s Pardons), in that it 
adopts the idea of impunity as its organizational focus. 
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beginning of the grieving process.27   
 Importantly, the negation of justice, understood as legal prosecution by an 
impartial judiciary,28 came to be seen as symbolic of the endemic institutional failures of 
the Argentine State.  This semiotic intertwining of corruption and impunity is important 
in understanding the way both terms operate in contemporary Argentina.  The perception 
of widespread political corruption in both Chambers of Legislators and throughout all 
levels of the judiciary led to diminishing hopes that those responsible for the Dirty War 
violence could ever be tried in Argentina.  By the late 1990s, this had led to many voicing 
support for efforts to have alleged perpetrators tried abroad.29  
 Earlier I suggested that impunity forms a kind of counterpoint to disappearance.  I 
find it useful to think of the idea of impunity as used in Argentina in this way as a 
reminder and a recognition of how this idea, so often naturalized as a factual reality both 
in public discourse and scholarly treatments, is in itself a cultural construction based on 
numerous underlying assumptions and historical influences.  The social and 
psychological effects of impunity have been discussed by a number of scholars and 
commentators on contemporary Argentina [Kordon 1995; Pérez Aguirre 1992, Roht-
Arriaza 1995, 1999; Sveaass 1994b].  In general, the idea of impunity used in the 
literature assumes its opposite to be the kind of legal and political accountability that also 
forms the basis of the demands of the counterimpunity movements in Argentina.  Little 
attention is paid to the way the notion of impunity gets deployed or to how the cultural 
and historical underpinnings that support it influence its use and circulation.  In 
attempting to delve more deeply into this notion of impunity that has become so 
commonplace in Argentina, I propose keeping in mind the way disappearance and its 
effects were/are discussed by the organizations that popularized its usage.   
 I argue that the notion of impunity and the need for legal justice took on such 
force within the human rights organizations and eventually, throughout large sectors of 
Argentine society because of a kind of emotional identification between the effects of 
                                                 
27 For further discussion of the logistics of impunity and its effects within Argentina, see Abregú 2000; 
Arditti 1999; Balaban and Megged 2003; Hayner 1995; Izaguirre 1998; Nino 1995, 1996. 
28 The next chapter takes up in detail the meanings given to this notion of justice across counterimpunity 
movements. 
29 For description and analysis of these international trials, see Bonner 2007.   
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disappearance and those of impunity.  Here, impunity is seen to mimic disappearance by 
denying the kind of social reckoning after a traumatic event.  Much as the military denied 
having kidnapped the disappeared, impunity for acts of violence denies relatives, friends, 
and ultimately society the right to official condemnation of the damage they have 
suffered.  In institutionalizing impunity for the perpetrators, relatives of the disappeared 
and ultimately broader sectors of society saw themselves as further denied the social 
acknowledgement of the wrong that they had suffered.  The political attempt to “move 
past” the dictatorship era only intensified these feelings by denying the voices of those 
affected the existence of their narrative of history based on experience, and foreclosed the 
possibility of a true social reckoning of events.   
 One of the main effects of these organizations has been in providing a space 
where those affected by the repression could find echo of their experiences in others, and 
together construct an alternative counter-memory.  Natalie Zemon-Davis and Randolph 
Starn use the idea of counter memory in order to stress that memory is subject to the 
pressure of challenges and alternatives [Zemon-Davis and Starn 1989:2].  They draw on 
Foucault in seeing counter memory as “designat[ing] the residual or resistant strains that 
withstand official versions of historical continuity” [2].  During the more than two 
decades that the government officially upheld a policy of forgetting, the efforts of 
organizations like the Mothers of Plaza de Mayo, Serpaj, CELS, and APDH helped locate 
the individual memories of those most affected by the repression within an increasingly 
influential counter memory narrative, one that held impunity as its central focus.30   
The success of these organizations, which, as noted above, are now also commonly 
referred to as counterimpunity organizations n gaining and maintaining the high level of 
respect they came to hold was due in grand measure to their ability to provide a space 
within which to counter the official silencing.   
 Ultimately, the politics of forgetting may in fact have had the paradoxical effect 
of multiplying memory by denying those affected the possibility of officially recognized 
                                                 
30 Serpaj stands for Servicio de Paz y Justicia (Peace and Justice Service), APDH is the Asamblea 
Permanente para Derechos Humanos (Permanent Assembly for Human Rights), founded in 1975, and 
CELS is the Centro para Estudios Legales y Sociales (Center for Legal and Social Studies), an offshoot of 
APDH that has become an important and well-respected organization for the defense of human rights on a 
wide variety of fronts reaching well beyond the issue of Dirty War justice.  For further information and 
analysis of these groups and of other Argentine human rights organizations, see Arditti 1999; Brysk 1994; 
Fisher 1989, Guzman Bouvard 1994; Jelin 1994; Navarro 1989; Schirmer 1994; Taylor 1998; Torre 1996. 
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public remembrance, keeping the debate over the past relevant to the present [Jelin 1998: 
28; 1994].  As Robben argues, the continued exploration of historical memory “led to a 
polyphonic reconstruction of the past which pushed conflicting memories of violence and 
trauma to the forefront of each group’s political concern” [Robben 2005:350].  The 
debates over memory continued to hold political salience in Argentina even through the 
intense economic and political crisis that peaked in December 2001.  However, the 
changes in the national political landscape that resulted from this crisis also had effects 
on the politics of memory.  The following sections explore these changes and their effects 
on the counterimpunity movements. 
 
  A New Politics of Memory 
 The government stance towards the dictatorship era and issues of memory and 
impunity changed drastically with the assumption of power of Néstor Kirchner on May 
25, 2003.  December 2001 had seen the climax of a political and economic crisis in 
Argentina.  When the Alejandro de la Rúa administration had tried to halt the tide of 
capital flight that was threatening to collapse the national banking system by freezing all 
deposits (el corralito), the Argentine middle class joined with other sectors in expressing 
their frustration with all political representatives, expressing an ardent desire to throw out 
the lot of them (expressed in the popular chant from the day -- que se vayan todos).  
Faced with widespread looting [Auyero 2006; Cotarelo 2004], de la Rúa declared a state 
of siege.  This proved the final straw, as tens of thousands poured into the streets in 
defiance of this heavy-headed attempt at maintaining control.  Two days of massive street 
protests resulted in the deaths of some 37 protestors and ended with de la Rúa 
abandoning his post and being spirited off the top of the Casa Rosada in a helicopter.31  
The protests were the culmination of a long process of economic disenchantment among 
the Argentine populace, in reaction to the neoliberal political and economic policies 
                                                 
31 A full discussion of the tumultuous and important events leading up to the December 19 and 20, 2001 
protests and their aftermath lies beyond the scope of this chapter, and will be treated in more detailed 
below.  For a discussion of the political effects of the crisis and the forms of popular mobilization at this 
time, see Dinerstein 2004.  For a discussion of looting at this time as a marker of social needs, see Cotarelo 
2004.  The exact number of those killed in the 19-20 December protests varies according to source, but 
most sources place the number of fatal victims in the 30s.  The number 37 used here comes from Página 
12, 14 February 2004 “Una mano reparadora del Estado para las víctimas del 20 de diciembre.”   
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implemented during the 1990s.32   In considering the “politics of memory” employed by 
the Kirchner administration, it is important to recognize that Kirchner came to the 
presidency under a political climate in which it made sense to demonstrate symbolically a 
radical difference with previous administrations.  Though elected with a mere 23% of the 
vote,33 Kirchner garnered considerable public support during his tenure as president, 
maintaining high approval ratings from across numerous social sectors.  This success, 
which has allowed him to consolidate kircherismo as a formidable political force, was 
based at least in part and initially on his successful adoption of a different strategy 
regarding the memory of the dictatorship era than that demonstrated by his predecessors.   
 Kirchner worked to dismantle the earlier politics of forgetting on various fronts.  
His first actions once in office were to place high-ranking military and police officials 
into forced retirement, in order to bring about a change of command in these institutions.  
He also made immediate reforms to the judicial systems, which was vital in bringing 
about the processing and disrobing of members of the Menemist Supreme Court on 
charges of corruption.  These efforts have led to the previous immunity/impunity laws of 
Due Obedience and Full Stop being declared unconstitutional, allowing the perpetrators 
of the Dirty War violence to be tried in Argentine courts.34   
 In addition to these moves, Kirchner has proved adept at performing powerful 
symbolic gestures that resonate with large numbers of the Argentine populace.  March 
24, 2004 marked another anniversary of the 1976 coup that inaugurated the most recent 
dictatorial regime, but this anniversary was like no previous one.  Counterimpunity 
groups had for years observed this date with acts of remembrance for the Dirty War’s 
victims and renewed calls for justice.  These events had in general not been actively 
supported by the different national administrations in the post-dictatorship years, which 
preferred to embrace the politics of forgetting discussed above.  But in 2004, Kirchner 
                                                 
32 Wide sectors of society, from political opponents to human rights organizations to the leftist and center 
leftist press frequently trace the roots of these policies back to the dictatorship and the tenure of José 
Alfredo Martínez de Hoz as Economics Minister, making a discursive connection between authoritarian 
mismanagement and Menem-era politics.   
33 Carlos Menem, sure of a devastating defeat, pulled out of the second round run off election, leaving 
Kirchner to assume the presidency without the confirmation of a definitive electoral victory. 
34 For detailed information on recent prosecutions concerning the Dirty War era, see Centro para Estudios 
Legales y Sociales (CELS) Annual Reports, 2002-2006.  Notably, though the reopening of trials has been 
seen by the counterimpunity organizations as a very important step, they have been bogged down by 
numerous obstructions and delays.   
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joined in this time of remembrance by carrying out evocative public spectacles that 
symbolically justified rather than minimized the counterimpunity groups’ insistence on 
the need for their voices to be part of the narrative of national history.  As was 
triumphantly noted by the center-leftist (and eventually kirchnerist) newspaper Página 
12, this was the first time this commemoration was to be organized by the national 
government, and the first time the State organized an official act of repudiation to the 
military coup.35  In addition to the massive march and numerous cultural activities 
organized by the counterimpunity groups, Kirchner orchestrated two additional acts for 
the 2004 anniversary.  In the first, Kirchner and nearly his entire Cabinet went to the 
Colegio Militar, or Military College, where he ordered the head of the Army, Roberto 
Bendini, to take down the portraits of Jorge Rafael Videla and Reynaldo Benito Bignone, 
two of the principal junta leaders from the dictatorship.  Kirchner then addressed the 
assembled cadets, demanding that they leave behind “the hell” into which State terrorism 
had plunged them.  He also invited them to reencounter “their San Martinian history” and 
their role as the armed branch of the people, and thus a part of and not separate from it.36  
By forcing the head of the army to publicly remove these portraits, Kirchner was both 
reaffirming the civilian government’s dominance over the armed forces, and eliciting a 
moment of public self-criticism from the Army.37    
 Yet even a moment as radically new as this moment of submission was eclipsed 
by the other government-organized event of the day.  Kirchner left the Colegio Militar 
for the Escuela Mecánica de la Armada (Naval School of Mechanics).  The ESMA was 
known to be one of the largest detention centers where the disappeared where held and 
tortured for years during the repression.  Over 5000 people are thought to have passed 
through the ESMA, most never to be seen again.  Those who did survive their detention 
have described the horror and raw brutality that was unleashed within its walls.  Located 
                                                 
35 Página 12, 22 March 2004 “ESMA, colegio militar y otras ceremonias”, and 24 March 2004 “Actos en la 
ESMA, El Colegio Militar y Plaza de Mayo.” 
36 No hay nada que pueda habilitar el terrorismo de Estado y menos en las Fuerzas Armadas que deben ser 
el brazo armado del pueblo...estoy convencido de que nuestro Ejército va a colaborar con este proceso 
para salir del infierno y reencontrarse con su historia sanmartiniana. Página 12, 25 March 2004, 
“Quedaron los clavos para la historia.” 
37 As noted above, in 1995 Martín Balza, then head of the Army, had made a public self-criticism of the 
branch of the armed forces he led.  The navy followed suit only in the days leading up the 2004 
anniversary.  Nonetheless, moments like these held great symbolic importance as further demonstrations of 
the leadership of the armed forces’ public submission to civilian authorities.   
 104
in the elegant porteño neighborhood of Núñez, just meters from the stadium of the soccer 
club River, the ESMA had remained under the control of the Navy after the end of the 
dictatorship era.  For survivors and the victims’ loved ones, its continued presence as a 
naval institution was yet another haunting reminder of the void disappearance had left 
behind.  It had become a symbol of state terrorism, as a site for demonstrations or 
exhibitions of the continued call for truth and justice for those responsible.  For years 
counterimpunity groups had been demanding that it be taken from the Navy and turned 
into a museum.  It was this site that Kirchner chose to publicly demonstrate an official 
break with the past.  After spending several months in consultations with a committee of 
representatives from a number of the counterimpunity organizations, that March 24 
Kirchner and Aníbal Ibarra, then-head of government for the City of Buenos Aires, 
publicly signed an agreement that in effect removed the grounds and buildings that made 
up the ESMA from the Navy and restored it to the tenancy of the City of Buenos Aires.  
The agreement also established that the site would be established as “A Space for 
Memory and the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights” (Espacio para la memoria y 
para la promoción y defensa de los derechos humanos).  Tens of thousands of people 
attend the event, which included musical performances by León Gieco, Víctor Heredia, 
and Joan Manuel Serrat, and speeches by children of the disappeared who had been born 
in the ESMA.  
  After signing the agreement, Kirchner spoke, stressing a dual identity for himself 
in addressing the crowd.  On the one hand, he presented himself as a leftist militant from 
the 70s, from the same generation as the disappeared, continuing the struggle to construct 
a better nation.  “Just now when I saw your hands, when you sang the National Anthem, I 
saw the arms of my compañeros, of those from the generation that believed and those of 
us left who still believe, that this country can change.”38  But he also spoke as President 
of the Nation, and in doing so, apologized in the name of the State for the lack of justice 
following the dictatorship era.   
 
 Things have to be called as they are, so here, if you will permit me, not now as the compañero and 
brother of all those of us who shared that past era, but as President of the Argentine Nation, I 
                                                 
38  Cuando recién veía las manos, cuando cantaban el Himno, veía los brazos de mis compañeros, de la 
generación que creyó y que sigue creyendo en los que quedamos que este país se puede cambiar. 
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come to ask forgiveness on behalf of the National State for the shame of having kept quiet so 
many atrocities during 20 years of democracy.   
 
He also, as he had with the act in the Colegio Militar, unequivocally rejected the actions 
of the dictatorship:   
 
 Let us speak clearly:  It is neither a grudge nor hate that guides us, I am guided by justice and the 
struggle against impunity.  Those responsible for the horrid and macabre act of having these many 
detention centers, like the ESMA was, have only one name:  they are assassins rejected by the 
Argentine people.39  
 
 Using the word “assassins” (asesinos) is in itself a political act in the Argentine 
political field, denying the military’s assertions that their actions were just(ified).  Doing 
so was a clear adoption of the discursive language of the counterimpunity organizations.  
He also achieved an initial popularity though attempts to include the opinions and voices 
of these organizations in the planning of human rights policies.  For example, the nature 
of the Museum of Memory planned for the ESMA was neither decided by the 
government nor in place at the time of the March 24, 2004 act.  Rather, there was a 
convocation for proposals, and the final nature of the use of the space was to be decided 
in cooperation between the city and national governments, survivors, the victims’ 
families, human rights groups, and other “representative organizations of civil society.”40   
 Michel-Rolph Trouillot has considered the conditions of possibility for this kind 
of public ritual, with actors making apologies for historical wrongs in which they 
personally were not implicated.  As he notes, these apologies depend on the attribution of 
aspects of the liberal subject to collective actors, such as, in the case discussed here, the 
state.  Furthermore, “The moral or legal case...for an admission of guilt can be made 
only...on a particular composition of the subjects involved and on a particular 
interpretation of history” [2000: 174].  Kirchner here is, as President, speaking in the 
                                                 
39 Las cosas hay que llamarlas por su nombre y acá, si ustedes me permiten, ya no como compañero y 
hermano de tantos compañeros y hermanos que compartimos aquel tiempo, sino como Presidente de la 
Nación Argentina vengo a pedir perdón de parte del Estado nacional por la vergüenza de haber callado 
durante 20 años de democracia por tantas atrocidades. Hablemos claro: no es rencor ni odio lo que nos 
guía, me guía la justicia y lucha contra la impunidad. Los que hicieron este hecho tenebroso y macabro de 
tantos campos de concentración, como fue la ESMA, tienen un solo nombre: son asesinos repudiados por 
el pueblo argentino. 
40 See Brodsky 2005, and its accompanying website, www.lamarcaeditora.com/memoriaenconstruccion, for 
records about this process.   
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name of the State, who, he asserts, bears the responsibility for the wrongs committed in 
the ESMA.  This assertion places Kirchner firmly on the discursive side of the 
counterimpunity organizations, and far distances himself from the Theory of the Two 
Demons held up under earlier administrations.   
 But, as Trouillot also observes, the postulation of a collective actor that can take 
responsibility and express repentance rests on a problematic assumption of historical 
continuity.  The State that Kirchner purports to personify is hardly the same entity as that 
imagined or that which functioned under the dictatorship.  But while Trouillot says this 
makes these performances abortive rituals, unable to act tranformatively [2000:184-185], 
I argue that even given Kirchner’s dubious assumption of the continuity of the state, this 
speech can act as a transformative ritual, or at least the beginning of one.  Trouillot is 
correct in saying that the apology in itself can do little to bring about reconciliation 
between offenders and offended, given the complicated nature of collective subject 
identification temporally removed from the events.  However, to declare as Kirchner did 
that impunity exists necessarily assumes that a wrong has been committed.  In 
apologizing, Kirchner is asserting of a particular view of history that categorically denies 
any interpretation that justifies the dictatorship’s actions or, importantly, state policies 
that either deny that wrongs had been committed or allow these crimes to remain 
unpunished, unrecognized, and unresolved.  To the extent that it was or will be 
accompanied by concrete actions designed attend to the sense that impunity reigns, this 
moment has the potential to effect real change in Argentine social and political life.  In 
this way, this action resonates with the quotes that serve to open this chapter, both of 
which note the way the construction of memory is more about the future then about the 
past.  Thus, whether or not Kirchner can speak in the name of previous incarnations of 
the state, he can effect future change by altering the official historical memory of the 
past. 
 While this act of collective apology was seen as a monumental, garnering strong 
popular support and copious attention, Kirchner’s actions were not uniformly well 
received.  Numerous counterimpunity organizations and individuals feel that Kirchner’s 
actions have functioned as part of a political strategy designed to co-opt or placate 
opposition through highly symbolic public spectacles while avoiding undertaking real 
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reform (again, I argue that this kind of ritual can work transformatively only to the extent 
that it is seen to be accompanied by concrete differences in policy).  Many of these 
accuse Kirchner of trying to appropriate for himself the issue of human rights, while 
failing to act concretely to revert the situation of impunity or dismantle the economic 
system that they argue is inherently related to the injustices committed under the 
dictatorship, and after.  These criticisms, voiced at the time of the ESMA event, became 
even more acute three years later, when Kirchner made a similar gesture and 
commemorated the 31st anniversary of the coup by announcing the creation of another 
museum in La Perla, an infamous former detention center in the interior city of Córdoba.  
The leftist opposition points to continuing cases of police brutality, evidence of current 
torture inside state-run prisons, stalled legal actions against former repressors, and recent 
acts of repression against workers as incongruencies in Kirchner’s “politics of human 
rights.” 41 
 On the other side of the spectrum lie those who reject these gestures on the 
grounds of their symbolic meaning.  One of the forces that have led to the continued 
strength of the counterimpunity groups is precisely the still active opposition to the 
negative characterization of the military dictatorship, from both inside the military and 
other social groups.  In spite of official denials, rumors abounded in the days before 
March 24 that the portrait of Bignone to be removed had been stolen and replaced by an 
imitation, thus symbolically preventing its removal under Kirchner’s orders.  On the day 
of the event, two active generals and a colonel requested retirement in protest of the 
action.  An apartment complex in front of the ESMA proudly displayed a “Long Live the 
Navy”  banner while Kirchner signed the agreement, and shortly after the anniversary an 
organization known as Complete Memory (Memoria Completa), demanding a “revision 
of the past in both senses,” called for a mass to be held in rejection of the March 24 event 
[see also Picture 3.1].  The struggle over the meaning and memory of the dictatorship era, 
and its place in Argentine history, remains active. 
                                                 
41 See, for example, Frente Popular Darío Santiallán (www.frentedariosantillan.org); Esquivel, Adolfo 
Pérez, 24 de Marzo: Memoria y resistencia,  Servicio Informativo Alai-amlatina, 5 March 2007; 24 de 
marzo, una fecha en disputa, Doble discurso: para muestra basta una Perla,  Indymedia Argentina, 27 
March 2007; prensadefrente.org, “Más "monumentos" kirchneristas para cristalizar los derechos humanos 
en el pasado,” Boletín quincenal Nº62, 26 March 2007.  Further discussion of interrelation of the idea of 
impunity with economic and social injustice is taken up in Chapters 5 and 6. 
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  Nonetheless, this new space of remembering brought on by the stance taken by 
the Kirchner administration has opened up the possibility for other kinds of reflection 
previously suppressed.  There is a danger for oppositional memory towards reifying and 
not leaving space for other voices, in part necessitated by the need to contest official 
versions [Jelin 1994: 53].  There was a tendency towards this in Argentina until recently, 
and it has been one source of contention contributing to the lack of unity among the 
counterimpunity organizations.  However, recent years have seen the publication of a 
number of new books, articles, editorials, and other public forums such as talks and 
conferences by former left-wing activists concerning the activities of these groups in the 
1960s and 70s.  While in no way justifying the dictatorship’s actions, the new climate of 
open recognition of past violence has opened a space for ex-guerilleros and their 
supporters to reflect upon their role in and response to the traumatic violence leading up 
to and during the dictatorship era, in consideration of the damage done and lessons 
learned from this experience.  In this way, the new official support for recognition and 
debate of the era of state terrorism has opened a space for a more nuanced and multivocal 
understanding of the era.   
 A full analysis of the way the dictatorship era is remembered and commemorated 
lies beyond the scope of this dissertation.  There is, however, an important body of recent 
and emerging scholarship that takes up the theme, as well as, in recent years, 
considerable diffusion of such events electronically by the groups themselves and by 
small, independent news organizations.42  As little of the scholarship takes up detailed 
microanalysis of commemorative events, preferring to focus on overall histories and 
patterns of the organizing groups,43 I end this section with a brief description of one of 
these events that took place during my fieldwork.  This description also serves as a 
linkage between the two sections of this chapter, by further illustrating the personal 
connections between the counterimpunity movements concerning the dictatorship era and 
that of Memoria Activa.  Furthermore, it provides a counterexample to the state-directed 
events discussed above, focused here not on politicians and political rhetoric but on the 
                                                 
42 See, for example, the web sites of counterimpunity groups like the several Madres and HIJOS groups, as 
well as media collectivities like lavaca and alavío.  For analysis, see for example Brysk 1994; Jelin 1994; 
Taylor 1998; Torre 1996.  
43 But see Tandeciarz 2007. 
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codification of memory by the counterimpunity organizations that set, as it were, the 
stage on which Kirchner chose to perform.   
 
El Olimpo 
27th anniversary of its inauguration 
16 August 2005 
corner of Lacarra and Col. Ramon L. Falcón Sts. 
 
 Last night I attended an event commemorating the 27th anniversary of the 
inauguration of El Olimpo, one of the clandestine detention centers used by the last 
military dictatorship here in Argentina.  The Olimpo (Olympus) was cruelly and 
ironically nicknamed after the home of the gods by those who considered themselves the 
all-powerful controllers of life and history.  I don’t often frequent these memorial/protest 
events by the human rights community around issues pertaining to the disappeared 
(desaparecidos); there’s just too many of them, it’s not central to my research, and I 
simply can’t do everything.  But this one I went to because a good friend of mine from 
the Plaza Lavalle, where the base of Memoria Activa still holds its Monday vigils, asked 
me to go.  She is a survivor of the Olimpo, having spent four months inside its infernal 
walls in 1978.  Her name is Rebeca Sacolsky, but everyone calls her Tita, and she is an 
amazing woman.  She was held and tortured by the infamous Julian the Turk, who is at 
long last in prison.  She tells of the ‘special treatment’ she received for being Jewish.  
One night, he made her stay up and sing the national anthem all night long, saying that, 
“this Jew probably doesn’t even know our anthem.”  Tita always recalls how she had at 
that time been a schoolteacher for over 30 years, and thus had personally taught the 
national anthem to hundreds of children, but of course, such realities counted for nothing 
inside the inhuman camps.  We recently learned, through a well-connected friend, that 
Julian the Turk has been abandoned by his former allies, and is not enjoying the 
pampered life in prison that these former incarcerators typically have.  Tita’s response 
was, “Oh, poor thing, I’ll have to take him some food.”  And she probably would.   
 It was dark when we got there.  The other events that have been held recently at 
the Olimpo, which was finally turned over to the survivors and family members a few 
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months ago (though the Federal Police had yet to vacate), were held during the day.  But, 
for whatever reason, this one was held after dark, and it was quite dark, the lights to that 
part of the site have been cut off some time ago.  The building itself, where the camp 
operated and my friend Tita and others were held, was until very recently still used by the 
Federal Police as the car registration center for Capital (the City of Buenos Aires).  That 
is, if you bought a car or needed to renew your registration, you had to go to the Olimpo 
– the past breathes at you out of the walls here in Buenos Aires.  So we occupied the 
covered parking lot next to it.   
 I ended up being one of the people holding the banner for the desaparecidos.  It 
wasn’t a position I was entirely comfortable with; for one thing, it meant I ended up in 
the unpleasant position of having my image plastered across the evening news again; but 
even more, I felt like it should be the relatives who held the banner.  But Tita, who, in 
spite of her 82 years, does not like to stay still in one place but would rather mingle 
around ‘being part of everything’, as she says, found it convenient to hand the banner 
over to me at the first opportunity.  Participant observation, I suppose.  
  The event itself was pretty standard for these things.  Short speeches by survivors 
and family members of the victims; one young man told in halting words his story of how 
his pregnant mother was killed here, and his father disappeared soon after.  One speaker 
placed it all in historical context, calling for remembrance of those killed in the 
bombardment of Plaza de Mayo in ‘55, murdered under Onganía, or killed for political 
reasons in the years since the return of democracy in 1983.  Tita spoke only to recognize 
and praise the struggle of the Mothers of Plaza de Mayo, who, she insists, helped her 
continue on after what she had experienced [see Picture 3.2].  The names of those killed 
in the Olimpo were read, those known, anyway, the rest subsumed under a call for ‘those 
whose stories we still have not been able to recover’, with the crowd intoning in unison a 
resonating ‘Presente!’ after each name.   
 But for me, the most intense moment came afterwards.  The local group Mate 
Murga had been invited to come and perform.  Murgas are a local art form, combining 
music and dance.  Banned during the dictatorship, they have reemerged in recent years, 
and are best known for their appearance during Carnaval, when they perform in the 
streets during the month of February.  Most murgas are comprised of elaborate costumes, 
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lots of percussion, and lyrics invoking a strong neighborhood identity.  This murga was 
one that took up what it called songs or chants of resistance (cantos de resistencia).  In 
chorus they sang of the disappeared, of workers who resisted by force the privatization of 
their source of labor, exiles, and other themes.  As I mentioned, we were in a covered 
parking lot, and they performed right beneath where the corrugated metal roof began.  
We in the audience were gathered close to them.  I was to one side, facing the building 
itself, with Tita on my arm.  The moon hung above the barred windows of the building as 
the murga prepared to sound out with “the voices this century did not manage to silence.”  
The moment the drums began, from out beneath the roof above our heads flew a horde of 






The Argentine Falcon 
 The material artifacts of history are frequently embedded in and made the object 
(literally) of struggles over memory.  What better example can be provided than the 
emblematic Ford Falcon.   The Falcons landed in Argentina in 1962, and were 
manufactured in the Ford Motor Company factory in General Pacheco, 40 km north of 
the capital in the province of Buenos Aires, from 1963-1991.44  Ford had begun operating 
in Argentina in 1913, when Argentine luxury consumption could still rival the world’s 
richest nations.  Initially, Ford Argentina served as an assembly plant for imported parts, 
but by the 1960s the cars coming out of General Pacheco were entirely locally produced, 
and were meant to be accessible, following classic Fordist principles, to Argentina’s 
working class. 45   Autoworkers’ unions became strong in Argentina, and the Ford plant 
was an important source of employment.  As one former worker recounts, “It was a real 
novelty to work in an auto factory...you felt really privileged to get a job there.  There 
was lots of talk about the “Ford family” and they’d have a big Christmas party every year 
and raffle off a new Falcon.”46    The Falcon became a remarkably successful model in 
Argentina, capturing the record for best selling car of the year six times between 1965 
and 1983.47  It gained a reputation for being exceptionally reliable and long lasting, and 
even had a successful life as a racecar, winning no less than seven national racing 
championships [sic].  By 1978,  the Falcon was being marketed as an “Argentine classic” 
(clásico argentino), with television and print ads hailing the Falcon as on par with mate, 
tango, and soccer as national emblems.  This iconic encoding of the car added to and 
capitalized on the wave of nationalistic propaganda surrounding Argentina’s role as host 
and later champion of that year’s Soccer World Cup, and fit well with the nationalist 
ideology promoted by the dictatorship. 
 But the Argentine Falcons have a darker history as well, one that has left a deep 
imprint in Argentine society.  The Falcons produced by workers in the Pacheco plant 
                                                 
44 http://purofalcon.netfirms.com/historia.htm 
45 http://www.auto-historia.com.ar 
46 Pedro Troiani, quoted in Robert 2005. 
47 1965, 1971, 1972, 1974, 1979, 1983 
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were to become the favorite car of the organized repressive groups in kidnapping and 
disappearing their victims, swooping down like birds of prey, leaving no trace.  It is said 
that they liked this model as it was wide enough to fit several kidnapped people on the 
floor in the back.48  The model, which was the official car of the Buenos Aires 
(Provincial) Police Force (la bonaerenese), has become an icon of Dirty War repression.  
Cinemographic depictions of the Dirty War often use the slowing down of a Ford Falcon 
as a sufficient symbol of the events that would inevitably follow, and the fear they 
inspired.   
 The Ford corporation, neither in its Argentine branch nor the US parent company, 
has not escaped from the desire for truth and justice so firmly entrenched among large 
portion of Argentine society.   Evidence suggests that company management may have 
welcomed the disciplinary controls on unions imposed by the military government, and 
25 former Ford employees are now suing the Company over its involvement in their 
detention and torture during the dictatorship.49  Abducted and subjected to torture and 
imprisonment from 1976-1977, they are working to prove that the Argentine subsidiary 
of the Ford Motor Company enjoyed more than just a privileged supplier relationship 
with the military juntas, and were aware of and complicit in the disappearances of union 
leaders and employees.  The company stands accused of handing over union leaders and 
organizers to the military forces, printing up lists of undesirables the night before the 
coup, in a clear indication of the close connection between military and business 
leaders.50  A lawsuit filed in February of 2006 states, “The Ford company hatched and 
executed a precise and concrete plan to violently put an end to union activity, with the 
objective of creating management terrorism that would permit it to reduce personnel 
indiscriminately and without major costs, speed up the production lines without any 
problem...[and] ignore the unsafe working conditions.”   According to Argentine attorney 
                                                 
48 Perelli 1994: 43. 
49 Página 12, 26 Feb 2006. 
50 Robert 2005.  It is not surprising that large businesses were willing to subscribe to, and even aid in, the 
repressive measures embraced by the dictatorship. As notes, the period leading up to the coup was highly 
turbulent, with a number of increasingly militant unions and union leaders gaining support for increased 
workers’ rights.  Events like the Cordobazo and Rosariazos in 1969 and the Viborazo in 1971, combined 
with the general political instability that only worsened with the death of Perón, left many businesses, 
national and multinational, keen to secure their interests in the country and reassert their dominance over 
the workers’ unions inside the plants.  See Robben 2005; Brennan 1994; James 1988.  
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Tomás Ojea Quintana, Ford’s action turned the company into “one more gear in the 
machinery of state terrorism.”51 
 But the term ‘Falcon’ also resonates with an earlier variant as an icon of 
repression that predates the coming of the foreign-owned local auto industry to 
Argentina.   In the Buenos Aires of the early 1900s, Chief of Police Coronel Ramón 
Falcón was infamous for his brutal repression of workers and activists.   Enraged by his 
actions in response to the May Day demonstrations of 1909, which left at least five 
people dead and dozens more wounded or imprisoned, 19-year-old Russian immigrant 
Simón Radowitzky shot and killed Falcón in reprisal.  The assassination turned both men 
into legendary figures, to be remembered and memorialized by different factions of 
Argentine society.  The current police school for the Federal Police (Policía Federal), 
took on Falcón’s name in 1928, as proudly displayed on their website and television 
recruitment commercials.52   One morning in the Plaza Lavalle, while Tita was inviting 
us all to come to a manifestation at the Olimpo where she was detained and tortured in 
1978, Benjamín began talking about Radowitzky, how we “should never forget that it 
was a Jew who had the courage to kill the repressor Falcón.”  The connection was 
immediately apparent to those present (though not to me).   It turns out the Olimp
located, precisely, on Calle Ramón Falcón (Ramón Falcón Street).   Argentine irony or 
the poetry of history.  Meaning remains contested and inescapable for the inhabitants o
the city, embodied in the materiality of the urban landscape, the street signs, cars, and 




 The wars over history and symbolic meaning rage on in Argentina.   
Advertisements for a new documentary film by Jorge Gaggero papered the subways of 
Buenos Aires in the spring of 2005.  The movie, Life in a Falcon (Vida en Falcon), tells 
the story of two homeless men, who due to the economic crisis brought on by decades of 
neoliberalist policies and “worker flexibility,” take up residence in their old Ford Falcon, 
parked on a quiet street corner of the wealthy porteño neighborhood of Núñez.   In this 
way the filmmakers highlight the continuity of Dirty War repression with the current 
plight of the many Argentines who still suffer the consequences of the economic program 
                                                 
51 World Socialist Website ( http://wsws.org/articles/2006/feb2006/ford-f-25.shtml); 
http://www.americas.org 
52 See http://www.escuelafalcon.edu.ar 
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begun under the dictatorship, while at the same time reappropriating the Falcon for 
popular use.   
 Regardless of its history and assigned symbolic value, the Falcon still maintains 
its staunch supporters.  There are at least two Ford Falcon fan clubs still holding regular 
meetings in Argentina.53   While some of the members may simply love their old reliable 
cars, holding on to the days of the clásico argentino and its national racing glory, the 
existence of these clubs also speaks to the active divisions within Argentine society over 
the memory and meaning of an era.  Such divisions have prompted certain Falcon owners 
to clarify their position.  At least one of the Ford Falcons that still cruise the streets of 
Argentina is adorned with a handmade sign that reads, “My Falcon wasn’t to blame.  
Never Again” (Mi Falcon no tenía la culpa.  Nunca más).54   
                                                 
53 See http://www.todofalcon.com; http://www.fanafalcon.com 
54 Robert 2005: 15. 
 116
Part 2:  Active Memory, Street Protest, and the Practice of Citizenship 
 Part 1 of this chapter focused on the construction of historical memory 
surrounding the most recent military dictatorship in Argentina and the way the notion of 
impunity has become an organizing trope around which the demands of the human rights 
organizations have been structured.  Part 2 continues the exploration of ideas of memory 
begun in Part 1.  It builds specifically off the previous chapter on cultural citizenship, in 
tracing further the actions and discourse of the group Memoria Activa and their 
relationship to the politics of memory.  I consider some of the ways memory has been 
understood, constructed, articulated, and deployed by the group Memoria Activa as they 
assert their demands.  The combination of memory with protest as adopted by the group 
is conceived of in particular ways that draw on historical local traditions such as those of 
the other counterimpunity movements.  It also blends an appeal to an international 
discourse of universal rights, as will be discussed further in the coming chapter.  Here, I 
focus on the way in which Memoria Activa and their supporters appeal to a notion of 
memory as an active practice, and as one that as is mandated by both religious precepts 
and their redefinition of the rights and responsibilities of citizenship.  In addition, I 
consider the group’s use of public space and protest in making their demands, arguing 
that this use of public space serves to both give coherence and visibility to their demands, 
as well as to assert extra-systemic pressure upon the governmental institutions they are 
trying to influence.  My research witnessed especially the way in which the meanings and 
importance attributed to space and memory are intertwined for a significant sector of 
Memoria Activa’s base supporters.  The final portion of this chapter is devoted to relating 
how the connections between ideas of memory and space as held by many of Memoria 
Activa’s supporters were dramatically revealed during my fieldwork at a key moment in 
the group’s long history, with the formation of a splinter group that continued the practice 
of the weekly actos even after Memoria Activa made the decision to stop. 
 Information in this section comes primarily from my work in Buenos Aires and 
with the group Memoria Activa and the other organized groups of family members and 
their supporters.  As discussed in more detail in the Introduction, this fieldwork took 
place over three sessions, spanning the years from 2000 to 2006.  During this time, I 
attended many of their weekly protest memorials, until their conclusion in December 
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2004.  After that time, I continued to participate in the actos held by a number of those 
who had faithfully come to the plaza over the years.  I also conducted many interviews 
with both organizing and supporting members of Memoria Activa and participated in 
several of their organizational meetings.  However, some of the events described here 
took place before my physical presence in Buenos Aires.  Information on these events 
comes from both primary and secondary textual sources, as well as many personal 
interviews and conversations I had with participants, organizers, and observers of group.  
In general, the depictions below rely heavily on descriptions provided by the participants.  
In this way, they can be seen as windows into the continuous construction of the history 
of the group, as understood by the participants and their observers at the particular 
historical moment of my fieldwork.   
 
Monday morning, 9:53am 
 Shortly after the AMIA building exploded early on a wintry Monday morning in 
1994, those most deeply affected by the blast met and agreed to gather publicly in the 
Plaza Lavalle the following Monday morning, in a silent memorial/protest that appealed 
for justice in the attack.  By holding a public gathering, the victims’ relatives intended to 
bring immediate pressure on the government to conduct a serious and thorough 
investigation into this latest attack.  Already there was widespread condemnation of the 
lack credible information in the wake of the Israeli Embassy bombing two years earlier, 
and dismay at what was felt as a lack of protection offered by the Argentine government.  
The investigation into the Embassy attack was by now seen as highly problematic, and 
many felt that had the Argentine government been more efficient or diligent in 
uncovering responsibility for that attack, the AMIA tragedy would never had occurred.  
In addition, the attitude displayed by then-President Menem in the wake of the AMIA 
bombing was cited as an immediate cause for concern, and seen as indication of a 
continued lack of political responsibility.  Those critical of the government’s efforts often 
comment on the fact that Menem’s reaction to news of the attack had been to call the 
Israeli Prime Minister to offer his condolences, even though the building in question, 
unlike the Embassy, was an Argentine Jewish institution located on Argentine soil.  
Through manifesting a visible “symbolic representation of the destruction” [Gurevich 
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2005: 15-16], these gatherings or actos were designed to provide a voice for the suffering 
of the families and a call for justice.   
 As the months and years passed, the group gained a more organized format, 
eventually taking on the legal status of a not-for-profit civil association (asociación civil), 
maintaining their focus on the victims by mandating that the rotating board of directors 
be comprised of direct family members of those killed and wounded in the attacks.  They 
took the name Memoria Activa (Active Memory), in recognition of their stated desire that 
the memory of their loved ones serve as an active force in the pursuit of justice.  As seen 
in the previous chapter, over time they would become the public face for a strong voice 
of criticism of both the investigation into the attack and the AMIA/DAIA leadership 
themselves. 
 The choice of location for these actos was in itself designed to be symbolic of 
Memoria Activa’s claims and objectives.  The Plaza General Lavalle sits in the 
downtown center of Buenos Aires, known locally as the microcentro.  This area is 
recognized as the as the cultural, political, and economic heart of the city and the nation, 
and was historically the first stopping point for Jewish immigrants to Argentina.  Located 
some 13 blocks from the Plaza de Mayo, this plaza extends from Avenida Córdoba to 
Lavalle Street, occupying the space between Talcahuano and Libertad.  Its southwest 
corner faces the Justice Building Tribunales, an imposing neoclassical building bustling 
with the bureaucratic activity of an overburdened legal system.  To the southeast it is 
bordered by the renowned Teatro Colón, the magnificent national theater whose seasonal 
operatic and symphonic offerings can rival those of the world’s most prestigious locales.  
The northeast corner holds the Templo de la Congregación Israelita Argentina (Temple of 
the Argentine Jewish Congregation), mentioned in Chapter 2 as the site of the 
demonstration against European Anti-Semitic acts attended by Menem.  The facade of 
this synagogue, whose foundation stone was laid in 1897 and which also houses a 
museum of Jewish immigration to Argentina, is now punctuated with the spaced concrete 
barriers (pilotes) that now separate all Jewish building in the city from the street in front.  
These barriers, a visible icon of segregation and distance, were put in place to prevent 
another attack like those that destroyed the Israeli Embassy in 1992 and the AMIA 
building in 1994.  Like so many other issues surrounding these attacks and the 
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community’s response to them, these barriers are a source of contention among members 
of the community, and serve as a symbolic marker of the self-imposed divisions that 
these attacks have left behind. 
 Memoria Activa’s Monday morning rituals in a corner of the Plaza Lavalle were 
held without fail from July 1994 to December 27, 2004.  While in the initial weeks these 
events were silent, undirected gatherings, over time a group of individuals began to take 
on more of a leadership role, and the format of the events changed as they began to invite 
speakers to address those present.  The form altered somewhat as the years passed, but 
the essential elements remained constant.  On a typical Monday, the crowd, ranging from 
50 to several hundred individuals, would gather on the sidewalk on the western side of 
the Plaza, facing the Justice Building.  The events always began at 9:53am, the moment 
when the bomb had exploded on July 18, 1994.  They would be opened with the sounding 
of the shofar.  Three men would approach the microphone, kippas carefully in place, and 
fill the plaza with the loud, persistent wail of the ancient horn.  Then, a central member of 
the movement, from what came to be known as the “directive board” (mesa directiva) 
would call for a minute of silence in honor of those killed.  This would be followed by 
some introductory words that might give an update on the status of a legal or political 
aspect of the case investigation, or simply renew the call for the need for justice and 
serious investigation into the attack.  During the introduction, the speaker would remind 
the listeners of number of weeks that had passed since the attack, still without justice.  
300, 400, 544 weeks.  This was followed by one to three speakers, which over the years 
included activists, lawyers, psychologists, performers, politicians, journalists, religious 
leaders, writers, artists, and other public personalities, both Jewish and non-Jewish.  
These speeches are published on the group’s website and selections from 1997, 1998, and 
1999 were compiled and published in booklet form by the newspaper Página 12, serving, 
as the cover of the 1999 edition asserts, as a “national document against impunity.”  The 
speakers would be followed by some general announcements, typically concerning 
upcoming community events, and the act would be closed with a demand for justice 
directed towards Tribunales. 
 In developing these weekly actos, Memoria Activa drew on the language and 
protest forms developed or popularized by established counterimpunity movements like 
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the Madres de Plaza de Mayo.  The politicization of memory was already operative when 
the 1992 and 1994 Israeli Embassy and AMIA attacks happened.  Memoria Activa was 
organized and began to articulate its demands in a climate where the notion of impunity 
as a central problem was beginning to gain dominance.  Adopting familiar patterns such 
as weekly protests in public plazas worked towards establishing their cause as part of the 
same generalized problem of impunity.  Though the group has had little formal or 
technical support from organizations concerned with the Dirty War, they frequently 
appeal to their symbolic alliances, made visible through such actions as the presence of 
one of the Madres in their weekly actos.  By adopting the notion of impunity in ways 
similar to those used by the earlier and other emergent human rights organizations, 
Memoria Activa both drew on and contributed to the strengthening of impunity as a 
central and formative notion. 
 
Memory as an Injunction to Action 
 Here, I begin with an examination the notions of memory and protest employed 
by the group, and the ways in which they are formulated within and formative of the 
national counterimpunity discourse.  In doing so, I draw upon the insights of scholars 
whose work demonstrates how memory serves as a field of contention in the formation 
and propagation of national histories.  However, I argue here that this literature often 
does not explore the important aspect of how memory and debates over national history 
are related to the practice and conceptualization of citizenship.  The changes that 
Memoria Activa and its membership have undergone in the years since the AMIA attack, 
and the implicit and explicit conceptions of citizenship embedded within their discourse 
and actions, provide an especially salient site for understanding how notions of the role of 
the citizen can often include an adjuration for the responsibility to remember.  This is 
important to note, as, undoubtedly, this aspect of the idea of citizenship is not unique to 
Argentina, but is operative in numerous contexts, particularly in areas and situations that 
have witnessed moments of extreme human-directed violence.   
 Memoria Activa’s weekly events, in their structure and content, entwined the act 
of remembering the victims in the attack with an active protest against the handling of the 
investigation and the demand for justice.  The name of the group itself implies this active 
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need to remember combined with a call for justice as a social necessity, as expressed by 
one speaker and prominent member of the movement, Enrique Burbinski, who, 
commemorating the beginnings of the movement on the occasion of the 500th week of 
uninterrupted protest, said,  
We wanted to remember, we wanted to practice memory but we wanted to do it in an active way, 
exercising our rights as citizens, as members of a community, as free men [sic] that seek to live in 
freedom and we could only achieve that through justice.  For that reason [we have] our name, to 
practice our memory actively, for that reason [we come] to this place, in front of the Palace of 
Justice that does not honor its name.55 
 
 This idea can also be seen in the inscription on the plaque describing the 
monument by plastic artist Mirta Kupferminc, that was erected in the Plaza Lavalle in 
honor of those killed in the AMIA [Picture 3.3].  This bronze plaque, before it was stolen, 
read: 
 
The basic idea of this work is a protest.  Not a remembrance or a homage   
A protest materialized through each one of its elements 
A circle of granite serves as the foundation of the whole and symbolizes the totality around which 
everything turns 
Stakes of quebracho wood of different sizes and textures penetrate the stone 
Fusing themselves in one destiny they form a singular mass but maintain their singularity 
The monument is posed expectantly facing the Palace of Justice and projected to the world as a 
pillar of the search 
The base, hammered and broken in one place, signals a clock stopped at 9:53am 
The Biblical text etched in the granite “Justice, justice you will seek (Deuteronomy XVI)” is an 
appeal for active memory56 
 
In addition, participants in these events often insist that coming to the plaza and 
performing memory in this way is essential in assuring that the dead, “don’t die twice, 
once from the bomb and again from being forgotten.”  Para que no mueran dos veces, so 
                                                 
55  8 March 2004.  Queríamos recordar, queríamos ejercitar la memoria pero queríamos hacerlo de una 
manera activa, ejercitando nuestros derechos como ciudadanos, como miembros de una comunidad, como 
hombres en libertad que buscábamos vivir en libertad y sólo lo podíamos lograr a través de la justicia. Por 
eso nuestro nombre, ejercitar la memoria de una manera activa, por eso este lugar frente al Palacio de la 
Justicia que no honra su nombre.   
56 la idea básica de esta obra es un reclamo.  no un recordatorio o un homenaje 
un reclamo materializado a traves de cada uno de sus elementos 
un círculo de gránito oficia de base del conjunto y simboliza la totalidad alrededor de lo que todo gira 
estacas de quebracho de diferentes tamaños y teturas se incrustan en la piedra fundiéndose en un mismo 
destino se ordenan formando una masa única pero manteniendo su singularidad 
el monumento se presenta en actitud expectante hacia el palacio de tribunales y se proyecta al exterior 
como un vector de búsqueda 
la base martillada y rota en un sector señala un reloj detenido a las 9:53 
el texto bíblico tallado en el gránito “justicia, justicia, perseguirás” (duet XVI) es una apelación a la 
memoria activa 
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that they don’t die twice, has become a central slogan of the group. 
 What can these examples tell us about the way ‘memory’ is being used by 
Memoria Activa?  What does it mean for memory to be ‘active’?  Daniel Goldman, one 
of the most respected conservative rabbis in Argentina today and an ally of the group, has 
reflected on the nature and purpose of ‘memory’ as used in the Bible.  He argues that the 
Bible proposes an essential dialectic, with one side holding the idea of ‘remembering’ 
and the other holding the opposite idea, which is not ‘to forget’ but of ‘not forgetting.’  
Key here is that the action of ‘remembering’ is considered as active, while that of ‘not 
forgetting’ is passive.  Goldman cites Yerushalmi’s seminal 1982 work Zakor, in which 
he argues that the repeated use in biblical texts of this word, which can encompass 
meanings including to remember, to memorize, and to commemorate, attests to the 
importance the concept holds as a religious mandate.  Finally, Goldman argues that: 
 ...the other central axis of the Bible is rooted in the practice of denouncement as a permanent 
activity, in opposition to the submission of humanity to mediocre conformativism and the 
authoritarianism exercised by the powerful in particular moments of history, who through corrupt 
mechanisms have obstructed the capacity of the people to be outraged by the unjust ways in which 
humanity has been oppressed as a creature of God.57     
 The idea of active memory used by Memoria Activa resonates with Goldman’s 
treatment, and contains several layers.  One element of the conception of memory 
deployed by the group concerns the insistence by participants in these actos that the 
memory of the attack serve as a catalyst and constant reminder of the need and obligation 
to pursue justice.  The participants in these events frequently expressed their continued 
participation in terms of their obligation to continue this struggle.  As a group Memoria 
Activa expresses an insistence on the pursuit of justice as a basic right of citizenship, and 
a moral, social, and religious obligation.  Looking at the way members of Memoria 
Activa talk about memory reveals a common appeal to the idea that the behavior of the 
Argentine state led them to feel pressured to take on roles they had not previously 
assumed.  Many of the people I talked to asserted that not only did the state not fulfill its 
                                                 
57 ...el otro eje central de la Biblia está enraizado en la práctica de la denuncia como actividad 
permanente, en oposición al sometimiento del ser humano al conformismo mediocre y al autoritarismo 
ejercido por los poderosos en determinados momentos de la historia, quienes a través de corruptos 
mecanismos obstruyeron la capacidad del pueblo de escandalizarse, ante las formas injustas a que 
sometieron al ser humano en su carácter de creatura de Dios.  From Goldman 2007.  
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constitutional obligation to provide justice but also actively participated in its obstruction, 
and that this is what led them to feel that they were left the unwelcome obligation to take 
up the fight against corrupt and inefficient government institutions.  In this way, they 
understood their actions not just as a search for justice, but for justice as the path towards 
the construction of a better nation, one in which this basic right of citizenship was upheld 
and protected rather than violated by state institutions.   
 Another, related aspect of the idea of memory as used by the group concerns the 
social and emotional effects of uncertainty following the traumatic loss of a loved one or 
an irruptive moment of violence.  The participants in these events argue that only once a 
social recognition of the deaths of the victims through serious attempts at justice has been 
achieved will their memories be able to become part of a past, completing a kind of social 
death to accompany the physical one already suffered.  To give one example, I quote the 
words of Laura Ginzberg, whose husband died in the AMIA: 
 
...And, because that morning they left their homes as they did every morning, they deserve 
justice.  And because we will not forget, we demand justice...And because they believed that they 
lived in a country that was free and safe, we demand justice.  And because their voices call out 
from the very center of the earth, we insist on justice.  And because we reject terrorism in any and 
all of its manifestations, violence, hate between peoples and discrimination, and because 
shedding light on the attack is an inescapable responsibility we take up the struggle for 
justice.  And they deserve justice, because from the place in the universe in which they are, 
or from inside of us, only after justice has been served can our dead rest in peace.  The dead 
from the AMIA:  present (emphasis added).58 
 
 This social recognition of death is taken here as the result of a kind of knowledge 
                                                 
58 From the speech given by Laura Ginzberg on the third anniversary of the AMIA attack, 18 July 1997.  
The full text is available at www.memoriaactiva.com.  The following is the original of the last two 
paragraphs of this speech. 
 ...Y, porque esa mañana salieron de sus casas como todas las mañanas, merecen justicia.  Y 
porque no olvidaremos exigimos justicia.  Y porque la ley de la vida dice que los padres no entierren a sus 
hijos, reclamamos justicia.  Y por todos los que ya no verán crecer a sus hijos pedimos justicia.  Y por 
todos los que no se harán viejos  junto a los suyos exigimos justicia.  Y porque los amamos gritamos 
justicia.  Y porque nos amaron merecen justicia.  Y porque creyeron vivir en un país libre y seguro 
demandamos justicia.  Y porque sus voces reclaman desde el centro mismo de la tierra exigimos justicia.   
Y porque repudiamos el terrorismo en cualquiera de sus manifestaciones, la violencia, el odio entre los 
pueblos y la discriminación y porque esclarecer el atentado es una responsabilidad ineludible luchamos 
por justicia.  Y merecen justicia, porque del lugar del universo en donde estén, o desde adentro nuestro, 
sólo después de hacer justicia nuestros muertos podrán descansar en paz.  Los muertos de la AMIA: 
presentes. 
Earlier in the speech, Ginzberg directly accuses Corach and Menem of covering up the attack.  Ruben 
Beraja, then head of the DAIA, immediately met with the government to apologize for her words.  This 
moment was key in leading to the division between Memoria Activa and the leadership of the 
AMIA/DAIA, discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
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produced through the workings of a competent and effective legal system.  The 
importance that central members of Memoria Activa place on the production of 
knowledge through its certification by credible legal institutions, and the way this vision 
has influenced their course of action, is taken up in the next chapter.  Here, I want to 
focus on how this appeal to justice as the necessary route towards the possibility for 
social and emotional healing after a moment of traumatic loss is related to a broader 
counterimpunity discourse that gained widespread public adhesion in the decade prior to 
the AMIA and Israeli Embassy attacks.   
          This need for closure, but only through and after a full accounting of what has 
happened, has become a key aspect of public discourse and source of contention in the 
political field in recent years.  This particular assertion by Memoria Activa as to the 
importance of justice in allowing for the social death of loved ones resonates specifically 
with that of one of the most well known of these counterimpunity movements, the 
Madres of the Plaza de Mayo.  This group consists of mothers of those disappeared under 
the last military dictatorship.  Even years after all hopes of finding survivors still 
imprisoned within military detention centers had been abandoned, the Mothers still 
demanded the aparición con vida (‘reappearance with life’) of those missing, arguing that 
their children could only pass from sites of living struggle into points of remembrance 
once their deaths were accepted as acts of state violence and the perpetrators submitted to 
the processes of justice.59   
 The practice of memory employed by Memoria Activa as part of this struggle 
against impunity is must be considered within the climate of the politicization of memory 
current in Argentina at the time of the bombings.  In Part 1 I showed how interpretations 
of recent national history remain highly salient in contemporary Argentine society, and 
how personal and collective memories are presented and contested.  Many scholars have 
taken up questions surrounding the relationship between memory and the construction of 
a national history.60  However, what I want to pursue are not questions on how historical 
                                                 
59 Fisher 1989.  This position is powerfully expressed in their oft repeated chant that has left an almost 
tangible residue on the cityscape surrounding the plaza, CON VIDA LOS LLEVARON, CON VIDA LOS 
QUEREMOS (They/you took them alive, we want them back alive). 
60 Pierre Nora’s massive 1984 work on “lieux de mémoire” is well known for its theoretical contributions 
on this subject [see Nora 1989, 2001].  For information pertaining to post-Franco Spain, see Resina 2000.   
A powerful cinematographic treatment of this issue in relation to the Armenian genocide is Atom Egoyan’s 
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memory shapes and is transformed by experience [Rappaport 1990], nor how personal or 
collective identity stands in a mutually constructive relationship to memory [Malkki 
1992, Bardenstein 1998, 1999], but how memory of lived experience is being invoked 
and used in Argentina as a practice of citizenship, designed to work towards political and 
legal reform, in ways that follow from and create a particular idea of the role of the state 
and the rights and responsibilities of its citizens. By demanding justice, counterimpunity 
movements are insisting upon their rights as citizens to protection from the abuse of 
power, and the enforcement of the rule of law in case of violation.61  In this way, the 
struggle against impunity of these groups became simultaneously a performance of 
citizenship that relied on and put forth specific notions of what this role entails.  Memoria 
Activa at once molds the presentation of the memory of their experiences into the 
patterns utilized by other groups and reworks and presents it in accordance with their own 
demands, including, as discussed in Chapter 2, an assertion of Jewishness and a vision of 
Argentina as a nation comprised of a plurality of different cultural, ethnic, and religious 
traditions.    
 For Memoria Activa, their responsibility to mobilize immediately following the 
1994 attack was clear.  Repeatedly stressing that “no one else was going to undertake this 
struggle for us,” speeches from the early years of the group’s existence make frequent 
reference to the need to actively work to construct a nation whose institutions would 
protect and provide resolution for its citizens, as seen as well in this passage from a 1997 
publication: 
 
Memoria Activa was born to confront the impunity for the criminals and those who protect them, 
and to struggle against forgetting.  We are a group of citizens...dedicated to memory, devoted to 
justice, lovers of peace and desiring that the institutions take the place that belongs to them within 
our afflicted democracy.62 
  
 This section has shown some of the meanings given to the notion of memory as 
                                                                                                                                                 
2002 film, Ararat.  For Latin America, see Coronil and Skurski 1991; Rappaport 1990; Sánchez G. 2003; 
Skurski 1996. 
61 This notion of justice, based on a system of retribution through a legal system run on the rule of law, is 
explored in more detail in Chapter 4. 
62 Para enfrentar la impunidad de los criminales y de quienes los encubren, y para luchar contra el olvido, 
es que nació Memoria Activa.  Somos un grupo de ciudadanos...comprometidos con la memoria, ávidos de 
justicia, amantes de la paz y deseosos de que las instituciones ocupen el lugar que les corresponde dentro 
de nuestra castigada democracia.  From 1997 collected speeches.   
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used and understood by members of the group Memoria Activa.  I explored both the 
moral and political injunctions that the group considers to have arisen from the attack and 
the government’s response.  I turn now to a more careful consideration of the other side 
of the practice of citizenship employed by the group:  the use of public space.   
 
On Public Spaces 
 In what follows, I consider the ways in which the Plaza Lavalle served as a 
symbolically charged public space for the public articulation of the political positions and 
tactical stances taken by the group, always entwining ritualized elements of remembering 
with a codified local language of protest.   At the end of this chapter, I look particularly at 
the decision by Memoria Activa to end the cycle of weekly actos, as this divisive moment 
made especially visible the ways in which public space, the practice of memory, and the 
performance of citizenship were intricately and ultimately inextricably intertwined for 
many of Memoria Activa’s participants and supporters.  To give the reader a sense of the 
flavor of this particular space, as well as to draw attention to the importance of the 
physical nature of space (too often lost in the abstraction of the written word), I have 
included a brief description of one of the many mornings I traversed the urban landscape 
of Buenos Aires to add my presence to the topography of the plaza. 
 
Fall 2005 
 It’s a dull grey morning in the city.  I arrive at Tribunales a few minutes early, and 
climb out of the subway tunnel, walking down the subterranean hall past the young guy 
busquing with his bandoneón, past the women selling the brightly striped socks so 
popular this fall, past the stream of billboards publicizing English institutes, theater 
productions, or the city government’s new campaign to improve waste collection 
(Remember:  only put out your garbage between the hours of 8 and 9pm!).  I get to the 
steps to the street, shaking my head no to the guy selling tissues and mints, and the 
ancient shoeless woman’s outstretched hand.  All of them daily fixtures at this stop on the 
D Line.  The only thing that changes regularly are the advertisements on the walls.  
Climbing the final set of stairs, I emerge directly in front of the imposing facade of The 
Palace of Justice Tribunales (Palacio de Justicia), though my companions in the plaza 
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prefer to call it the Palace of Injustice.  I walk carefully, avoiding the ubiquitous dog shit 
on the sidewalks.  I have heard many residents of Buenos Aires report their surprise upon 
traveling to other cities and noting the lack of this permanent porteño fixture.  
Nonetheless, attempts by the city government and some neighbors to curb this freedom of 
canine expression are largely ignored.  Crossing Talcahuano street to enter the Plaza, I 
notice how much more crowded it is than usual.  I’m reminded of the murga practices 
that happen here in the summer months, as the neighborhood group refines its rhythms 
and energetic kicks in the days leading up to Carnival.  But it’s fall now, and the 
pounding drums sound more methodical than the playfully expressive music of the 
murgueros.  A street protest, clearly.  Another near constant fixture in the city, though 
this plaza sees fewer than the nearby Plaza de Mayo or the Plaza dos Congresos.  This 
concentration is directed at the entrance to Tribunales.  Reading the signs the protesters 
hold, I realize that they are some of the family members and allies of the young people 
killed in the December 30, 2004 fire in the discotheque Cromañón, mobilized today while 
the members of the band that played that night give their legal declarations.  Behind 
them, alone in his folding chair as he has been for the last few weeks, sits a man from 
Jujuy.  The sign at his side announces his entrance into the 40th day of a hunger strike, 
undertaken in a lonely struggle against some unclear instance of suffered injustice.  
Several meters to his left, past the now bare monument to the lawyers disappeared during 
the last military dictatorship (the solid bronze plaque where their names had been etched 
in had been stolen, perhaps as a political statement, but more likely for its resale value as 
a raw material), lies the now-ragged tent of the Cooperativa San Telmo (Ex-Padela), a 
housing cooperative whose residents suffered eviction from the building they had 
occupied, and who had installed themselves months previously in a tent in this plaza, 
living beneath the elements while awaiting government resolution.   
 The middle of this section of the plaza, between Tucumán and Lavalle streets, is 
where the monument in honor of the AMIA victims is located, and where I find my 
companions.   
 The Plaza Lavalle.  
  
Taking to the Streets 
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 Street protest has a long history in Argentina as a way of expressing public will 
and exerting pressure on governing officials.  Hilda Sábato notes how, in the Buenos 
Aries of the second half of the 19th century, the performance of citizenship was based far 
more on participation or support of public demonstrations than on the formal mechanisms 
of voting [Sábato 2004].  Notwithstanding the differences in historical moments, many of 
the most momentous events in Argentine history have been based in public 
demonstration.  The 17th and 18th of October, when hundreds of thousands filled the 
streets to protest the resignation and imprisonment of Juan Domingo Peron, signaled a 
decisive shift in Argentine politics.  They also became key focal points from which the 
Peronist regime traced its legitimacy, as proof of the leader’s intimate connection to the 
people [James 1988(2), Plotkin 2003].  The protests of 19/20 December 2001 were 
sparked when President de la Rúa declared a state of siege, which ordered Argentines to 
stay indoors, i.e., not to take to the streets.  Not only was this injunction not obeyed, one 
of the most oft-repeated slogans of the day told the soon-to-be-ex-President what, 
precisely, he could do with such an order.  Once and again the electoral machine has been 
far less important in Argentina than the capacity to exert pressure through public 
mobilization around particular groups (clubs, unions, political parties, or social 
movements) or issues.63   
  The Madres de Plaza de Mayo made public demonstration a cornerstone of their 
actions.  Many of those who have written about these women over the years have noted 
the importance of this aspect [Guzman-Bouvard 1994; Navarro1989; Schirmer 1994; 
Taylor 1998; Torre 1996].  Acting under a dictatorship, the Madres were essentially not 
citizens, in the sense of having lost, along with the rest of society, “the right to have 
rights” and “a place in the world which makes opinions significant and actions effective” 
[Arendt 1973: 296, cited in Feldman 2007: 151].  Nonetheless, through public 
demonstration, the Madres found a way to be heard, to force the dictatorship to contend 
with their demands.  Yet the Madres did not make their demands under a discourse of 
citizenship.  They were not, fundamentally, arguing for their rights as citizens.  Rather, 
they appealed to their position as Mothers, holding a moral right to protect and know the 
whereabouts of their children [cf. Bonner 2007].  One frequent appeal of the dictatorship 
                                                 
63 See Rosenthal 2000 for an overview of the role of urban public space in Latin America. 
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in conducting its ideological war was to reproach parents for the “breakdown of social 
norms,” challenging them with the question, “Do you know where your children are?”  
Rather than accepting this reproach, the Madres changed this implicit responsibility into a 
right and posed the question back as a demand for information. 
 Memoria Activa drew heavily in the Madres in developing the form of their 
demands, including adopting the idea of a weekly public protest in a symbolic location as 
a way of keeping their struggle present.  Yet they have over time come to position 
themselves differently.  While continuing to draw upon their status as family members of 
victims (both discursively and through actions such as mandating that the rotating board 
of directors be comprised of direct family members of those killed), and thus reserving 
their moral right to know the details that led to their loved one’s death and their 
entitlement to justice, they have couched their demands on the state also in terms of their 
rights as citizens.  This comes through clearly in their presentation of their demands 
against the Argentine State in a case they brought in front of the InterAmerican 
Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States, taken up further 
in Chapter 4: 
 
No serious investigation was undertaken to find the guilty and nothing was done to prevent future 
massacres, the Argentine State thus violating its responsibility of prevention to its citizens.  As the 
relatives and friends of the dead in the AMIA we began what no one would do for us, for our dead 
and for our families:  undertaking the struggle for the truth and for justice we came together as 
Memoria Activa...We still have no answers.  We still don’t have the truth and we still don’t have 
justice.  The Argentine State thus violating its responsibility to provide justice...The impunity that 
has reigned in our country has been nothing more and nothing less than state policy...  As 
Argentine citizens we are exercising our rights, and we are embarrassed and hurt at having had to 
take this measure, but we weren’t the ones who chose this impunity.  And we are convinced that 
this sanction will bring about benefits for the future of all Argentines [emphasis added].64 
  
 The importance of street demonstration and the public display of memory as 
                                                 
64 From the presentation by Memoria Activa, 4 March 2005.   
Ninguna investigación seria se llevó a cabo para encontrar a los culpables y nada se hizo para prevenir 
futuras masacres, violando el estado argentino el deber de prevención para con sus ciudadanos.  Los 
familiares y amigos de los muertos en AMIA comenzamos a hacer lo que nadie haría por nosotros, por 
nuestros muertos y por nuestras familias; encarnando una lucha por verdad y justicia nos agrupamos en 
MEMORIA ACTIVA...Aún no tenemos respuestas. Aún no tenemos verdad y aún no tenemos justicia. 
Violando el Estado Argentino el deber de otorgarnos justicia...La impunidad que ha reinado en nuestro 
país ha sido ni más ni menos que una política de estado...Como ciudadanos argentinos estamos 
ejercitando nuestros derechos, y nos avergüenza y duele haber tenido que llegar a esta instancia, pero no 
fuimos nosotros los que elegimos tanta impunidad. Y estamos convencidos que esta sanción redundará en 
beneficio del futuro de todos los argentinos.   
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practices of citizenship became especially explicit and revealed following the decision by 
the directive board of Memoria Activa to end their weekly protests in the Plaza Lavalle.  
This decision brought into articulation many of the fundamental reasons for participation 
in the events, which in turn highlighted in a particularly prominent way how Memoria 
Activa’s supporters thought and felt about their participation in the movement.  The 
debate that arose around this decision, and the differing reactions to it, made especially 
visible embedded notions of participation as a practice of citizenship for the movement’s 
members and supporters, and thus provides an especially salient site for investigating 
these understandings.  The final section of this chapter turns to a consideration of this 
decision, and its effects.   
 
Memory, Space, and Citizenship:  (No) Todos somos Memoria Activa 
 For Memoria Activa as for the other counterimpunity organizations, the change in 
political climates brought about by the inauguration of the Kirchner administration had 
significant effects.  Importantly, it came at a time when many saw reason for hope in 
achieving advances on legal aspects of the AMIA bombing cases.  The Kirchner 
administration was successful in inculcating in many people a renewed faith in the legal 
system, by paving the way for prosecutions of Dirty War offenders within Argentina and 
for a number of other high profile corruption cases.65  Memoria Activa also witnessed in 
2004 the end of the three-year-long trial of the only people that had been charged in the 
AMIA bombing, all of whom stood accused of only accessory roles in the attack.  This 
trial, though it ended in an acquittal for all those accused, was seen as in many ways a 
victory for Memoria Activa, in that the verdict severely criticized the behavior of the 
investigating judge in the case, and pointed to high-level government complicity in 
constructing a false hypothesis concerning the attack and failing to carry out a serious 
investigation.  All of the court’s findings were in accordance with what Memoria Activa 
had been denouncing for years, and followed closely the analysis of the OAS observer of 
the trials, who had appointed as part of Memoria Activa’s case against the Argentine 
                                                 
65 Faith in Kirchner’s “politics of human rights” had waned somewhat by the end of his administration.  
Critics cite repression of protest under his administration and the lack of effectiveness in bringing to 
conclusion the trials of Dirty War era security officials (when Cristina Fernández de Kirchner took power 
in 2007, only 3 of some 300 accused offenders had been sentenced to prison).  See, for example, “¿Juicio y 
castigo?”  10 December 2007, by Anred – Sur, www.anred.org. 
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State in the OAS.  Soon after, the investigating judge was tried and disrobed for 
irregularities in his investigation.   
 These legal developments changed the situation in which Memoria Activa 
operated, and influenced concrete transformations in the group’s tactics.  Key among 
these was the decision to end the weekly protests in December 2005.  This was done, 
according to the directive board, in order to focus their energies more directly towards the 
legal sphere.  Their decision must be understood within the context of a renewed, if still 
skeptical, faith in the legal system, advances in the international sphere, and initial 
assessments of the politics of memory of the Kirchner administration.  These conditions 
are essential for understanding why Memoria Activa was able to consider this move 
towards a more focused approach on legal aspects.  This is not to say that preserving and 
maintaining the memory of the attack or its victims became unimportant, but that 
meaningful recognition from the national government allowed the fear that the memory 
of the events would be adulterated or dismissed to rescind to a certain degree.  This 
opened up a space in which the leaders of Memoria Activa felt comfortable enough to 
direct their necessarily limited energies in other ways, rather than investing time and 
effort in their weekly presence in the plaza.66  However, it was immediately evident that 
this tactical move on the part of Memoria Activa was not satisfactory to a large 
percentage of their base of supporters who had turned out in the plaza on Monday 
mornings over a span of more than 10 years.     
 In December 2004, Memoria Activa invited its supporters to a pair of open 
meetings, purportedly to discuss the idea of ceasing the weekly protest/memorials. I 
attended this meeting, and the intensity of the emotions that came out seemed to take 
everyone by surprise.  The response was overwhelmingly against the cessation, but the 
decision of the organizers was clear:  their energies would from now on be devoted 
elsewhere.  There was a deep sense of betrayal amongst many of the supporters, who 
with this decision were being effectively excluded from all active participation in the 
                                                 
66 Some detractors of this decision related to me their suspicion that the decision was due to Memoria 
Activa’s leadership wanting or agreeing to remove this pressure from the Kirchner administration in 
exchange for concessions in the OEA case [an agreement was signed between the parties in March 2005].  
Whether or not this impending meeting held any influence in the determinations made at the end of 2004, 
Memoria Activa has since made strong public statements criticizing the failure of the administration to 
make concrete advances on the promises assumed in front of the Commission. 
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group.  Though Memoria Activa had always claimed to be a democratic and participative 
organization, all decision-making power was in practice left in the hands of the directive 
board, comprised of the family members of victims.  Yet in reality, few of Memoria 
Activa’s supporters were direct relatives of anyone killed in the attack.  The majority of 
victims’ relatives who maintained a level of activism were nucleated around the group 
Familiares y Amigos de las Víctimas de la Masacre en la AMIA (Relatives and Friends of 
the Victims of the AMIA Massacre), which remained more closely linked to formal 
community institutions AMIA/DAIA.67  By the time they decided to stop holding the 
weekly protests, Memoria Activa itself only directly represented the relatives of about 4 
of the victims, though there were a number of other relatives of victims who approved of 
or supported at least some of their actions.  Nonetheless, these partial supporters were not 
willing to share legal counsel with the group or join them as a unified plaintiff in any of 
the national or international legal cases.  Thus, the “inner circle” of the movement was in 
fact a very limited number of individuals, and their decision-making practices, while 
nominally including all of its active supporters, only considered the opinions of a select 
few. 
 The base of Memoria Activa’s supporters, which by this time numbered around 
50 constant or semi-constant participants, were mostly from among those within the 
Argentine Jewish community who felt deeply affected by the attacks and felt themselves 
committed to the principal of the need for justice as a moral right and a means of 
protection against future injustice.  Many frequently cited feeling a sense of responsibility 
as Jews and/or as citizens for their active participation.  Making the effort to come to the 
plaza early Monday mornings was their way of contributing to what they saw as the 
struggle against impunity and preservation of memory.  Being suddenly informed that 
this avenue for action was no longer available to them, and learning that their opinions 
were not, in the end, influential, was met with resistance.  The thought of the Plaza 
Lavalle and the memorial to the victims remaining vacant and unaccompanied even one 
Monday morning was clearly painful to her and a number of others, as much or more so 
than their perceived exclusion from the movement’s activities.   Tita, the ex-detainee 
from the dictatorship era described above, was especially vehement about the importance 
                                                 
67 See Chapters 2 and 4.  
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of “not losing the plaza” and “not abandoning the plaza.”  She spoke forcefully, drawing 
on her age in saying that she could be mother or grandmother of most of them, and 
emphasizing the debt that Memoria Activa owed them.  She detailed how whenever 
someone failed to come to the plaza twice in a row they would call them, how whenever 
someone was sick they went to visit them in the hospital, all in name of Memoria Activa, 
and in this way maintaining the case of support for the group and its presence in the plaza 
for ten years.   
 On Dec 27, 2004, Memoria Activa held its last official weekly act.  It was played 
up as a big event, the major papers published the news, and there were 10 orators instead 
of only one, as had become common.  Taking a picture with some friends afterwards, 
Benjamín, a faithful supporter of the group, wryly commented, “So that we have the 
memory, even if it’s no longer active.”  He brought along the banner that read “Todos 
somos Memoria Activa” (“We are all Memoria Activa,”) but instead of holding it up 
amongst the crowd, he draped it over the monument to the victims.  He was not alone in 
voicing his feelings of exclusion, saying openly, “We are no longer all Memoria Activa.”  
 The first Monday following Memoria Activa’s final weekly event, no less than 
half of their usual supporters gathered around the monument to the victims and 
improvised their own protest/memorial.  None were direct relatives of victims, but all 
were committed to the idea of “not losing this space.”  As one woman, Chiche, said, “The 
plaza is the soul, to be in the plaza is like a drop of water rubbing away at a rock.  There 
are those who are arguing that the judicial struggle is the most important, or the political 
struggle, or being in the plaza, but these things cannot be separated.”68    
 There were initial attempts by some to push this new splinter group in one 
direction or the other, but over time they slowly consolidated into a cohesive though 
diverse group of some 25 individuals, all committed to “preserving the space” of the 
plaza and maintaining, through their presence, the memory of the victims and the demand 
for justice.  They decided to call themselves Citizens of the Plaza (Ciudadanos de la 
Plaza), highlighting the centrality of the space they occupy [Picture 3.4].  Tita explains 
her commitment like this, “I am here for the dead.  I will accompany the dead here in the 
                                                 
68 La plaza es el alma, estar en la plaza es como una gota contra la roca.  Algunos dicen que lo judicial es 
lo más importante, otros que lo político, otros que es estar en la plaza, pero no se puede separar.  
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plaza every Monday until I die, just as I accompany the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo 
every Thursday.”69   
 One feature that remains constant with the group is their lamentation that their 
gatherings have not managed to attract any direct family members of victims.  This lack 
is mentioned repeatedly, and attempts are frequently made to convince one family 
member or another to come to the plaza.  Nonetheless, even given their marginalization 
in this hierarchy of affected (akin to that discussed above), they do not hesitate to take on 
the responsibility for remembering the dead.  During the weekly gatherings they often 
take up a collection in order to tip the city sanitation employee engaged in cleaning the 
space around the monument to the AMIA victims (I couldn’t help but notice how he 
quickly learned to time his rounds through the plaza to coincide with their presence).  
They also pooled their resources and purchased a replacement to the stolen plaque that 
accompanied the monument in honor of the AMIA victims [Picture 3.5]. 
  Lambek and Antze argue that the idea of memory has become individualized in 
Western societies.  They say that memory, while increasingly recognized as collective 
and socially patterned, is nonetheless, through psychoanalytic and popular discourses, 
progressively located within the individual as the ultimate legitimate receptor and 
container of memory [1996: xiii-xiv].  The actions of Citizens of the Plaza both conform 
to and dispute this notion in particular ways.  By lamenting the lack of participation of 
direct family members of victims, they are following a more general idea present 
throughout the Argentine counterimpunity community that privileges the place of those 
most directly affected by the repression in controlling the form that the public memory of 
the events can take.  Yet, by maintaining their protest/memorials even without this 
presence, they are performing a kind of collective and socialized memory in honor of the 
victims that is not dependant upon individual experience. 
 
Cast of Characters  
 In spite of my use of this conceptual distinction, I believe that a better sense of 
this group as a collective body can be gained through a more detailed picture of some of 
                                                 
69 Estoy aquí por los muertos.  A los muertos los voy a acompañar aquí en la plaza todos los lunes hasta 
que yo me muera, como acompaño todos los jueves a las Madres de Plaza de Mayo.      
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the individuals involved.  The following are a series of brief portraits, a kind of cast of 
characters of those involved in these events.  The names of some individuals have been 
changed, and in some cases a number of individuals sharing similar characteristics have 
been combined into composites.  However, I do think that the descriptions retain enough 
of the original to endow an accurate sense of who chooses to go keep going to the plaza.  
Overall, all of the participants (except this anthropologist and the occasional university 
student or journalist) are between the ages of 50 and 95.  Most are part of the lower to 
mid- middle class, though some count on more resources than others.  There is a nearly 
even gender ratio, with women only minimally represented more than men among regular 
participants.  The group as a whole would generally split up into 2 or 3 smaller groups 
who would gather in separate nearby coffee houses after the events.  These were usually 
segregated by gender (excepting the anthropologist, who accompanied each group on a 
rotating basis), though on several special occasions (ex. birthdays, my farewell party) the 
participants agreed to meet as a whole.   
 
Sarita:  “I’ve been coming since the very first moment.  Not since the first week [of 
Memoria Activa’s actos], but from the very first moment.  I was walking close to the 
AMIA when the attack happened.  I immediately began to walk in that direction, to see 
what help I could be.  When I got to Tucumán [Street], the sidewalk was covered in glass.  
All of the windows had been blown out.  You couldn’t even walk there.  Born in Poland, 
she speaks Yiddish and German as well as Spanish, and came to Argentina as a child 
escaping Nazi persecution.  One of her four sons was killed by the dictatorship while he 
was as a student at a provincial university.  She lost her life savings with the economic 
collapse of 2001.  A voracious reader, she is capable of providing thoughtful commentary 
on a wide variety of themes related to contemporary politics.  Nonetheless, she is soft-
spoken, and rarely speaks when in a group of more than two people and maintains a low 
profile.  She is also one of the few participants who does not join any of the others for 
coffee after the weekly actos.   
 
Las maestras [The teachers]:  A significant number of the regular participants in Citizens 
of the Plaza are retired schoolteachers, from both public and religious institutions.  They 
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tended to for and move together as a group, with Chiche (mentioned above) holding a 
minor leadership role among them and often speaking for the whole.   
 
Los del Banchero (the Banchero group):  Most of the male participants would meet 
afterwards in a nearby restaurant known as El Banchero (one in a chain of restaurants 
with that name).  In the early days of Memoria Activa, many of the attendees would 
gather here after the actos.  Thus, some of those that still did during my fieldwork had 
been doing so for many years, and would recall wistfully the days when they would 
occupy the entire back portion of seating.  Now numbering between 6 and 10, this group 
would discuss politics, Argentine history (two of their number being historians, and all 
having lived there throughout most of the 20th century), and their interpretations of local 
and international events.  They differed strongly in their political convictions and 
personalities, but all valued the opportunity to share the time and space for what were 
often heated conversations these Monday mornings. 
 
Tita:  Through her activism as a former detainee she has chosen to accept a degree of 
public visibility that furthers her cause by providing a human face to the horrors suffered 
by those in her position.  I have already described her to some extent above, in regards to 
the Olimpo.  Here, I only note that her detention occurred when she was already in her 
50s.  Her advanced years, like those of a number of others, made her continued weekly 
presence in the plaza, regardless of rain or winter cold, a true effort she nonetheless 
tirelessly undertook.  Forceful but not aggressive, she was one of the strongest defenders 
of the importance of memory in the group.  She also, like many of the others, participated 
in the monthly memorials organized by another group of family members of victims, 
though she remained more akin to Memoria Activa in disapproving of the AMIA 
leadership. 
 
Samuel:  One of only three participants who also actively attend meetings and events by 
another of Memoria Activa’s splinter groups, APEMIA [see Chapter 4].  Though in an 
initial interview he told me he had never belonged to or participated in any organized 
political party, months later he confided to me that he was a card-carrying member of the 
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Communist Party (literally, card carrying.  He pulled out his wallet to show me the card).  
He admitted to having feared that I might be a CIA operative, but had finally decided I 
was probably not.  He claims to have been briefly incarcerated during Perón’s presidency 
for his political activism.  In addition to his regular presence at AMIA related events, he 
also attended the weekly demonstrations held by one of the groups of retirees demanding 
an increase in pensions [see Dubois 2006 for an analysis of these organizations].  
Originally part of the Banchero group, he stopped attending Citizens of the Plaza all 
together after getting into several fights with other participants.  These fights came about 
when he accused the man who learned to play the shofar of showing off, arguing that 
such demonstrations of Jewish identity, greatly approved of by nearly all the other 
participants, were unnecessary and no more than ostentatious displays. 
 
Helena:  Comes to the Plaza Lavalle on Mondays from a district of the Province, the trip 
taking well over an hour each way on early Monday mornings. 
 
R.:  The mother of one of the main lawyers for Memoria Activa.  This makes her 
continued presence in the Plaza especially significant, both for the attendees and for her 
commitment to “preserving the space.”  She is an accomplished seamstress, and her 
deceased husband had owned a textile store in the traditional neighborhood of Once. 
 
Carlitos: One of the participants who was most often called upon to speak during the 
actos, this man was also an active supporter of the Madres of Plaza de Mayo (Linea 
Fundadora) and other counterimpunity organizations.  He was also on numerous 
occasions called out in the group as a symbol of the broad nature of their struggle, as he 
continued to frequent the events “even though he isn’t Jewish.”  This served for them as 
support of the idea that the attacks were not a Jewish concern, but one that affected all of 
Argentine society [see chapter 2]. 
 
Moishe:  This man was not quite as old as some of the others (another faithful participant 
turned 94 during my fieldwork; in fact, his birthday was July 18, the same day as the 
AMIA attack).  However, he always seemed to have felt the effects of his years more 
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than the others in many ways, and in part because of this, I know little of his personal 
history or circumstances.  He was generally accompanied to the Plaza by one of the 
Banchero group who attended his same synagogue, and this man would help him when 
he would become over excited or disoriented.  He would often break into heated 
diatribes, most often against things not clearly connected to the present situation in ways 
the rest of us could readily perceive.  However, once in a while his injunctions did seem 
relevant to the moment, and in a few key instances were especially pertinent for me.  On 
several occasions, he vocally questioned my presence and motives.  He accused me of 
coming to Argentina and being with them in order to take away their stories and histories, 
to take them abroad (llevarlas al extranjero) and use them for my own benefit.  A charge, 
put that way, that I could not deny, but would try to cast in a different light or at least 
relativize with appeals to my desire to contribute to the group.  However, ours was not a 
dialogue, but a one-sided screaming match, intensified by his invectives on my being “a 
goy” (i.e., not being Jewish).  Those around would try to silence him, or smooth over the 
things he said.  Nonetheless, I appreciated his openness, even coming as it did out of 
someone generally dismissed as suffering from age- or trauma-induced dementia (I was 
once told that he was a Holocaust survivor, but this was denied by others).  I suspect he 
articulated feelings that others held as well, even though by the end I know many of them 
had come to also value my presence and care for me as I did for them.  I was moved one 
day long into my fieldwork when this man, who often refused to join the other men at the 
café, blaming his financial troubles and decrying the high prices of modern times, 
insisted in spite of all my refusals to pay for my coffee.   
 
The anthropologist (me):   
 The replacement of the plaque mentioned above provided me with one of the few 
and meager ways in which I was able to make an immediate and direct contribution back 
to those who so generously shared their time and feelings with me.  Though they very 
much wanted to repeat the same inscription on the plaque (the one noted above), the long 
span of time since its theft meant that no one in this group remembered the words.  
Having both copied and photographed the inscription in an earlier trip to Buenos Aires, in 
diligent anthropological obsession with detail, I was able to provide them with a copy of 
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the original.  This gesture was appreciated, though I felt that it also fed their confusion 
over my purposes.  My interests, as in what I found interesting or important, differed so 
incomprehensibly from theirs that I received constant questions, at first, and later only a 
quiet acceptance filled with occasional sideways glances, wondering ‘why would I be 
interested in asking/doing that?’  ‘Who was I that I could combine such access to 
information (the inscription, in this case, but also in my attendance at the various trials 
and legal proceedings, which members of this group did not do, leaving such matters as 
the provenance of the inner circle of Memoria Activa) with such a foreigner’s inability to 
understand some of the most basic things (repeatedly proven by my what were 
considered to be irrelevant or ignorant questions)?’  The category of “anthropologist” was 
an empty signifier to them; when introducing me to others, Tita invariably and to the end 
called me a journalist (periodista).  Nonetheless, whether or not I was ever able to make 
my purposes and desires fully understood, I know that many of the group did come to 
trust me, and I can only hope that I manage to find ways to write about their lives and the 
stories they shared with me in ways that do them justice. 
 
Keeping the space 
 Having hopefully given some sense of the participants, I now turn to a description 
of the structure and content of the weekly events, in reflection on how the participants 
evaluated appropriate and relevant information and actions.  The events themselves are 
simple:  after several minutes casual chatting in small groups, they gather in a circle in 
front of the monument to the victims.  One member, following the end of Memoria 
Activa’s acts, took it upon himself to buy and learn to play the shofar, (as mentioned 
above, a gesture greatly appreciated by many of those present).  Someone, usually chosen 
from one of three individuals who are seen as particularly gifted at speaking, opens the 
act with a reminder of why they are there and provides any information they may have on 
the AMIA case(s) or other events.  In this sense it is interesting to note what is seen as 
appropriate and important information.  The group defines and maintains its focus on 
what it considers as the central features of its act through an informal but highly effective 
democratic process of selection.  Overall, this focus quickly became defined as 
concerning the preservation of memory and a visible performance of the struggle for 
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justice.  Thus anything surrounding any of the many court cases surrounding the AMIA 
or its investigation is noted.  Acts of anti-Semitism within Argentina or abroad are often 
mentioned, as are a wide range of events and activities relating to the memory and 
struggles against impunity around the Dirty War, particularly those related to people or 
places that directly involved some members of the group.  Other cases generally 
considered under the rubric of impunity are also frequently discussed, such as cases of 
police brutality and the tragedy of the discothèque fire in Cromañón, when 194 young 
people died.  These cases are considered non-polemical, with all members sharing the 
same general assessment of the situation (and showing the force that the broader 
discourses of impunity and corruption had among the participants).  However, in an 
unspoken but collective agreement to avoid conflict, political or violent events in Israel 
are not typically mentioned at this point in the acts, nor are news items surrounding 
political topics within Argentina.  When such issues would be mentioned, the speaker 
would be shushed or the topic quickly changed.  Once the initial speaker has finished, 
they invite anyone from the group who wishes to speak to do so.  At this point, 
contentious topics do often come up and are debated openly, as are historical items 
considered of interest or relevance.  In this way, the group maintains a centralized focus 
on its purpose, while still allowing space for open debate among the widely varying 
spectrum of beliefs and opinions of those present.   
 The act is then closed with one member leading the call for justice, with all 
turning to face Tribunales and the stone tablets that symbolized justice atop its 
neoclassical facade (though, as frequently mentioned by Citizens of the Plaza, these 
sculptures had not been seen for some 8 years, having been covered “while undergoing 
repairs” that never seemed to occur, much less be completed).  Patterned off Memoria 
Activa, the unvarying call insists: 
 
For the 30,000 disappeared at the hands of the military dictatorship, we demand JUSTICE 
For the dead in the Israeli Embassy bombing, we demand JUSTICE 
for the dead in the AMIA massacre, we demand JUSTICE 
justice, justice, we shall seek70 
                                                 
70 por los 30,000 desaparecidos en manos de la dictadura militar, exigimos JUSTICIA 
por los muertos en la masacre de la Embajada de Israel exigimos JUSTICIA 
por los muertos en la masacre de la AMIA exigimos, JUSTICIA 
justicia, justicia, perseguimos.   
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 Like Memoria Activa, Citizens of the Plaza is dedicated to the practice of 
citizenship through the struggle for justice in society.  Unlike Memoria Activa, they 
refuse to give up their physical occupation of public space and visible presence as a key 
feature of this practice.  Many no longer believe that any legal justice will be achieved 
surrounding the attack and its purposefully flawed investigation, but continue to seek 
another kind of justice through publicly keeping alive the memory of what happened.  
Memoria Activa has vowed to continue working for institutional reform in Argentina 
through legal means.  Citizens of the Plaza continue to insist on the preservation of 
memory as a practice of citizenship through direct physical occupation of what has 
become, for them, a sacred space of remembrance. 
 
 This chapter has been concerned with showing how the idea of impunity came to 
be a central and constructive frame around which discourses of memory and practices of 
citizenship came to be defined among those concerned with justice in the wake of the 
AMIA bombing, specifically, and in a wide range of social and political issues.  In the 
next chapter, I investigate further the notions of corruption and justice that serve as 
essential elements in this idea of impunity, and show how institutional channels are used 
and exploited by groups like Memoria Activa in advancing their demands on the practical 
register.  In addition, I explore how the demands made by Memoria Activa intersect with 
international codifications and institutions of human rights, and consider in more depth 
the divisions within the Jewish collectivity over definitions of justices and appropriate 






Graffiti reading “If you are a murderer and guerilla, you will be President,” in derogatory 
reference to Néstor Kirchner’s self-identification with the leftist struggle from the 1970s.   
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Monument to the victims of the AMIA bombing, Plaza Lavalle, Buenos Aires.  In the 























The new plaque placed in front of the AMIA monument, paid for and installed by 






Truth, Justice, and the Rule of Law:  Taking the AMIA Case before the 
Organization of American States 
 
 
Soy madre de una víctima del atentado a la AMIA, soy una mujer que llora la pérdida irreparable de su 
única hija, soy una más de los que luchan sin descanso para esclarecer esta masacre, soy una ciudadana 
que me rebelo ante la falta de justicia, soy una argentina que me avergüenzo de la impunidad que reina 
en mi país.  
     
(I am the mother of an AMIA victim, I am a woman who cries for the irreparable loss of her only child, I 
am one more of those who struggle without rest to shed light on this massacre, I am a citizen rebelling 
before the lack of justice, I am an Argentine who is ashamed of the impunity that reigns in my country.)   
  
--Sofía Kaplinsky de Guterman, to whom I dedicate this chapter 
  
  
 In the Introduction, I noted how in contemporary Argentina social movements 
show a strong tendency towards fragmentation into numerous factions, most frequently 
along political lines.  However, even given the frequency of this phenomenon, many 
outside of the Jewish community have found it difficult to understand why certain family 
members of the AMIA victims and the institutions of the collectivity have found it 
difficult to work together.  This is at least in part due to the way the basic disparities 
between these organizations are difficult to discern from their public statements, which 
often share more commonalities than differences.  The divisions are in this way hidden 
between the lines, and can only be read by those who already possess a considerable 
understanding of internal community dynamics.  Furthermore, divisions between the 
different factions are neither clear-cut nor absolute, nor can they be reduced to differing 
political orientations.  In this chapter, I demonstrate how the divisions between these 
groups has resulted in large measure from divergent considerations of appropriate forms 
of engagement with governmental and international organizations.  In other words, I 
show how the points of contention between the groups can be traced to differing 
assessments of appropriate action on the practical register.  A close analysis of the 
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engagements that the groups do undertake and reactions to them shows how these are 
determined and evaluated according to a complex combination of ideological differences 
and pragmatic evaluations of personal and collective interests.    
 In this chapter, I trace how the rhetoric concerning what constitutes justice, as the 
antithesis or resolution of the notion of impunity discussed in the previous chapter, is in 
many ways similar across the organized groups of family members.  In this way, they can 
be seen to present a degree of unity on the ethical register, by demanding that the state 
provide a particular form of justice.  I then turn to a consideration of the case brought by 
Memoria Activa against the Argentine State in front of the Organization of American 
States for privation of justice and failure to protect its citizens.  In doing so, I consider the 
differing postures and responses that each of the groups of family members have taken in 
relation to this case, as indicative of the underlying concerns that each of these groups 
holds in determining their perceived roles and appropriate spheres of action.       
 I want to begin with a description and some reflections on another important set 
of events that showed the divisions between the organized groups of family members.  
This concerned the political trial and eventual disrobing of Judge Juan José Galeano, who 
had led the legal investigation into the AMIA bombing.  In describing the details of 
certain moments in this case, I aim to give the reader a better sense of the ways in which 
actual legal practice occurs, and kinds of situations they faced in their on-the-ground 
engagements with governmental institutions.  I also hope to provide a taste of the 
multiplicity of personal and collective interests converge to determine the manner in 
which events ultimately occur. 
 
 The Accuser Accused 
 The day had been long in coming.  Memoria Activa had for years been accusing 
Judge Juan José Galeano of committing grave irregularities in the investigation of the 
AMIA bombing.  When the verdict in the trial against Telleldín and Ribelli and Co. 
backed up these allegations and called for an investigation into Galeano’s conduct in 
September of 20041, the Consejo de la Magistratura (Judicial Council) began to act.  
                                                 
1 Galeano had been removed from the AMIA investigation in December 2003.  The trial against Telleldín 
and the Buenos Aires police officers had been carried out by federal prosecutors who had worked under 
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This body, whose formation was mandated under the 1994 Constitutional Reforms, is 
charged with selecting judges and overseeing their conduct.  Following formal 
procedures, Galeano’s performance in the AMIA investigation had been the subject of a 
hearing in November 2004, held by the Accusatory Commission (Comisión de 
Acusación) of the Council.  This warm February morning that commission would finally 
vote on whether or not to recommend to the Council as a whole that Galeano be subjected 
to a political trial, which could end in his destitution as a judge.  To be sure, it was a 
small step in a long line of bureaucratic proceedings, each of which contained endless 
opportunities for dilatory tactics and political machinations designed to derail the process.  
Perhaps that was why at that time, of the 1200 complaints the Council had received in the 
seven years of its operation (its formation not having been realized until November of 
1998)2, only one or two a year had ended in sanctions for the accused judge.3   Though 
the commission had heard Galeano’s case in November, the lack of quorum at several 
sessions and the insistence by one of its members to suspend the vote until after the 
summer recess forced another long wait for those anxious to hear the outcome, while 
buying more time for the exertion of political pressure upon the voting members.  
Meanwhile, Galeano remained an active judge. 
 Now with the moment of the vote finally approaching, tensions were high among 
those family members of victims in the AMIA who were following the proceedings.  For 
it was not certain that enough members would recommend that Galeano be tried, and a 
vote against moving the case forward would end it on the spot.  Even more dangerous 
than votes in Galeano’s favor was the very real possibility that too few members would 
show up.    
 I headed out early that warm February morning, stopping along the way for a 
quick cortado, and chanced to open the morning paper.  My eyes having been wearily 
conditioned to pick out certain key words from among endless fields of newsprint 
(AMIA, Galeano, BAUEN, etc.), I honed in on a small article buried in the middle of the 
paper, which mentioned that the audience I was headed for had been moved across the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Galeano and a divided group of plaintiffs of family members of victims.  The logistics of this trial and the 
split in the family members of victims is taken up below. 
2 See Chavez 2007 for a clear and concise discussion of this judicial body. 
3 Página 12, “Hora de acusar a los acusadores,” 7 December 2004, p8-9.  
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street from the Justice Palace Tribunales into a smaller building on the Calle Libertad 
(Liberty Street).  It seems that the move had been decided (or at least announced) in the 
middle of the night.  Manipulation of information being an old tactic and integral part of 
politics, and this trial being more political than legal, even seemingly routine matters like 
fixing the time and place for holding sessions became contentious sites for the exertion of 
power.  Rumors later abounded that the move was due to the president of the Supreme 
Court having ordered the removal of the table that had been in the room slated for that 
morning’s hearing.4  For the Judicial Council was embroiled in its own political battle 
with the nation’s highest legal authority (mainly over the issue of members’ salaries, 
which the Council at that time maintained the power to regulate).  But many family 
members told me it had been an attempt to diminish their presence at the hearing.  
 Regardless of the reasons for the move, it provided an illuminating look at how 
information flowed among those interested in following judicial processes.  I asked those 
who made it that morning and, later, those that didn’t, how they found out about the 
change of venue.  Most made it there in spite of the change, though a few had gone to 
Tribunales, only to be sent uselessly from floor to floor by emblematic agents of 
bureaucratic operations who, in impeccable local fashion, unwaveringly offered incorrect 
information rather than say that they didn’t know, or, even less likely, actually seek out 
the correct answer.  It seems that those most directly involved in the case, the members of 
Memoria Activa involved in bringing the accusation to this point, had received a call 
from their allies on the Accusatory Commission.  These then notified some others, and a 
limited chain reaction of phone calls ensued, to ensure the presence of a minimum 
number of relatives. 
 Equally interesting were those who had not planned to go at all.  I spoke with 
several people who, though they maintained a faithful presence every Monday in the 
protest/memorials held in front of the Justice Palace in the Plaza Lavalle, expressed 
hesitation in responding to Memoria Activa’s call to attend the hearings.  The Monday 
morning following another of the meetings I had attended, I was immediately questioned 
on what it was like to get in.  In spite of the fact that the hearings were open to the public, 
                                                 




my companions anxiously asked me, “Do they ask for your documento (national identity 
card)?  Do they register your name?  Were you searched?”  In fact, none of these things 
happened, neither to me nor to anyone else.  These individuals tirelessly placed their 
bodies in front of the imposing facade of the Justice Palace in a stance of defiant 
insistence, yet they were clearly intimidated at the prospect of crossing that external line 
and entering into its neoclassical halls.  (I myself admit to feeling a sense of timid 
foreboding the first time I passed over its threshold.  The architectural design intended to 
endow an air of grandeur on the institutions of the state effectively fulfilled its related 
purpose of evoking the citizen’s sense of vulnerability). 
 Galeano did lose the vote that February morning, and the commission 
recommended 6-0 that he be subjected to a political trial.  A week later a full session of 
the Judicial Council approved this recommendation, and with this move, Galeano was 
provisionally suspended from his position.  The trial that would decide his future as a 
federal judge began four months later, in June 2005. 
 The jury for that trial was comprised of nine (white male) members, headed by 
the vice president of the Supreme Court, Augusto Belluscio.  The other members 
included two senators, a legislator, and three lawyers.  House Representative Marcela 
Rodríguez and lawyer Beinez Szmukler, both members of the Judicial Council who had 
been responsible for writing the accusation, acted as the prosecution.  This trial did take 
place in its entirety within Tribunales, in the grandiose auditorium that had, some two 
decades earlier, been the site of the Juicio a las Juntas, the trials of the military leaders of 
last dictatorship.  This opulent chamber still held the sense of weighty importance its 
designers had clearly attended, with intricate stained glass windows, ornately carved 
wooden benches, and elegant fixtures.  The thick coatings of dust that enveloped even the 
crucifix above the judges’ heads attested to the layers of judicial history that the room 
had conditioned and contained.     
 The division among the members of the Jewish collectivity showed acutely at this 
trial.  While the members and supporters of Memoria Activa and APEMIA were roundly 
critical of Galeano, much of the official representation of the DAIA was actively 
supportive of the soon-to-be-ex-judge.  Two key members of Memoria Activa testified 
against Galeano, criticizing him so harshly that one had her testimony thrown out after 
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openly declaring that her interest in the case was make sure that Galeano was found 
guilty.  Key members of the DAIA, on the other hand, testified on his behalf.   
 Galeano’s defense consisted largely in his assurances that he had acted in good 
faith, with the sole objective of uncovering the truth in the attacks.  He admitted that the 
investigation had certain problems, and explained the failings with the insistence that the 
country was not prepared for such an attack, that no Argentine federal judge could 
possibly have been prepared to undertake such an investigation.  Amidst the murmurs of 
disapproval at Galeano’s answers, which adroitly managed to extend considerably while 
saying little to nothing at all, a staunch supporter of Memoria Activa leaned over and 
whispered to me, “Of course, they’d kill him if he said what he knows.”  Who exactly 
could be so direly implicated were Galeano to disclose his purported knowledge into 
what the other tribunal had denominated the “shady interests of unscrupulous governing 
officials” remained unsaid by this individual, but he was quick to assert that Galeano 
himself was not immune from the political maneuverings that lay behind the 
(mis)handling of the investigation.      
 The verdict came on August 3, 2005.  Security was high on this tension-filled day, 
and this time it was required to exchange a picture ID for an entrance pass, though, as far 
as I could tell, no one was denied entry.  A colleague and I were mildly reprimanded by a 
nervous young police officer for audio recording the procedures, but they did not take our 
devices or the recordings we had already made.  Galeano was convicted on three of the 
most serious counts against him and formally removed from his post as a federal judge.  
(And, thus, would not be entitled to the pension that accompanied this post.  He had tried 
to retain this privilege by offering his resignation at the end of 2004.  This move, which 
would also have spared him the political trial, had been rejected by President Kirchner).  
Criminal proceedings against Galeano, at the time of this writing, remain pending.   
 Memoria Activa and Familiares both applauded the action, but emphasized that 
Galeano was only one link in a long chain of complicity that reached into the upper 
echelons of the Menemist government.  As expressed by Diana Melamud of Memoria 
Activa, “This is a first step in what I suppose we’ll call justice.  It is absolutely deserved 
and we have worked many years so that it would happen, but Galeano didn’t do what he 
did alone.  He was supported by other sectors.”  Adriana Reisfeld was even more explicit, 
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““[The verdict] fills us with sadness, not happiness.  Galeano is not the only one:  from 
[Former Interior Minister Carlos] Corach to [former head of the SIDE Hugo] Anzorreguy 
to [ex-governor of the Province of Buenos Aires, and later president Eduardo] Duhalde, 
they will have to provide the explanations for their roles.  After so many years I don’t 
know if we can find justice.”5  Laura Ginsberg of APEMIA also agreed with Galeano’s 
removal, but was quick to condemn the state as a whole, including the present Kirchner 
administration, for its role in covering up the investigation into the attack, “The Kirchner 
government gives us the fall of Galeano, very delayed, necessary, but totally insufficient 
in resolving the crime that at this moment is still at the starting point.  The Kirchner 
government must at once open its archives and establish what responsibility the state 
bears.”6    The reaction of the DAIA was far more measured, choosing to immediately 
put the trial aside and emphasizing the need for vigilance.  Then-president Jor
Kirszenbaum said, “...it is essential to reinitiate the case and find the real guilty parties, 
because if we don’t we will always be a tempting target...Galeano committed many 
oversights (desprolijidades), but all that we do have was done under his instruction.”
ge 
                                                
7 
 
A Community Divided 
 The AMIA bombing was both literally and figuratively a ground shaking moment 
for members of the Argentine Jewish community and its collective representation.  The 
long years that have followed this disruptive event have revealed and given rise to a 
pronounced heterogeneity of opinions among individuals and groups within the 
community.  Almost immediately after the AMIA bombing, members of the Jewish 
collectivity began to meet in order to decide how best to confront the tragedy with which 
 
5Este es un primer paso de la que vamos a llamar justicia.  Es absolutamente merecido y nosotros 
trabajamos muchos años para que esto ocurriera, pero Galeano no hizo lo que hizo en soledad.  Lo 
apoyaron otros sectores.//No nos llena de alegría, sino tristeza.  Galeano no es el único: desde los Corach, 
los Anzorreguy y los Duhalde tendrán que dar las explicaciones que corresponden.  Después de tantos 
años no sé si podemos encontrar justicia.   
6 El gobierno de Kirchner nos muestra, tardía, necesaria, pero totalmente insuficiente a la hora de haber 
esclarecido el crimen que aún está en foja cero.  De una vez el gobierno de Kirchner debe abrir los 
archivos y establecer cuál fue la responsabilidad del Estado.  The archives she refers to are a set of files 
concerning a part of the initial investigation into the attack.  This had formed part of the family members’ 
demands for years; upon coming to office, Kirchner ordered the opening of a portion of the secret archives 
held by the SIDE, and allowed SIDE agents to testify in court.  APEMIA continues to demand the full 
release of all relevant documents.    
7 ...hay que refundar la causa y hallar a los verdaderos culpables, porque si no siempre seremos un blanco 
tentador...Galeano cometió muchas desprolijidades, pero lo único que hay se hizo bajo su instrucción. 
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they had been hit.  The leadership and managing members of the AMIA/DAIA came 
together to consider the immediate future and location of these badly damaged 
institutions and how they should react publicly.  Other meetings included some of the 
family members of victims, who began to gather in the Plaza Lavalle Monday mornings.  
These public assemblies served as not only a source of solace for those affected, but also 
to place pressure on the government and to draw attention to the ensuing events as they 
unfolded.  At first, though the meetings convened in the wake of the attack were diverse 
in composition of participants and their positions in the collectivity (‘family member of 
victim’ having become, as seen in Chapter 3, an important subject position that held 
considerable social and symbolic power), those involved acted largely in concert and 
without significant antagonism.  However, as time went on, divisions between those most 
directly affected by the AMIA bombing (or those who chose to accept this role, either as 
family member of a victim, survivor, or institutional representative of the AMIA or the 
DAIA) became acute, and led to visible ruptures.     
 The divisions that arose between Memoria Activa and the leadership of the 
collectivity led to some of the victims’ family members forming a new group, Familiares 
y amigos de las víctimas del atentado a la AMIA.  This group stayed close to the 
AMIA/DAIA, holding their monthly memorials to the victims in front of the newly 
reconstructed AMIA building and sharing legal representation with the AMIA/DAIA.  
Memoria Activa, on the other hand, argued for and won the right to serve as an 
independent plaintiff in the case that was slowly mounted against a number of alleged 
accomplices in the attack, and has continued to hold a more critical stance of Galeano’s 
official investigation and the behavior of the collectivity’s leadership.   
  These divisions over how to pursue justice for the AMIA and Embassy attacks 
have continued and multiplied.  In 2002, Laura Ginsberg left Memoria Activa and formed 
a new movement, APEMIA, which has since taken more radical and oppositional stances 
on the issues that have confronted the victims’ relatives.  However, it is important to note 
that these divisions, no matter how contentious, are not complete or entirely exclusive.  
There are still aspects of cooperation and overlap between the different groups, especially 
among their base of supporters, who often participate in the demonstrations of more than 
one or even all of the different groups.  This is made possible by the convergence in 
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ultimate objectives that seems to be shared by all of these groups.  These objectives 
center around a particular notion of justice.   
   
A Question of Justice 
 The idea of justice is a central feature of the demands of all of these groups.  This 
idea comes across poignantly, for example, in one attention-grabbing method designed by 
the AMIA for the 13th anniversary of the AMIA bombing [picture 4.1].  In the days 
leading up to July 18th, AMIA members handed out paperboard boxes made to resemble 
the package of commonly available medicines, with the label JUSTICE printed in bold 
across the front.  Inside each box there was a flyer announcing the memorial/protest event 
to be held on the anniversary, along with a list of the names of those killed in the attack 
and an empty pillbox.  The objective of this action was, according to the AMIA website, 
“so that society as a whole can continue to reflect on all the victims that, in different 
cases, our country has due to the lack of justice.”   
 However, when the organized groups of family members demand justice, what is 
it, fundamentally, that they seek?  What could or would need to happen for this demand 
to be met?  In essence, the notion of justice held by each of these groups is fundamentally 
based on a state-organized juridical resolution of the event (i.e., an officially sanctioned 
accounting of what happened) and condemnation and punishment of those responsible, 
following procedures established according to a preexisting democratic code of law.  
While a full discussion of the historical development of this particular notion of law and 
punishment falls beyond the scope of this dissertation (but see Foucault 1995), I do want 
to take a moment to unpack some of its aspects and their roots.     
 I see at least five aspects to this notion that are relevant to understanding the 
actions and reactions of the organized groups of family members to events surrounding 
the aftermath of the AMIA and Embassy bombings and to the discussions that follow in 
this chapter.  First, this vision of justice looks to the state as the appropriate and necessary 
provider of justice.  Later in this chapter, I explore how this assertion forms a central 
tenet of Memoria Activa’s case against the state in front of the OAS.  Second, this justice 
to be provided is imagined as taking the form of the trial of alleged offenders in an 
impartial court, where their guilt or innocence is to be established according to accepted 
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and established legal procedures through the presentation of credible evidence.  Third, the 
process of legal investigation and trial is charged with the evaluation and accreditation of 
knowledge surrounding the events at hand.  Ideally, the sentence by the court is expected 
to be held as the arbiter of the truth, in this way producing knowledge about the events.  
Fourth, the legal system is imagined as operating following the “rule of law.”  In 
Argentina, this term is used to express a difference to authoritarian governance, and is an 
appellation to a particularly conceived idea of democracy.  Fifth and finally, upon 
condemnation, the guilty are to be incarcerated within a state-run or state-approved 
prison, and thus denied certain basic liberties or rights assumed for all citizens.  I 
frequently heard members of all three groups insist that the planners and perpetrators 
must “rot in jail” (“pudrirse en la cárcel”) for their actions.  The idea that the offenders, 
which in the case of the AMIA bombing include both those responsible for the original 
violence and those who prevented its juridical resolution, should and in fact must be 
imprisoned in order for the event to be resolved is an expression of this idea of justice as 
based in juridical proceedings.   
 Nonetheless, before turning to a consideration of how this notion of justice 
influences the actions of these groups, I want to highlight that this conception of justice is 
not the only one possible, nor even the only one readily available to groups like the 
family members of the AMIA bombing.  Indeed, local circumstances in Argentina in 
recent years have led to other notions of justice gaining rhetorical force.  As shown in 
Chapter 3, this idea of justice as the result of the prosecution and punishment of 
perpetrators by a fair and impartial judiciary is also common to many of the 
counterimpunity organizations that formed during and after the last dictatorship.  
However, as a result of the many years when their efforts were ineffectual in changing 
official government policy, and given the general distrust and perception of the judiciary 
as corrupt, inefficient, and dependent on the executive branch of government, some of 
these organizations began to explore avenues for achieving justice that were not reliant 
upon the (Argentine) state.  While these included such actions as initiating and 
participating in trials for alleged offenders within foreign courts, other actions expanded 
the idea of justice to include a kind of social approbation that did not include recourse to 
formal juridical proceedings.    
 155
  
 The group H.I.J.O.S. (Hijos. por la Identidad y la Justicia contra el Olvido y el 
Silencio, or Children for Identity and Justice against Forgetting and Silence) is comprised 
of the children of those disappeared during the last dictatorship.8  As the years passed and 
they grew to adulthood, many became active in revalidating the perceived ideals of their 
parents, and in demanding retribution for the repression they had suffered.  While access 
to the kind of legal justice described above was blocked by the so-called impunity laws 
that prevented prosecution of the perpetrators of the Dirty War violence and the 
aforementioned lack of faith in the judiciary, H.I.J.O.S. chose to consider what kinds of 
justice were available to them.  Outraged that those who tortured and murdered their 
parents were free to walk the streets and live in relative peace and anonymity, unhindered 
by their past, H.I.J.O.S. began staging escraches or forced “outings” of former repressors.  
These outings consist of groups of supporters gathering at former repressors’ homes or 
places of work, and publicly denouncing their identity and role in the Dirty War 
repression, decrying the abuses allegedly committed by the person being outed.  Their 
targets are exposed both vocally, through chants and shouts, and visually, by painting 
‘asesinos’ (‘murderers’) or other epitaphs on the sidewalk and walls and by holding signs 
that would be widely seen though news coverage of the events.  They define the escrache 
as, “...a tool to denounce the impunity that keeps afflicting us.  It publicly ‘marks’ the 
house of the perpetrator of genocide, to show society where the assassins of our people 
hide.  Since there is no justice [here], at least they should not have peace, at least they 
should be signaled out on the street for what they are:  criminals.”9    
 Through this kind of public shaming, H.I.J.O.S. has endeavored to hold these 
individuals accountable for their actions, disturbing their daily routines, intruding into 
their private and personal spaces, and thus bringing a kind of unofficial justice through 
public exposure and the rallying of the local community against the perpetrators of the 
Dirty War violence.  This exposure equals a kind of exhibition of knowledge, the forced 
imposition of a public face, the ultimate act of “appearing” those who first disappeared 
                                                 
8 This group has also seen division into fractions, with a small splinter group HIJOS (without periods) 
taking a more radical and traditional Marxist position. 
9 El escrache es una herramienta para denunciar la impunidad que nos sigue golpeando. Consiste en 
"marcar" públicamente la casa de los genocidas, para mostrar a la sociedad donde se esconden los 
asesinos de nuestro pueblo. Ya que no hay justicia, por lo menos que no tengan paz, que se los señale por 
la calle como lo que son: criminales.  All H.I.J.O.S. citations taken from http://www.hijos-capital.org.ar. 
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others and then tried to effect their own anonymity.  H.I.J.O.S.’s slogan “a donde vayan 
los iremos a buscar” deploys grammatical ambiguity to at once affirm their dedication to 
society as a whole “wherever they go we will find them” while at once directly 
threatening those who would be their targets, “wherever you [plural] go, we will find 
you.” 
 Starting in 1995, the escraches as carried out by H.I.J.O.S. quickly became well 
known both within counterimpunity movement circles and throughout the broader 
society, thanks to the considerable media attention they received.  The word ‘escrache’ 
has become part of popular parlance, and the method has been adopted by other groups 
on numerous occasions.10  Though it was for many considered as a complement to, and 
not a replacement for, legal prosecution, it did present a model for an alternative 
possibility in the quest for justice and an expanded understanding of what justice could 
entail.  As they argue, “The escrache is not an end in itself, but a medium, like so many 
others, to demand justice and punishment for these perpetrators of genocide and their 
accomplices.  The escrache tries to create a social condemnation that puts pressure on 
those who have to legally judge and condemn the assassins.”11  
 In this regard, it is interesting to note that none of the groups of family members 
of victims in the Embassy/AMIA bombings chose to pursue alternative forms of justice, 
even in the face of years of obvious legal stalling and deliberate inefficiency.  Indeed, 
they are unanimous in insisting that legal prosecution for the planners and perpetrators of 
the attacks, in the ways discussed above, is the necessary form justice for what happened, 
and the only one they actively pursue.   Their street demonstrations are not discussed in 
terms of enacting justice; rather, they are seen as a necessary expression of memory and 
tactic to pressure for this legal justice. 
 It is also worth noting that the situation of H.I.J.O.S. and the organized groups of 
family members of AMIA victims contrasts to that of marginalized or underprivileged 
citizens (and non-citizens), whose access to legal justice may be severely hindered due to 
                                                 
10 I am not asserting that this kind of action does not have a history within Argentina.  However, it was 
widely popularized and brought to the fore as an alternative possibility, and an outlet for frustrated attempts 
at justice, through its use by H.I.J.O.S..  Since the creation of H.I.J.O.S, other groups with varying aims 
have utilized the escrache as a way of applying public pressure, particularly on politicians.   
11 El escrache no es un fin en si mismo, sino que es un medio, como tantos otros, para exigir juicio y 
castigo a los genocidas y sus cómplices. El escrache intenta crear una condena social que ejerza presión 
sobre los que tengan que juzgar y condenar legalmente a los asesinos.   
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their legal status or lack thereof [cf. Ong 1996].  A contrasting example can be found in 
the work of Daniel Goldstein, who has provided insightful analysis of the incongruencies 
between official discourses of justice and the actual practices that arise, in accordance 
with local circumstances.  He considers the case of Cochabamba, Bolivia where, though 
the idea of legal justice is in theory given priority, in practice a lack of faith in the 
channels for achieving justice available to non-wealthy citizens results in a reliance on 
community-enacted forms of justice such as lynchings [Goldstein 2003, 2004].  
H.I.J.O.S. recourse to alternative actions came about due to a generalized mistrust and 
lack of confidence in the justice system, rather than as an attribute of their personal status 
or due to issues of racial, ethnic, religious, or economic discrimination in access to 
justice.  As discussed in the previous chapter, the inability to prosecute perpetrators of the 
Dirty War repression was part of a political stance spearheaded by the executive branch 
under several consecutive presidential administrations.12  Likewise, the lack of legal 
justice in the wake of the Embassy and AMIA bombings is not generally considered to be 
due to the status of those affected.  Some do believe that the inefficiency in the 
investigation was due in part to an entrenched anti-Semitism among some of those bodies 
charged with investigating the attacks (notably the police forces and the SIDE, or State 
Intelligence Agency).  However, as seen in Chapter 2, the attacks were also investigated 
by other organizations not considered to be subjected to such a bias, including the 
Mossad and the US Department of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Control.  In addition, 
there is little evidence that anti-Semitic attitudes have played a significant role in the case 
once inside the legal system.   
 It is nonetheless worth noting that, though more than 30 of the 85 victims in the 
attack were not Jewish and/or not inside the AMIA building at the time of the blast, 
which also caused extensive damage to surrounding buildings, nearly all of those active 
in the pursuit of justice are members of the Argentine Jewish community.  I have found 
little evidence that members of the organized groups of family members of (Jewish) 
                                                 
12 Chapter 3 also demonstrates how this pursuit of legal prosecution functions as part of a struggle over the 
memory of this era.  Legal prosecution is seen as a way of gaining official recognition of a version of 
history that rejects the military’s claims that its actions were justified as part of its struggle to ‘save the 
nation’ from communist insurgents.  Prosecutions, in this sense, are seen as condemnations of the 
repression, an authoritarian model of politics, and, for many, the economic model including mass 
privatizations and worker flexibilization that began to be initiated during this era.   
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victims actively worked to exclude the non-Jewish family members from their 
organizations or manifestations.  Indeed, many frequently lamented to me the lack of 
their participation, feeling that they had been “left with the burden” of pursuing justice.  I 
showed in Chapter 3 how the participation of a non-Jewish man in Citizens of the Plaza 
was highly valued and warmly embraced by the other participants.   
 Furthermore, it is the death of a Christian child that has come to be evoked by the 
groups of family members as the ultimate symbol of the barbarity of the attacks and the 
innocence of those killed.  5-year old Sebastian Barreiro, the youngest victim in the 
attack, lost his life as he walked with his mother in front of the AMIA building that 
fateful morning.  The use of Sebastian as a symbol can be seen in a poster that circulated 
in the days following up to the 13th anniversary of the attack [picture 4.2].  Parodying the 
elements of visual persuasion adopted during local electoral campaigns, this poster reads 
“Sebastian Barreiros – Presidente.”  It also explicitly interpellates the viewer, Jewish or 
otherwise, appealing to them to identify with the victims of the attack: “Ellos estaban 
viviendo.  Como vos.”  (They were alive.  Just like you).  In the same way, Sebastian was 
invoked during one of Familiares monthly events that I attended, to which children from 
three local public schools had been invited.  The speakers highlighted how Sebastian was 
the same age as these children, and would have been graduating from high school had he 
lived, just as they were about to.  His memory was thus deployed as an available point of 
identification for non-Jewish Argentines, refuting the idea that the bombing affected only 
Jews, while symbolically evoking the innocence of all of those killed.  
 However, as seen in Chapter 2, symbols of Jewish identity and the support of the 
Jewish collectivity were central to the discourse and actions adopted by Memoria Activa 
and Familiares.  Was it perhaps the prominence of this identification that effectively 
excluded most non-Jewish participants?  Perhaps some of these also held a different idea 
of what justice should/could entail.  Access to resources (for travel costs, etc) may also 
have affected the participation of the family members of non-Jewish victims, particularly 
those that did not live within Buenos Aires (Capital).  Non-citizens would have faced 
even more extreme barriers in accessing the legal system, as at least six of those killed 
were not Argentine citizens, but Bolivian day laborers killed while working a remodeling 
project within the AMIA building.  It is likely that a combination of these factors that 
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effectively excluded family members of non-Jewish victims from active participation in 
the pursuit of justice, as understood by the organized groups from within the Jewish 
community.  However, the question merits further research.  
 This unity on the ethical sphere in terms of the ideal conception of justice and 
stated ultimate aims across all the organized groups of family members did not, however, 
prevent the groups from becoming bitterly divided.  These divisions came about, I argue, 
based on differing assessments of what the role of the family members should be on the 
practical register, in moving to the sphere of practical action and engagement with 
government institutions in asserting and attempting to realize their demands.  In what 
follows, I discuss in more detail the divisions between these groups.  These divisions, and 
their basis in differing considerations of personal and collective interests, are illustrated 
through an analysis of several important developments in the AMIA case that have 
occurred in national and international judicial institutions. 
 
The Divided Struggle  
 When Memoria Activa first formed, they represented family members of victims, 
other members of the Jewish community, and their allies and supporters.  Initially, they 
worked in concert with the official representation of the collectivity, centered in the 
AMIA/DAIA, which was working tirelessly to reorganize and rebuild following the 
massive destruction to its physical infrastructure.  However, as time went on, struggles 
began to emerge among those involved, mainly as to what the nature and role of Memoria 
Activa should be.  Beatriz Gurevich has argued that, for the AMIA/DAIA as well as for 
some of the initial members of Memoria Activa, this group was to be “...the symbolic 
representation of the destruction and DAIA should remain as the sole formal and legal 
negotiator in the name of the victims and the Jewish organizations vis-à-vis the national 
authorities, and also as the sole Jewish political representation within mainstream 
society” [Gurevich 2005: 15-16].  However, a number of family members, including the 
four women who formed the core of Memoria Activa’s leadership, were increasingly 
critical of the stances taken by the collectivity’s institutional leadership.  In many ways, 
this leadership was seen as repeating the historical pattern discussed in previous chapters, 
with the DAIA criticized for maintaining its close ties to the ruling political powers, even 
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when those powers were seen to act against the interests of the community.  These 
women felt that Memoria Activa should be willing be foster social mobilization, as well 
as publicly condemn irregularities or omissions in the actuation of government officials 
concerning the investigation, regardless of the position taken by the AMIA and DAIA.  
Some family members of victims, who would have preferred that the organization serve 
“as the symbolic memory of destruction and the space of solidarity and not as a collective 
political actor” [Gurevich 2005], began to distance themselves from Memoria Activa.   
 These divisions became increasingly acute.  By 1996, Memoria Activa had begun 
to denounce problems they observed in the investigation being carried out by Judge 
Galeano, even though the magistrate maintained the support of the AMIA/DAIA.  The 
event that participants in Memoria Activa most often cite as the incident that clearly 
marks the split between Memoria Activa and the AMIA/DAIA leadership came during 
the acto organized for the third anniversary of the attack.  During this event, Laura 
Ginsberg, at that time still acting on behalf of Memoria Activa, read a speech that directly 
accused then-President Menem and Interior Minister Carlos Corach of obstructing the 
investigation into the attack.  Immediately following the event, the president of the 
DAIA, Rubén Beraja, “crossed the street” to the House of Government and personally 
apologized to President Menem for her statements, thus, in their eyes, privileging his 
relationship with those in power over the interest of the Jewish community in the success 
of the investigation.13  After this incident, Memoria Activa began to hold separate 
memorials on the anniversary of the attack, and increasingly charged the AMIA/DAIA of 
complicity in the covering-up of the attack.   
 Those family members of victims uncomfortable with Memoria Activa’s 
increasing estrangement from the AMIA/DAIA joined together to form the group 
Familiares.  They also often speak out against members of the ruling elite and current 
members of government that they see as complicit in the lack of justice.  In many ways, 
                                                 
13 Another of the most complicated and notorious of issues has concerned the alleged participation of 
former DAIA president Rubén Beraja and the DAIA’s legal council, Marta Nercellas, in falsely accusing 
members of the Buenos Aires Police Force during the only case to have come to trial.  Allegations that 
Beraja and Nercellas were aware of the payment made to Telleldín, and complicit in the attempt to close 
the investigation of the “local connection” in the bombing with the trial that ended in their acquittal, further 
exacerbated these tensions.  Beraja was subsequently imprisoned for his role in the bankruptcy and 
corruption scandal surrounding the Banco de Mayo, which resulted in the evaporation of the savings of 
many community members.   
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their criticisms echo those of Memoria Activa.  However, the group stays close to the 
AMIA/DAIA leadership, avoiding direct criticism of these organizations and their former 
or actual leaders and acting in conjunction with them.  For example, in AMIA trial 
mentioned in Chapter 2 and discussed in more detail below, they formed a unified 
plaintiff and shared legal representation with the AMIA/DAIA.  They also hold their 
monthly and yearly memorials in conjunction with these organizations, which are in turn 
attended by the leadership and important political figures from the collectivity and the 
local and national governments.  
 Beatriz Gurevich has argued that the differences between Memoria Activa and the 
group Familiares is due to a differing set of ethics guiding their actions [Gurevich 2005].  
She divides these into the “traditionalists identified with ‘communitarianism’ and 
respectful of what is known in the Argentine Jewry as ‘communitarian responsibility’”, 
and contrasts this with the “liberals who think that a legitimate defense of individual 
rights does not interfere with a positive identification with a collective entity” [26].  
While I disagree with Gurevich’s analysis of the workings of the gender dynamics among 
the different groups, in which she contends that the women of Familiares subscribe to a 
“care” ethics while those of Memoria Activa adopt a “rights ethic,” I do find value in her 
assessment of the different ethos of responsibility operative amongst different groups of 
family members.14  Many members of the Jewish community are supportive of the ethos 
of community as espoused by the organization, and its many and consist efforts in the 
promotion and defense of the welfare of the collectivity as a whole.  While members of 
Memoria Activa base their demands and appeals for justice within a language of 
individual rights, the members of Familiares tend to support the AMIA/DAIA, at least in 
part for their continued dedication to fostering community wellbeing.  I have discussed 
how the DAIA has often been criticized for interpreting communitarian responsibility in 
contrast to the best interest of individuals, at various moments in the organization’s 
history.  Nonetheless, for the leadership of the AMIA/DAIA, at least part of this 
promotion of wellbeing has been interpreted as being served through the maintenance of 
a positive relationship and set of alliances with economic and political powers, including 
                                                 
14 A discussion of the various perceptions of appropriate gender roles, their role in Argentine social 
movements, and in particular their application in the case of the family members of AMIA victims, is an 
important topic that unfortunately lies beyond the scope of this chapter.  See, for example, Jelin 1990.  
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the government.       
  The other main organization of family members of victims, APEMIA, takes a 
different stance from either Memoria Activa or Familiares.  The most recent of the 
groups, APEMIA developed out of a growing disagreement between Laura Ginsberg and 
other members of Memoria Activa.  The founder and leader of APEMIA, Laura 
Ginsberg, was one of the four women who solidified the stance of Memoria Activa and 
was for years a key member and referent of this organization.  Yet the definitive split 
between the two came at the end of December 2001.  After the convulsive political and 
social events of December 19/20 2001, when popular protest forced the resignation of 
President de la Rúa, Argentina went through a difficult process of political 
reorganization, with the naming of 4 new presidents in a span of two weeks.  During one 
of these ephemeral ‘administrations,’ that of Adolfo Rodríguez Saá, one of Memoria 
Activa’s lawyers, Alberto Zuppi, was named Minister of Justice.  Memoria Activa 
approved this move, hoping that his designation would lead to concrete advances in the 
AMIA investigation.  However, Ginsberg was strongly opposed to the legal 
representation of Memoria Activa assuming an active government post.  At that time, 
Ginsberg formally left Memoria Activa and founded APEMIA shortly after, in early 
2002. 
 These differences between the organized groups of family members and their 
basis in differing assessments of appropriate actions to pursue on the practical register in 
engaging with governmental and international institutions can be seen more clearly by 
looking at the different stances taken by these groups in relation to the national and 
international legal cases that have ensued around the AMIA bombing.  I turn now to a 
consideration of Memoria Activa’s decision to sue the Argentine State in front of an 
international institution.  I show how this move by Memoria Activa presented an 
untenable solution and a dilemma for the AMIA/DAIA/ Familiares, given their focus on 
maintaining a close relationship with the ruling administration.  Furthermore, looking at 
this case permits a deeper exploration of the avenues of justice considered appropriate by 
each of these groups.    
   
Suing the State: Memoria Activa vs. Argentina 
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 In July of 1999, Memoria Activa filed suit against the State of Argentina in front 
of the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), a part of the Organization 
of American States.  This body and the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights are the 
operative force within the OAS for the promotion and protection of human rights.  These 
bodies function based on legal instruments, principally pacts or conventions, and a small 
but significant set of established precedents that bind their signature members to the 
stipulations contained within.  The AMIA case (as it is known in the IACHR) provides a 
clear demonstration of the way the claims of rights of citizenship and conceptions of 
justice form in relation to and intersect with national and international discourses.      
  Memoria Activa initially brought the case against the Argentine State five years 
after the AMIA attack.  At this time, key members of the group had already come to 
doubt the behavior of the DAIA leadership in the investigation and its role both in the 
payment to Telleldín discussed in Chapter 2 and the subsequent accusation of the Buenos 
Aires Police officers.  Their separation from the official leadership of the collectivity 
meant that the accusation of the Argentine State in front of an international body was 
undertaken without support from Jewish institutions.  Instead, they were supported and 
accompanied by the Buenos Aires-based Center for Legal and Social Studies (Centro de 
Estudios Legales y Sociales, or CELS) and the Center for Justice and International Law, 
an international NGO dedicated to “achiev[ing] the full implementation of international 
human rights norms in the member States of the Organization of American States (OAS) 
through the use of the Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights and 
other international protection mechanisms.”15   In addition, they were represented by a 
private lawyer, Alberto Zuppi (with the later addition of another private lawyer, Pablo 
Jacoby).   
 The case brought by Memoria Activa accused the State of Argentina on two 
major counts: 1) for having violated the right to life and physical integrity of the victims 
of the AMIA; and 2) the violation of the rights of the victims and their families to obtain 
justice by way of local tribunals.  They argued that the Argentine State had thus violated 
articles 4 and 5, in the first count, and articles 8 and 25, in the second, of the American 
Convention on Human Rights, or the Pact of San José, which Argentina ratified in 
                                                 
15 From the CEJIL website, www.cejil.org. 
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September of 1984 upon the official return to democracy following the last military 
dictatorship.  The first accusation rested on the argument that the Argentine State violated 
their rights as citizens and failed in its obligations to uphold the American Convention on 
Human Rights by not protecting the victims’ right to life and physical integrity.  They 
allege that, following the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy, the Argentine State had 
the obligation to foresee the possible danger of another attack and respond appropriately 
in order to prevent such an occurrence, and that the State’s failure to “fulfill its obligation 
to prevent, investigate, and penalize the attack” on the AMIA constitute a violation of 
these rights.  They contend that the Argentine State “failed to adopt the necessary 
measures to prevent the attack,” charging that the police protection offered to local 
Jewish institutions was inadequate, and they note the lack of attention on the part of the 
intelligence services in response to indications and warnings of a second attack.16 
 Their other accusation considers that the Argentine State had violated the right to 
justice through local tribunals that corresponded to the victims’ family members after the 
attack.  They appeal to the right to judicial protection, as guaranteed under articles 8 and 
25 of the Pact of San José.  Specifically, they claim that the Argentine State “has violated 
to the detriment of the relatives of the victims the right to the judicial guarantees that 
assure that the causes of the events that produced the damage be effectively investigated, 
the right that a regular process be followed against those responsible for having produced 
the damage, and that as part of this process the guilty be sanctioned and the victims 
compensated.”17  On this court they denounced numerous specific irregularities into the 
investigation as carried out by Federal Judge Juan José Galeano and his office (juzgado), 
including the loss and destruction of material evidence, the occultation of evidence from 
some parties involved in the prosecution, and the use of illegal methods, including illegal 
detentions and pressuring of witnesses, and the illegal payment to Telleldín.  They also 
denounce the obstruction of the investigation by elements of the security forces, among 
others the Office of Immigration (Dirección Nacional de Migraciones).  The complaint 
against Migraciones had to do with its inability or unwillingness to produce the archives 
that had recorded the entrance and exit of foreigners to Argentina in the days surrounding 
                                                 
16 Citations taken from the Presentation by Memoria Activa in front of the IACHR, case n 12.204, AMIA-




the bombing.  At first, Migraciones insisted that these records were unusable, having 
been destroyed by an infestation of rats.  Years later, under new direction, the records 
appeared, intact.18     
 While Memoria Activa’s denouncements extend across the three branches of 
government, they center around the ways each of these interfered in the effective 
realization of justice.  In particular, their complaints about the inefficiency of the justice 
system itself follow a long history of such criticisms, as seen in the Introduction.19  The 
image of the Argentine judicial system as ineffectual in providing justice, particularly 
when the violations involved security forces or other members of state apparatus, has also 
led to other cases being brought in front of the IACHR.  These include, among others, the 
case of Walter Bulacio, a 17-year old boy beaten to death by police in 1991, and a case 
brought by prison inmates in the province of Mendoza, for alleged maltreatment and sub-
regulation living conditions.  Though all of these cases are by definition against the 
Argentine State, none has been as divisive amongst those supporting or participating in 
struggles for justice as that of Memoria Activa.   
 This is true even given the open rhetorical grounds on which Memoria Activa 
bases its claims.  Interestingly, OAS appointed observer Claudio Grossman argues in his 
                                                 
18 The office known locally as simply Migraciones is located symbolically on an avenue (Avenida 
Antárdida) named after one of the two places over which Argentina claims but cannot exercise sovereignty.  
While we waited for the government employee who attended us during several long hours to create and 
then untangle a bureaucratic mess over the status of our visas, we watched him delicately balance a 
succession of lit cigarettes off the edge of his faded wooden desk.  Directly above him hung a copy of a 
faded decree establishing a ban on smoking, which, as my partner wryly noted, had clearly resulted only in 
the disappearance of ashtrays.  This Office of Immigration was headed at the time of Memoria Activa’s 
accusation by the ex-subsecretary of the Interior Security, who had been removed from that post when, 
days following the attack on the Embassy, he had claimed without substantiation that it was perpetrated by 
a “comando israeli.”  Similar claims were made about the AMIA bombing, most polemically in 2007 when 
a fierce and highly politicized debate over the role of Iran in the attack erupted around the figure of Luis 
D’Elia, a piquetero leader who joined the Kirchner administration as Land and Housing Secretary 
(Subsecretaría de Tierra y Hábitat).  He was removed from this post for his public support of Iran, as 
accusations against this nation once again came to the fore.  However, he continues to play a key role on 
behalf of the Kirchner administration(s) through the mobilization of physical demonstrations of popular 
support for official policies. 
19 Mercedes Hinton points to a 1994 public opinion survey in which 84% of those surveyed stated that the 
judicial system favors the rich and powerful (Instituto Gallup Argentina 1994), and she cites the Argentine 
sociologist Julio Mafud as saying, “The Argentine does not believe in the law or in its representatives.  This 
lack of faith and disbelief is justified by his entire history and sociology” (Mafud 1984: 285).  She further 
notes that the classic nineteenth century Argentine novel and symbol of national identity, El gaucho Martín 
Fierro by José Hernández, “is full of scenes that convey popular contempt for judges” [Hinton 2006: 
44n36], and she adds, “there is indeed amble evidence to justify mistrust of the judiciary, dating back to the 
nineteenth century, if not earlier.  More recent events demonstrate that little has changed” [Hinton 2006: 
44].      
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report that the Memoria Activa’s petition should be considered admissible not only under 
the articles guaranteeing the right to life and physical integrity and the serving of justice 
through the mechanism of a fair trial, but also under Article 24 of the American 
Convention, which guarantees the right to equal protection before the law for all persons, 
without discrimination.   The report states that “The Observer recommends that the case 
be declared admissible in function of Article 24 of the American Convention of Human 
Rights to the extent that this attack could imply a discriminatory character of anti-Semitic 
character” [Grossman Report 2005: 96].20 Memoria Activa did not chose to make their 
demands in these terms nor under this article initially, nor have they done so 
subsequently.  By choosing to not appeal on these grounds, Memoria Activa does not 
limit the failures on the part of the Argentine State to provide protection or justice to its 
treatment of minority communities.  Rather, they extend their demands to cover all of the 
nation’s citizens.   This open definition of the problem echoes the insistence by many 
within and outside the Jewish collectivity for the attacks and their lack of resolution to be 
considered as problems affecting all Argentines [see Chapter 2].   
 Looking at this case reveals specific configurations of both justice and citizenship, 
as presented by Memoria Activa.  T.H. Marshall’s conceptual division of citizenship into 
four component parts [as discussed in the Introduction] places right to justice within the 
civil component of citizenship, which also includes the principle of liberty.  This 
component serves to both protect private individuals and to provide the rights of 
communication and association between them, thus allowing the creation of a public 
sphere.21  Caldeira and Holston have built upon Marshall’s work in considering further 
the nature and implications of these rights of citizenship.  Citizenship, for Caldeira and 
Holston, is “a complex regulatory regime by which the state molds people into particular 
kinds of subjects, and by which citizens also hold the state accountable to their interests” 
[693].  Rather than relying upon a dichotomous division of state and civil society, they 
argue that looking at Latin American “uncivil democracies” reveals an “ambiguous 
                                                 
20 Además el Observador recomienda que se declare admisible el caso en función del artículo 24 de la 
Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos en cuanto este ataque puede relevar un contenido 
discriminatorio de carácter antisemita. 
21 The notion of the public sphere has been the subject of much theoretical consideration.  A fuller 
discussion of this concept, and its historical development and nature in Argentina, can be found in Avritzer 
2002; Sábato 1992, 2004.   
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mediation” between the state and civil spheres.  Their definition tries to capture this 
ambiguity, which rests on the fact that while the civil sphere serves to protect individuals 
from abuses by the state, it can only do so within the framework of a state, whose power 
for regulation it depends upon [see also Speed and Collier 2000, especially p.901].  
Scholars and activists concerned with the rights of women have often noted this 
ambiguity, questioning how women’s rights can be assured and protected within a male-
centered, patriarchal state system [Das 1995; Rivera Cusicanqui 2003].   In the case of 
Memoria Activa, the group continues to locate the state as the necessary provider of 
justice as an integral part of the rights of citizenship.   However, mistrust in the state’s 
willingness and ability to provide these rights have led them to take their demands 
outside of the national sphere.  They have chosen to appeal to an international 
organization with the ultimate aim of forcing the state to provide these rights.   
 I argue that looking at the case of Memoria Activa necessitates that we probe 
deeper into the way rights of citizenship are conceived by those advocating for their 
protection by the state, and how these conceptions may be influenced by the institutional 
channels and mechanisms through which groups seek to realize their demands.   
Specifically, I see that their petition for these rights has come to be expressed within the 
terms of generalized discourses of citizenship, human rights, and the democratic state as 
embraced by the international organizations to which they appeal.    In taking their case 
to the OEA, Memoria Activa effectively removed the question of citizenship rights from 
a closed state-citizen relationship, and in doing so draws on an international discourse of 
universal rights intricately connected to a globalized and homogenizing discourse on the 
nature of modern democracies.   
 While I am not arguing against the desirability of the discourse of universal rights, 
I do want to draw attention here 1) to the nature of this discourse that, in proposing 
universality, does not escape from the historical and geographic particularities of its own 
development; 2) that attempts to remake governments or hold them accountable along 
these lines implies the imposition of this generalized framework onto systems which 
operate under their own unique cultural and political logics; 3) that the manifestation of 
these generalized discourses in any given context is necessarily conditioned by these 
local particularities; and 4) that these particularistic manifestations in turn stand in a 
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dialogic relationship of mutual influence with the generalized discourses they partially 
absorb.  As Luis Roniger has also argued specifically on the issue of human rights in 
Argentina: 
 As part of the West, [the Spanish-speaking countries of Central and South America] have assumed 
the culture and institutions derived from Spain and later other nations, but their specificities within 
the “New World” and the peripheral character of their development in the past centuries have 
generated a certain kind of modernity that differs from other models within and outside the 
West...I suggest that a discourse of global projection like that of human rights has been mediated 
by local processes, by local visions of legitimacy, and by the contemporary political and social 
context of these societies [Roniger 2003: 115, 118].   
 
In looking at Memoria Activa, I consider specifically how the appeal by many 
counterimpunity groups in Argentina to a discourse of universal rights occurred within 
and engendered the application of these discourses in Argentina, and how this appeal had 
consequences for the support the groups were able to rely upon and the avenues of 
struggle available to them.  
 
A cultural history of universality 
 I want delve a little further into two seemingly contradictory but in fact 
intrinsically linked elements of this notion of rights that is appealed to by Memoria 
Activa in this case, namely, that this idea of rights is both inherently individualized and 
necessarily universal.  That is, in spite of attempts to broader the definitions in recent 
years, the notion of rights codified in international institutions like the OAS primarily 
conceive of these rights as pertaining to individual subjects (rather than groups) and are 
universal, in being by definition valid only if and as applicable to all individuals equally, 
regardless of nationality, ethnicity, race, or religion.  Lynn Hunt, in her recent work 
Inventing Human Rights, has expanded on historical trajectory of this particular notion of 
rights and the specific sociohistorical conditions that provoked its initial formulations in 
Western society towards the end of the 18th century, which she argues included 
reconfigured notions of the self and the body [2007].22  More recently, conventions like 
the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights revived this notion of rights, which had 
drifted towards national particularisms in the 19th century.  The 1948 Declaration of 
                                                 
22 Hunt’s argument considers new social practices like the reading of novels, and increasing emphasis on 
the self-containment of persons through a lowered “threshold for shame” and increased “pressure for self-
control” led to new considerations of personhood and the flourishing of “empathy” towards others.  These 




Human Rights grew out of the atrocities of the Second World War, and were based upon 
these liberalist idea of the rights of man [sic], that assumed a fundamental equality of all 
adults [on the history of this Declaration see Glendon 2001].  Additional conventions 
over the years have taken up specifically issues surrounding the rights of women, 
children, the disabled, and other defined groups.  Nonetheless, the core conception of 
human rights remains fundamentally based on an individualized notion of the person, in 
ways inherently tied to a Lockean idea of democracy founded on the inherent abilities of 
free individuals to act and interact as the basis for society.  
 A number of scholars have pointed out that these notions of universal rights not 
only come out of a particular place and time but, as a correlation of this, are based on a 
number of cultural assumptions [Wilson 1997].  Talal Asad has taken up this point with 
regards to the conception of “cruelty” that underlies Article 5 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.  In tracing the historical development of the idea of cruelty 
to European colonialist practices, Asad argues: 
 In the attempt to outlaw customs the European rulers considered cruel, it was not the concern with 
indigenous suffering that dominated the Europeans’ thinking, but rather the desire to impose what 
they considered civilized standards of justice and humanity on a subject population –i.e., the desire 
to create new human subjects. [1997:293].  
 
He goes on to say that his point is not that colonial administrators lacked ‘humanitarian’ 
motives, but that “...they were guided by a particular concept of ‘humanness’”  [Asad 
1997:306 n12].    
 The force that the language of universal rights has gained in the international 
sphere makes it a powerful tool for those wishing to gain redress or recognition of a 
situation in which they have suffered due to the action or omission of another, 
particularly when the offending other is a formal governing body.  This focus on the state 
is an effect of the particular history of the development of the idea of universal rights, and 
has its own implications.  Here, I consider specifically how this focus on the state has 
meant that the notion of human rights has developed concomitantly and inherently 
intertwined with the idea of the modern democratic nation-state.   
 In appealing to the notion of universal human rights, Memoria Activa’s demands 
at once assume the nature of the Argentine State under the rubric of a modern democracy, 
and contend their inadequacies in fulfilling this role in a complete way.  In other words, 
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their demands imply that Argentina functions as a disjunctive democracy.  Caldeira and 
Holsten, in the article cited above, further develop this concept arguing that any 
discussion of consolidating democracy in Latin America must go beyond the political 
sphere, to consider the cultural implications and understandings that, in their views, can 
alter or hinder the democratization process [Caldeira and Holsten 1999; Caldeira 2000].  
While I do not believe that these authors go far enough in questioning the cultural and 
historical roots of the idea of the democratic state, I do want to draw here on their 
descriptions of the cultural differences that conflict with the ideas of democracy being 
proposed and, to some extent, applied.  Caldeira, for example, explores in another work 
the example of the category of common criminals in Brazil.  According to her analysis, a 
majority of citizens, even under the post-authoritarian political system, believe that 
defending this group of citizens with a discourse of human rights is reproachable, and 
that they are somehow unworthy or fall beyond its acceptable limits [Caldeira 2000].  
Mercedes Hinton has also observed how, in Brazil, “the value of universal human rights 
is far from being widely embraced:  a large portion of the population holds the view that 
only upright and hardworking citizens should be entitled to human rights.”  She 
emphasizes how “the popular classes draw a clear distinction between the abuse of an 
honest “worker” (trabalhador) and abuse of a criminal (marginal).  While the killing of a 
trabalhador by the police is usually met by public outrage, reaction is exactly the 
opposite when the victim is a suspected criminal [Hinton 2006: 111], and she cites a 
police officer as saying: 
 Criminals shouldn’t have human rights; you can’t imagine how horrible these people are...Human 
rights are for decent people.  Criminals are completely different from decent folk, but it is true that 
you need to be able to differentiate between a small-time crook and a really big one, though it is 
also true that sometimes you have to use violence to deter a small-time crook from becoming even 
more violent [2006: 134]. 
 
While it is important to keep in mind the heterogeneity of opinion that exists within any 
country, it is also essential to recognize the practical effects that these kinds of social 
classifications create.  In Argentina, though the discourse of human rights has become 
deeply ingrained within large sectors of society, it coexists with a number of equally 
strong discourses on the “problem” of public safety and security and a recent trend 
towards the rhetorical and actual criminalization of poverty.     
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 Beyond the exclusion of certain classes to people from the right to have rights, the 
application of the universalist and individualist notion of rights in Latin America reveals 
other culturally determined aspects of its nature.  In addition to the way that the ideal of 
the universality of rights may produce cultural dissonance among many not willing to 
assume this basic premise, the idea of human rights is also inherently individualized 
[Rivera Cusicanqui 2007; Speed and Collier 2000].  The legal instruments that form the 
basis for the workings of the IACHR clearly express this individualized notion of justice 
as derived from the doctrine of human rights.  As early as 1843, Marx condemned the 
French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen for failing to “go beyond the 
egoistic man” [1977:43].  This Declaration and its 20th century counterpart contemplate 
rights as pertaining to individual beings, not to classes or communities.  Recently, there 
have been notable efforts by indigenous groups to challenge this notion and make 
collective rights an integral part of the discourse of human rights [Barsh 1996; Brysk 
1994a; Seider 2002; Warren and Jackson 2002].   
 The case brought by Memoria Activa, however, does not rest on any basis of 
collective rights.  In fact, one of the criticisms launched at Memoria Activa by other 
members of the Jewish collectivity rests on the way the petition was presented, in 
representation of only four individuals rather than all the victims.  This made for an 
especially tense moment one morning with the Citizens of the Plaza.  R., the mother of 
one of the defense attorneys representing Memoria Activa in the case, became embroiled 
in a bitter argument with other members of the group.  This man alleged that in 
abandoning the plaza and thus excluding the majority of their members, the directive 
board of Memoria Activa was only continuing a pattern of acting solely in its own self-
interests, as evidenced in the wording of their demands at the OAS.  R. vigorously denied 
this accusation, and made a point of bringing a photocopy of the legal document the 
following week, to show how the formalized legal language required in these documents 
did not allow Memoria Activa to make generalized claims but only to present demands 
on behalf of the wrongs they allegedly suffered in person.  As this moment shows, it was 
a combination of the actual and perceived adoption of this individualized notion of justice 
by Memoria Activa that was in part so divisive within the Argentine Jewish community.  
However, it also shows how, by choosing to pursue this course of action, Memoria 
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Activa found it compulsory to ascribe to the terms of the legalistic codes that formed the 
basis for the institutions to which they appeal. 
 However, before turning to a discussion of these divisions, I want to make clear 
that, in arguing that Memoria Activa’s recourse to an international discourse of justice 
and human rights runs against certain ingrained cultural notions, I do not mean to imply 
that this international code of rights is entirely foreign to Argentina.  Nor to I wish to 
obscure the important role that Argentina organizations and political situations have 
played in the formation of this discourse itself.  Recently, initiatives put forth by 
Argentine organizations and political representatives led to the creation of an OAS treaty 
against the practice of forced disappearances, as well as inspiring a new international 
forum, the United Nations Working Group on Forced Disappearance [Brysk 1994c].  The 
idea of the right to identity, the subject of a March 2007 Special Meeting of the 
Permanent Council of the OAS entitled Children, Identity, and Citizenship in the 
Americas, has also come out, in part, of the issue of the children stolen from their 
abducted parents by the security forces under the last dictatorship.  Furthermore, 
Argentina was a key agent in establishing the “right to truth” as part of the set of rights to 
justice as overseen by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights [April 2005].23   
 Rather than minimizing the role of Argentina in establishing and promoting an 
international discourse of human rights, and the legal instruments used for their 
protection, I wish to emphasize the interaction of these international definitions of human 
rights with the way human rights and the rights to justice are perceived within the local 
context.  I would like to draw attention to the way that the use or adoption of this 
language of rights occurs in relationship with these particularities.  Specifically, I want to 
highlight how the interplay of this international discourse (as in inter-nation, i.e., between 
nations, Argentina included) with local conceptions and conditions has led to differing 
and often conflictive interpretations and reactions among members of the Argentine 
Jewish collectivity and family members of AMIA victims.  This is similar to Speed and 
Collier’s call for scholars to focus “on how rights discourses are understood and used by 
people living in the world today” and to study human rights “according to the actions and 
                                                 




intentions of social actors, within wider historical constraints of institutionalized power” 
[2000:879].  However, while their study makes the important contribution of 
demonstrating how the discourse of human rights becomes “a language of argument that 
establishes the terms in which individuals and groups may make conflicting claims” 
[2000:880], I am more concerned with exploring the mutually formative interaction 
between local and international formulations of human rights discourse, and the concrete 
effects of its implementation.   
  
Shame and Guilt 
 In Chapter 2, I explored how the demands made by Memoria Activa were not 
only demands on the political sphere but also worked to modify the cultural sphere.  I 
argued there that though the ideas of cultural plurality advanced by Memoria Activa 
rested on neoliberal constructions of multiculturalism, they also worked to institute 
change by utilizing a language of traditional morality and practice.  While that notion is 
broadly supported among members of the Argentine Jewish community, Memoria 
Activa’s case in front of the IACHR has produced a more complex reaction.  The appeal 
by Memoria Activa to a discourse of universal rights in working for concrete institutional 
changes within the Argentine government on issues relevant to the AMIA bombing, 
while effective from a certain perspective, has been a source of conflicting sentiments for 
those who undertook the move, and has led to the further division and isolation of this 
group from many of its local allies. 
 President Menem’s reaction to Memoria Activa’s accusation in 1999 had been to 
dismiss their claims, asserting that the State’s performance in carrying out the 
investigation had been of “exemplary energy and promptness.”24  In 2000, the first 
audience of the case was held in Washington, D.C.  At that time, the Argentine State 
under President de la Rúa argued that decision in the case should be postponed until after 
the trial against Telleldín and the police officers, which was about to begin, had reached 
its conclusion.  Furthermore, they proposed that the IACHR appoint an observer to report 
on its proceedings.  This was accepted.  Renowned Chilean lawyer Claudio Grossman 
was designated as this observer in August of 2001, and the trial began the following 
                                                 




 The trial (juicio oral y público) took place in front of the Tribunal Oral en lo 
Criminal Federal n°3 (TOF3), presided by three judges, Guillermo Andrés Gordo, 
Gerardo Felipe Larrambebere, and Miguel Ángel Pons.  It extended nearly three years, 
the longest in Argentine history, and heard testimony from over 1500 witnesses.  When it 
finally concluded in 2004, all of the defendants were absolved, and the case and the 
investigation were annulled and denounced as part of an elaborate framework designed to 
falsely incriminate the accused.  The TOF3 went further in calling for an investigation 
into the investigation, which would examine the actions of Galeano and the prosecutors 
that worked for his office, and look into the role played by, among others, former Interior 
Minister Carlos Corach, members of the SIDE including its former head, Hugo 
Anzorreguy, the federal judges who had received (and failed to act upon) expedients 
denouncing the behavior of Galeano, and the ex-president of the DAIA Rubén Beraja, as 
well as DAIA lawyers Marta Nercellas and Roberto Zaidemberg.  It also stated that the 
“distancing from the truth” that had occurred had involved different sectors from all three 
branches of state power, either in offering political support or directly covering the 
“illegal or irregular” actions of Galeano [verdict TOF3, case n487/00].  Grossman 
presented his report to the IACHR on February 25, 2005.  He supported the actuation of 
the TOF3, and he recommended that the IACHR accept Memoria Activa’s accusations.   
 Memoria Activa applauded the work of the TOF3, and while they maintained that 
Telleldín should have been found guilty of the many crimes the trial revealed he had 
committed, they announced that they would not appeal the verdict.  This position makes 
sense, as the verdict concurred with many of the claims that Memoria Activa had been 
making for years, and represented, in their eyes, a “rupture in the political-judicial 
pact.”25  In addition, the conclusion of the trial would allow their case against the 
Argentine State to proceed.  Familiares and APEMIA, however, condemned the 
absolution of the defendants, and organized demonstrations in rejection of the verdict, 
though each for different reasons.  Familiares and the AMIA/DAIA contended that the 
defendants should have been found guilty, and rejected the discrediting of Galeano’s 
investigation.  APEMIA, on the other hand, argued that the verdict was yet another stone 
                                                 
25 Declaration by Memoria Activa, 6 September 2004. 
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in the wall of impunity that continued separating the families from the truth, and 
denounced what it saw as further manipulations and concealing of evidence by the three 
powers of state.26 
 The plaintiff unit formed by AMIA/DAIA/Familiares and that of the federal 
prosecutors  appealed the verdict.27   This move put in jeopardy the case brought by 
Memoria Activa in front of the IACHR.  For the case to prosper required the “exhaustion 
of internal recourses” and an appeal could be considered as a remaining possibility for the 
conviction of individuals with alleged involvement in the attack.  However, the Grossman 
Report recommended that the IACHR admit the petition regardless of an appeal, saying 
that “The IACHR has a solid jurisprudence establishing that slowness in investigations 
and the lack of results clearly generate an unjustified delay in the administration of 
justice, which implies a negation of such by not permitting the resolution of the events” 
[Grossman Report 2005: 97].28   
 Following the presentation of the Grossman Report, a new audience in front of the 
full IACHR was called for March 4, 2005.  The weeks following the announcement and 
realization of the meeting were full of renewed media coverage of the case and 
expositions of the parties’ respective positions.  Shame and guilt became the key concepts 
in the treatment of the case.  While members of Memoria Activa made reference to the 
shame they felt in having undertaken this move, the Kirchner administration chose to 
respond to its near certain condemnation by the Commission with a proactive assertion of 
its guilt.   
 Suing the Argentine State was not without its emotional conflicts for the leading 
members of Memoria Activa, who expressed on repeated occasions the shame 
                                                 
26 APEMIA, Boletín 6, September 2004, and author’s interviews.   
27 APEMIA had not held a role as plaintiff in the trial, and therefore could not have filed an appeal.  The 
Cámara de Casación ruled in May 2006 to uphold the verdict of the TOF3, and sent a copy of their findings 
to Ariel Lijo, the federal judge in charge of investigating the irregularities of Galeano’s investigation.  In 
October 2007, Lijo attempted to bring the case to trial, though the final accusation did not impute either 
Corach or Menem.  As of this writing, the action remains stalled following a move by the 
AMIA/DAIA/Familiares, which argues that Lijo’s investigation is incomplete.  Memoria Activa alleges 
that this action is designed to avoid further revelations of the involvement of the DAIA in the cover-up 
(former DAIA president Beraja is one of those indicted by Lijo).  APEMIA also condemns Lijo’s 
investigation as incomplete, though for reasons that differ from those of the AMIA/DAIA.   
28 La CIDH tiene una jurisprudencia sólida en el sentido que la lentitud en investigaciones y falta de 
resultados genera claramente un retardo injustificado en la administración de justicia, lo que implica una 
denegación de la misma en cuanto no permite el esclarecimiento de los hechos. 
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(vergüenza) they felt at having taken this move.  Even apart from the criticisms of the 
other family members, and their increasing alienation from the formal leadership of the 
Jewish collectivity, adopting this kind of action was clearly fraught with tension.  Diana 
Malamud of Memoria Activa expresses this tension and attempts to justify the actions of 
the group when she says, “[In going before the IACHR] we are exercising our rights as 
Argentine citizens, and it brings us shame and pain to have had to come to this, but we 
are not the ones who chose so much impunity” [Malamud 2005: 11].29  Such sentiments 
were expressed frequently by members of the group.  Why would this be so?  I argue that 
this shame, felt by the only group that has been able to achieve even minimal advances 
toward the objective of justice in the AMIA case, illustrates in one more way the inherent 
contradictions that can come into play in the attempt to apply universal notions of rights 
of citizenship to particular places and situations.  By appealing to a vision of democracy 
and a kind of knowledge (based on technical collection and processing of information, 
culminating in the detention and prosecution of the perpetrators of crimes) developed in 
the global North, and denouncing the inadequacies of the Argentine State in living up to 
this model, the case brought by Memoria Activa reinforces the schematics of global 
hierarchy that places countries like Argentina conceptually (and spatially) below the 
“more developed” countries of the North [Mignolo 2005; Dussel 1998]. 
 This hierarchy is propagated and reinforced by the widespread perception among 
many in Argentina that cases like these in “developed” nations are immediately and 
effectively resolved, even when the evidence runs against this assumption.  Still 
entrenched in Argentina are the schematics of the “First” vs. “Third” worlds, with the 
country remembering its fall from glory in the first part of the twentieth century to find 
itself inextricably snared on the lower part of the global ladder   This measuring of 
Argentina against its northern neighbors is common in discussions of the AMIA.  To give 
just one example, when the verdict against Galeano came in, the assistant editor of one of 
the country’s principal daily newspapers, Clarín, wrote an opinion piece entitled “Un 
final que da vergüenza” (“A shameful end”), in which he writes, “In the United States, 
Spain, Great Britain, stricken as we were by hyperterrorism, the guilty were identified 
                                                 
29Como ciudadanos argentinos estamos ejercitando nuestros derechos, y nos avergüenza y duele haber 
tenido que llegar a esta instancia, pero no fuimos nosotros los que elegimos tanta impunidad. 
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and imprisoned within days.  Here, we disrobe the judge.  Of course attacks like these 
don’t appear on the radar screen.  They are complex and overwhelm the judicial system.  
But it is precisely that complexity that requires efficiency and effort not in the realm of 
what is sadi but in the realm of actions.  Things should not be this way” (emphasis 
mine).30   Apart from the issue of the questionable accuracy of his belief in the immediate 
resolution of these issue in the global North, I highlight here the words efficiency 
(eficacia) and effort (esfuerzo) in order to draw attention to the value being placed on a 
nation’s willingness and ability to quickly produce detailed knowledge following 
criminal activity, and to successfully use this information to prosecute the perpetrators.  
What is seen as lacking in Argentina, then, is not the technical capability to produce this 
information, but the organizational structure of institutions (efficiency) and the political 
will (effort) to conduct orderly and successful criminal investigations.   
 That this negative assessment of the act of appealing to an international body is 
widespread and a source of contention is demonstrated by Memoria Activa’s consistent 
justifications for doing so.  Their lawyer, Pablo Jacoby, gave this energetic defense of 
their actions:  
Leaving aside a few “experts,” the rest of the public functionaries are unaware of the implications 
and consequences of the fact that the State has interfered with human rights recognized by the 
American Convention.  This lack of awareness, or, in some cases, rejection, of the international 
system rests on the false and erroneous conception that when States recognize their international 
responsibilities or are condemned [by international organizations], they are being intervened by 
external organisms, or that national sovereignty is being affected.  Collaboration with the system, 
fulfillment of a sentence [pronounced] by the Court, or, in the most general way, the assumption 
of international responsibilities implies raising the standard of respect for human rights, which in 
no way signifies a defeat for the State.31 
 
 Memoria Activa’s denouncement of the Argentine State put its representatives in 
                                                 
30Roa, Ricardo, Clarín,  4 August 2005: 2. En Estados Unidos, España, y Gran Bretaña, azotados como 
aquí por el hiperterrorismo, los culpables fueron identificados y apresados en días.  Aquí, no.  Aquí, 
destituimos al juez.  Naturalmente son atentados que no aparecen en la pantalla del radar.  Complejos y 
que desbordan el sistema judicial.  Pero precisamente esa complejidad requiere de una eficacia y de un 
esfuerzo no en el ámbito del discurso sino en el de los hechos.  Las cosas deben ser de otro modo.  
31 Dejando de lado algunos pocos “expertos”, el resto de los agentes públicos desconoce las implicancias 
y consecuencias de que el Estado haya afectado derechos humanos reconocidos por la Convención 
Americana. Este desconocimiento o, a veces, rechazo del sistema interamericano reposa sobre la falsa y 
equivocada concepción de que cuando los Estados reconocen responsabilidad internacional o son 
condenados, están siendo intervenidos por organismos foráneos o se está afectando la soberanía nacional.  
La colaboración con el sistema, el cumplimiento de una sentencia de la Corte o, dicho de modo más 
general, la asunción de responsabilidad internacional implica elevar el estándar de respeto hacia los 
derechos humanos, lo que de ningún modo significa una derrota para el Estado. 
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the position where, by accepting culpability in the handling of the AMIA case, they 
would be in essence, publicly accepting their inadequacy in this regard.  In this sense, it is 
interesting to analysis the admission of guilt presented by the Kirchner administration 
upon being called to the IACHR audience in March 2005. 
 Even before the audience was held, the government announced that it would 
assume responsibility for the privation of justice following the AMIA bombing.  This 
extraordinary announcement marked an absolute change in the position of the State in the 
AMIA case.  In place of the denials and claims of good management offered by previous 
administrations, the Kirchner government, when faced with almost certain condemnation 
by the IACHR, chose to publicly announce the State’s guilt.  In their declaration in front 
of the IACHR on March 4, 2005, the representatives of the State accepted the terms of 
Memoria Activa’s original denouncement, saying:  
 
The government recognizes the responsibility of the Argentine State for the violation of human 
rights as denounced by the petitioners...as there existed a failure to fulfill the function of 
prevention for not having adopted the necessary and effective measures to avoid the attack...there 
existed a covering up of the facts, due to a serious and deliberate failure to fulfill the function of 
investigation... and because this failure to follow through with regards to an adequate investigation 
produced a clear privation of justice.” [From the Acta CIDH (IACHR Record) 4 March 2005, case 
12.204].32   
 
The government went even further, formally asking Memoria Activa and all family 
members of AMIA and Embassy victims for forgiveness.33     
 This extraordinary declaration by the Argentine State, personified by Kirchner 
and transmitted through his official representation, was highly publicized across all major 
new media.  This put the AMIA/DAIA in the uncomfortable position of having to 
reconcile their estrangement from Memoria Activa with this clear and popular advance in 
the State’s treatment of the bombing.  The more conservative publications, historical 
and/or economic allies of the official leadership of the collectivity, minimized or simply 
                                                 
32 El gobierno reconoce la responsabilidad del Estado argentino por la violación de derechos humanos 
denunciada por los peticionarios...ya que existió un incumplimiento de la función de prevención por no 
haber adoptado las medidas idóneas y eficaces para intentar evitar el atentado... existió encubrimiento de 
los hechos, porque medió un grave y deliberado incumplimiento de la función de investigación... y porque 
este incumplimiento en materia de investigación adecuada produjo una clara denegatoria de justicia. 
33 También corresponde pedir perdón a Memoria Activa así como a todos los familiares y víctimas de los 
dos atentados de Buenos Aires. [From the presentation in front of the IACHR of Alejandro Rúa, in 
representation of the Argentine State, 4 March 2005]. 
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ignored the role of Memoria Activa in bringing about this sea change in government 
policy.  For example, the newspaper INFOBAE chose to publish a photo of Alejandro 
Rúa (then head of the AMIA Unit of the Federal Ministry of Justice and Human Rights) 
with Abraham Kaúl, the charismatic and influential president of the AMIA at the time, 
couched the events in terms of the reaction of the “Jewish community,” and omitted all 
mention of how the audience in front of the IACHR came to exist. 
 APEMIA, however, was quick to denounce Kirchner’s declaration.  This group 
sees the admission of guilt as an attempt that follows in the footsteps of all previous 
administrations by presenting the Argentine State as the victim of the bombing.  Playing 
on the notion of institutional continuity, Kirchner’s admission of State guilt is seen in this 
way as designed to achieve precisely the opposite: as an opportunity to present the State 
as a victim, having been subjected to the corrupt and “unscrupulous” practices of 
previous administrations, now vindicated under the new President.  APEMIA’s 
condemnation of the moves that the other organizations have taken as positive rests 
precisely on what they see as self-interested moves that divert rather than direct attention 
to the continuation of failed institutional practices.    
 
In Search of a Solution?:  The Role of the State  
 After the Grossman report was presented to the IACHR, it was clear that the State 
faced condemnation by this body.  Their admission of guilt avoided this outcome, and 
allowed for Memoria Activa and the Argentine State to enter into a process of “friendly 
resolution” (solución amistosa).  The drafting of the terms for this process, which 
continues under the oversight of the IACHR at the time of this writing, resulted in 
Memoria Activa concretely expressing a detailed list of measures that they want the State 
to undertake.   
 The first of these demands, and the only to have been fulfilled to date, revolved 
around the wide dissemination of the Grossman Report (which validated Memoria 
Activa’s position regarding the trial and the actions of the state), and the formalization 
and distribution of the State’s acceptance of its guilt.  The Grossman Report was 
subsequently published on the website of the Ministry of Justice.  The public acceptance 
of guilt was finally formalized through Presidential Decree 812/05, though its release was 
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delayed some 6 months, until July 2005.  In the eyes of many, this was a bald-faced PR 
move, designed to follow a long pattern of the government showing “advances” in 
answer to the public clamor that peaks around each July 18 anniversary.  However, the 
content of the decree [see Appendix] was well received by Memoria Activa. 
 The other points agreed upon in the solución amistosa include the strengthening 
of the Special Investigating Unit for the AMIA attack (a part of the national Ministry of 
Justice and Human Rights, part of the Executive Branch), the improvement of the system 
of registry in the Department of Migrations, the creation of a special catastrophes unit, 
reforms to improve the transparency of the use of funds by the Secretariat of National 
Intelligence, and measures to provide for financial reparations to the family members of 
victims, including the reimbursement of costs to those who took the case in front of the 
international tribunal.  These demands were drawn out of the experience of the AMIA 
bombing but were designed to better, in the words one key member of organization 
frequently used in our interviews, “the institutionality of Argentina as a whole” (la 
institucionalidad de la República).  The fact that they have yet to be satisfied, and the 
precise modes and flows of each request within the bureaucratic machine of the state 
provide yet another illustration of the ways multiple interpersonal and institutional 
interests compete with one another.  For give just one example, the creation of a 
catastrophes unit that could operate at least within the Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos 
Aires, or the political unit of the city of Buenos Aires, remains bogged down in the 
increasingly virulent struggles between the Federal and local governments over who 
should pay for city security services.34  Meanwhile, the city continues to operate without 
such a unit or a system of coordination between the different public emergency services. 
 A consideration of the demands as presented by Memoria Activa also serves to 
illustrate the conception of state responsibilities as conceived and presented by this 
organization.  I have shown how the divisions between Memoria Activa and the 
AMIA/DAIA/Familiares group rests in large measure upon divergent sets of personal and 
                                                 
34 The debates over the status and proper source of fiscal resources for the City of Buenos Aires have been 
a source of contention throughout the entire history of Argentina.  Most recently, the debate has centered 
over the police force (PFA).  The current local government wants a porteño police force under the 
command of the city government, but insists that the funds for its operation continue to be provided by the 
national government.  Currently, the PFA provides not only security services within the capital, but also 
handles issues of national concern.    
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group interests in the use of institutional channels for the pursuit of justice.  However, the 
differences between these two groups and APEMIA run along somewhat different lines.  
The divisions between these organizations are also concerned with proper engagement 
with the government on the practical register.  However, APEMIA proposes a 
considerably different notion of the role and responsibilities of the State towards its 
citizens. 
 The differences between Memoria Activa and APEMIA in many ways parallel the 
split between sectors of perhaps the best-known Argentine social movement, the Madres 
of Plaza de Mayo.  The mothers first came together in 1977, after their children were 
disappeared during the last military dictatorship.35  However, they became increasingly 
divided after the fall of the military government, on questions of how best to define their 
continuing struggle.  One key issue in this debate was that of exhumations.  After the 
restoration of democracy, it became possible to excavate sites of mass graves, where 
many of the disappeared where believed to have been interred.  However, the military 
continued to deny its involvement in the disappearances.  One sector of the mothers, 
which later came to call itself Madres de Plaza de Mayo – Linea Fundadora, or Founding 
Line, eventually supported the exhumations, which held the possibility of providing at 
long last answers to the question of what had happened to their loved ones.  However, 
while not condemning those mothers who chose to seek answers to their questions by any 
means available, another sector of the Madres, now led by Hebe de Bonafini, rejected the 
exhumations.  As Alison Brysk notes, “Human rights activists who opposed exhumations 
contended that technical issues would overshadow the more important political 
determination of responsibility.”  She quotes one movement leader as saying, "We want 
to know who the murderers are; we already know who the victims are!”  [Brysk 
1994c:48].  Another mother insisted, “We don’t agree with the exhumations of the 
bodies.  With the exhumations they want to eradicate the problem of the disappearances, 
because then there are no more desaparecidos, only dead people...If you accept this, in 
your desperation to have the remains of your loved one, you lose all your rights.”36 
However, their rejection of the exhumations is also based on a fundamental insistence on 
                                                 
35 Further aspects of this organization and its relevance for other Argentine movements and society were 
discussed in Chapter 3.  
36 Graciela de Jeger, quoted in Fisher 1989:129. 
 182
  
socializing rather than individualizing their struggle.  They refer to all 30,000 
desaparecidos as their own children, “The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo make our 
demands in the name of all of our 30,000 disappeared children without distinctions” (Las 
Madres de Plaza de Mayo reivindicamos a nuestros 30.000 hijos desaparecidos sin hacer 
distinciones).  Furthermore, this group of Madres has taken on what it considers to be the 
“revolutionary struggle of our children” (la lucha revolucionaria de nuestros hijos).  
They define their objectives beyond the struggle for their biological children and insist, 
“The struggle of the world’s peoples is our own” (la lucha de los pueblos del mundo es 
nuestra propia lucha).  Their idea of justice includes the realization of the kind of world 
they see their children as having fought for, including the extension of social and 
economic rights to all members of society.  In the reality of post-dictatorship Argentina, 
they argue that, “The lack of work is a crime.  The businesspeople who leave millions of 
men and women without work are criminals.  The Madres of Plaza de Mayo believe that, 
“the unemployed workers are the new desaparecidos of the system.  Decent work is a 
right...for which we must always fight.”37 
 Given this context, it should not be surprising that Memoria Activa, with its focus 
on individual justice, was supported in its weekly actos by the presence of a member of 
the Madres – Linea Fundadora.  On the other hand, APEMIA is more akin to the Madres 
led by Hebe de Bonafini, in highlighting the need for community-wide social justice as 
an integral part of the struggle against what they see to be the continuation of state 
terrorism.  The idea that the problem of the AMIA attack and its cover-up, as the result of 
a failed state institutional structure, cannot be separated from the rights and needs of all 
Argentines is echoed in the following, taken from a speech given at the APEMIA 
commemoration of the 12th anniversary of the attack: 
 “...violations of human rights are of the State and not of persons...the possibility to advance in the 
AMIA case will not exist if we do not manage to unite our demand for trial and punishment for 
those responsible for the AMIA attack with the struggle against the impunity that our people 
suffer, with the policies of misery, hunger, and repression that are in place today and that we see 
applied to us on a daily basis.”38 
                                                 
37 La falta de trabajo es un crimen. Son criminales los empresarios que dejan sin trabajo a millones de 
hombres y mujeres....Las Madres de Plaza de Mayo creemos que los desocupados son los nuevos 
desaparecidos del sistema. El trabajo digno es un derecho...por el que debemos luchar siempre.  All 
quotations taken from http://www.madres.org. 
38 From the speech given by Graciela Rosemblum, of the Liga Argentina por los Derechos del Hombre 




 In expressing its position, the group has forged alliances with traditional leftist 
political organizations, and maintains a far more oppositional stance to the government, 
including the Kirchner administration, than any of the other groups.  APEMIA chose to 
hold its initial demonstrations in the Plaza de Mayo, rather than the Plaza Lavalle.  By 
choosing to make their public appearance in the historically resonant space for public 
manifestation, APEMIA highlighted the AMIA case as one affecting all Argentines, and 
launched their criticisms, not primarily at the Justice system as with Memoria Activa, but 
against the government as a whole.   The vision of the state as proposed by Memoria 
Activa rests on the idea of the estado de derecho, or the rule of law.  However, this 
notion is disputed by APEMIA, who argues that the incongruencies between the 
rhetorical use of this idea and the actual practices of government officials belie its status 
as a deceptive and manipulative mask.  The group has expressed their position in this 
way: 
Memoria Activa guides their actions in name of an abstraction:  the defense of [a State based on] 
the “Rule of Law” –  of whom they demand that it “acts” as it should – and not in defense of our 
rights including that against the decomposition of this same “State”.  They end up disguising the 
[real] function of the judicial apparatus and the State itself:  to uphold impunity.//The reality of the 
“Rule of Law” is very different.  If its essence were the provision of justice or rights and 
guarantees, how can do they explain that, of 20 years of “democracy”, the last 12 [have seen] the 
explosion of the Israeli Embassy, of the AMIA, and the Military Munitions Factory at Río III, not 
to mention the laws of Full Stop and Due Obedience [that prevented the prosecution of Dirty War 
repressors]?  How can they explain the 1500 unpunished assassinations by gatillo fácil [easy 
trigger] or the criminalization of social protest and the new political prisoners of the K[irchner] 
era?39 
  
 APEMIA takes the provocative step of accusing the State itself of being 
                                                                                                                                                 
violaciones de los derechos humanos son de los Estados y no de las personas...no habrá posibilidad de 
profundizar en la causa AMIA sino logramos unir nuestra reivindicación de juicio y castigo a los 
responsables de la AMIA en la lucha contra la impunidad que sufre nuestro pueblo, con las políticas de 
miseria, hambre y represión que hoy existen y que cotidianamente vemos aplicadas sobre nosotros. 
39 Memoria Activa guía su acción en nombre de una abstracción:  la defensa del “Estado de derecho” – a 
quien le reclama se “comporte” como debiera ser – y no en la defensa de nuestros derechos incluso contra 
la descomposión de ese mismo “Estado.”  terminan maquillando la función del aparato jurídico y del 
Estado mismo: sostener la impunidad.// La realidad del Estado de derecho es bien distinta.  Si su esencia 
fuese la provisión de justicia o los derechos y garantías ¿cómo se explica que de los 20 años de 
“democracia”, los últimos 12 se lo llevan la impunidad de la voladura de la Embajada, de la AMIA y de la 
Fábrica Militar de Río III, sin contar los de las leyes del Punto Final y de la Obediencia Debida?  ¿Cómo 
se explican los 1.500 asesinatos impunes del “gatillo fácil” o la criminalización de la protesta social y los 
nuevos presos políticos de la era K? [Cruzaron la vereda, APEMIA Boletín 6, Sept 2004].  The 
information presented on APEMIA in this chapter come primarily from the author’s interviews with key 
members of the organization and attendance at organizational meetings and public events.  The quotes are 
taken from speeches given by members or from printed materials provided to the author by Laura Ginsberg. 
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responsible for the attack on the AMIA.  This argument derives from the evidence that 
members of different branches of the State were complicit in the execution and covering 
up of the attack.  In making this argument, they point to evidence that: 1) the SIDE and 
the Ministry of the Interior had word of the attack before it happened and failed to 
prevent it; 2) members of the security and intelligence forces contributed in the carrying 
out of the attack; and 3) elements from all three branches of government worked in a 
coordinated manner in covering up what happened.40 Given this position, for APEMIA, 
Memoria Activa’s case against Argentina in front of the IACHR becomes ineffectual in 
the attempt to achieve justice.  In addressing only specific claims of violations, within an 
established structure based upon individualized notions of retribution, the case fails to 
attend to what APEMIA sees as the need to reform the entire political system, in ways 
that attend to the needs of all Argentines. 
 
 I have dedicated these last three chapters to an exploration of the dynamics of the 
demands and concerns as formulated by the organized groups of family members of 
victims from the AMIA bombing, and the ways in which they have chosen to act in 
pursuing these demands.  In the next section, I turn to an examination of another set of 
organizations involved in modes of social protest, and I consider the ways in which they 
conceive of and work to bring about social change.    
 Though these two groups are on the surface dissimilar, comprised of individuals 
from for the most part different class and professional backgrounds and organized around 
different issues, looking at them both reveals a number of basic similarities in the ways 
they choose to formulate their claims and in their actual engagements with the political 
and legal systems that govern their possibilities for enacting the changes they advocate.  
Exploring both demonstrates how certain concepts like corruption and impunity come to 
hold relevance and interpretive value precisely across such disparate sectors of Argentine 
society, and how existing notions and operations of politics affect and are challenged by 
disparate organizations simultaneously.  As such, the actions of each necessarily 
influence the climate in which all others also operate.  Furthermore, in coexisting both 
spatially and temporally, both of these sets of groups arose within and are impacted by a 
                                                 
40 See, for example, “Salen los fiscales del juicio...¿y ahora qué?¨, APEMIA Boletín 4, May 2004. 
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particular historical moment and local, national, and international circumstances, which 
form the context for their actions, understandings, and chosen fields and methods of 
action.  This study recognizes the importance of these convergences by allowing each of 
these groups to serve as a lens on different aspects of the socio-political climate within 
which both operate and which conditions their actions, even as and while their actions in 





“Justice – Fast-acting formula against impunity.  So that crimes are not repeated.  So that 
the guilty are punished.   
Justice Branch Laboratories 


















Picture 4.2  
 
 
“Sebastián Barreiros for President – The change that Argentina needs. 
Sebi was 5 years old and dreamed of becoming President.  He didn’t even get to finish 





     
Chapter 5 
 
“If they touch one of us, they touch all of us”:  Cooperativism as a 
Counterlogic to Neoliberal Capitalism 
 
 At first glance it could be any large Buenos Aires hotel early on a Sunday 
morning.  A few guests bustle around with their suitcases, the phone rings sporadically 
behind the reception desk, and sparsely scattered groups of people in the adjoining 
restaurant sit sleepily sipping the small, espresso-sized cups of coffee that are the 
standard fare in any porteño cafe.  Slowly, though, a rising sense of tension begins to 
infiltrate the air.  A barely perceptible disturbance registers somewhere near the entrance.  
In its wake, movement quickens, as individuals, in ones and twos at first, begin to make 
their way quickly back and forth across the lobby, calling out to others who scurry off in 
varying directions.  Within a short while, a crowd of people has gathered in front of the 
main doors.  The sound of drums begins to penetrate the walls, and glimpses of tattered 
homemade banners bearing the emblems of leftist political parties, neighborhood 
associations, and piquetero groups filter through the dark windows, reflected in the 
strengthening morning sun.  For this is no ordinary hotel, but the Hotel Bauen, a once-
bankrupt enterprise taken over by its former workers in defense of their source of labor.  
Controlled and operated by a workers’ cooperative, the actual Hotel Bauen is the object 
of an intense legal and political struggle, as the former owners and their political and 
economic allies dispute the cooperative’s right to manage the hotel.  This early Sunday 
morning in June 2005, a new attempt to have the hotel shut down takes the form of a pair 
of young police officers who arrive to place a mandatory closure notice on the front door.  
Within the hour, and in spite of being only shortly past daybreak on a weekend, hundreds 
of people have rallied in front of the hotel in a show of solidarity for the BAUEN 
cooperative and for the worker-controlled recuperated businesses movement.1  
                                                 
1 For the sake of accuracy and clarity, I refer to the building itself as the Hotel Bauen, and the workers’ 
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 This show of solidarity with the BAUEN did not emerge spontaneously or in 
isolation.  In this chapter, I examine how a logic of cooperativism has been steadily 
established across diverse sectors of Argentine society in recent years.  In examining the 
history and development of cooperativism in Argentina and its emergence in this case, I 
argue that this recent manifestation of cooperativism has consolidated as a specific 
challenge to the ideas of the citizen and labor as advanced by the politics of neoliberalism 
applied in Argentina.  I focus specifically on the Hotel Bauen as a key site for the 
exploration of this idea and its development and practice within the recuperated 
businesses movement.  The geographic centrality and functional nature as a hotel, the 
networks of solidarity cultivated by the cooperative, and their prolonged struggle for 
legal definition have made the hotel and cooperative an important symbolic referent and 
location for the expression of social protest.  Here, I show how the logic of cooperativism 
deployed within and across the recuperated businesses movement works to recreate the 
notion of the worker as a collective and independent political actor, based on an ethics of 
solidarity and collaboration.  In this way, I see the recuperated businesses movement as 
enacting a kind of cultural politics on the ethical sphere that works to “resignify and 
transform dominant cultural conceptions” and serves as a “crucial arena for 
understanding how th(e) perhaps precarious yet vital entanglement to the cultural and the 
political occurs in practice” (Alvarez, Dagnino, and Escobar 1998:13, 5), in ways similar 
to the cultural politics enacted by Memoria Activa discussed in Chapter 2.  Furthermore, I 
show how this resignification relies upon a discourse of corruption that delegitimizes the 
cultural program of the ruling elite and opens a space for the emergence of new and 
revitalized conceptions of work and the citizen.      
 
Buenos Aires, Una Empresa Nacional (B.A.U.E.N.) 
 Cooperative member Gerardo has astutely described the Hotel Bauen as “A 
twenty story summary of Argentine history from the past thirty years.”  The building, 
located at Callao 360 between Corrientes and Juan D. Perón Streets in the very heart of 
Buenos Aires, was initially constructed under the direction of Marcelo Iurkovich and 
associates [Picture 5.1].  The five-star installation was built with a credit from the Banco 
                                                                                                                                                 
cooperative that operates it by their legal name, BAUEN (Buenos Aires, Una Empresa National). 
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Nacional de Desarrollo (BANADE, or National Bank for Development) as part of the 
dictatorship’s efforts to prepare the country for the 1978 Soccer World Cup tournament.  
Argentina’s role as host came on the heels of the most severe period of Dirty War 
violence, and the dictatorship faced increasingly intense international criticism as 
information on its heavy-handed methods at crushing opposition and the plight of the 
disappeared were slowly gaining visibility.  The military government tried to use the 
World Cup to divert local and international attention away from the violence, and to 
capitalize on the nationalist sentiments that the tournament provoked.  While nascent 
human rights groups like the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, Serpaj (Servicio para Paz y 
Justicia), and the APDH (Asamblea Permanente de Derechos Humanos) worked with 
some success to use the increased media coverage to draw attention to their struggle, the 
successful transpiring of the events and Argentina’s culminating victory as first time 
World Champions undoubtedly worked, at least temporarily, in the dictatorship’s favor.  
Now, however, the memory of the 1978 World Cup is for many shrouded in a haze of 
embarrassment for the popular exuberance it provoked, and the Bauen’s association with 
the event inevitably evokes its emblematic status as a repository of the material traces of 
political machinations.2   
 Throughout the 1980s and 90s, the Bauen continued to serve as a political stage, 
becoming renowned as a favorite venue for entertainment and business purposes by the 
political and economic elite.  President Menem frequently held personal and political 
events within its walls, including using it as a campaign headquarters.  Not reserved for 
any one party, but catering across the spectrum of elite actors, it has been cited as also 
having been home to the many secret meetings between the Duhalde faction of the PJ 
(Menem’s political rivals within his party) and members of the opposition Alianza party.  
In the era of “pizza and champagne” during Menem’s first presidency, so named for 
consolidation of established fortunes and the rise of a noveau riche able to capitalize on 
the easy profits of decreased regulation, the Bauen was the iconic space for the closed-
door negotiations and public posturing that characterized political practice.  
 The credit that Iurkovich and his associates received from BANADE in 1976 
                                                 
2 For more information on the 1978 World Cup, see Gilbert and Vitagliano 1998; Llonto 2005; Mason 
1995. 
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totaled 37 million USD, and was designed to finance 80% of the construction costs.  By 
1982, the terms of the loan were being challenged in court.  Iurkovich and associates 
claimed that the credit had only served to finance 40%.  BANADE was later absorbed 
into the Banco Nación, and the legal dispute was not closed until 1994, when the Banco 
Nación accepted only 6 million USD in exchange for considering the loan cancelled (i.e., 
paid).  By 1997, Iurkovich, having failed to invest in the Hotel Bauen (preferring instead 
to use profits to build other luxury hotels, including the nearby Bauen Suites), passed its 
management to a Chilean company, Solari, S.A.  The hotel was by this time deeply in 
debt, largely for non-payment of taxes and other services.  By 2000, this group had 
entered into bankruptcy protection (concurso de acreedores), and claimed to be operating 
under accumulated debts of over 8 million USD.  Under commercial law in Argentina, a 
business that cannot fulfill its fiscal obligations enters into this preventive status.  The 
intent is to bring together the owners with its creditors, to assure payment of the balances 
due.  However, the law also stipulates that, as a source of jobs, the attempt must be made 
to save and reactivate the business.  To this end, the commercial judiciary intervenes and 
appoints a síndico, typically an accountant who takes control of the business’s finances.  
In this way, the hotel remained opened and operated under a síndico until it was finally 
closed on December 28, 2001.  At this time, only days after the tumultuous events of 
19/20 December that had led to President De la Rúa’s (literal) flight from office, another 
judicial order instructed that the doors to the hotel be closed and the few remaining 
personnel abruptly dismissed.3 
 The workers often reflect on the irony of having showed up on that particular day, 
only to find the business shut down.  December 28 in Argentina is the Día de los 
Inocentes, something akin to April Fools’ Day in the United States.  Many of the workers 
recount how losing their jobs on that day, with scant possibilities of finding work in the 
height of an acute economic crisis, made a bitter mockery of the direness of their 
situation.   
 The Bauen remained closed for over a year.  By early 2003, some former workers 
                                                 
3 Information on the history of the hotel comes from author’s interviews with hotel workers and was 
corroborated by archival sources, especially coverage from local mainstream and alternative media 
including Clarín, ANRED, Página 12, and lavaca.  Information on the takeover and early days of the 
cooperative come primarily from the author’s interviews with members and others that closely 
accompanied the process. 
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had begun to meet with representatives of other recuperated businesses and the umbrella 
movement the Movimiento Nacional de Empresas Recuperadas (National Movement of 
Recuperated Business, or MNER).  The MNER advised them to gather as many former 
employees as they could and occupy the installation.  Finally, on March 20, 2003, a small 
group of workers decided to enter the hotel.  
 The practice of factory occupation has historical precedent within Argentina.  In 
1959 workers occupied the meatpacking plant Lisandro de la Torre in response to its 
privatization under Frondizi [see James 1988:113-118].  Workers facing imminent 
personnel reductions occupied and took over production within the Ford plant in General 
Pacheco in 1985.  These occupations and others like them were generally part of a 
defensive strategy designed to apply pressure, and not considered as a permanent 
measure.  The more recent occupations differ from these earlier experiences in their focus 
on the idea of workers owning and controlling both the process and the product of their 
labor.  Rather than seeing worker control primarily as a defensive response to a dire 
situation, in its more recent manifestation “the occupation of the factory is not just a form 
of protest but itself constitutes an affirmation” [García Allegrone, et. al. 2004:341].   
 
The Logic of Cooperativism 
 I met with the María, head of the housecleaning team at the Bauen, one day late in 
2005.  It was not the first time we had spoken, as I had at that point been accompanying 
the cooperative for nearly a year.  However, this conversation took place in the relative 
quiet of her office, rather than in the heavily transited lobby or during the heat of a street 
protest.  Parts of her narrative appear throughout this chapter, and the quotes I have 
selected carry many layers of meaning that the accompanying analysis only begins to 
unravel.  Hers is not the only voice on which I rely in interpreting the events discussed, 
and though what she says in many ways closely resembles things I heard from many 
others, I do not mean to indicate that her point of view can be taken as representative of 
all of the cooperative’s members.  However, I include her words at length as a way of 
providing the reader with access to some of the perspectives and interpretations of those 
most directly involved in the events described.4 
                                                 
4 As I have throughout this dissertation, with this in mind I have included the original version of her words 
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 María described the initial days of the takeover to me this way: 
..and we came to know what hunger was, outside of the home, no?  We lived in a different 
situation but here with the compañeros we suffered from cold, because here there wasn’t anything, 
there was no hot water, nothing, the only thing we had was electricity, we didn’t have potable 
water...we began to cook in a giant pot, we used some cardboard and we began to eat out of it 
because we didn’t have, we didn’t have anything, because we weren’t at home, later when we 
began to go home sometimes we began to bring, spoons, forks, etc..5 
 
She had been one of the original participants in the occupation.  Her narrative, as in 
resonance with those of many of the others, recalls how they quickly learned to rely on one 
another and to work together.  Once inside, these former workers faced with the utter 
desolation that a year of abandonment and pillage had left.  The difficulty of their 
situation, expressed in the quote above, was exacerbated by the workers’ fear of leaving 
the hotel.  The precariousness of their situation took its toll.  For a time Iurkovich took the 
stated position that it was to his benefit to have the workers inside, taking care of the hotel 
for him for free and saving him the cost of a security service.  However, the workers, 
many of whom considered themselves to have no background or previous experience in 
political action of any kind, felt that they had taken a dangerous step, and lived in constant 
fear of being forcibly evicted.   
María:  ...we arranged ourselves near the door to Callao Street, where at that time hung the 
banners of all the organizations that came to help us, and there was just a piece of metal that we 
used to cover (the opening), and every time someone moved the metal it made a noise, so every 
time we heard that noise, eh, we though they were coming, that the police were coming to take us 
out.  That was the psychological blow that we had continuously within ourselves.6 
 
 The mixture of fear and resolve that relating these events to me brought out in her 
face was perhaps further intensified by the freshness of the repression the workers had 
just suffered.  We were speaking just days after members of the Cooperative had been 
                                                                                                                                                 
in the footnotes.  All translations throughout the chapter are mine, unless otherwise noted.  My thanks go to 
Cynthia Golzman for her careful transcriptions. 
5 ... y supimos lo que es el hambre, más allá de que en las casas también, no? vivíamos otra situación pero 
acá con los compañeros pasamos frío, porque acá no había nada, no había agua caliente, no, lo único que 
teníamos era electricidad, agua potable no teníamos... nosotros nos empezamos a cocinar en una olla 
gigante, hicimos un cartón y empezamos a comer del cartón porque no, porque no, no teníamos nada, 
porque no estábamos en la casa, y después cuando ya empezamos a ir a las casas empezamos a traer una 
cuchara, un tenedor.   
6  ..hicimos un, una parte como un, una puerta la parte de Callao entonces eran todo banderas de todas las 
organizaciones que nos vinieron a ayudar y, eh,  había una chapa que nos lo tapaba nada más entonces 
cada vez que cuando corría la chapa hacía un ruido, entonces cada vez cuando hacía ese ruido, eh, 
nosotros pensábamos que venía, no sé, venía la policía y nos venía a sacar. Ese era el golpe psicológico 
que teníamos continuamente siempre teníamos en sí.   
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forcibly evicted from the City Legislature while trying to have a law on their behalf 
advanced.  Her body still bore the deep purple bruises left by the police batons.  
Nonetheless, after the nearly three years of effort that she had at that time put into the 
cooperative, her commitment showed no signs of wavering.     
 The workers who occupied the Bauen had organized into and registered as a 
workers’ cooperative soon after the occupation.  They named their new cooperative 
Cooperativa Buenos Aires Una Empresa Nacional Ltda (B.A.U.E.N.) (Cooperative 
Buenos Aires, A National Business).7  They were given the right to legally guard the 
building and its installations by the judge handling the bankruptcy case.  While this 
provided a certain reprieve in tension while they labored to fix up and clean sectors of the 
hotel, once they began to operate (first renting meeting rooms and banquet halls, and later 
opening 80% of the guest rooms and inaugurating a full bar and restaurant), they were 
once again on the defensive.  The uncertainty of their legal status and the disputes over 
their right to operate the hotel were of daily concern to the workers, who functioned 
under constant threat of police or legal action against them, as Iurkovich and certain 
political sectors sought out new ways to recover the hotel by delegitimizing their actions.  
Under this atmosphere, the need to rely on one another and what external help they could 
get was pronounced, and many of the workers relate how these practical concerns 
overshadowed other considerations.  However, cooperative members often convey that as 
the initial days of tension turned into long years of struggle for their right to operate the 
hotel, the logic of autogestión, or worker-led management, came to hold increased 
significance for them.  As another worker has expressed, “We continue to defend worker-
led management because in the time we’ve been struggling we’ve seen before our own 
eyes that we can successfully run a business (llevar una empresa adelante) and keep it in 
the spirit of cooperativism and compañerismo”8 [Pictures 5.2-5.4].   
 Before exploring further the details and significance of this notion of 
cooperativism, I consider some aspects of the specific historical and cultural contexts 
from and within which the idea has emerged.  The actions of these former workers, the 
                                                 
7 The initial registration took place under a different name, but following a reorganization the cooperative 
took on this name soon after.    
8 This quote comes from an interview recorded by the alternative filmmakers’ group Alavío, website 
www.alavio.org.  Their video coverage of the BAUEN and numerous other topics is freely available at 
www.agoratv.org. 
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meaning and implications of their decisions, and how they themselves interpret their 
situation are deeply informed by and constructive of these contexts.  In what follows, I 
focus specifically on the particular ideas of citizenship, work, and corruption as 
circulated, understood, and applied in Argentina and by the BAUEN Cooperative. 
 
Trabajo Sin Patrón  
 In the Introduction to this dissertation, I discussed how the implementation of 
neoliberalism in Argentina had locally specific effects on the ideas of citizenship widely 
circulated and promoted throughout the 1990s.   Each of these models of citizenship 
advanced a new kind relationship between the state and civil society.  A minimalist 
conception of the state and democracy and the reduction of the political domain and its 
appropriate participants worked to remove citizens from previously influential modes of 
participation in political life.  The logic of cooperativism that quickly came to be 
embraced by the BAUEN and other recuperated businesses challenges these notions of 
citizenship by asserting the rights of workers to play an active role in the public sphere, 
as actors capable of influencing the political and economic direction of the nation as a 
whole.  A key element of this concerns a reasserted right to work as a fundamental right 
of citizenship.  This is expressed through an emphasis on collective wellbeing over 
individual gain, as an inherent part of the idea of and worker-controlled management, or 
trabajo sin patrón. 
 The appearance of the recuperated businesses movement in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s comes on the heels of a protracted succession of changes in the formal rights 
and actual possibilities for protected and salaried work in Argentina.  Though a series of 
such rights have been formally guaranteed by the Argentine Constitution since 1949, the 
second half of the 20th century saw a long decline in the effectiveness of the protection 
offered to workers both legally and through formal organization structures such as 
unions, government ministries and agencies, etc.9   However, beyond and in conjunction 
with these concrete changes in the nature and practice of work and the legal and 
economic forces that influence and regulate it, looking at contemporary forms of social 
                                                 
9 For more information on the status of workers’ rights and the history of the important workers unions 
throughout the 1960s and 1970s, see James 1988; Robben 2005.  For the 1980s see Tedesco 1999. 
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protest in Argentina reveals the way the idea of work is being conceptualized and 
deployed in new ways [Battistini 2004].  These include the actions of piquetero or 
unemployed workers movements, informal and organized groups of cartoneros or street 
recyclers, and recuperated businesses, among others.     
 Built in a weak sense into classical liberalism, notion of the right to work in 
Argentina has roots in the socialist, anarchist, and syndicalist movements at the turn of 
the 20th century, but derives its main force and flavor from classical Peronism and the 
union structures that emerged in that era.10  The importance of classical Peronist ideology 
in establishing the notion of work as a right in Argentina should not be underestimated, 
even given the drastic and contradictory changes that Peronism as a political party has 
undergone.   As Daniel James has written: 
 
Peronism did not only represent higher wages, its historical meaning for workers was embodied 
also in a political vision which entailed an expanded notion of the meaning of citizenship and the 
workers’ relations with the state, and a ‘heretical’ social component which spoke to working-class 
claims to greater social status, dignity within the workplace and beyond, and a denial of the elite’s 
social and cultural pretensions [1988:263]. 
  
 However, the idea that the State was responsible for assuring access to stable, 
salaried labor continued to hold force and provide impetus to workers’ organizations even 
as the practical conditions of labor came under continual threat both from state forces and 
union bureaucracies during the second half of the twentieth century.  The adoption of 
neoliberalism posed new problems for Argentine workers, with the premise of State 
protection cast away in favor of market control.  Labor laws were altered, erased, and 
ignored, and many workers found themselves increasingly subjected to policies with key 
words like “labor flexibility,” specifically designed to increase profitability by reducing 
worker protections.  These reforms, which included substantial cuts for government 
workers and other such structural adjustment measures, were enabled in part by the 
overturning of the National Employment Law under President Menem.  By the end of the 
1990s, there was a marked increase in desalaried work, black market work devoid of 
protection, and under- and unemployment throughout Argentina.    
 It is within this particular context that the recuperated businesses movement 
                                                 
10 Guillermo O’Donnell’s classic article “Y a mí, qué mierda me importa?” playfully and effectively details 
the notion of the right to work as commonly expressed in Argentina.  See O’Donnell 1997. 
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begins to emerge and formulate its demands.  Argentine anthropologist María Inés 
Fernández Álvarez elaborates on the notion of work as understood and promoted 
particularly within this movement [2004].  She notes that the primary sense of work 
among the workers (though I would add, not necessarily among the promoters) is often 
that of work as daily experience, as the means of social reproduction.  This sense is 
expressed by many workers when they highlight their participation in the cooperatives as 
a means to “llevar el pan a nuestras casas,” or the fundamental condition of life that 
guarantees their subsistence and that of their families.  This, she argues, is “a key element 
from which a resource for political action is constructed, and from which protest is 
legitimated, both before the State and before their own families,” a finding also 
corroborated by my own research [Fernández Álvarez 2004: 353-354, my translation].  
 However, as we have seen, this is not the only sense through which work is 
understood and protest legitimated.   Work is also fundamentally asserted and considered 
as a right that should be available to all. 11  This sense holds a number of interrelated 
aspects, all of which relate to how the workers are imagining their relationship to the 
State.  One of these holds work in contrast to unemployment.  In this aspect, holding a 
job is strongly linked to the idea of dignity.  The workers insist that they do not want to 
simply receive their means of subsistence from the State (as was being promoted through 
a number of State plans, such as Jefes y Jefas de Hogares, which provided monthly 
payments to unemployed heads of households).  Rather, they contend that the State 
should take responsibility for assuring jobs for those in need, rather than simply 
providing handouts.  Work in this sense is seen as a regulated source of stability and 
protection.  The State is held accountable for assuring a set of basic rights, “instituted as 
rights beginning in the 1940s and considered as fruits of the struggles of the working 
class” [Fernández Álvarez 2004:358].   These include limits on the hours of the workday, 
fair pay, yearly bonuses, standards of production, safe working conditions, and access to 
social security and health benefits.  In doing so, they further assert their own legitimacy, 
                                                 
11 In this paragraph, I differ from Fernández Álvarez in considering a number of aspects of the notion of 
work as falling within the frame of work as a right.  She prefers to make an analytical distinction between 
them, isolating this as one sense on level with the others.  While not disputing the existence of these 
different senses, I find it more useful to see how each ties into and relates to the overall notion of work as a 
right,  as my research indicated that this was the way it was understood and talked about by the workers 
themselves.   
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highlighting the effort (esfuerzo) that they have dedicated to creating their own source of 
jobs while the State remained unwilling and unable to do so.  By insisting on the State’s 
responsibility to provide work, they demand that the State treat them as rights-bearing 
active participants in the life and economy of the nation (portadores de derechos), rather 
than as passive recipients of State programs (beneficiarios), i.e., to be treated as active 
citizens, not passive subjects.   
  This points to the way this notion of work as a right, while clearly drawing on 
historically resonant notions of the right to work in Argentine society, is not a simple 
reassertion of this principle.  Rather, in the recuperated businesses movement, the idea of 
work takes on the added dimension of an effort having been realized by the workers 
themselves.  In addition, it takes the form of worker self-management, based on an ethics 
of cooperativism.  While there are many issues yet to be resolved around the 
implementation and practice of worker control, a notion of cooperativism has become a 
central feature of the recuperated businesses movements.  The use of the word 
cooperativism (cooperativismo) by the members of recuperated businesses refers directly 
to this idea of labor being organized collectively and oriented towards the benefit of all.  
It also includes a moral sense of cooperation, both between the members of a cooperative 
and of these to the larger society.   
 The idea of worker-controlled businesses may seem to have certain similarity to 
the kind of autonomy embedded in the neoliberal models of citizenship discussed above, 
based in part on the notion of community assistance/participation, as a way of displacing 
responsibilities formerly assumed by the State onto local groups in the name of 
community autonomy.  However, I argue that the kind of autonomy the workers are 
promoting is moving towards an alternative political construction, in building the kind of 
“other world” made possible “through the potentiality found in the collective actions that 
emerge from and are rooted in society” [Thwaites Rey 2004:14].  Thus, though the idea 
of self-management may bear a resemblance in practice to that promoted under 
neoliberalism, both the intention and the effects are quite different.  Rather than being 
empowering, the kind of community autonomy promoted by neoliberalism generally led 
either to a dire lack in basic services, and/or restrictive modes of participation, often 
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carried out under the strict guidance of international NGOs.12  The workers argue that the 
business class sees trabajo sin patrón, on the other hand, as a threat rather than a way of 
relieving a burden, and interpret the constant attempts to have the Hotel under their 
management shut down in this way.  As one cooperative member expressed, “They can’t 
leave things as they are, because we are showing the people that we negros can also be, 
not bosses, but create sources of labor.”13  As such, they see their efforts as constituting 
not only a rhetorical challenge to the individualism of (neo)liberalist philosophy.  By 
having demonstrated their capacity, as workers, to run and manage businesses and 
factories without the managing class or financial backing from banks or other lending 
institutions, they see their efforts as a practical challenge to the very premise of how work 
is organized under the current economic system.  
 This reassertion of the right to work as a fundamental right of all citizens can be 
seen within the rhetoric and actions of the BAUEN Cooperative.  The centrality of the 
right to work in their struggle was eloquently exhibited during one protest I attended.  A 
mix of cultural centers, theaters, bookstores, and local, national, and provincial 
government institutions all coexist around the heavily transited corner of Callao and 
Corrientes Streets.  This location lends the protests held by BAUEN Cooperative vitality 
and visibility.  As they had done on numerous previous occasions, during this protest they 
cut off the block of Callao Street that ran in front of the Hotel.  However, this time, the 
agreement reached with the police forces that quickly arrived was that one lane of Callao 
would remain open to traffic.  In visible symbolic demonstration of “work” as a central 
notion of their struggle, during this protest the Cooperative decided to bring a 
representation of their work into the street.  To do so, they set up elaborate dinner tables 
and beds in the closed lanes.  [see Pictures 5.5-5.7].  The contrast that this established 
was striking.  The physical evidence of the work of the cooperative was dramatically 
displayed in front of a generalized public, including the masses of people who filled the 
                                                 
12 As Charles Hale has noted in a Central American context, “If, under classic liberalism, the quintessential 
agent of discipline is the Panoptic state penitentiary, under neoliberalism it is the professionalized NGO” 
[2002:17].  
13 No puede quedar así, porque estamos demostrando al pueblo de que los negros también podemos ser, no 
patrones, sino crear fuentes de trabajo.  Her use of the word “negros” (blacks) should be understood within 
the context of how this term circulates in Argentina.  Though a full discussion of the racial and class 
implications such designations mark lies beyond the scope of this chapter, it is important to note that its 
usage in Argentina differs from that in other  places, including even other parts of Latin America.   
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tables of the many cafés lining the street, who for the most part casually observed the 
proceedings while leisurely sipping their mid-afternoon coffees.  
  The figure of the salaried worker as a social identity, combined with the 
culturally salient notion of collective good, provide the members of the BAUEN 
cooperative and the rest of the recuperated businesses movement with an argument for 
legitimacy that resonates with previous notions and strongly contradicts the primacy 
given to highly mobile finance capital and labor “flexibilization” in neoliberalist 
philosophy.  In explaining the contrast between their efforts and the actions of the former 
owners, members of the recuperated business movement frequently appeal to a notion of 
corruption.  In the next section, I explore the meaning of this notion and its usage by 
members of the BAUEN cooperative in explaining and claiming legitimacy for their 
actions.   
 
Corruption  
  Though a critique of the economic effects of neoliberalism is strongly voiced 
among workers in the recuperated businesses movement, this is not their primary focus.  
Rather, it is the perception that the implementation of these economic strategies was 
accompanied by widespread corruption, understood in a particular way, that is most often 
and harshly mentioned among these workers.  While the notion of work that they advance 
is more specific to their particular situation, a discourse of corruption permeates 
discussion of contemporary life in Argentina across the social spectrum.  “Corruption” 
here acts particularly as a frame through which their practice, that of occupying and 
operating businesses, is legitimated.   In appealing to a notion of corruption, the workers 
contrast the logic of capitalism and the primacy given to an ethics of (individual) fiscal 
gain to what they see as the owners’ ethical obligation to have acted for the benefit of the 
business as a productive unit, one that includes the workers.  
 In addition, for members of the recuperated businesses movement their right to 
the occupation of their factory or business fundamentally includes the argument that 
many of the factory and business closures that plagued the second half of the 1990s were 
fraudulent.14  The rewriting of the Bankruptcy Law under Menem facilitated owners’ 
                                                 
14 This perception of widespread corruption was also intimately connected to the issue of privatizations.  
 201
     
ability to evade debt payment, particularly to workers, and invented the notion of the 
“cram-down” which allowed interested parties a favorable position from which to buy the 
business under protection and renegotiate its debts.  This led to many cases of “phantom 
associations” controlled surreptitiously by the former owners, and allowed business 
owners the possibility of authoring fraudulent bankruptcies as a method of debt evasion, a 
route many took (Fajn, et. al. 2003; lavaca 2004; Rebón 2006).  The prevailing ethics of 
profit maximization was so complete as to lead some to speak of a “habitus of impunity.”   
Within the business sector was installed the idea of  legal and moral deregulation, forming a kind 
of “habitus of impunity,” in which many businesspeople placed little value in the most elemental 
aspects of following the law.  Only by taking into consideration this supposed social climate of 
immunity in which they were inserted and a profound anomie, can we understand the set of 
fraudulent practices that many developed (Fajn, et. al. 2003, 35, emphasis in original). 
 
 For a significant number of cooperative members, their occupation of the factory 
or business comes not out of a preconceived ideological adherence to the notions of 
cooperativism, but in direct response to the dire economic and social conditions that 
accompanied the closure of their source of labor, and the perception that the closure was 
itself fraudulent or corrupt.  It was this perception of corruption across the business 
sector, in ways that directly affected the workers and their families, that galvanized many 
into action.  This is visible in the way one member explains her decision to leave 
BAUEN Suites and join the cooperative: 
When the BAUEN closed, I kept working for Iurkovich in Bauen Suites; later I had to choose 
between continuing to work there or recuperate the hotel.  It was a difficult decision because I had 
four children to care for and who was going to provide for my household?...[I decided to come 
because] my compañeros were there.  But beyond that, while I was in the Bauen Suites, which is 
connected to the BAUEN hotel across the back, I saw that the Iurkovich family was taking things 
from here [BAUEN] to use there [Suites].  I am a maid, and when I cleaned the rooms I 
recognized the stolen furniture.  They had left us without work and now they were stealing even 
the night tables.  That, which is what made me feel more powerless, was what made me decide to 
change.15 
                                                                                                                                                 
Neoliberal policies demanded the deregulation and privatization of the industries that had remained under 
state control, and these new contracts, most often to foreign bidders, have been severely criticized for 
operating under a logic of profit for the principal players and unrelated to concerns for the public good.  In 
addition, the ways the contracts were settled and the terms included have been shown to also follow this 
pattern.  The companies that were given these contracts have frequently failed to fulfill even the minimum 
requirements of investment in things like infrastructure, provoking serious crises in many cases.  For more 
on privatizations, see Vilas 2004; Azpiazu 2002. 
15Cuando esto [el BAUEN] cerró, yo seguí trabajando para Iurkovich en el Suite BAUEN; después tuve 
que elegir entre seguir allá o recuperar el hotel. Fue una decisión conflictiva porque tenía cuatro hijos a 
cargo, ¿quién iba a parar la olla en mi casa?... Pero mis chicos más grandes, que ya trabajan, me 
apoyaron y me ayudaron económicamente el primer tiempo. [Decidí venir porque] estaban mis 
compañeros. Pero además, mientras estaba en el Bauen Suite, que está comunicado con este hotel por la 
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Her narrative demonstrates how feelings of solidarity with her co-workers are 
accompanied by an accumulated anger and sense of indignation over the perceived 
behavior of the former owners.     
 While the assessment of the former owner’s practices as corrupt is claimed as a 
major motivating factor for many in breaking out of the employer-employee relationship 
mold, and also a key component in the way the cooperative legitimized their occupation 
of the hotel, it is the idea of solidarity with one another that is most commonly invoked as 
the element that has allowed the BAUEN workers to continue fighting for their right to 
operate the hotel over the years.  For the remainder of this chapter, I consider the 
emergence of the current logic of cooperativism in Argentina and how the elements it 
entails form an integral part of understanding the demands, actions, and implications of 
the recuperated businesses movement.   
 
Understanding Cooperativism in Practice    
 Cooperativism itself in various forms has a long history in Argentina, beginning 
with the mutual aid societies created by immigrant groups around the turn of the 20th 
century (Munck 1998; Sábato 1998).  In the second half of the 20th century cooperativist 
groups produced a number of important institutions, including cooperative credit unions 
and educational institutes.16  These went through numerous manifestations as they 
contended with a string of military dictatorships, which often imposed restrictive laws 
reducing their possibilities for action.  The formation of a workers’ cooperative was also 
used as a union strategy for placing pressure on owners during the 1980s, most notably in 
the metalworkers union (see Rebón 2004:29-30; Fajn, et. al. 2003:185-219).   
 Though this history undeniably had an effect on the form of cooperativism 
expressed within the recuperated businesses movement, the relationship between these 
earlier or already established supportive organizations around cooperativism and the 
                                                                                                                                                 
parte de atrás, veía que los Iurkovich se estaban llevando cosas de acá para usarlas allá. Soy mucama, y 
cuando limpiaba los cuartos reconocía los muebles robados. Nos habían dejado sin trabajo y ahora se 
estaban robando hasta la mesita de luz. Eso, que es lo que me hacía sentir más impotencia, fue lo que me 
decidió a cambiar.  From an interview published in Página 12, 21 August 2007.   
16 Current manifestations include the Instituto Movilizador de Fondos Cooperativos (IMFC), founded in 
1958, and the related Instituto de la Cooperación (IDELCOOP), created by an earlier version of the IMFC 
in 1973. 
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recuperated businesses movement is not direct.  The impulse behind the current 
recuperated businesses movement comes from a mixture of political ideologies, with its 
principal promoters coming from traditional Peronist, militant unionist, and a number of 
different organized leftist political backgrounds.  Some of these promoters came from or 
initially worked with the existing organizations devoted to cooperatives, but these 
organizations were ultimately unable to adapt to the needs and realities of those workers 
now recuperating businesses.  In an important way, the adoption of both formal and 
affective cooperativism by these recuperated businesses developed in response to the 
particular historical moment at the time of their emergence.  It is the lived situations 
experienced by these workers that has been key in the formation of a discourse of 
cooperativism and work as a right, more so than the influence of political ideologies.  The 
history of these workers, and the cooperativism they have embraced, cannot be separated 
from the era that produced them and come directly as a challenge to the neoliberalist 
ideas that led to the dissolution of their source of salaried labor.      
 In what follows, I discuss what I see as three different though complementary 
aspects of the logic of cooperativism being expressed in the BAUEN Cooperative and the 
broader recuperated businesses movement.  In doing so, I distinguish analytically 
between what I call formal cooperativism and affective cooperativism, or compañerismo.  
By formal cooperativism, I refer to the association of workers into legal or otherwise 
formalized cooperatives, as a means of organization of management and production 
within the workplace.  This differs from what is generally called compañerismo, which 
carries a sense of working together for the benefit of a group.  In addition to these two 
aspects, I consider the importance of the ways in which the BAUEN Cooperative has 
effectively garnered community support, largely through its self-definition as a 
community resource dedicated to protecting and promoting “culture” as an essential 
feature of community life. 
 
Compañerismo  
 I.  The Other Bauen 
 The importance that a sense of compañerismo – or affective cooperativism—had 
taken on among the workers of the BAUEN was clearly expressed one October day, 
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immediately following a protest march against a city judge who had ordered the hotel’s 
closure.  This order accused the cooperative of failing to have the proper safety 
authorizations to operate a business in the city, and were based on formal complaints 
(denuncias) filed by individuals directly connected to, and acting in the interests of, the 
former owner of the Bauen.  While technically true, cooperative members argue that this 
position overlooked the numerous papers that they had filed attempting to address the 
problems cited and regularize their situation.  The protest march, which had noisily 
installed itself outside the judge’s office for more than an hour, was heading back to the 
Bauen when a few of those in the lead decided not to stop in front of the doors of the 
Hotel.  Instead, they continued to lead the march up Callao Street to Corrientes, where 
they turned left and stopped in front of the doors to Bauen Suites, formerly the partner 
hotel to the Bauen, which had not been closed at the same time and which remained in 
the hands of the Iurkovich family.   
 This decision was spontaneous as far as I was able to discern, and was suggested 
and led by a few of the core male members of the cooperative (though none of those that 
held office, nor among those typically responsible for designing the cooperative’s 
political strategy).  Initially the idea of taking the march in front of Bauen Suites seemed 
to center on the figure of the former owner, who was considered responsible for the 
current dilemma that had precipitated the day’s activities.  Indeed, in other moments 
marches had paused briefly in front of a restaurant that Iurkovich owned only a few 
blocks away.  However, once in front of the Suites and directly facing the workers of that 
hotel, many of whom had been former coworkers of those now organized into the 
cooperative, emotions ran higher than in any of the many marches that came before or 
after.  One member of the cooperative, the head chef, whose rotund figure was encased as 
always in his entirely white work clothes, took hold of the megaphone.  In an 
increasingly impassioned manner called out against those inside, asking them why they 
had not had the courage to join in their struggle, nor had demonstrated solidarity with 
them when the hotel had been closed and their jobs liquidated.  His words seemed to give 
voice to feelings of rage and pain embedded in many of his compañeros.  For the first and 
only time I witnessed in any of the many marches I accompanied, some members became 
violent and began to break minor exterior features of the Suites, including smashing a 
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standing sign and ripping out the plants that decorated the entranceway.  The doors had 
been locked upon our arrival, though I doubt any would have tried to enter, and the 
confused and frightened faces of hotel guests were visible from behind several layers of 
glass.  (Later the story circulated that one Suites guest, afraid to leave the hotel while the 
marchers were outside, had missed his flight out of Buenos Aires.  The workers’ response 
was to offer him a room in the Bauen (“Y bueno, lo podemos poner acá”)).  More 
poignant, though, was the observant but pained expression of one Suites security guard, 
who faced unflinchingly but with obvious distress the accusations ardently hurled from 
the other side of the glass.   
 I see this event as revealing the utmost importance that compañerismo had taken 
on for the members of the BAUEN cooperative.  Though their struggle for survival was 
directed against the institutions of the state and members of the business elite, emotions 
ran highest when confronting what was seen as a betrayal of their cause by other workers 
who could have but chose not to either take the same risks as they had or to renounce 
their posts in solidarity with those who had lost them.  It was the failure to act in concert 
with the group, and to join in their struggle and sacrifice, that produced the strongest and 
least controlled or calculated emotion. 
 
 II. Singing for Solidarity 
 The emphasis on compañerismo also rings out clearly in the chants that the 
workers improvise and sing during the marches.  Chants have a long history of use during 
public manifestations throughout Latin America, and are famously employed as rallying 
cries and points of enjoyment during soccer matches, with fans of opposing teams 
competing to outdo each other with the volume and creativity of their songs.17  The 
chants taken up during these protest marches are generally patterned of a standard set of 
rhythmic tunes, and often draw on traditional forms in their construction, changing only a 
few words to fit the situation.  For example, El BAUEN/unido/jamás será vencido (the 
BAUEN/united/will never be defeated) is a simple modification of the widespread el 
pueblo/unido/jamás será vencido (the people/united/will never be defeated).  Another 
particularly telling example has excited chanters calling upon the observer to participate:  
                                                 
17 For an analysis of the gendered connotations of chants within the soccer stadium, see Archetti 1997. 
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borom bom bom/borom bom bom/el que no salta/tiene un patrón (borom bom 
bom/borom bom bom/whoever doesn’t jump/has a boss).  This chant has a simple 
elegance in encapsulating the essence of trabajo sin patrón.  It serves as a powerful 
interpolation to those accompanying the marchers from other organizations, whether 
from political parties, neighborhood assemblies, or even unemployed workers, to truly 
join in their movement and embrace this new logic of organizing production.  For this 
reason, though frequently used, it often produced a moment of tension, with only a core 
group of workers joining in the circle of jumping chanters.  At one of these marches a 
member of an alternative press organization covering the march looked around a little 
sheepishly and jokingly explained, “Well, I do have a boss.”  He jumped anyway, in 
solidarity, but that particular chant served to potently mark and remind everyone of the 
essential nature of these workers’ struggle.   
 The sense of play and creative invention that often accompanies these marches 
can be clearly seen in the way these songs are crafted and transmitted.  Many times I 
walked alongside groups of two or three workers as they bantered back and forth 
suggested lyrics, which would then quickly be taught to and carried on by the marchers as 
a whole.  This process gave rise to another popular example:  vamos compañeros/hay que 
poner un poco más de huevo/estamos todos juntos nuevamente/la dignidad del BAUEN 
no se vende, se defiende (come on, compañeros, we’ve got to try a little harder (lit., put 
our balls into it)/we’re all together again/the dignity of the BAUEN is not to be sold, but 
defended).  By calling on those assembled to work together, and work harder, this chant 
expresses the essential role accorded to compañerismo. 
 
 III. Affective Kinship 
 For many members of the cooperative, this idea of compañerismo and the sense of 
solidarity with other workers are both literally and figuratively expressed through the idea 
of the family.  In the BAUEN, as in a number of the recuperated businesses, once the 
hotel began functioning, the original small group of workers who had occupied the hotel 
began to incorporate others into the cooperative.  Many of these were former coworkers, 
but as the need for more hands increased, the offer of work was frequently extended to 
family members of the workers.  The presence of actual family members within the 
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cooperative added another dimension to the way compañerismo was felt and expressed 
among many in the cooperative.  To return to María’s words: 
Here, really with all that we’ve done, all the sacrifices, together with our compañeros, here we 
have practically the entire family of each compañero.  If one doesn’t have a child here, they have a 
sibling, and if not, a cousin.  Here we are, practically the whole family, and so when, it’s for that 
reason perhaps that we’re more united than ever because when they touch one of us it’s as if 
they touch all of us.  When the compañeros saw that they were hitting us women it nearly turned 
into a massacre, but we tried to stop those compañeros (who turned on the police who were hitting 
us) because there weren’t many of us there.  How were we going to let them, with all the assault 
vehicles there, when there were like 500 police officers and only 10 of us?  (emphasis added).18 
 
 Here, she slips between talking about actual family members and the way the 
members of the cooperative would see each other as family.  This focus on real and 
figurative family also adds another dimension to the need expressed above to account for 
the cultural context in considering corruption.  I have never heard of the idea of giving 
preference to family in incorporating new cooperative members expressed in these terms.  
Though the decision to incorporate family members was contentious, the debate centered 
over whether or not the cooperative would be better served by adding the most qualified 
personnel available, rather than those most in need of work or already implicated in the 
struggle, as family members were seen to be.   
  
Formal Cooperativism 
A cooperative is “an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common 
economic, social and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly owned and democratically controlled 
enterprise” (ILO R193, art. 2A) 
 
--From the 1995 International Cooperative Alliance, Declaration on Identity and Cooperative Principles, 
Manchester, England, adopted by INAES 
 
 The affective cooperativism discussed above has its counterpart in the formal 
cooperativism that serves as the mode of organization for the majority of the recuperated 
businesses.  While the idea of compañerismo is strongly expressed throughout the 
                                                 
18 Acá, realmente, con todo lo que hicimos, con todo el sacrificio, con todos los compañeros que, que, acá 
están prácticamente casi toda la familia, eh, de cada compañero. Si uno no tiene un hijo, tiene un hermano 
y si no tiene un, un primo y así. Estamos, eh,  prácticamente, eh, casi toda la familia, y entonces cuando, 
por eso es que tal vez estamos más unidos que nunca porque cuando nos tocan a uno es como que nos 
tocan a todos nosotros. Los compañeros cuando vieron que las mujeres fuimos golpeadas casi se arma un, 
ahí, un, una masacre pero nosotros tratamos de pararlos a esos compañeros porque eran poquitos los 
compañeros que estábamos. Entonces, ¿cómo íbamos a permitir, que estaban todos los carros de asalto 
ahí, eran como 500 policías y nosotros éramos 10..? 
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recuperated businesses movement, the level of formal cooperativism varies widely and in 
practice takes on numerous manifestations.  These differences typically correspond to the 
history and specific circumstances of the factory or business and to the internal 
organization and political stance that, given these factors, the factory or business has 
chosen to adopt.  
 Though the procedure and some details vary according to provincial laws, 
presently the formation of a workers’ cooperative in Argentina requires registration with 
the Instituto Nacional de Asociativismo y Economía Social (National Institute of 
Associations and Social Economics, or INAES).  Created by presidential decree in 2000, 
the INAES centralized the laws concerning cooperatives.19  The formation of a legally 
registered cooperative provides the workers with certain rights and protections, and 
allows them the ability to act in legal matters.  For this reason, many of those involved in 
recuperating their source of labor chose to formally organize and register as a 
cooperative.20  However, not everybody looks at the adoption of this legal status in the 
same way, and even amongst those businesses that subscribe to one or the other of these 
visions, there are significant differences in their plans of action and internal organization.  
Considering these differences and the reasons cooperative members give for their choices 
reveals some of the fundamental contradictions that lie at the heart of the recuperated 
business movement, the BAUEN included. 
 There are two main visions for the ideal solution to the legal uncertainty that 
surrounds the majority of the recuperated businesses.  For the BAUEN, the formation of a 
workers’ cooperative was an essential and desirable step in designing the internal 
organization of the hotel under worker control.  They would ultimately seek the 
expropriation of the hotel by the state, which they argue is the principal creditor of the 
millions of dollars of debt the former owners left upon its closure.  The state would then 
                                                 
19 For more information on the INAES, see http://www.inaes.gov.ar; lavaca 2004:22-24.  INAES replaced 
in practice the need for cooperatives to pass through older manifestations of such institutions, such as the 
National Institute of Cooperatives (Instituto Nacional de Cooperativas), which had become increasingly 
restrictive, expensive, and bureaucratic.   
20 A few recuperated businesses have chosen to register as Sociedades Anónimas, or corporations.  While 
also providing a legal status, this method is both more expensive to form and ineligible for the tax benefits 
afforded to cooperatives.  In practice it has perhaps afforded these businesses a more stable and lucrative 
place within the capitalist market than that held by cooperatives.  However, legal organization within a 
structure that highlights the values of cooperation has been a powerful discursive tool for the recuperated 
businesses movement.   
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either cede or concession the building and its installations to the cooperative.  Thus, for 
the BAUEN and many other recuperated businesses, the workers’ cooperative is a 
medium that not only provides them a certain legal status during the period of uncertainty 
and a method of formal internal organization, but is also desirable as a permanent 
institution.   
 For other recuperated businesses, however, their organization as formal 
cooperatives is intended as a temporary means, rather than a desired permanent outcome.  
The largest and most well recognized of the recuperated businesses that fall into this 
category is the ceramic factory formerly called and still widely referred to as Zanon, now 
operated by the cooperative FaSinPat (Fábrica Sin Patrón).  For the workers of Zanon, 
the formation of a workers’ cooperative was designed to be a temporary means of 
operating.  In contrast to their allies at the BAUEN, they demand that the state 
expropriate and maintain the titles to the factory, which would be run under worker 
control but remain public property, not owned by the cooperative.  
 The underlying current in this debate revolves around one of these central 
contradictions faced by workers in recuperated businesses:  how the organization of 
production based on cooperation can fit into (and can survive within) a capitalist market.  
For FaSinPat, this contradiction is one more reason to ultimately demand state control of 
the factory, as a means of protection.  FaSinPat member Raúl Godoy, at the time also 
secretary general of the Ceramics Workers Union of Neuquén, explains: 
 
For us, the cooperative isn’t the end solution, because one has to compete against enormous 
conglomerates that set prices, like San Lorenzo or Alberdi, groups that export, have foreign 
capital, international credits, they lobby...We are vulnerable.  If they lower prices for four months 
to kill us, they take us out of the game.21  
 
While the danger to cooperatives is real, nonetheless most have managed not only to 
prove their business viable but even to expand production and create additional jobs.  
                                                 
21Para nosotros la cooperativa no es una solución de fondo, porque uno tiene que competir con 
conglomerados enormes que forman precios, como San Lorenzo o Alberdi, que son grupos que exportan, 
tienen capitales extranjeros, créditos internacionales, hacen lobby... Nosotros somos una cáscara de nuez. 
Si ellos bajan los precios cuatro meses para matarnos, nos sacan del camino.  Cited in “El strip-tease de 
los reyes: ¿Cuenta regresiva para Zanón?,” published by lavaca at www.lavaca.org, 20 November 2007.  
Godoy made similar statements in conversations we shared during my fieldwork.  Lavaca is an alternative 
media cooperative, and their high-quality reporting provides an important counterbalance to the increasing 
consolidation of major media sources into fewer and fewer hands in Argentina (and elsewhere).   
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Therefore, these debates over desired final solutions often take a backseat to the more 
urgent questions of day-to-day operation and survival.   
 These more immediate questions over how to interpret and adhere to cooperativist 
principles within a neoliberal capitalist climate cover a number of aspects.  One of these 
concerns the way in which new members are incorporated into the cooperatives, as 
production resumes and the need for additional labor increases.  In the case of the 
BAUEN, the need for additional labor grew quickly, and the cooperative prides itself on 
having created some 150 jobs.  The initial expansion from the 32 people who entered the 
hotel in 2003 to the creation of a stable workforce was not without debate, however.  
Both within the BAUEN and in other recuperated businesses, there are some who believe 
that it is more important to select those most skilled at the job in question, in order to 
preserve and enhance the productivity and profitability of the business.  Others argue for 
the importance of offering those jobs to those who most need them.  As shown above, 
within the BAUEN the decision was eventually made to first offer positions to family 
members, as they “are the ones already paying the price of our being here.”  This 
demonstrates how the idea of work is also seen in ways not purely rationalistic, but rather 
highlights the affective dimensions and lived experiences of workers as whole beings.  In 
other cooperatives, members of local unemployed organizations were given the first 
opportunities. Debates over remuneration and distribution of profits have also arisen 
within the recuperated businesses.  The laws of cooperatives under INAES stipulate only 
that, rather than salaries (salarios), the cooperative members deal in the distribution of 
earnings among members (reparto).  Many of the recuperated businesses follow an ethic 
of equal distribution among all members, without gradations for position or seniority.  In 
these cases, an agreed upon amount is usually also set aside for further investment in the 
business.  However, in the early and difficult days of many cooperatives, the scant 
earnings would be either entirely dedicated to putting the business in operation again or 
given to those workers whose need was perceived as greatest, due to their personal 
circumstances.  Within the BAUEN, during the initial days of operation the distribution 
of pay was equal, but as the need for labor increased and new workers were incorporated 
into the cooperative or hired on a temporary basis some members began to feel the need 
to distribute earnings on a gradated scale, that included a recognition of time with the 
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cooperative.   
 In all of these debates, the resolution in practice is rarely fixed and unchanging, 
nor devoid of internal contradictions.  The legal uncertainty that surrounds many of these 
recuperated businesses, including the BAUEN, has in many cases had the effect of 
allowing the construction of an internally coherent practice to be to some degree 
postponed, with attention focused squarely on the sheer survival of their efforts.  
 One way of mitigating the contradictions has been through the direction of the 
efforts of production or the provision of service towards the benefit of the community.  
While some businesses have, through either choice or necessity, focused more directly on 
the mercantile aspects of production, others have decided and been able to direct more 
effort to putting their work towards the benefit of the community, and particularly those 
most in need.  One way of doing this has been the donation of produced goods or services 
to local community organizations or the establishment of community programs, including 
secondary schools and health clinics.  Cooperatives such as FaSinPat emphasize the need 
to put the factory in the service of the community, as part of an ultimate goal of turning 
the installations into a state-owned, worker-operated enterprise devotedly exclusively to 
the needs of society as a whole.  As I explore in the next section, the cooperative BAUEN 
differs from FaSinPat in embracing formal cooperativism as a permanent solution, but 
shares the core idea that the hotel should serve the community.   
  
Building a Community:  Trabajo Lucha Cultura  
 The final aspect of the logic of cooperativism that I discuss as having particular 
relevance for the BAUEN is the nature and extent of the collaboration among recuperated 
businesses, and the relationship of these businesses with the broader community.  As a 
large hotel with nearly 200 functioning rooms and ample meeting space, the Bauen is 
able to comfortably host conferences, workshops, and exhibitions, as well as events such 
as wedding receptions or parties.  This feature has allowed the Cooperative to develop as 
a central player and referent within the recuperated businesses movement, as well as 
among the broader community of people and organizations concerned with social justice.   
 From the beginning, the cooperative counted on the support it received from 
neighbors, university groups, and other individuals and organizations sympathetic with 
 212
     
their cause.   
 
María:  ...Then, when we began to go to the neighborhood assemblies to tell what was happening, 
what was really (happening), that we were fighting for our source of work, that we were (in) here, 
they came from the university, they helped us, they decided to bring yerba, sugar, so we could 
drink mate, eh, they brought a bit of rice, and they came from over there, from the food bank, they 
helped us a lot, so after that we began to move a little, we began to learn from this, what it is, what 
work is...22 
   
Here, her narrative relates not only how the cooperative both cultivated and received 
support from numerous groups, but also how she sees the change in the concept of work 
emerging from the possibilities opened to them through this support.  
 Collaboration between recuperated businesses has also been important, and has 
taken on a variety of forms.  These have included the organization of umbrella 
movements,23 individual mutual aid or trade relationships between recuperated 
businesses, and the staging of recuperated businesses expositions.  The BAUEN has 
played a central role in this collaboration, whether through lending event space or by 
providing material and other forms of support to many other cooperatives.  They also 
helped organize and hosted one of the expositions, designed to promote cooperation 
between and publicize the recuperated businesses and their products/services.   
 From the time it re-opened its doors, the BAUEN has also provided meeting 
space, often free of charge, to a wide variety of groups beyond the recuperated businesses 
movement.  A few of the many examples of this include its use by subway workers on 
strike, workers from Garrahan State Hospital during their extended conflict with the 
government over salary and working conditions, international anarchist groups, 
piqueteros, H.I.J.O.S., and those concerned over the Dirty War-style disappearance of a 
                                                 
22 ..entonces, nosotros cuando empezamos a ir a asambleas barriales a comentar lo que estaba pasando, 
eh,  lo que realmente, eh, que nosotros estábamos luchando por nuestra fuente de trabajo, que estábamos 
acá, venían de la facultad  nos ayudaban, decidían traer yerba, azúcar, para tomar un mate, eh, nos traían 
un poco de arroz, y bueno, venía por ahí la, eh, la caja de los merenderos que nos ayudaban muchísimo, 
entonces ahí es como que empezamos a, a movernos un poquito más, empezamos a aprender de esto, lo que 
es, el trabajo...    
23 The major umbrella movements are the Movimiento Nacional de Empresas Recuperadas (MNER) and a 
similar though antagonistic movement, the Movimiento Nacional de Fábricas Recuperadas por sus 
trabajadores (MNFR).  Contrary to what their names seem to suggest, it is not the case that the MNER is 
comprised of businesses and the MNFR of factories, rather, each movement encompasses both.  For more 
on these movements, see Fernández Álvarez 2004:349-350; lavaca 2004; Magnani 2003; Rebon 2004, 
2006.   
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man who was to testify against a former repressor.24  
 In providing a space for the issues and agendas of other groups, those of the 
BAUEN cooperative profess to the idea of the hotel as a space for building community, 
belonging, first and foremost, to the people.  The cooperative recognizes the need to 
disseminate the idea of work based on cooperation as elaborated above, and as such 
insists that all workers are welcome in the Bauen, those from the recuperated businesses 
movement and those “in relationships of dependence” (recuperados o en relación de 
dependencia).  They also provide assistance to individuals and groups in need, such as 
offering free lodging to patients from the interior provinces who come to Buenos Aires to 
receive operations at state hospitals.  In this way, as the president of the cooperative has 
asserted, the workers of the BAUEN have transformed the space “de cuna de la 
burocracia a cuna de la sociedad,” from the cradle of the bureaucracy into the cradle of 
society.25  
  The BAUEN cooperative also highlights the importance of artistic expression as 
a fundamental element in the construction and expression of citizenship.  The hotel has a 
constant run of movies and theater productions, and their marches and protests are 
frequently accompanied by performances from major cultural figures, such as the director 
of the Teatro Colón, or popular countercultural rock bands, who offer their support on a 
voluntary basis.  They adopted Trabajo Lucha Cultura (Work, Struggle, and Culture) as 
their motto, brandished on the enormous banners that proclaim their identity in their 
street protests [Picture 5.8].  The focus on artistic expression integrates an element of 
playfulness into their struggle, with their protests often being as full of festiveness as they 
are of determination.  The interweaving of the idea of work with artistic expression at 
once serves to draw in further support for their cause, especially among the youth, and 
adds another dimension to this reconfigured idea of work based on ideas of social 
wellness and cooperation rather than giving primacy to profitability. 
 The articulation of the Bauen as a space of popular cultural expression establishes 
links with a broader set of struggles within contemporary Argentina over the use of 
                                                 
24 At the time of this writing, Jorge Julio López remains missing.  This event, widely publicized as 
‘disappearance 30,001,’ has once again brought into the spotlight the continuity of mafia-style hierarchies 
and relationships among the security forces, particularly in the Province of Buenos Aires.    
25 Spoken during a street demonstration, 22 May 2006. 
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public spaces and the asserted need to recuperate these areas from private hands.  This 
reappropriation and resignification of public space encompasses a wide set of interests, 
including human rights and memory activists and street artisans (see Tandeciarz 2007 for 
a discussion of some examples of this).  As one group expressed it, as part of their 
struggle to keep their community center open in spite of official attempts to close it 
down:   
The refusal to recognize that cultural and social spaces fulfill the function of articulating the 
participation of neighbors with the production of our local artists within a context of values of 
solidarity and of collective work is to refuse to recognize that cultural spaces are the builders of 
citizenship and of social, collective, and democratic participation.26  
 
In the same way, the emphasis on Work, Struggle, and Culture within the BAUEN insists 
that the opening of a space where events can be planned and held fulfills an important 
function within society, one that goes beyond the articulation of the interests of any one 
group or faction within the movement or the community as a whole.  This adds another 
element to the concept of citizenship being advanced and practiced (and advanced 
through practice) by the BAUEN Cooperative.  Such alternative practices of citizenship 
differ strongly from the models discussed above that were made available and promoted 
under the era of neoliberalism.   
 
Conclusion 
María:  We, around 1997 when the owners changed business on us [when management of the 
hotel passed to Solari, S.A.], in the moment Iurkovich told us, I was one of the ones who didn’t 
want to sign, so he said to me, if you want to sue me go ahead, if you’re going to get something 
you’ll get it three years from now, and during those three years you won’t have work.  So I signed 
the paper in front of the public notary and lost all my rights.  Now, yes, I fight for my rights, 
because now I know that as a citizen I have to fight for my children and their future, so that 
Argentina keeps growing.27 
  
                                                 
26Desconocer que los espacios culturales y sociales cumplen con la función de articular la participación de 
los vecinos con la producción de nuestros artistas locales en un contexto de valores solidarios y de trabajo 
en conjunto es desconocer que los espacios culturales son constructores de ciudadanía y de participación 
social, colectiva y democrática.   Basta de clausuras, press release from Red de Cultura Boedo, 24 
November 2006. 
27 Nosotros, de ahí que nosotros en el ’97 cuando, eh, se hizo cambio de, de empresa a nosotros el dueño, 
en su momento, Iurkovich nos dijo, bueno, yo era una que  no quería firmar, entonces me dijo, bueno, si me 
vas a hacer juicio haceme, si vas a cobrar por ahí cobrás de aquí a 3 años pero mientras esos 3 años no 
vas a tener trabajo. Entonces yo firmé un papel ante el escribano público que perdía todos mis derechos. 
Ahora sí, yo lo peleo por mis derechos, porque ahora yo sé que realmente como ciudadana lo tengo que 
pelear por mis hijos y por el día de mañana esto para que la Argentina siga creciendo.  
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 María’s words point to the way her participation in the BAUEN Cooperative goes 
beyond the protection of her source of labor.  Rather, through its emphasis on 
cooperation, solidarity, and community partnership, the idea of cooperativism embraced 
by the Cooperative operates as a counterlogic to the individualized and materialist 
conception of citizenship promoted by neoliberal capitalism.  Employing a discourse of 
corruption that itself seeks to challenge the “socially corrupting influence of corruption” 
[Muir 2008], the BAUEN Cooperative selectively utilizes established legal channels in 
order to articulate and fight for the right to continue to operate the Hotel.  The 
interweaving of a delegitimizing discourse of corruption with newly conceived forms of 
worker-organized action in places like the BAUEN has implications for understanding 
post-neoliberal politics of work throughout Latin America.  Recuperated business such as 
the BAUEN and FaSinPat have become international referents for rethinking working 
class organization outside of traditional union structures, in ways that have counterparts 
throughout the Global South.  In this chapter, I have endeavored to show how detailed 
ethnographic research and historically sensitive analysis of the context of contemporary 
forms of social protest like the recuperated businesses movement can shed light on the 
way these processes emerge out of a dialogue between the lived experiences of the actors 
involved and the cultural and historical forms of practice that structure the context of 
their actions.   I have further demonstrated the importance that notions of impunity and 
corruption have in defining the movement’s demands on the ethical sphere.  The next 
chapter turns to a deeper consideration of the political and legal climate within which the 
BAUEN Cooperative operates and in response to which it formulates its demands and 
strategies for action.   
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The Hotel Bauen 
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Women from the BAUEN cooperative 
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During a street protest 
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Tables and beds set up in the street 
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 Picture 5.7 
 
 


















Street protest   “B.A.U.E.N.  STRUGGLE, WORK, CULTURE” 
Chapter 6 
 
Resistance and Accommodation:  Tracing Morality and Legality in the 
Choice of Political Practice 
 
 
...Por ahí nunca hice política. No, no, nosotros no sabemos nada de política. Y, [ahora]...es como que con 
solo hablar estamos haciendo política. Entonces, bueno, eso es un proceso que vas cambiando...Para mí la 
política es lo más sucio que había y...algo que no se podía creer como estaban [las cosas], los cartoneros, 
la fuente de trabajo que no había. Entonces, yo decía “no puede ser esté tanto de afuera y como yo de 
política, la verdad que tampoco me interesa” y ahora tal vez sí porque si nosotros, si nosotros nos 
interesaríamos un poquito cambiaríamos un poquito lo que es la política....Entonces, es totalmente 
diferente ahora lo que yo estoy viendo en sí porque, bueno, es linda la política si realmente uno quiere 
hacer algo bueno, no?   
 
...I was never involved in politics.  No, no, we didn’t know anything about politics.  And now, it’s that in 
just talking we are doing politics.  It’s a process that you are changing...For me “politics” was the worst 
thing, and, you couldn’t believe how things were, with the cartoneros [street recyclers], the jobs that 
weren’t there.  And I said, “things just can’t be this way, but, politics, no, no, I’m not interested in that,” but 
now maybe yes, I am, because if we, if we just get a little bit interested in politics then we can change a 
little bit what politics is...So, what I think now is totally different because, well, politics is a good thing if 
one wants to do something good with it, no? 
 
-- María, member of the BAUEN Cooperative1 
 
  
 In this chapter I discuss two situations faced by the BAUEN Cooperative as part 
of their efforts to preserve their ability to control and operate the Hotel.  I have selected 
these two particular challenges faced by the cooperative as anchors that allow for a 
broader exploration of a number of aspects of the group, their demands, and their 
insertion within a particular set of political and social circumstances as operative in 
contemporary Buenos Aires.  I begin with one of several legal cases brought against the 
Cooperative, and their response.
                                                 






21 DE OCTUBRE DE 2005 
 
  
En la madrugada de hoy, siendo las 6:00 AM, sufrimos un nuevo 
intento de clausura del hotel que viene a continuar una política de 
persecución a los trabajadores de la Cooperativa. B.A.U.E.N.  La orden 
fue emitida desde el juzgado en lo contravencional Nº 3, por la Jueza 
Dra. Carla Cavallieri.  Para implementarla, irrumpieron en el interior 
del hotel, varios inspectores custodiados por efectivos policiales. 
El argumento presentado se refiere a las medidas de seguridad que, 
supuestamente el hotel no cumple.  Meses atrás, se pidió la 
cumplimentación de 26 requerimientos para garantizar la seguridad 
del lugar.  dichos puntos fueron cumplidos en su totalidad.  Se 
priorizo este tema durante los últimos cuatro 
meses realizando enormes inversiones en la infraestructura del 
edificio. 
Es Claro que los intentos de clausura responden más a fines políticos 
que a requerimientos de habilitación y seguridad.  Además, el intento 
represivo que hemos sufrido, se inscribe en el marco de una escalada 
contra los luchadores como los trabajadores del subte, quienes fueron 
reprimidos en el día de ayer.  Este tipo de medidas llaman 
poderosamente la atención cuando se efectivizan a pocas horas de las 
elecciones legislativas. 
Ante la cierta posibilidad de un nuevo intento de clausura en el día de 
hoy, convocamos a todas las organizaciones, empresas recuperadas y 
particulares a concentrarse en la puerta del hotel para marchar hacia 
el juzgado Nº 3, sito en Combate de los Pozos e Hipólito Irigoyen y 
exigir que se ponga fin a este tipo avances contra la clase trabajadora. 
 
PEDIMOS EL APOYO DE TODOS 
VIERNES 21 DE OCTUBRE 
13 HS CALLAO 360 
 









PRESS RELEASE  
AND CALL TO ACTION 
21 OCTOBER 2005 
 
At dawn this morning, at 6am, we suffered a new attempt to shut 
down the hotel, an action that comes in continuation of the policy 
(política)2 of persecution towards the workers of the BAUEN 
Cooperative.  The order was issued from Civil Judicial Office Number 3, 
by Judge Dr. Carla Cavallieri.  To implement it, several inspectors 
accompanied by police officers invaded the interior of the hotel. 
The argument presented refers to the security regulations that the 
hotel allegedly does not meet.  Some months ago, it was demanded 
that the hotel comply with 26 requirements to guarantee the security 
of the locale.  These requirements were complied with in full.  This 
theme was given priority during the last four months through 
enormous investments in the building’s infrastructure.   
It is clear that the attempts to close the hotel respond more to political 
ends than to safety and security regulations.  Furthermore, the 
repression that we have suffered occurred in the context of an 
escalation of the use of force against those who struggle, as seen with 
the subway workers who were repressed yesterday.  This kind of 
measure powerfully draws attention when they occur just hours before 
the legislative elections. 
Given the likely possibility of a new closure attempt today, we call on 
all organizations, recuperated businesses, and individuals to come 
together at the doors to the hotel, for a march toward the Judicial 
Office Number 3, located at Combate de los Pozos and Hipólito 
Irigoyen, to demand that they put an end to these kinds of incursions 
against the working class. 
 
WE ASK FOR EVERYONE’S HELP 
FRIDAY, OCTOBER 21 
                                                 
2 In Spanish the word política can mean the equivalent of both the meanings of the English words ‘politics’ 
and ‘policy.’ 
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1PM       CALLAO 360 
 
The Bauen belongs to us all 
 
 
 Though it required a drastic reshuffling of personal schedules of the kind only 
fieldwork seems capable of imposing, I managed to be at the march that afternoon.  Once 
again the spontaneity and uncontrollable unpredictability of my research was rather 
antithetical to life with small children, particularly when so far away from all immediate 
and extended family, and yet somehow we worked it out.  The march itself was similar to 
many others, though this time we headed for the Judicial Offices of the Judge who had 
issued the order to close the hotel rather than offices from the legislative or executive 
branch of government.  As expressed in the press release included above, the order 
accused the cooperative of failing to have the proper safety authorizations to operate a 
business in the city.  While technically true, cooperative members point out that the 
reason they did and could not hold these authorizations was due to their uncertain legal 
status – as they did not legally hold the right to operate the hotel, they could not file for 
the proper status.  Furthermore, they argue that the accusation against them overlooks the 
improvements they had made and the numerous papers that they had filed attempting to 
address the problems cited and to regularize their situation.   
 On the way to the judicial office, we weaved through narrow side streets flanked 
by tall colonial style buildings, whose height and proximity amplified even louder than 
usual the persistent drumming and singing.  On more than one occasion I had observed in 
my field notes the seeming need and desire to make noise during the marches, how part 
of the struggle was itself the ability to express, full volume, one’s presence (and right to 
such presence) in the street.  During this march, the heighted reverberations of these 
insistent self-proclamations seemed to intensify the marchers’ need for this effect.  
Several of the younger male members of the Cooperative busied themselves setting off 
numerous firecrackers, which they pulled out a large, unmarked wooden box with a 
stylized black stencil of a woman in a suggestively sexual position drawn on the top.  The 
close quarters outside the judge’s office, which were located in what appeared to be a 
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reconditioned apartment building, made these explosions deafeningly loud.  For more 
than an hour we held vigil outside her office [see Picture 6.1], with insults against her 
person generously interspersed with the chants proclaiming the Cooperative’s right to 
operate the hotel. 
 The march had been timed to coincide with the meeting of several city legislators 
who supported the BAUEN with Judge Cavallieri.  Upon returning to the hotel, an 
assembly meeting (asamblea) was held in one of the auditoriums.  The majority of the 45 
minutes the assembly lasted saw these three female legislators both reporting on their 
meeting with the Judge and putting forth their positions on the strategies they thought the 
BAUEN should pursue.  Though sprinkled with considerable political rhetoric (all were 
candidates in the upcoming midterm elections), it was the legislators’ description of their 
meeting that was received with the most enthusiasm.  They noted that the noise from the 
street below made it nearly impossible to proceed, a detail that was heartily cheered by 
the workers.  In addition, they relayed the judge’s claims to have acted only after 
receiving numerous formal complaints (denuncias) against the hotel for operating without 
the proper safety authorizations.  All of these had been filed by individuals who were 
purportedly directly connected to, and acting in the interests of, the former owner of the 
Bauen, who seemed to be trying to exploit public sensitivity on the issue of safety (i.e., 
the case was not brought by the city government, even in the context of increased safety 
enforcement following public outrage over the level of irregularities found in compliance 
with these safety laws after the December 2004 Cromañón tragedy).   Apparently, the 
complaints in their majority consisted of clipped newspaper ads announcing upcoming 
shows or events to be held in the Bauen.  This kind of evidence confirmed for the 
members of the Cooperative that the closure attempt was more a political act than one 
actually concerned with public safety.  As expressed by one cooperative leader, “It isn’t 
the lack of some bureaucratic paper or a fire extinguisher that brings about the closure, 
but rather the example that we workers are providing.”3  
 This case provides an illustration of one of the multiple ways the BAUEN 
Cooperative found itself immersed in interactions with state institutions.  Their response 
                                                 
3 No es la falta de un papelito o un matafuegos lo que lleva al cierre, sino el ejemplo de lo que los 
trabajadores estamos llevando adelante  Fabio 14 julio 2005 
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to this legal challenge occurred on several planes.  The lawyer for the Cooperative 
immediately filed an appeal of the closure order, based on the measures that had been 
taken and citing the particularities of their case in their defense.  These included the fact 
that full habilitation by the city was not available to them, as they could not nor would be 
able to provide proof of ownership of the hotel.  They also, as seen above, called upon 
political allies from within the City legislature to intervene in the case.  And, as also 
shown, they manifested their objection to the order by holding a highly visible (and 
audible) public demonstration. 
 In order to further explore the ways in which the BAUEN Cooperative engages 
with state institutions and the local political systems, I begin with some of the legal 
background involved in the Hotel Bauen.  I show how these legal claims operate in 
dialogue with the claims to legitimacy asserted by the group, and the way ideas of the 
rights to work and to collective well-being are put forth in contrast to the neoliberal 
concerns for the protection of property rights, the free operation of business, and 
unrestricted flows of capital as asserted by the former owners and their political and 
economic allies. 
 
Case Background   
 The workers of the Hotel BAUEN have struggled from the beginning with the 
pressure of the legal uncertainty that surrounds their occupation and operation of the 
hotel.  Their particular situation was made additionally complex by the legal haze that 
surrounds the conditions of the hotel’s closure.  As mentioned in the previous chapter, in 
1997 the owners of the Hotel Bauen turned the administration of the hotel over to the 
Chilean group Solari, which was to buy the business for 12 million pesos (at that time 
equivalent to 12 million USD).  When the hotel closed in December 2001, Hugo 
Iurkovich, son of former owner Marcelo Iurkovich, presented a complaint in court 
requesting that the hotel be returned to them, on the basis that the Solari group had made 
only one payment of 4 million pesos towards the purchase of the hotel.  They won the 
case, which legally removed the hotel from bankruptcy, but the decision contained the 
provision that the Iurkovich family return the 4 million pesos they had received.  As they 
have not done so, the ownership of the hotel remains encased in legal ambiguity.   
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 While each case presents its own idiosyncrasies, in general within the recuperated 
businesses phenomenon in Argentina there are five actual or desired resolutions to the 
situation that arises once the workers take over the factory or business [Fajn, et.al. 
2003:102-109].  In some cases the workers have won the (usually temporary) 
expropriation of the factory or business by the state, through either law or decree.  In 
other cases, the workers have agreed to contracts that allow them the right to rent the 
installations, either under direct negotiations with the former owners or through judicial 
decisions.  Others have made arrangements with the major creditors and stockholders, in 
cases where the business is in bankruptcy and the creditors are those with the strongest 
legal demand upon the businesses.  In others, such as Zanon and Bruckman, the workers 
have chosen to demand the nationalization of the business, having it operate under 
worker control and for the benefit of the entire nation.  
 As the Bauen hotel was technically removed from bankruptcy through legal 
decision, the workers were limited in their possibilities for a resolution.  As one 
cooperative member, Fabio Resino, relates,  “When we entered here at first we wanted, as 
a solution, to sign a rental agreement with the owner, since as the hotel wasn’t bankrupt, 
it was difficult to expropriate:  everyone in the Legislature told us, as the hotel isn’t 
bankrupt, nobody’s going to expropriate it.  But for that same reason we couldn’t rent it 
either.”4  In September of 2003, some six months after occupying the hotel, the workers 
were able to achieve a preagreement that allowed them the right to operate a part of the 
hotel.  This agreement was decided between the cooperative, the former owners, the 
government of the City of Buenos Aires, the MNER (Movimiento Nacional de Empresas 
Recuperadas), and the lawyers for the former creditors.  Under this agreement, which 
was overseen by the Commercial Judicial Circuit #9 under Judge Paula Hualde, the 
cooperative was able to put into operation the first three floors of the hotel.  These 
included the large meeting rooms and halls, which the workers were able to renovate and 
rent out profitably. 
 As time went on, the cooperative was able to expand the usable portions of the 
                                                 
4 Cuando nosotros ingresamos acá quisimos primero, como una salida, firmar un contrato de alquiler con 
el dueño, pero como no estaba la quiebra, era muy difícil de expropiar: todos nos decían en la legislatura 
que como el hotel no estaba quebrado, nadie lo iba a expropiar. Por eso no podíamos alquilar tampoco. 
Fabio Resino, published on www.indymedia,org.ar, 4 July 2005. 
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hotel.  They invested much of their profits in renovations, and in 2004 were able to open 
to the public a full café/bar.  By 2005, 80% of the hotel was in operation, and the ground 
floor hosted a bookstore, hair salon, gift shop, and point of sale for the new line of 
originally designed and manufactured shoes by the recuperated factory C.U.C. 
(Cooperativa Unidos por el Calzado, ex-Gatic).  However, as the hotel became 
profitable, the pressure from both the former owners and political forces whose interests 
lay in the protection of property rights increased.  Each of these have mounted legal 
attacks against the cooperative’s right to occupy and operate the hotel, with the legal 
complaints discussed above serving as just one example.   
 In analyzing the specific legal attacks that the BAUEN Cooperative has faced, I 
hope to demonstrate the how the reactions and defenses that they have designed represent 
a challenge to the neoliberal idea of citizenship on yet another front from the 
cooperativism discussed in the previous chapter, namely through fore fronting the idea of 
the right to work and that of collective wellbeing over the property rights.  In doing so, 
the cooperative draws on and attracts those committed to historically prominent 
ideologies within Argentina, including leftist and center leftist Peronism and the 
traditional socialist parties, in ways that are both constrained by these ideologies and 
attempt to adapt them to the current political situation, and specifically post-neoliberalist, 
post-crisis Argentina.  As we will see, the struggle for the Hotel Bauen occurs within 
both the ethical and practical registers.  I also hope to show that this challenge takes place 
within a given political system, and that the attempt to survive and protect the source of 
jobs and personal investment in the cooperative has implied a mixed strategy of 
accommodation and resistance that at once challenges and yet is limited by the 
constraints of politics as perceived and practiced within contemporary Argentina, and 
specifically within the City government of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires 
(Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires).   
 Following counsel by the MNER5, the BAUEN Cooperative has responded to the 
legal uncertainty surrounding its status by demanding that the State expropriate the hotel 
and turn it over to the cooperative.  Fundamentally, and underlying these demands for 
                                                 
5 The differences between the MNER and the other umbrella organizations are taken up at the end of this 
chapter.   
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expropriation, the BAUEN Cooperative and the MNER assert the right to work as a 
fundamental right of citizenship, and thus the protection of a source of jobs as a basic 
responsibility of the state.  This demand occurs on two fronts, both in terms of legality 
and in terms of legitimacy.  These two fronts do not exist in separation.  Rather, I show 
here how the claims to legitimacy are codified and channeled through specific preexisting 
juridical notions in forming a legal basis for their claims.   
 
Competing Moral Frameworks 
In making their case for the right to operate the hotel, the Cooperative argues that 
the former owners acted both illegally and immorally in allowing the hotel to decline into 
bankruptcy.  From this point of view, the corrupt practices of the former owners and the 
impunity afforded to the business class under the era of Menemist politics are seen 
coming together to form the principal cause of the severe unemployment and extreme 
debilitation of the primary and service industries in Argentina around the turn of the 21st 
century.  In referring to the widespread practice of fraudulent bankruptcies, Rebón notes:  
 This behavior by the businesspeople is perceived as ‘intolerable,’ making space for acts of 
resistance.  In this perspective, it is important to point out that in the literature [on recuperated 
businesses] and the consciousness of the workers moral explanations of the ‘inappropriate 
behavior by the owners’ as determining the business crisis abound.  These hypotheses don’t take 
into account that the very nature of capital is the maximization of gain and its reinvestment.  If the 
conditions for the realization of the cycle of accumulation don’t exist, withdrawal at the lowest 
cost is the morally capitalist alternative to follow [2004:65].6 
  
 Rebón fails to note that even under the capital friendly laws passed or decreed 
during the era of neoliberal reform, many of the actions of the business owners remained 
illegal.  As laid out in the previous chapter, this idea of profitability in the 1990s often led 
to business owners placing little regard on the continuity of the business and an 
exaggerated emphasis on the transportability of capital, manifested both in widespread 
capital flight and preferential investment in other, often foreign-based business.  
However, Rebón does make an important observation in noting, first, the way that moral 
                                                 
6 Esta acción del empresario es percibida como ‘intolerable,’ dando lugar a acciones de resistencia.  En 
esta perspectiva, cabe destacar que en la literatura y la consciencia de los trabajadores abundan las 
explicaciones morales acerca del ‘mal comportamiento de los empresarios’ como determinante de la crisis 
empresarial.  Estas hipótesis no tienen en cuenta que la propia identidad del capital es la maximización de 
la ganancia y su reinversión.  Si no existen condiciones para la realización del ciclo de acumulación, el 
retiro con los menores costos es la alternativa moralmente capitalista a seguir. 
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arguments are widely employed by the workers in justifying and explaining their actions, 
and secondly, that the moral logic being applied by the workers to their situation differs 
from that promoted by neoliberal capitalism and its adherents.      
 On the surface it may seem that these competing moral frameworks are relatively 
straightforward.  For the workers, morality is based on their basic rights to a dignified 
manner of employment, fair and honest treatment by the owners of the business, the right 
to be remunerated with a wage that covers their basic needs and access to social benefits 
like retirement support and health care.  In this view, the state as representative of the 
people holds the obligation to protect the rights of workers.  For the business owners, 
operating under the logic of neoliberal capitalism, the emphasis is placed on moral 
responsibility to shareholders and the maximization of profitability.  The state in this 
view takes on the role of defending the right to private property and the free operation of 
business.  However, looking closer at the ways in which each set of actors works to 
implement and achieve their vision on a practical level reveals both the variations that 
exist among those who interests lie in the promotion of each vision, and the ways in 
which the limits and constraints of the existing system are imagined and accommodated.  
Finally, as was the case with Memoria Activa and the other organized groups of family 
members of AMIA victims, an analysis of these differences shows that the divergences 
between similar groups are rooted in different assessments of appropriate action on the 
practical register.  In the next section, I explore further the claims to legitimacy advanced 
specifically by the BAUEN Cooperative, in resistance to the challenges mounted against 
them by their opposition. 
 
Decadencia (Decadence and Decline) 
As was the case with the organized groups of family members from the AMIA 
bombing, and as seen in the preceding chapter, the workers’ claims to legitimacy rely 
heavily on specifically understood notions of impunity and corruption.  Each side in this 
debate utilizes the legal and political system in particular ways in advancing their claims.  
Fundamentally, the Cooperative argues that the bankruptcy claim made by the former 
owners was fraudulent.  Though considered to be part of a widespread phenomenon 
tolerated or even encouraged under the ethics of neoliberal capitalism as applied and 
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practiced in Argentina, the members of the BAUEN Cooperative relate in precise detail 
the specifics of their case.  They specifically allege that that the former owners 
deliberately failed to properly maintain and invest in the hotel as a viable entity.  Rather, 
the cooperative argues that the former owners amassed millions of dollars of debt in non-
payment of services to the hotel, and of having used the profits they thus gained from its 
operation to construct other luxury hotels in Argentina and Brazil.  They also accuse 
them of violating labor laws applicable to the maintenance and closure of a business.  For 
example, by the time the doors formally closed, the number of workers employed at the 
hotel had already been drastically reduced by the management under varying 
reorganization schemes and the slow reduction of the hotel’s offer of services.  Those 
who had maintained their posts report having suffered months of underpay and 
nonpayment of mandatory benefits.  In addition, the owners are said to have for years 
engaged in predatory management practices.  As evidence of this, workers cite how they 
changed social service providers 5 times, with each change forcing the entire workforce 
to resign and be rehired.  This move is said to have allowed the owners to avoid paying 
their debts and to deny workers the rights they accumulate for continuous tenure.  The 
Cooperative also charges the former owners with vaciamiento, or the emptying of the 
premises of all saleable goods after bankruptcy had been declared, thus preventing their 
liquidation towards repayment of the amassed debts.7  Finally, the cooperative alleges 
that the former owners orchestrated a post-bankruptcy ‘sale’ of the business to a phantom 
corporation that is in fact controlled clandestinely by the former owners, in a move 
designed to allow them to evade responsibility for having led the business to bankruptcy. 
 This appraisal of the former owners’ actions directly influences the way workers 
chose to confront the hotel’s closure.  Anger over their mistreatment, the denial of their 
legally established rights as workers, and the fraudulent practices of the owners are all 
reasons frequently cited to justify the occupation of the business.  That these factors are 
important in a number of situations is supported by the low incidence of a business being 
recuperated when the proper indemnity was paid to the workers upon their dismissal 
                                                 
7 The former workers are themselves creditors of the bankrupt business, with both salary and benefits due 
to them.  However, though this is often true in bankruptcy cases in Argentina, the former workers are rarely 
able to collect on any of this debt as current bankruptcy law, both as written and de facto, gives lowest 
priority to this group. 
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[Rebón 2003:43].   
 
Legitimizing the Right to Work 
 These divergent perspectives on what constitutes morally appropriate behavior lie 
at the core of the dispute between the workers and the representatives of the former 
owners.  I have shown how the Cooperative bases its claims to the right to run the hotel 
by contesting the claims to property rights of the former owners, and how these are 
expressed in legal arguments over the illegality of the former owners’ actions.  They also 
make positive assertions as to the legal right of the State to expropriate the hotel.  The 
cooperative argues that the state is in fact the principal holder of the debts amassed by the 
former owners, as the initial loan from BANADE for its construction was largely unpaid 
and the former owners have over 7 million USD in unpaid back taxes to the City 
Government. 
 Beyond these arguments against the rights of the former owners and in favor of 
the state’s right to expropriate, the BAUEN Cooperative also argues for their own right to 
operate the hotel.  This claim rests on several points.  Fundamentally, the Cooperative 
argues that they hold a legitimate right to occupy and operate the hotel because they have 
been to do so successfully.  Though this claim has a shakier legal basis than those 
outlined above, in a context of massive un- and underemployment, the creation of jobs, 
and thereby the enhancement of social wellbeing, is a powerful argument that resonates 
widely.  They repeatedly emphasize the number of jobs they have created by reopening 
the hotel (some 150 at the time of my fieldwork), and continuously assert that even more 
would be created through the resolution of the hotel’s legal status, which would allow the 
cooperative to put the remaining portions of the hotel into operation.  These 150 jobs, 
with the accompanying family members that they also support, are also repeatedly cited 
as what are at risk with each new legal threat.  The fact that the cooperative has been able 
to lucratively exploit the same hotel that the former owners ran into bankruptcy and 
closure, thus benefiting not only the workers and their families but also the many 
suppliers of the hotel and the public as a whole through the economic activity of an 
important business in the city center, is presented by the cooperative as itself an argument 
for their right to continue to do so. 
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 These debates over who deserves the right to operate the hotel are also reflected in 
the terms used to describe the phenomenon.  For the sake of consistency and fluidity, I 
have chosen throughout this work here to refer to this set of experiences as “recuperated 
businesses,” though in using this term I to refer to both factories and businesses (fábricas 
y empresas recuperadas).8  Furthermore, I adopted the name recuperada as the one most 
commonly used by the workers within the movement.  However, other terms have been 
used to describe the phenomena, and the different word choices reveal much both about 
the differences between supporters and detractors of the movement and debates within 
the movement itself.  From usurpadas (usurped) or reconvertidas (reconverted) to 
ocupadas (occupied) and autogestionadas (worker-controlled), each term embodies a 
different notion of what the workers are doing and their rights to do it.9 
 Calling these businesses usurpadas is usually restricted to the right-wing press 
and politicians/businesspeople who hope to establish the workers’ actions as a crime.  In 
alleging an inherently illegal nature to the workers’ actions, they argue for the moral 
superiority of acting to restore the property to its “rightful” owners.  Reconvertidas is the 
name that has been chosen by certain agents of the state, who hoped to reinitiate 
production within the businesses without granting expropriation.  Those within the 
movement who choose to call these businesses ocupadas are emphasizing the method of 
struggle utilized, and are drawing a connection between these takeovers and earlier, 
union-directed takeovers that served as a mechanism for putting pressure on the owners.  
The term autogestionadas places emphasis instead on the workers’ ability to operate the 
businesses on their own, on the organization of production created inside these factories 
and businesses.  In this sense, it is often used by those who which to draw connections 
and alliances with other worker controlled projects, like the autogestionadas from Brazil.  
Another example of this usage comes from the association in 2005 of some 80 
cooperatives into a section of the CTA (Central de Trabajadores Argentinos, an umbrella 
union group that split off from the CGT in 1992).  This Asociación Nacional de 
                                                 
8 The distinction between recuperated factories and businesses is maintained linguistically somewhat more 
strictly than what I do in this dissertation.  However, in Spanish it is common to simply refer to these as 
recuperadas or another term of choice, without always adding the cumbersome addition of ‘business’ or 
‘factory’ or both, thus allowing this distinction to be maintained with less awkward results than would be 
the case in English.   
9 This section on the use of different names parallels, with some differences, that of Rebón 2003:34-36. 
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Trabajadores Autogestionados (ANTA) includes neighborhood-based or farming 
cooperatives as well as some recuperadas. 
 Despite these variations, I found recuperada to be the word most commonly used 
by the workers’ themselves.  The meaning of the word recuperada to describe this 
process holds several layers.  Many of these layers were powerfully and compactly 
expressed by BAUEN cooperative member Gerardo to a major local newspaper:  
 
 Our dedication is unshakable.  We are caring for a different Argentina.  Our conflict with the 
Iurkovich family is a reproduction of the one that exists between the businesspeople who sunk this 
country and the workers, who generate work and not inflation.  We are doing everything that an 
ordinary businessperson has not done:  we pay taxes, we pay our suppliers in full and on time, we 
reinvest in the installation and [for this] we suffer chronic attacks, because we believe that those 
who produce, the honest ones, those that think of businesses as social goods are those who save 
the country.10 
 
 As reflected in these words, a dominant meaning of having ‘recuperated’ the 
factory or business is of having recuperated a source of labor.  In the context of rising 
unemployment and massive businesses closures across all labor sectors that characterized 
the peak years of the recuperations, the loss of a job was then and remains a serious 
concern.  Thus, the idea of refusing to permit this closure by taking control of the 
business and putting it back into operation principally implies the recovery of the jobs 
that have been lost.  It also implies the recovery for production of a business or factory.  
In this sense, the nation’s productivity is being recuperated one business at a time, in 
direct opposition to the long decline of Argentina’s self-held identity as an industrialized 
country.  In this sense, workers often cite how the word ‘Bauen’ itself carries the 
meaning ‘to build’ or ‘to construct,’ and they thus make a symbolic connection between 
their efforts and the rebuilding of the nation.  Many workers also cite recuperation as 
referring to the recovery of the specific factory or business itself.  They argue that the 
business is fundamentally the product of their own labor, and therefore belongs to them.   
 Though this revolutionary potential for transforming the organization of 
                                                 
10El compromiso es contundente. Estamos cuidando una Argentina distinta. Nuestro enfrentamiento con 
los Iurcovich es una reproducción del que existe entre los empresarios que hundieron al país y los 
trabajadores, que generan trabajo y no inflación. Nosotros hacemos todo lo que no hace un empresario 
normal: pagamos impuestos, pagamos a los proveedores en tiempo y forma, reinvertimos en instalaciones 
y sufrimos ataques crónicos, porque consideramos que al país lo salvan los que producen, los que son 
honestos, los que entienden a las empresas como un bien social.  Quoted in “Cuando la música es una 
cooperativa,” Página 12, 16 December 2005.  
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production is what led to so much attention being paid to Argentina and recuperated 
businesses as one of the new “practices of resistance” that arose around the 2001 crisis, I 
argue that this tells only part of the picture.  Apart from the complications that arise from 
their continued insertion within a capitalist market, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
the recuperated businesses must also continue to operate within an established system of 
public administration.  For the remainder of this chapter, I want to turn to another 
incident that reveals a number of important aspects of the BAUEN Cooperative and their 
engagement with the broader political and social climate within the City of Buenos Aires.  
Rather than being focused on the judicial sphere, these events concern the interactions of 
the cooperative with the City Legislature. 
 
Democracy Inside and Out 
 The BAUEN cooperative’s interactions with the state were not limited to the 
judicial circuit.  Part of their legal strategy involved pressuring the national and local 
governments for laws of expropriation (leyes de expropiación) that would firmly place 
the hotel in the hands of the workers.  While a permanent expropriation would clearly be 
the ideal solution, the cooperative has also undertaken efforts to push a temporary 
expropriation law through the Legislature of Buenos Aires.  Through Congressman Diego 
Kravetz, a lawyer and founding member of the MNER, the BAUEN cooperative 
introduced legislation that would have given the cooperative legal protection to operate 
the hotel.  Similar laws had been passed for a few other recuperated businesses in the 
city, notably the 2004 law that granted temporary expropriation to 13 factories.  
However, though this law stipulates that the state indemnify the former owners, to date 
they have failed to pass the accompanying budgetary legislation that would provide the 
funds to do so.  The project proposed by Kravetz asks specifically that the hotel be 
considered of public utility (utilidad pública).  This juridical notion, most often appealed 
to for the appropriation of privately owned lands for public works projects such as 
highways or otherwise, contains the implication that the Argentine state has the right and 
obligation to put to public use that which can benefit the people as a whole.  Assigning 
this status to the Hotel Bauen would serve as legal grounds for its expropriation by the 
state.  The forceful appeal to this relatively minor juridical figure by the Cooperative 
couples with the notion of the right of citizens to a collective wellbeing over private 
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property rights.  
 The temporary expropriation law presented by Kravetz on behalf of the BAUEN 
passed through the Congress’s Development Commission and, in August of 2005, was 
passed by a minority of votes out of the Comisión de Presupuesto, which meant that it 
was now eligible to be voted on by the Legislature as a whole.  However, a 
counterproposal was suddenly presented by Congressman Jorge Morando, a political ally 
of the right-wing politician Mauricio Macri (later elected in 2007 as Head of the City 
Government, or mayor of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires).  This counterproposal, 
though it presented numerous legal irregularities, such as not having passed through the 
mandatory Development Commission, was passed by majority vote in the Comisión de 
Presupuesto also in August 2005.  This project proposed recognizing the ownership 
claims to the hotel by the Iurkovich family, and creating a negotiating commission, 
including those cooperative members who had been formally employed by Iurkovich 
(i.e., and not those contracted under the administration of Solari, S.A.), to discuss the 
terms of their continual employment, once again under the Iurkovich family.  
 The workers were forced to wait under continuing legal uncertainty for these 
projects to come up for vote on the House floor.  Early on November 3 they finally heard 
that the projects were on the schedule for that day.  They quickly sent out calls for 
support, and hundreds gathered in front of the Legislature building on Peru Street to urge 
against the passing of the Morando bill, as it was known [see Picture 6.2].  
Approximately 70 members of the cooperative had gained permission to attend the 
session as part of the viewing public.  In spite of this, though allowed inside the building, 
they were prevented from entering the Floor itself.  After waiting some seven hours in the 
cold white stone passages that led to the symbolic center of political decision making 
power, Congressman Kravetz spoke to the gathered workers.  The hard truth was that the 
cooperative’s project did not have the votes to pass, and the Morando project did.  
Therefore, Kravetz proposed accepting some of the terms of the Morando project, which 
would allow the cooperative the right to negotiate the terms of the settlement.  At any 
rate, he argued, it would buy the cooperative time, during which they could pressure then 
head of City Government Aníbal Ibarra to veto the law.  A discussion was quickly held.  
Many workers expressed why accepting this proposal was so difficult.  For the workers, 
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accepting Iurkovich as the owner meant ignoring the layers of corruption that surrounded 
the selling of the hotel and the process of its bankruptcy.  One member shouted out, “If 
Iurkovich wants to be recognized as the owner then let him show the papers proving it!”  
Furthermore, the project at its best would result in a return to salaried work, trabajo con 
patrón.  And lastly, the project provoked resistance for giving primacy to rights to private 
property.  The MNER and the Cooperative BAUEN argue, “Businesses are not 
exclusively private property, but rather social goods.  They are built with much human 
capital and the labor of the workers.”11 
 With their own project for temporary expropriation as good as dead, the workers 
understood that they had limited options at this critical juncture.  Should the Morando 
law pass, the former owners and right wing political forces would have a potent tool to 
use against the cooperative’s fight to hold onto the hotel.  Should the legislature act, their 
situation would become all the more precarious.  The frustration of the cooperative 
members was visible.  MNER and certain members of the cooperative had spent months 
meeting with legislators, visiting their offices, putting on pressure, trying to win votes for 
their proposal.  Now, suddenly, they could seemingly do little to stop a vote against them.  
Within moments of the impromptu debate spawned by Kravetz’s explanations, Fabio 
Resino, from the MNER but an integral figure within the BAUEN, shouted out over the 
din, “Okay, raise of hands, all those in favor of accepting this proposal?”  No one moved.  
“All those in favor of bursting onto the Legislature Floor and preventing a vote on the 
Morando Law?”  Cheers erupt, and the workers move off towards the inner doors leading 
to the session hall.   
 No longer content to accept their restriction from the session floor, the workers 
pushed through the human barrier of police and congressional security and won their way 
through the doors.  They erupted into the circular depressed cavity ringed by polished 
wooden benches where the legislators were gathered in small groups.  From the public 
seating areas in the highest level of the hall, the workers rained down cries of “BAUEN 
es, de los trabajadores, y él que no le gusta, se jode, se jode,” and other forceful cries 
against those who refused, through action or omission, to support their efforts.  Pounding, 
                                                 
11 Las empresas no son exclusivamente de propiedad privada, sino bienes sociales. Se construyen con 
mucho capital humano y el esfuerzo de los trabajadores Eduardo Murúa (MNER). “Desde una quiebra a 
una esperanza”, Página 12 29 Sept 2003. 
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clapping, yelling, their focused objective was simply to make impossible the continued 
proceedings of this governmental body.  After a while, the legislators accepted the 
inevitable and closed the session.  The vote on the Morando proposal had not come, and 
the workers left.   
 
Democracy as Social Responsibility 
 I want to explore in particular three aspects of this event, before turning to the 
developments that followed.  First, I want to consider in more depth the idea of collective 
wellbeing and its relationship to ideas and practices of democracy as expressed by the 
BAUEN Cooperative.  The articulation of this idea within the recuperated businesses 
movement cannot be separated from the idea of the social as a general notion circulates 
within Argentine and, specifically in the case of the BAUEN, porteño society.  While this 
notion is multifaceted and heterogeneous, it is nonetheless possible to trace some broad 
outlines.  The idea of democracy in post-dictatorship Argentina is discursively linked to 
ideas of social responsibility, in the sense of recognition of the self as part of a larger 
group (in this case, democratic society), to which the self bears a responsibility towards 
the proper functioning and well-being of the collective.  I remember being struck by the 
importance placed on this development of the idea of the self as part of a group at a 
parents’ meeting at my youngest son’s preschool.  That this idea is entrenched and 
reproduced in that sublime machine of social discipline, the school, was confirmed for 
me through conversations and interviews that I had with teachers of ‘citizenship’ 
(ciudadanía), as well as through published educational materials, both from government 
and private sources.12  This sense of the group, and the importance of solidarity, has a 
resonance in Argentina that permeates society even across and beyond class lines.  
Though political formulations from a variety of angles interpret and address what this 
idea of solidarity implies in different ways, it is a constant feature of social discourse.13  
Therefore, for the actions of the Legislature to be considered democratic, it is essential 
                                                 
12 A full discussion of the idea of citizenship as presented through the school system, and its permutations 
over the years, unfortunately lies beyond the scope of this dissertation.  I hope to expand upon this theme in 
a later work.  For valuable insights and useful bibliographic references, see the numerous published works 
of Inés Dussel. 
13 An example of this idea can be seen in the work of a group of investigators from the Centro Cultural de 
la Cooperación, who consider the differing manifestations of the idea of participation in post-crisis 
Argentina. See Landau, et.al. 2004.  
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that they also be seen as operating in consideration of this kind social responsibility.  This 
linkage of the democratic to the social, inflected in specific ways according to local 
socio-historical particularities, draws on deep-seated notions of social responsibility and 
solidarity and has recently been forcefully asserted in opposition to and rejection of 
notions of authoritarian governance, on the one hand, and the individualist principles of 
neoliberal citizenship as discussed in the Introduction, on the other.   
 A clear and poignant example of the way importance of the social is highlighted 
and fundamentally integrated into the Argentine notion of democracy can be seen in a No 
Smoking sign that I was fortunate enough to see hanging on the wall of the Centro de 
Salud Mental y Acción Comunitaria No 7 (Center for Mental Health and Community 
Action Number 7), in the northern Buenos Aires neighborhood of Núñez.  The 
serendipity of such finds, where a particular aspect of cultural life is so clearly and 
elegantly encapsulated in ways an anthropologist can only hope for but not actually seek 
out, was for me an essential feature of and rationale for extended fieldwork.  This faded 
and slightly yellowed sign, poorly printed out on a piece of office paper and taped up at 
the bottom of the stairwell, admonished visitors that: 
 
Fumar en el hospital atenta contra la convivencia.  La Ordenanza 47.667 del Honorable Consejo 
Deliberante lo prohíbe.  Si ud. [sic], a pesar de ello, fuma aquí, da muestra de su propio 
autoritarismo, de su desprecio a la salud ajena y de su descuido por el hospital, que es público, lo 
que quiere decir "de todos". 
 
To consider this warning line by line:  The first thing we are told is that smoking in this 
hospital is an attack against social living.  Convivencia is used in Spanish to denote the 
kinds of basic rules of coexisting with others, as in those taught to Kindergarten children.  
The next line informs us that Rule or Decree number 47,677, an appropriately obscure 
number relying in all its weighty importance on assured levels of bureaucratic efficiency, 
is the precise rule that we would be breaking.  Furthermore, this rule was decreed by the 
Honorable Deliberating Council, carrying the lexical connotation of having been fairly 
and morally decided by a group, which carefully considered the matter and made a joint 
decision.  The next line begins with an injunction to Ud., the formal 3-person singular 
tense for you in Spanish, which should grammatically be capitalized, but here is not, 
which could be seen as a denigration of the figure of the individual.  If this demoted 
“you” chooses, in spite of Honorable decrees, to smoke there, they are showing their 
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“authoritarianism,” or their own tendencies to act in a dictatorial fashion, and thus 
inherently undemocratically.  The appeal to words like “authoritarianism” within 
contemporary Argentina cannot escape from an implied reference to the last military 
dictatorship and its brutal repressive tactics.  To use this term is to invoke the widespread 
discursive condemnation of Dirty War violence by the military, and of those who would 
impose their will upon society.  Finally, we are told that the smoker is acting selfishly, by 
“showing their lack of respect for the health of others” and failing to properly care for the 
hospital, which “is public, which means belonging to everyone.”  The appeal to the 
public, the social, and the condemnation of any who would act in a way that imposed 
their will over others and over the good of the group is the central logic upon which this 
sign makes its injunction.14 
 In the case of the BAUEN, their moral injunction to collective well-being refers to 
the need for a kind of sociality and moral consideration that would place the viability of a 
national business, which by nature implicates workers, suppliers, and owners in a unified 
system of interests, over an individualized concern with earning money or responding 
only to the interests of a limited set of individuals (such as stock holders or investors).  
The idea that the former owners of the Hotel Bauen engaged were representative of what 
is seen as an era of corruption and impunity is symbolically expressed in a number of 
ways.  Marcelo, a former high-level worker in the hotel who served during my fieldwork 
as Cooperative president, considered the history of the hotel to be “a paradigm of 
corruption.”  The linkage between the current situation and the era of Menemist politics 
is further expressed through one of the chants most repeated during the protests against 
the Morando law.  As mentioned above, Morando was a political ally of and considered 
to be acting on behalf of Mauricio Macri, a major right wing figure and successful 
businessman.15  As such the chant, directed against Macri, declares: 
 
Mauricio Macri     Mauricio Macri  
vos sos igual que Menem    you’re just like Menem 
lo mismo que Chupete    just like Chupete 
                                                 
14 It is worth noting that smoking in public places is still a widespread and commonly accepted practice in 
Argentina, and such a strong condemnation of such a frequent and generally tolerated act rings as being 
both noteworthy and somewhat out of place.  The injunction was also, in my observation, nearly entirely 
ignored. 
15 His visibility as the president of the soccer club Boca Juniors propelled his political career.   After losing 
to Aníbal Ibarra in 2003, he was elected head of City government in 2007. 
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ajuste y represión    adjustments and repression 
(repetir)      (repeats) 
por eso yo     that’s why 
te quiero dar     I want to give you 
algo de corazón     something from the heart 
cada fábrica que cierra    for every factory that closes  
lo abrimos con expropiación   we will open it with expropriation16 
 
  
Engaging in Democratic Practice 
 The second point I would like to consider in relation to the events described at the 
beginning of this section concerns how ideas of ‘democracy’ are being understood and 
acted upon.  In this case, it would perhaps be possible to see the actions of the BAUEN 
Cooperative as undemocratic, as they purposely prevented a freely elected body of 
Congress from conducting its scheduled business, in order to avoid a vote on an issue 
they were likely to lose.  Yet this was not their interpretation of the events.  I discussed 
briefly above how in post-authoritarian Argentina the notion of democracy is frequently 
discursively linked to the idea of the public and of the social.  Related to this, and I argue 
also at work here, was an overwhelming sensation among members of the Cooperative 
that the kind of ‘democracy’ offered by and practiced within the legislature was one 
already heavily stacked against them.  The BAUEN workers, even and often especially 
those not intimately connected with planning and implementing the political strategies 
designed for their struggle, repeatedly mentioned to be their impression that the 
legislature is not playing by the rules, that they are up against an unresponsive and unfair 
system.   
 Their allegations were both general, as against the political system as a whole, 
and particular.  They would cite in minute detail the numerous irregularities presented by 
the Morando proposal, including its failure to follow the proper channels (which the 
BAUEN proposal did follow, and which in practice meant months of stressful waiting) 
and its granting legal recognition of ownership when this ownership was still disputed in 
court.  Furthermore, many were convinced that Morando had himself been paid to bring 
forth the proposal against them.  Several members mentioned to me how it was certain 
that Morando had received his little suitcase of money (valijita de plata) for having 
                                                 
16 This chant is modified from another, which begins pingüino (penguin), a popular nickname for Néstor 
Kirchner, a native of the southern Patagonian province of Santa Cruz.  Chupete ( a baby’s pacifier) refers to 
the weak and ineffectual ex-President de la Rúa.  
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brought the law to the floor.    
 The sense that the political system itself is unfair not unique to the Cooperative 
BAUEN.  The “crisis of legitimacy” that has besieged the Argentina government at least 
since the 1990s, culminating in the political and economic crisis of December 2001, has 
received abundant popular and scholarly attention [ex., Colectivo Situaciones 2002; 
Dinerstein 2004; Svampa 2002].  The recent lack of faith in all politicians has certainly 
affected the way electoral democracy is perceived and talked about in Argentina.   
 This disenchantment with the political class and the actual workings of electoral 
democracy was in large measure due to the popular assessment of corruption as endemic 
with the system.  Of course, public perception of widespread corruption as a problem 
amongst Argentine elected officials and other state actors did not arrive with the 21st 
century.  In 1910 French observer Georges Clemenceau wryly noted that “Argentina 
grows thanks to the fact that its politicians and authorities cannot steal while they are 
sleeping.”  In 1946 Borges insisted, “The State is impersonal:  Argentines only conceive 
of personal relationships.  For that reason, for the Argentine, stealing public funds isn’t a 
crime” [1996:658].  More recently, Mercedes Hinton has argued that political system as 
organized in Argentina “generat[es] few incentives for elected officials to act in the 
interests of the common good” [Hinton 2006:76].  However, as I laid out in the 
Introduction to this work, ‘corruption’ is a malleable notion that is interpreted and 
utilized in particular and culturally specific ways.  In this case, when used to refer to 
situations in which the actors involved are seen as privileging personal gain over 
collective benefit, corruption is subject to widespread ethical disdain.  Borges’s comment, 
while perhaps accurate as a cultural commentary, fails to take into account that, while 
stealing from the state may not receive excessive public approbation and is quite certainly 
at least expected, once this kind of corruption is seen to directly affect public welfare, or 
collective good, then it is subject to widespread moral condemnation.   
 Recent work on the use of the term “corruption” among the Argentine middle 
class reveals that, “Both the practices and the critiques of corruption are bound up in the 
construction of an evaluative moral framework that not only expresses the 
untrustworthiness of specific institutions, but also goes so far as to question the very 
possibility of sociality.”  [Muir 2008].  Furthermore, beyond the impersonal and broad 
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based deceptions that the general public can feel following the actions of major figures, 
(public scandals, the corralito, fraudulent business closures, suspicious privatizations, 
etc), what has received less attention and, I contend, has a stronger influence on popular 
lack of confidence in the government has to do with their own personally felt experiences 
interacting with government officials, and their understandings of democratic practice.  
Thus, understanding attitudes towards politics and towards the idea of democracy as 
practiced in Buenos Aires requires taking into account the way elected officials are 
viewed as having become increasingly entangled in practices seen as working against the 
common good (i.e., “corrupt”) since the 1990s, and bearing in mind the idea of corruption 
as understood in this particular context. 
  Given this context, for the members of the BAUEN cooperative, the question 
becomes, how can you play their game if they don’t play by their own rules?  In this 
context, and in any context of widespread corruption and favoritism, how can any social 
actor practice democracy?  For the workers of the BAUEN, the answer lies in their 
practice.  Their interruption of the legislature session that day reveals two aspects of this 
practice.  On the one hand, their forced entry into the floor of the session served as a 
literal irruption of those affected by the laws being debated into the sphere of debate.  
Their physical presence forced onto the scene a visual recognition, at least, of their actual 
existence as noise-making, bodily entities, in contrast of the sterilization and flattening of 
existence so effectively effected by inscription through formalized linguistic codification 
onto sheets of paper.  Furthermore, their prevention of the vote on the Morando proposal, 
and the accusations they directed against the measure and those supporting it, challenged 
the workings of politics as usual within the chamber.  Their presence worked to expose 
the nature of political practice within the body, defying to the legislature and legislators 
to live up to heir own rules and stated purposes.    
 On the other hand, the actions of the Cooperative that day also held an alternative 
example to this kind of practice.  The space outside the legislature session hall witnessed 
a moment of direct democracy, of the kind that rallied the workers around a position 
rather than isolating them for the process.  This is not to allege that the practice of 
democracy within the BAUEN is strictly egalitarian or devoid of hierarchies of power.  
Indeed, debates over the nature and practice of democratic decision-making within the 
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recuperated businesses are some of the most hotly contested.17 Nonetheless, what I want 
to highlight is that the existence of these debates seems to allow a sense of confidence in 
the practice of democracy within the recuperated businesses movement, a confidence that 
is lacking in the workers’ understanding of governmental institutions.  The significant 
difference lies in that democracy as practiced within the BAUEN Cooperative inspires 
confidence rather than distrust among its members.   
 The struggle has also led, as the initial quote to this chapter demonstrates, to a 
change for some cooperative members in their understanding of their role within the 
political system, as a regulatory body for society.  Rather than feeling alienated from the 
workings of politics, some now feel empowered to work towards changing the system 
itself.  I come back once again to María’s words.  With no prior political formation or 
activity, she points to her experiences with the cooperative for her newfound 
understanding of their own rights as citizens, rights to both protest against the “corrupt” 
workings of the politics of elected officials and to influence the governmental policies 
that most directly affect their lives: 
 
Yeah, this has totally changed my life, the fact of having seen this, and I never, as I always say, I 
have never gone for any political party, I had never known what it was, never entered a 
Legislature building or stepped into the National Congress.  And I more or less was a little afraid 
of the polit..., of these people, like, legislators.  Maybe I was a little afraid because I’d say “I’m 
going to go talk to a legislator?  Why?”  Now it’s like, “No, we’re the ones who vote for them.  
They have to receive us.  And, why wouldn’t they receive us?”  It’s thanks to us that they are 
there, so they really have to provide us with a solution.  Not us going to ask them for a favor, 
when it’s they who are representing us.  That’s why we gave them our vote.  So, I’m totally 
different now than what I was before, no?  18 
 
 However, her understanding of her situation and, more directly, the decisions 
made as to what actions the cooperative should take, cannot be separated from the 
                                                 
17 The ceramic factory Zanón in the Patagonian province of Neuquén has been one of the most successful 
of the recuperated businesses in implementing a decision-making process that equally includes the voices 
of all of the more than 400 workers.  Other recuperated factories have had lesser degrees of success in 
dealing with these issues.   
18 Y sí, totalmente cambió mi vida el hecho de, de ver esto y jamás, como siempre digo, jamás he militado 
en ningún partido político, jamás, eh,  he sabido lo que, he pisado una legislatura o he pisado un Congreso 
de la Nación. Yo por ahí era como que les tenía un poquito de miedo a los pol<>, a, a esta gente de decir, 
eh, de decir a los, como a los diputados. Por ahí me daba un poco de miedo porque decía “yo voy a ir a 
hablar con un diputado? Por qué?” Ahora es como, “No. Si nosotros le estamos dando el voto. Nos tiene 
que recibir. Y, por qué no nos va a recibir?”  Entonces, gracias a nosotros está ahí y nos tiene que, 
realmente, dar la solución. No nosotros irle a pedirle un favor si ellos es lo que nos están representando. 
Por eso le votamos. Entonces es totalmente diferente a lo que era antes a lo que soy ahora, no?  
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influence of the promotores, or leaders because of and through their connections to 
sources of power, who generally do come to the cooperatives with prior political 
formation, connections, and ideologies.  Undoubtedly, the prominence and control of 
knowledge by certain promotores, has had profound implications for who has the ability 
to direct and influence the paths taken by the cooperative and the decisions made.  Fabio, 
the representative of the MNER who came to form part of the cooperative and the one 
who called for the informal vote that day, indisputably influenced the impressions and 
positions of the other members of the cooperative in the very act of calling on them to 
vote.  María credits Fabio with having taught her much of what she knows about 
Argentine politics and history.  She told me that before he came she did not know what 
the AAA was,19 and said that she had not known what it meant to be active for a cause 
(militar).  The influence of these promotores undeniably had influence over the workers 
within a given cooperative, though internal debates within several of these (most notably 
perhaps are the intense debates and abrupt transitions within the textile factory Bruckman 
and the metalworks factory IMPA), seem to indicate that this control was not absolute.    
  
The Debate over Appropriate Forms of Practice 
 This point leads into the third and final aspect of the events from this day that I 
would like to discuss.  The move made by the BAUEN Cooperative on this day was, as 
with any other, also subject to the political considerations of those involved.  Here, I refer 
to “politics” in the sense I laid out in the Introduction, in terms of encompassing and 
describing the way people move through and manage interpersonal relationships of 
power.  Specifically to this case, it was important that Fabio, as a key strategist for the 
BAUEN, distance himself and the Cooperative from Legislator Kravetz (the legislator 
who had put forth the BAUEN’s proposal that Morando was countering).  Though 
Kravetz had himself been a founding member of the MNER, his rise to prominence 
within the Legislature as a head of the Kirchnerist block had conditioned his ability to 
oppose legislative practices and had limited the ways in which he could manifest his 
support for the Cooperative.  Furthermore, and more relevant to the discussion here, it 
                                                 
19 The AAA or Triple A was the Argentine Anti-communist Association (Asociación Anticomunista 
Argentina), created by then Minister of Social Welfare José López Rega in 1973.  It was responsible for 
much of the state-sponsored political violence in the years leading up to the 1976 military coup.  
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had implications for the Cooperative and their chosen position in relation to their 
engagement with the government.    
 As mentioned above, the BAUEN Cooperative was accompanied in their initial 
days by the MNER, and the BAUEN eventually became one of the principal referents 
and spearheads for the movement itself.  The position adopted by the MNER, and 
promoted by and through the BAUEN, can perhaps be best summarized as one of limited 
engagement with the government.  While they embrace a strong oppositional rhetoric, 
they are also willing to engage with the established channels to the extent necessary in 
order to secure their demands (filing legal briefs, legislative proposals, etc).  However, as 
we have seen, they also challenge these institutional practices, with a willingness to 
denounce the inadequate nature of these practices even as they work within them.  It is 
given this stance that Fabio and the Cooperative found it opportune to distance 
themselves from Kravetz on this occasion, given his rise to prominence within the 
established sphere of party and legislative politics.  This is my own interpretation of the 
events, but it was supported and agreed to by others with whom I spoke, most notably 
members of the alternative press who regularly covered the BAUEN and my companions 
in the press office of the Cooperative. 
 The sharp divisions between the MNER and other organizational currents within 
the recuperated businesses movement have more to do with this position on appropriate 
engagement with the government than with differences in their stated aims.  To the extent 
that ideological differences as to the goal of the movement exist, these have not generally 
been the source of division.  Though the BAUEN and Zanon pursue different ends 
(expropriation en favor of the cooperative, for the BAUEN, and expropriation as a state-
controlled industry, for FaSinPat), these two recuperadas maintain a close relationship 
and invariably support one another’s actions.  This is the case in spite of the geographic 
separation of the two, and it is not uncommon for each to send busloads of supporters 
across the vast stretch of Argentine countryside for protest events. 
 In contrast, the MNFT, a splinter group of the MNER that formally separated in 
2003, could be seen to exhibit a greater willingness to work within established 
institutional channels, and is more reluctant to challenge these.  Led by lawyer and 
politician Luis Caro, the MNFR rejects the MNER’s motto of occupy, resist, produce 
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(ocupar, resistir, producir), arguing that occupation is illegal under current law and 
therefore illegitimate, and therefore do not support the reentry and occupation of 
installations.  However, workers claim that the definitive split between the two groups, 
which played out most visibly in the struggle for control of the metalworks factory 
IMPA, came when Caro agreed to run for office on the same list as former carapintada 
Alfredo Rico.  In this way, Caro was seen as positioning himself too close to established 
forces within the government.  Another umbrella organization FECOOTRA, which came 
out of the 1970s and 1980s experiments with cooperativism, rejects the mixing of politics 
with the movement.  They defend cooperativism as an ideological notion, stay within the 
mandates of INAES, and have distanced themselves from both the MNER and MNFT’s 
attempts to enter into and thereby influence the formal political system in favor of the 
cooperatives. 
 While the MNFR and FECOOTRA are much more willing and in fact insistent 
upon working within a kind of legality, the MNER rejects this ‘legality’ as itself illegal.  
While accepting the necessity of working within the established political and economic 
system, they are also insistent upon the realization of the right to work and the primacy of 
collective wellbeing over legalistic concerns.  The experiences of these cooperative 
members point towards new ways of understanding politics within the Argentine social 
landscape.  However, the system within which these actors find themselves enmeshed 
profoundly affects the real possibilities for the survival of the Cooperative.  In the end, 
the success that the BAUEN Cooperative has had in maintaining control of the Hotel (as 
of this writing, the cooperative is in its fourth year of worker-controlled operation) has 
been the result of pursuing a strategy of resistance and accommodation, in which they 
both work within and challenge institutional channels.  Furthermore, it has required 
sustaining a balance of tension in resisting the pressures brought against them.   
 I see this kind of balance of tension as a common feature of the Argentine 
political landscape.  In the case of the BAUEN Cooperative, it includes a number of 
factors.  At any moment the BAUEN holds anywhere from two to several hundred 
people.  With some 150 workers, and numerous allies (such as those at the permanent 
stand in the lobby selling CUC shoes, a independently owned and operated bookstore, 
hair salons, and other services) and voluntary collaborators, the physical installations at 
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Callao 360 are never left unguarded.  And, as seen in the previous chapter, the 
Cooperative has a carefully cultivated network of social relationships, including the 
Mothers of Plaza de Mayo and key piquetero and neighborhood groups, willing and 
determined to defend them at all cost.  The Cooperative will not leave voluntarily, 
regardless of any legal injunctions that may be filed against them.  As one member put it, 
“To get us out of here, then there really would be a second Cromañón, because they’ll 
have to kill 150 people and all of our families [that stand] behind us.”20  And, as 
expressed in one of the most oft repeated chants, members insist: Estaba cerrado/lo 
fuimos a abrir/y poco a poco lo pusimos a laburar/No importa que diga el gobierno/del 
Hotel Bauen no nos vamos nunca más (It was closed/we went and opened it/and little by 
little we put in into operation/No matter what the government says/we will never leave 
the Hotel Bauen). 
 On the other side, however, lie the economic and political interests determined to 
get them out.  Yet even when these gain the force of rule (i.e., when those favorable to 
their interests hold key political offices, and thus control the security forces), no 
politician could afford being responsible for what would have to be a decidedly violent 
eviction in the heart of the microcentro.  The BAUEN Cooperative is in many ways 
protected by its central location within the City of Buenos Aires.  Unlike the eviction of 
shantytown residents or squatters that has been going on across the outskirts of the City 
and within the Conurbano, the Hotel Bauen is not spatially hidden from the view of 
middle and upper class porteños, not in any way out-of-sight/out-of-mind like many other 
groups who face similar pressures.    
 This balance of tension leads on the surface to a kind of stable inactivity, 
constantly undergoing minor fluctuations but with neither side having the ability to 
significantly alter the situation.21  Around the strongly confrontation rhetoric, what 
happens in practice is that a different, often clandestine kind of pressure is placed upon 
the Cooperative.  This takes the form of both legal and political pressures.  In the legal 
                                                 
20 Y para sacarnos de acá...entonces sí que va a ver un segundo Cromañón, porque van a tener que matar 
a 150 personas y a través toda nuestra familia.   
21 The Cooperative has tried to alter this balance by appealing to the national government, but this body has 
failed to take a consistent position in relation to the recuperated businesses.  For more detail on this aspect, 
see Anred, El gobierno de Kirchner y las empresas recuperadas. Balance de una ambivalencia, 11 
December 2007. 
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sphere, worker control of the Bauen has been threatened by legal attacks ranging from 
mandatory closure orders, criminal charges against cooperative members for removing 
such closure notices, and charges for the illegal hosting of public events in violation of 
the terms of occupation.  Politically, the workers also contend with less than transparent 
actions designed to remove them from the political process.  Following the workers’ 
success in preventing the passage of the Morando Law, the City Legislature eventually 
passed this law at two o’clock in the morning during a later session.  The workers 
frequently emphasize how this kind of pressure leaves them in a constant state of 
uncertainty, never knowing where and when the next threat will arrive, denying them the 
ability to “work in peace” (laburar en paz).    
  However, their ability to engage within this system can also be seen in what 
happened following the late night passage of the Morando Law by the City Legislature.  
Though this law recognized the Iurkovich family as owners of the BAUEN and stipulated 
the creation of a legislative committee to oversee its return to them, the Cooperative 
managed to exert enough pressure on the new Head of City Government, Jorge Telerman, 
to prevent the law from taking effect.  The Cooperative demanded that the law be vetoed.  
However Telerman, whose position towards the recuperated businesses was more 
moderated than that of the recently deposed Ibarra, was not willing to antagonize his 
opposition political forces by doing so.  Falling short of this, closed door negotiations 
between Cooperative leaders and members of the Executive led to the law being 
effectively set aside.  Though Telerman refused to veto it, he also did not sign it, an 
irregular but not uncommon legal procedure that left it without effect while allowing him 
to avoid taking a public position.     
 This chapter has shown how the BAUEN Cooperative operates with a combined 
strategy of resistance and accommodation to the existing political and legal system.  Even 
while denouncing the workings of politics as corrupt, the Cooperative moves within this 
same system, challenging and exposing its manner of operation.  At the same time, the 
BAUEN Cooperative needs to work within the existing political and legal system in order 
to achieve the stability they need, and to prevent further attacks from those opposed to 
their actions.  The Cooperative uses as a sign of its legitimacy its careful compliance with 
existing legislation.  We have seen how they highlight the number of briefs and motions 
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they have filed in the attempt to secure these clearances, as well as their careful and 
timely compliance with all business responsibilities.  Fundamentally, though, they argue 
that it is their right to work and the primacy of collective wellbeing that legitimates their 
actions.  It is this combination of legality and legitimacy, resistance and accommodation, 
that has defined the Cooperative’s strategy on the practical level, and that has been the 



















Death, Public Security, and the Workings of Politics in the City of 
Buenos Aires:  The Case of the Cromañón Nightclub Fire 
 
 
ni la bengala, ni el rocanrol 
a nuestros pibes los mató la corrupción 
 
(it wasn’t the firecracker, or rock and roll 
it was corruption that killed our children) 
 
Para vos, que no te metés en política porque te parece que política es algo sucio que hace un grupo de 
corruptos sin preguntarle nada al pueblo. Tenés razón, a veces hacer política es eso. Pero también, y 
nosotros lo hemos aprendido, puede ser luchar por lo que es justo, aunque el enemigo sea muy poderoso.  
Porque no podemos permitir que los responsables caminen impunemente por las calles. La calle es 
nuestra... 
(For you, who doesn’t get involved in politics because you think politics is something dirty that a group of 
corrupt individuals do without asking the people anything.  You’re right, sometimes politics is that.  But we 
have learned that politics can also be to fight for what is just, even though the enemy is very powerful.  
Because we cannot allow those responsible to walk the streets with impunity.  The streets belong to us....)     
--Family members, survivors, and friends of the victims of Cromañón, 30 December 2006  
   
 On December 30th, 2004, a fire in a Buenos Aires nightclub called República de 
Cromañón took the lives of some 194 people.  The vast majority of those killed were 
youth, many still in their teens.  The club was hosting a concert by the popular rock band 
Los Callejeros when someone in the audience launched a bengala, a kind of flare 
commonly set off during these performances in spite of a history of previous incidents 
demonstrating the hazards engendered by their usage.  The Cromañón tragedy was, 
however, unusually grave, and the high number of deaths and graphic televised reporting 
from the scene placed this occurrence squarely in the public eye.  The way this event 
became quickly inserted into the language and practices of politics within the 
administrative regimes of the City of Buenos Aires provides a condensed and poignant 
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illustration of the themes presented throughout this work.  Specifically, the Cromañón 
case demonstrates the force that the interpretive frames of corruption and impunity hold 
within Argentine public discourse.  Furthermore, it reveals once again how those 
mobilized to work for change can be united in their ethical stance and the manner in 
which they voice their demands, even as they become divided over how to manage the 
myriad of political relationships that they inevitably confront on the practical register.   
 
The Question of  Blame 
 Even before the ashes from the Cromañón fire had begun to settle, public 
attention turned to sorting out the question of who was responsible.  However, assigning 
blame proved to be a contentious task.  Media and official reports quickly drew attention 
to the unsafe conditions within the nightclub.  These included allegations that the roof 
was made of unsafe materials1, that all possible exits besides the main entrance were 
chained shut (reportedly to avoid anyone from sneaking in without paying), and that the 
number of people allowed into the building that evening far exceeded the local code of 
regulations for occupancy limits.  The owner of the nightclub, Omar Emir Chabán, was 
promptly signaled as responsible for managing the conditions under which the locale 
operated.2  Following a series of media spectacles during which the accused was hunted 
down by the authorities, Chabán was located at his business office and arrested.  Though 
facing charges that could result in his being sentenced to 25 years in prison, he was 
initially granted the right to await trial out of jail.  The fear of violent reprisal was so 
strong that he took refuge on a small island in the Tigre delta accessible only by boat.  
However, both the media and the family members of victims proved relentless.  In an 
attempt to calm the waters, Chabán offered to meet with some family members.  While 
this gesture was favorably received by a number of those involved, Chabán has continued 
                                                 
1 The official investigations into the incident report that the roofing of the building released toxic gases, 
including high levels of cyanide and carbon monoxide, when ignited.   The inhalation of these gases was 
the major cause of death in most of the victims. 
2 For the sake of clarity and brevity, I focus only on Chabán in this conclusion.  However, Chabán was 
actually only one of at least two co-owners of the nightclub.  The property holder of the adjoining hotel, 
Rafael Levy, is also said to have held partial possession of the club, through an array of murky financial 
arrangements.  Some of the family members of the victims therefore claim that he is also responsible.  
Furthermore, some argue that he was in fact behind the decision to keep all exits but the main entrance 
sealed, and that he had kept essential ventilation shafts covered.   However, only Chabán and the head 
manager of the club have charged in court.   
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to be defamed by many family members and media sources, who often focus as much on 
his transgressive personal identity and style as on his legal or moral responsibility [see 
Picture 7.1-7.2.  Soon after his much-publicized meeting with family members, Chabán 
was once again incarcerated, having lost a legal appeal over his right to await trial out of 
jail.  He spent two years and 13 days in prison before regaining this right.  As of this 
writing, Chabán remains free, with the opening date for his trial still pending.    
 Chabán was not the only person assigned responsibility for the tragedy.  Legal 
charges and public outrage were also leveled against the manager and members of Los 
Callejeros, the band that was playing that night.  Nonetheless, while the family members 
and press are for the most part united in their condemnation of Chabán, the case of Los 
Callejeros has been more divisive.  The accusation against the rock band claims that they 
hold responsibility for the planning and logistics of the show, including the inducement to 
fill the club to over three times its permitted capacity.  They are also blamed for having 
incited their fans to launch the bengala that started the fire.  Many family members of 
victims, survivors, and alternative media sources, while not denying the level of liability 
that the group may have, are wary of a tendency in the mainstream press to demonize Los 
Callejeros for coming from what is an often-deprecated  underground music scene that 
appeals most strongly to youths from the popular classes.  They see in the condemnation 
of Los Callejeros a desire to further marginalize and disparage both the underground 
music world and its fans [lavaca 2005]. 
 Related to this is the tendency within some major media sources to extend 
culpability to the victims themselves.  Major coverage of the events tended to portray 
these kinds of rock concerts as being frequented by unruly and deviant youths, coming 
largely from the poorer, outlying areas of the City of Buenos Aires, who were said to be 
known to engage in careless practices.  A much circulated rumor claimed that a kind of 
day-care was being held inside the girls’ bathroom, so that the young (unmarried) teenage 
mothers in attendance that night could leave their babies and small children behind while 
they enjoyed the concert.3  The notion of poor youth as a dangerous force resonanted in 
this highly class-structured society already engulfed in debate over public security and 
prone to discrimination against the young and disadvantaged.  Many conservative sources 
                                                 
3 This rumor is vehemently denied by many survivors of the fire. 
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still argue for the need to assign legal responsibility to the youth or youths that launched 
the bengala, though the identity of this person(s) and whether or not they managed to 
survive the inferno that followed has not been determined.        
 It is in refutation of this kind of portrayal of the event that led to the popularity of 
the chant with which I opened this section.  During their monthly marches in 
remembrance of that night, family members of victims often sing, “It wasn’t the 
firecracker/or rock and roll/it was corruption that killed our children.”  This allegation 
refers to the final, and most consequential, group commonly held responsible for the 
transpiring of events that evening.4   The government, seen as infused with corrupt 
practices and officials, are held as being ultimately at blame for the tragedy and the 
deficiencies in reacting to it [see Picture 7.3].  The accusations fall on a number of actors 
and institutions.  At its core, the injunction against the government revolves around the 
lack of enforcement and oversight of the laws regulating safety inspections for this class 
of business establishment.  Members of the Federal Police Force and the Corps of 
Firefighters in the City of Buenos Aires are accused of soliciting and receiving bribes in 
exchange for overlooking safety violations during yearly building inspections.  This 
practice was widespread and well known, having been the subject of previous legal and 
political investigations.  For this reason, several members of the local government are 
also accused of “failing to fulfill the duties of public office” (incumplimiento de deberes 
de funcionario público), for not having taken steps to increase compliance with safety 
regulation laws. 
 This extension of responsibility to political functionaries not directly involved in 
either the events of the evening or the ineffective inspections that preceded it has been a 
critical point of mobilization and contention among the family members of victims, 
survivors, and the broader public.  Several lower level functionaries in positions directly 
related to the control of safety inspections are currently awaiting trial, and their 
implication in the events is generally accepted as just by those most affected.  However, 
the event quickly became an opportunity for members of the opposition party in City 
                                                 
4 For the sake of brevity, I have forgone a discussion of the degree of responsibility that some sources 
assigned to other sectors in the long process of settling of blame.  Some intellectuals came forth in 
condemnation of a generic  “society” for the events, other religious voices condemned the erosion of the 
traditional family, to name just a few.   
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Government to criticize the ruling administration, headed by Aníbal Ibarra.  Though 
Ibarra was eventually acquitted of legal responsibility for the events, a group of family 
members, led by lawyer and father of one of those killed José Iglesias, pushed for a 
political trial of Ibarra’s conduct as Head of City Government.  In a hotly contested battle 
that sharply divided both the city legislature and the family members of victims, Ibarra 
was eventually impeached and removed from office.5   
 
Impunity, Corruption, Politics 
 As was the case with the AMIA bombing and the organization of the BAUEN 
Cooperative, all sectors of family members in the case of Cromañón understand and talk 
about the causes of their situation and the government’s handling of it in terms of 
corruption and impunity.  The idea of corruption as the ultimate cause of murder can be 
seen as well in the following quote, which comes from the text produced by one sector of 
family members on the second anniversary of the disaster:  “The crafty murderer [in this 
incident] wasn’t rock and roll, it wasn’t the fiesta, it was institutional politics and the 
handling of bribes of the political class of which Aníbal Ibarra was a member.”  Though 
this particular phrase comes from the anti-Ibarristas, similar accusations against the 
government in general are common across the groups.   
 Likewise, impunity is a major frame through which family members of victims 
and survivors formulate their demands and express their frustrations.  This remains the 
case even given the relatively high number of concrete results concerning the assignation 
of blame and justice (i.e., punishment) in this instance.  For example, impunity is the 
central notion in an emotional letter prepared by survivors of the tragedy and read during 
the march on the 22nd month after its occurrence.  This letter reads in part, “We 
denounce the Government, which doesn’t just look away, but actively guarantees 
impunity so that every day an endless number of Cromañóns parade by....  We are all 
                                                 
5 The government was also condemned for not having put into place a more effective disaster and rescue 
service prepared to handle tragedies of this nature.  Much attention was given to the fact that the Cromañón 
nightclub was located only a few blocks from the AMIA, both in the central neighborhood of Once.  In 
spite of the fact that the creation and implementation of just such a system has been a central demand of 
Memoria Activa for years (and forms one of the points in their OAS mandated “friendly agreement” with 
the Argentine State), such a system was not in place.  All reports indicate that many more people would 
have survived the tragedy had there been adequate rescue services and medical attention at the scene.     
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survivors of the tragedy of this country, where impunity reigns.”6  As with the AMIA 
case, they also denounce the Cromañón incident as a “crime of state” (crimen del 
Estado), and they link their struggle to those of the counterimpunity organizations on 
issues of the dictatorship and declare their solidarity with the struggles for the rights of 
workers:   
 To struggle for Cromañón is to struggle for the 30,000 compañeros disappeared under the last 
military dictatorship, it is to demand THAT JULIO LÓPEZ BE RETURNED ALIVE 
(APARICIÓN CON VIDA), it means to support the telephone workers in their just demand for 
decent work, it is to struggle for health care, and this is why we act in solidarity with the workers 
from the Hospital Francés.  The cases that we have just mentioned condemn a logic of 
functioning, a way of doing politics, that consists of physical repression and threats to witnesses. 
  
 However, as with the AMIA and Bauen cases, unity on the ethical register is 
accompanied by irreconcilable divisions among those most profoundly affected.  As with 
the groups discussed in this dissertation, at the core of this divisiveness rests differences 
over how relationships with governing institutions are to be managed on the practical 
register.  The political trial of Aníbal Ibarra brought these contradictions out into the 
open.  During the voting by the committee created to decide his fate, televised live on 
major television stations, two separate demonstrations were held near the House of City 
Government.  The proximity of the two demonstrations allowed me to be present at both 
of them.  In doing so I was able to observe how each of these, one in favor and one 
against Ibarra, counted on the organizational support of survivors and family members of 
victims.  The two held vastly different opinions as to the justness and utility of Ibarra’s 
political trial, in ways that were in some cases clearly influenced but ultimately not 
linearly determined by preexisting political alliances.   
 
Anti-politics? 
 Before leaving the Cromañón tragedy, I want to reflect a moment longer on the 
way notions of politics, impunity, and corruption serve as frameworks through which 
events are understood and demands for government action formulated and structured.  I 
return to the second quote with which I began this section.  Here, “politics” as 
                                                 
6 The full version of this text is available online at lavaca.org, “La locura es la impunidad,” posted 30 
October 2006.  These groups also symbolically refer to the nation as “Argentina República de Cromañón,” 
in a play on the name of the nightclub (República de Cromañón), using the Cromañón case as 
representative of the situation of the country as a whole. 
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traditionally practiced is equated with “corruption” (“politics is something dirty that a 
group of corrupt individuals do without asking the people anything”), and “impunity” is 
signaled as being at the root of the problem around which their demands are centered 
(“we cannot allow those responsible to walk the streets with impunity”).  The “street” is 
held up as belonging to the people, including fundamentally those currently engaged in 
protest (“the street belongs to us”).  Finally, the imputed meaning of politics is seen to be 
changed in this process.  Thus, activism becomes a recuperation of politics from those 
who have “corrupted” it.  Throughout this dissertation, I have worked to show how these 
notions are part of an idea of political action and a particular interpretation of 
contemporary society that has become common throughout broad sectors of Argentine 
society.   
  Furthermore, I have tried to show how groups working for social change, both in 
their discourse and in their practices, must be understood within the context of the 
particular confluence of cultural and historical circumstances that precipitated their 
emergence.  Specifically in this work, I have focused on how neoliberalism as conceived 
of and applied in Argentina has served as a principal figure against and in contrast to 
which contemporary movements have directed their attention.  Though originally 
formulated in the Global North, neoliberalism has been particularly reflected and 
ultimately subject to the particularities of the local situations in which it was put into 
practice.  Through advancing cultural plurality, justice, work, and collective good as 
notions fundamental to the rights of citizenship for democratic society, the groups studied 
in this dissertation have been shown to challenge the models of citizenship that the 
neoliberalist state strove to impose.  By appealing to the practice of memory, understood 
through a combination of Jewish tradition and the discourse of human rights that gained 
prominence in Argentina following the most recent military dictatorship, family members 
of the AMIA victims challenged the politics of forgetting that operated under the Menem 
administrations.  While this politics of forgetting provided the political stability needed 
for the implementation of neoliberal reforms, it also ironically helped set up the discourse 
of human rights as the essential terms of debate from all sides.  The embrace of a broadly 
imaged but narrowly implemented multiculturalism served as the basis for the Menem 
administrations’ claims to be themselves the promoters of human rights.    
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 While the family members of the AMIA victims draw on the notion of memory as 
a unifying feature, the recuperated businesses movement relies on the historically 
important sense of compañerismo and concern for collective good in making their 
demands.  They appeal to the historically resonant figure of work and workers in 
asserting their fundamental right to operate their businesses, in contrast to the 
neoliberalist concern with individualism.  The figure of the salaried worker as a social 
identity, combined with the culturally salient notion of collective good, provide the 
members of the BAUEN cooperative and the rest of the recuperated businesses 
movement with an argument for legitimacy that strongly contradicts the primacy given to 
highly mobile finance capital and job flexibilization in neoliberalist philosophy.   
 In both of these cases, we can see how these ethical challenges get advanced in 
ways that also draw on historically established forms and actions.  Each aspect of their 
selected forms of action, from street protests to chants to the occupation of public and 
private spaces, has guiding precedents that inform the available repertoire and choices for 
expressing their demands [cf. Tilly 1994].  Furthermore, the idea of directing their 
complaints towards the state itself derives from historically constituted notions of the role 
of government and public administration in social life [cf. García Allegrone et. al. 2004]. 
 However, this dissertation has also shown how these articulations of their ethical 
demands do not encompass the entirety of their actions.  Rather, looking at the way these 
groups have moved within the existing political systems, both conforming to and 
confronting their modes of operation, is equally as important as studying their discursive 
assertions in attempting to understand their role and effects within contemporary 
Argentine society.  Following the 2001 crisis, it became common for contemporary social 
protest in Argentina to be discussed in terms of anti-politics (anti-política).  Under this 
rubric, diverse forms of popular organization (what many refer to as “alternative popular 
experiences” or experiencias populares alternativas) like the piqueteros, recuperated 
businesses, and neighborhood assemblies in Argentina, and more broadly indigenous 
movements in Ecuador and Bolivia, the Sem Terra in Brazil, and the Zapatistas in 
Mexico, are all seen as constituting and working towards and through a kind of 
counterpower or antipolitics that questions the actually existing forms of capitalism, 
specifically neoliberalism, and the nature of contemporary political power itself 
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[Colectivo Situaciones 2002; Di Marco and Palomino 2004; Holloway 2002; Thwaites 
Rey 2004].   Argentine sociologist Ana Dinerstein explains anti-politics in this way: 
Reconciliation between people and politics occurred in the form of ‘anti-politics’ that is the re-
politicisation of the society through new forms of collective, direct, radical, joint and democratic 
participation, mobilisation and action that rejected the representative and institutional politics. The 
practice and language of anti-politics, the counter power of anti-capitalism, anti-globalisation 
developed and expanded territorially through the actions of neighbourhood assemblies, workers’ 
and trade union mobilisations, unemployed workers’ movement, co-operative movement and of 
occupied factories, human rights, retired people, savers and artists movement (ahorristas) 
[Dinerstein 2004b:12].  
 
 Mabel Thwaites Rey notes how this rise of anti-politics is often seen in terms of 
autonomy, by those engaged in action, their advisors, and the theorists who reflect on 
them.  In investigating this notion of autonomy, with origins in older emancipatory 
movements, she observes that the idea “of alternative political construction ought not to 
have the conquest of State power as its central axis, but should rather construct “another 
world” through the potentiality found in the collective actions that emerge from and are 
rooted in society” [Thwaites Rey 2004:14].   
 Many scholars and practitioners of social protest found hope and encouragement 
in the revitalization of community activism that emerged around the turn of the 21st 
century.  However, even who see these “new practices of resistance” in terms of anti-
politics tend to see the limits of their ultimate ability of bring about lasting change in 
terms of their distance from established modes of power .  As noted by sociologist Óscar 
Landi, “The reality of our multitudes in the street has its shades of grey.  They are not 
direct democracies, alternatives to the party representatives, because they are far from all 
sources of power.  They are supported by their own words and by taking charge of their 
own uncertainty; they are not the embryo of a defined political institution.” 7  It is 
precisely this need to utilize and draw from established power that I argue has been 
instrumental in both the choices for engagement with state and political institutions and 
the internal debates over appropriate methods for its realization.    
 Furthermore, while the tendency to view these experiences in terms of anti-
politics takes the important step of highlighting the surge in forms of protest that had not 
been prominent during neoliberalism, I find that it often deemphasizes key aspects in 
                                                 
7 Landi, Óscar.  “La metamorfosis del ciudadano:  Democracia de carne y hueso,” Clárin (Zona), 24 March 
2002. 
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both the rhetoric and functioning of these movements.  In arguing for a definitive break 
with prior forms of political activism and engagement, expressed as a  rejection of 
traditional party and union structures and classical leftist philosophy, it fails to account 
for the importance of notions like work, struggle, memory, and compañerismo, which are 
best understood through considering their historical roots and development.  It also fails 
to devote sufficient attention to the role and importance of traditional leftist parties in the 
planning and implementation of both tactical and strategic proposals for action, and the 
willingness and need to interact within and in accommodation to state institutional 
practices.  As I hope to have shown in this dissertation, this kind of anti-politics that was 
seen to have emerged around the events of 2001 is not so much a move outside and away 
from established political practice, but to be found instead in the discursive injunctions 
against politics (as the field of corruption and impunity, specifically).  Though new forms 
of organization and practice arise in conjunction with these anti-political discourses, even 
within the development of these new forms of action there is a necessary relationship 
with established modes and locations of power.   
 I have attempted here in this dissertation to account for the imbrications of social 
action with political practice, understood not only as the actions of state officials but as 
located in the interactions between individuals and groups interested in utilizing or 
altering relationships of power in seeking to bring about an intended effect.  However, the 
fact that I see the actions of the groups I studied as being intricately interlaced with rather 
than oppositional to political practice should not be taken as an injunction against their 
means or methods of conduct.  Rather, my intent has been to focus on precisely the need 
to understand politics as an intricate and deep-seated feature of social life.  Considering 
anti-establishment movements or new organizational practices as anti-political obscures 
part of the very heart of these efforts, centered on the desire to destabilize and redefine 
the notion of political practice along their own lines.  The locally inflected framing tropes 
of impunity and corruption allow them to pose this challenge in a way that resonates 
across society, and embodies a new conceptualization and set of practices for 
understanding their role as citizens in the nation.  Ultimately, what I have shown here is 
how it is precisely the force of the debates over how this engagement with established 
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political systems should proceed that leads to the tendency towards division among 




















Presidential Decree 812/05 
Decreto Presidencial 812/05 
VISTO el expediente N° 148.226/05 del registro del MINISTERIO DE 
JUSTICIA Y DERECHOS HUMANOS, y el acta de la audiencia celebrada en la 
ciudad de WASHINGTON, ESTADOS UNIDOS DE AMÉRICA, el 4 de marzo de 
2005 en el marco del 122 período ordinario de sesiones de la COMISIÓN 
INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS, en la petición N° 12.204 del 
registro de la Comisión; y 
 
CONSIDERANDO: 
Que habida cuenta de la petición formulada ante la COMISIÓN 
INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS por las organizaciones no 
gubernamentales MEMORIA ACTIVA, CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS LEGALES Y 
SOCIALES (CELS) y CENTRO POR LA JUSTICIA Y EL DERECHO 
INTERNACIONAL (CEJIL), en la que estas denunciaron, en relación con el atentado 
perpetrado el 18 de julio de 1994 contra la sede de la ASOCIACIÓN MUTUAL 
ISRAELITA (AMIA) la violación, por el Estado argentino, de los derechos a la vida 
(art.' 4 de la CONVENCION AMERICANA SOBRE DERECHOS HUMANOS), a la 
integridad física (art. 5, ídem), a las garantías judiciales (art. 8, ídem) y a la tutela 
judicial efectiva (art. 25, ídem) así como el deber de garantía (art. 1.1, ídem), el 
mencionado organismo regional de protección de los derechos humanos convocó a 
la audiencia referida en el "Visto", a efectos de escuchar a las partes una vez 
finalizado el juicio oral y público de la denominada "conexión local" del atentado 
contra la AMIA. 
Que en dicha audiencia, las partes acordaron formalmente iniciar un 
proceso de arreglo amistoso conforme lo contemplado por el arto 41 del Reglamento 
de la COMISION INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS. 
Que el Estado argentino, como consta en el acta suscripta en dicha 
oportunidad, reconoció la responsabilidad que le incumbe por las violaciones 
denunciadas, en cuanto existió incumplimiento de la función de prevención por no 
haber adoptado medidas idóneas y eficaces para prevenir el atentado - teniendo en 
cuenta que dos años antes se había producido un hecho terrorista contra la 
Embajada de Israel- y porque existió encubrimiento de los hechos y medió 
incumplimiento grave y deliberado de la función de investigación adecuada del ilícito, 
lo cual produjo una clara denegatoria de justicia, conforme lo declaró, en su 
sentencia del 29 de octubre de 2004, el Tribunal Oral Federal en lo Criminal N° 3. 
Que la sustanciación del juicio ante el mencionado tribunal fue seguida,  
paso a paso por la COMISION INTERAMERICANADE DERECHOS HUMANOS, 
que a tal efecto designó observador al Profesor y Decano de la Facultad de Derecho 
de la American University, Dr. CLAUDIO GROSSMAN, quien en su informe final 
concluyó que las "dificultades para hacer justicia en este caso, emblemático en la 




de que ocurrieran los hechos, las. dificultades de reorientar una investigación son 
extraordinariamente difíciles por el solo paso del tiempo, que ha permitido a los 
autores de este criminal ataque terrorista amplias oportunidades de esconder sus 
huellas. La búsqueda de justicia, sin embargo, no es una alternativa sino un deber, 
La rica experiencia de la COMISION INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS 
HUMANOS en el hemisferio ha demostrado su compromiso inquebrantable con los 
derechos humanos y la búsqueda de la justicia pueden contribuir a que, ese deber se 
transforme en realidad concreta", 
Que el Tribunal Oral, en el pronunciamiento recordado, llegó a la 
conclusión de que la investigación estuvo plagada de irregularidades cometidas en 
forma sistemática para sostener una hipótesis incriminatoria mas allá de lo 
realmente acontecido, y a propósito de lo cual no funcionó, por mucho tiempo, 
ninguno de 10s numerosos órganos de control que habrían debido corregir el curso 
de los hechos. La actitud ahora adoptada por el Estado argentino en la audiencia de 
la COMISION INTERAMERICANADE DERECHOS HUMANOS refleja, en el marco 
regional, el trascendente cambio en el tratamiento institucional del caso en el ámbito 
local, cuyo punto de inflexión coincide con el comienzo del juicio oral y público, 
caracterizado por la transparencia y el irreprochable proceder de los integrantes del 
tribunal. Las medidas adoptadas por el PODER EJECUTIVO, a partir de la segunda 
mitad del año 2003 especialmente las que levantaron el secreto de la actividad de 
inteligencia, evidenciaron el firme y decidido propósito del gobierno de avanzar 
decididamente hacia la recuperación de la verdad y la justicia escamoteadas del 
modo expresado por el Tribunal Oral. 
Con el acuerdo solemnizado en Washington, se ha abierto, por iniciativa, 
 
1) La pública difusión, que se materializa mediante e1 dictado de presente decreto, 
del reconocimiento de la responsabilidad del estado argentino por el incumplimiento de 
los deberes impuestos y quebrantamiento de los derechos 
garantizados por la CONVENCION. AMERICANA SOBRE DERECHOS 
HUMANOS precedentemente enumerado. 
 
2) La publicidad del Informe Final del Decano Claudio GROSSMAN, que se insertará 
en la página de internet del MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA Y DERECHOS 
HUMANOS. 
 
3) La adopción, por las jurisdicciones que correspondan, de medidas de apoyo a la 
investigación, incluyendo pero sin reducirse a las siguientes: a) Profundizar el 
fortalecimiento de la Unidad Fiscal Especial AMIA del MINISTERIO PÚBLICO; b) 
Medidas tendientes a garantizar la investigación del atentado y del encubrimiento 
y las ,sanciones a los responsables; c) Fortalecimiento de la Unidad Especial de 
Investigación del caso AMIA del MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA Y DERECHOS 
HUMANOS; d) profundización del proceso del relevamiento de archivos del caso 
AMIA en poder de la SECRETARIA DE INTELIGENCIA del Estado y de las 
Fuerzas de Seguridad; e) extensión de las unidades de relevamiento a la 





4) Creación de una unidad especializada en catástrofes, tanto para la atención de 
las emergencias médicas como para la recolección y protección de pruebas en 
casos criminales, lo que incluye la elaboración de un plan de contingencia para 
casos de atentados. 
 
5) Medidas relacionadas con reformas normativas con el objeto de: a) Transparentar 
el sistema de utilización de fondos reservados de la SECRETARÍA DE 
INTELIGENCIA; b) facilitar el acceso a la información de inteligencia por parte de los 
jueces en investigaciones vinculadas con hechos de terrorismo, 
 
6) Promover la sanción de una ley de reparación para todas. las víctimas del 
atentado. 
 
7) Cuestiones vinculadas con las costas en el proceso interno e internacional. 
 
Que a partir de cuanto se ha hecho, las cuestiones incluidas en la 
agenda que antecede, así como los temas señalados en el informe Final del Decano 
GROSSMAN señalan el camino que será necesario transitar a partir del dictado 
del presente decreto. 
 
Que ha tomado debida intervención la DIRECCIÓN GENERAL DE 
ASUNTOS JURIDICOS del MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA Y DERECHOS HUMANOS, 
expidiéndose favorablemente, 
 
Que esta medida se dicta en virtud de las facultades conferidas por el 




El PRESIDENTE DE LA NACION ARGENTINA 
DECRETA: 
 
ARTÍCULO 1°: Apruébase el Acta de fecha 4 de marzo de 2005 firmada en la ciudad 
de WASHINGTON, ESTADOS UNIDOS DE AMÉRICA, en la audiencia celebrada en 
el marco del 122 periodo ordinario de sesiones de la COMISIÓN 
INTERAMERICANADE DERECHOS HUMANOS, en la petición N° 12.204 del 
registro de la citada Comisión, en la que se reconoce la responsabilidad del Estado 
Nacional, en los términos expresados en los considerandos del presente decreto y se ' 
adopta, para la solución amistosa del asunto, la agenda allí expuesta. 
 
ARTÍCULO 2°: Los MINISTROS del INTERIOR y de JUSTICIA Y DERECHOS 
HUMANOS dictarán, en el ámbito de sus respectivas competencias, las resoluciones 
necesarias para el cumplimiento de los objetivos establecidos en la agenda a que se 
refiere el articulo anterior para los que no sea necesaria una norma legislativa o un 








ARTÍCULO 3°: Comuníquese, publíquese, dése a la Dirección Nacional del Registro 
Oficial y archívese. 
DECRETO N° 802 
 
FIRMANTES: 
SEÑOR PRESIDENTE DE LA NACION 
SEÑOR MINISTRO DEL INTERIOR 
SEÑOR MINISTRO DE RELACIONES 
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